A bill to require a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States.

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Bill ID: 119/s/3164
Last Updated: November 12, 2025

Sponsored by

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

ID: S001208

Follow the money

The bill

A bill to require a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States.

S. 3164, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$127,700 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Passed Senate

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Became Law

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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed Senator Slotkin and her cohorts in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, the noble goal of "increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from sources in the United States." How quaint. How utterly meaningless. This bill is a classic case of "feel-good legislation" designed to make politicians look like they're doing something about national security while actually accomplishing nothing.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from domestic sources within six months. Wow, a whole briefing! I'm sure the Pentagon is shaking in its boots. The briefing must include a list of 10 materials that could be procured domestically, recommended amounts for each material, and potential challenges. Oh boy, this is going to be a real game-changer.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Let's see...the Department of Defense, Congress, industry leaders, and the American public (who will no doubt be thrilled to hear about the thrilling world of strategic materials procurement). But let's not forget the real stakeholders: the lobbyists for domestic industries that stand to benefit from this "increased procurement." They're the ones who actually wrote this bill.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** Ha! This bill is a joke. It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real issue here is the lack of investment in domestic manufacturing and infrastructure, which has led to our national security vulnerabilities in the first place. But hey, let's just order a briefing and call it a day. I'm sure that'll fix everything.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Lip Service Syndrome" (LLSS), characterized by empty promises, vague language, and a complete lack of meaningful action. The underlying disease is a bad case of "Crony Capitalism-itis," where politicians prioritize the interests of their corporate donors over actual national security concerns.

Treatment: A healthy dose of skepticism, followed by a strong prescription of reality-based policy-making. But don't hold your breath; this bill will likely pass with flying colors, and we'll all be treated to another round of self-congratulatory press releases from our esteemed lawmakers.

Related Topics

Defense Spending & ProcurementFederal Budget & AppropriationsForeign Aid & Diplomacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$127,700
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$42,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$85,600

No PAC contributions found

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
2 transactions
$6,600
3
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
4 transactions
$6,600
4
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
5
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
6
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
7
SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA
1 transaction
$3,300
8
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE
1 transaction
$3,300
9
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
1 transaction
$3,300
10
SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IA
1 transaction
$2,500

No committee contributions found

1
PUGH, BILL
2 transactions
$13,200
2
DAVIS, MARLENE
2 transactions
$13,200
3
TISCH, DAVID
2 transactions
$13,200
4
KAMEN, AL
2 transactions
$10,000
5
GOLD, LESLIE F
2 transactions
$9,900
6
PARTIN, LYNN
1 transaction
$6,300
7
LUSTIGER, KRISTINA INGER
1 transaction
$5,700
8
SHAFROTH, TRACEY
1 transaction
$5,000
9
BLAU, LISA
1 transaction
$4,800
10
HACHIGIAN, NINA
1 transaction
$4,300

Donor Network - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 60 nodes and 30 connections (84 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $127,700

Top Donors - Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

10 Orgs10 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90

    Section 1(a) requires the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing on increasing procurement of strategic and critical materials from U.S. sources, which could lead to increased defense contracts for domestic suppliers.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Slotkin, Elissa [D-MI])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 129 contributions
    • MONAHAN, JASON$7,000
    • FANNING, ERIC$4,800
    • LETTRE, MARCEL$4,800
    • O'CONNOR, JENNIFER$4,750
    • MINDE, GEORGE$3,770

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Very Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly mandates a DoD briefing to identify and increase domestic procurement of strategic and critical materials, which aligns with the Project 2025 Defense objective of strengthening supply chain security and reducing reliance on foreign sources for national security."

Key themes:strategic and critical materialsdomestic procurementsupply chain securitydefense readinessnational security

