Making appropriations for national security, Department of State, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027, and for other purposes.

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8595
Last Updated: August 19, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]

ID: D000600

Follow the money

The bill

Making appropriations for national security, Department of State, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027, and for other purposes.

HR. 8595, 119th Congress — read as touching Pharmaceuticals.

The sponsor

Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$67,000 raised

21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 226-228 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate.

July 28, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

HR 8595: The National Security Theater Appropriations Act of 2027 Or: How to Spend $17 Billion While Pretending You’re Not Bribing the World

Let’s cut through the diplomatic fog: this bill appropriates roughly **$17.2 billion** for the Department of State and related national security programs in FY 2027. That’s not chump change—it’s enough to fund a small country’s entire military, or, more realistically, to keep the illusion of American global relevance alive for another year.

The biggest line item? **Diplomatic Programs** at $9.76 billion—of which a staggering **$4.16 billion** is earmarked for “Worldwide Security Protection.” Translation: we’re paying to guard our embassies in places where we shouldn’t have embassies, or at least not ones that require fortress-like defenses. It’s the geopolitical equivalent of putting bars on your windows because you keep inviting strangers over for tea and getting robbed.

Within that, **Human Resources** gets $4 billion—including $700k for hiring people “without regard to civil service laws.” Ah yes, the old “temporary workaround for nepotism and patronage” loophole. Nothing says meritocracy like bypassing hiring rules to slot in the ambassador’s unqualified cousin.

**Overseas Programs** get $1.44 billion—presumably to keep pretending we care about regional stability while our actual policy is dictated by whatever oil executive or defense contractor last donated to a PAC. **Diplomatic Policy and Support** ($871M) funds the bureaucratic theater of arms control talks we have no intention of honoring and international organizations we routinely ignore when inconvenient.

Then there’s the **Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance** fund: $865M for upkeep (including renovating the Truman Building—because nothing says “fiscal responsibility” like marble foyers in Foggy Bottom) and an additional **$1.12 billion** for “worldwide security upgrades.” That’s nearly $2 billion just to make sure our diplomats don’t get kidnapped while attending cocktail parties in unstable capitals. Priorities.

**Consular and Border Security Programs** get $533M—ostensibly to reduce passport backlogs and visa wait times. In reality, it’s a band-aid on a system designed to keep out the poor while letting in the wealthy via investment visas. The provision letting State officials or the USPS collect passport fees? A cute little revenue stream disguised as convenience.

**Educational and Cultural Exchange** ($647M) includes a floor of $287.8M for Fulbright—because nothing softens the blow of drone strikes like a well-funded exchange program in Germany. The consultation requirements? Pure bureaucratic kabuki: Congress gets to pretend it oversees policy while the Executive does whatever it wants.

**Representation expenses** ($10M) come with a catch: 25% withheld until the Secretary testifies. A trivial hostage-taking tactic—like denying a toddler dessert until they eat their broccoli, except the toddler is the State Department and the broccoli is accountability.

**Protection of Foreign Missions** ($30.9M) and **Emergencies** ($8.9M) are the “oh shit” funds—for when our diplomats inevitably get into trouble in places we have no business being. And the **Repatriation Loans** ($3.75M) to bring back stranded citizens? A pittance, but hey, at least we pretend to care.

Fiscal impact? This adds to the deficit like a leak in the Titanic—insignificant in isolation, symptomatic of a deeper rot. The real disease isn’t the spending—it’s the delusion that we can buy influence, security, and legitimacy with appropriations while refusing to address why we’re hated, overextended, or bankrupt in the first place.

This bill isn’t about diplomacy. It’s about maintaining the appearance of competence in a system running on inertia, ego, and the sunk cost fallacy of empire. We’re not funding foreign policy—we’re subsidizing the fantasy that we still

Related Topics

Foreign Aid & DiplomacyDefense Spending & ProcurementFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$67,000
17 donors
PACs
$1,000
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000
1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
FAISON, JAY W
2 transactions
$6,600
2
KAPLAN, DAVID
2 transactions
$6,600
3
KAPLAN, MEREDITH
2 transactions
$6,600
4
OCH, DANIEL
2 transactions
$6,600
5
MOORE, WILLIAM H
1 transaction
$3,300
6
ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE
1 transaction
$3,300
7
GEZARI, WALTER
1 transaction
$3,300
8
BRODIE, HOWARD
1 transaction
$3,300
9
GLENN, HARRY
1 transaction
$3,300
10
PEISACH, JAIME
1 transaction
$3,300
11
STERLING, MONA
1 transaction
$3,300
12
DAVIS, ANN
1 transaction
$3,300
13
STERLING, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
14
VICKAR, KERRY
1 transaction
$3,300
15
FORCHHEIN, JODY
1 transaction
$3,300
16
KRAFT, DANIEL
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 40 nodes and 53 connections

Total contributions: $53

Top Donors - Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]

Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 16 helped, 2 harmed.

  • +Pharmaceuticalsconfidence 0.95

    Section 7058(c)(2) allows up to $200,000,000 for combating infectious disease outbreaks, which would directly benefit pharmaceutical companies through funding for vaccines, treatments, and medical countermeasures. Additionally, Section 7058(c)(3) references the Emergency Reserve Fund which could be used for pharmaceuticals and other products for child survival, malaria, and tuberculosis.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Title IV includes $6,752,500,000 for Foreign Military Financing Program, which provides grants for defense articles and services to foreign security forces, directly benefiting defense contractors like Lockheed Martin, RTX, etc. (see section under 'foreign military financing program')

  • Section 7058(c)(2) allows up to $200,000,000 of funds from Global Health Programs, National Security Investment Programs, International Humanitarian Assistance, Democracy Fund, and Millennium Challenge Corporation to combat infectious disease outbreaks, which could benefit hospitals and health systems through funding for public health capacity and emergency response.

  • +Agribusinessconfidence 0.85

    Section 7060(d) provides not less than $720,000,000 for food security and agricultural development programs, including not less than $175,000,000 for international agricultural research, which directly benefits large agribusiness conglomerates like ADM, Cargill, and Bunge.

  • +Crop Producersconfidence 0.85

    Section 7060(d) provides not less than $720,000,000 for food security and agricultural development programs, including not less than $175,000,000 for international agricultural research, which directly benefits crop producers through improved seeds, farming techniques, and market access for corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Title I includes $540,000,000 for international communications activities, including grants for radio, internet, and television broadcasting, and up to $72,720,000 for satellite transmissions and global network distribution, benefiting telecom and satellite companies (see 'international communications activities' section)

+ 12 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of State

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 226-228AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill maintains current funding levels for the State Department without implementing the structural reforms, streamlining, or policy shifts (e.g., reducing WHO funding, consolidating foreign assistance, refocusing public diplomacy) advocated in Project 2025."

Key themes:Department of State fundingforeign assistancediplomatic operations

— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures — 194 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority. l Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices. The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities. l Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately, U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years. The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 64%
Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on State Department funding for diplomacy, security, and exchange programs, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt centers on Department of Defense nuclear modernization, acquisition reform, and defense industrial base strengthening—there is minimal thematic overlap between the two."

Key themes:national securitydefense spending

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be — 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities.

Department of State

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 226-228AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on funding allocations for State Department operations, security, and programs without addressing structural reform, streamlining, or reevaluating engagement with international organizations like the WHO as called for in Project 2025. While both concern the State Department, the bill maintains status quo funding rather than pursuing the policy objectives of reorganization or reduced multilateral commitments."

Key themes:Department of Statefundingforeign policy

— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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