— 128 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Preamble, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/preamble/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, Article I, § 8, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-1/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 3. U.S. Constitution, Article II, § 2, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Established pursuant to S. 1605, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, Public Law No. 117-81, 117th Congress, December 27, 2021, Division A, Title X, § 1004, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ81/ PLAW-117publ81.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division G, Title IX, §§ 70901–70953, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. S. 2943, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 114-328, 114th Congress, December 23, 2016, Division A, Title IX, § 901, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg2000. pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. H.R. 3622, Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Public Law No. 99-433, 99th Congress, October 1, 1986, https://www.congress.gov/99/statute/STATUTE-100/STATUTE-100-Pg992.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Historical Sales Book, Fiscal Years 1950–2021, p. 7, https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/dsca_historical_sales_book_FY21.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. Paul K. Kerr, “Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL31675, updated June 10, 2022, p. 1, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/ RL31675.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 10. Keith Webster, “How to Reform America’s Military Sales Process,” The Hill Congress Blog, October 6, 2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/congress-blog/3675933-how-to-reform-americas-military-sales-process/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 11. See Thomas W. Spoehr, “The Administration and Congress Must Act Now to Counter the Worsening Military Recruiting Crisis, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5283, July 28, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/ default/files/2022-07/IB5283.pdf. 12. Ibid. 13. Ronald Reagan Institute, “Reagan National Defense Survey,” conducted November 2021, p. 4, https://www. reaganfoundation.org/media/358085/rndf_survey_booklet.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 14. See Paul J. Larkin, “Protecting the Nation by Employing Military Spouses,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/protecting-the-nation-employing- military-spouses. 15. See Jude Schwalbach, “Military Families Deserve Flexible Education Options,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 14, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/education/commentary/military-families-deserve- flexible-education-options. 16. See Chapter 7, “The Intelligence Community,” infra. 17. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the military services: U.S. Air Force Intelligence, U.S. Navy Intelligence, U.S. Army Intelligence, and U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence, which also receive guidance and oversight from the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USDI). 18. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 19. The Department of Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence; the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Coast Guard; the Department of Justice’s Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Office of National Security Intelligence; the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research; and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis. — 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023).

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 67%
Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's requirement to assess and increase domestic procurement of strategic and critical materials directly supports Project 2025's objectives to strengthen the defense industrial base, prioritize domestic end‑product and friendshoring policies, and enhance supply chain resilience for critical materials."

Key themes:defense industrial basestrategic and critical materialsdomestic sourcing/onshoringsupply chain resiliencedefense procurement

— 96 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise relevant. This allows the acquisition community to focus on portfolio management and move money around more easily instead of being locked into inflexible, multiyear procurement cycles. 2. The President should examine the recommendations of the congressionally mandated Commission on Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution Reform4 and develop a strategy for implementing those that the Administration considers to be in the best interests of the American people. The commission’s final report is due on September 1, 2023. 3. Develop legislation or other means of providing funding outside the traditional PPBE process for the prototyping and experimentation of emerging technologies that are deemed essential to modernization and future conflict. Consider creating a “fast track” for projects that satisfy the most pressing national security needs. 4. Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, and all service secretaries to conduct “Night Court” and use existing authorities to terminate outdated or underperforming programs so that money can be used for what works and will work. Require the Under Secretaries and service secretaries to brief the Secretary annually on the results. 5. Require the Office of the Secretary of Defense to research and report on the acquisition processes used by America’s adversaries to improve our understanding of how they are often able to innovate and field new technologies on a faster timeline. l Strengthen America’s defense industrial base. 1. Replenish and maintain U.S. stockpiles of ammunition and other equipment that have been depleted as a result of U.S. support to Ukraine. This will strengthen the defense industry supply chain and ensure that adequate inventory exists if it is needed for a future conflict. 2. Collaborate with industry to develop a prioritized list of reforms that the DOD and Congress can enact and implement to incentivize industry to help America’s military innovate and field needed capabilities. — 97 — Department of Defense 3. Strengthen the ability of acquisition authorities to engage in multiyear procurements and block buys. This will improve private-sector rates of return, thereby incentivizing defense contractors to partner with the government. It will also reduce government overhead by reducing the number of procurement competitions. 4. Prioritize the U.S. and allies under the “domestic end product” and “domestic components” requirements of the Build America, Buy America Act.5 Currently, defense companies are required to manufacture defense items for the U.S. government that are 100 percent domestically produced and at least 50 percent composed of domestically produced components. However, there are loopholes that allow companies to manufacture these items overseas. This can create supply chain and other issues, especially in wartime. Manufacturing components and end products domestically and with allies spurs factory development, increases American jobs, and builds resilience in America’s defense industrial base. 5. Review the sectors currently prioritized for onshoring or “friendshoring” of manufacturing (kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, critical materials, microelectronics, space, and electric vehicle batteries); evaluate them according to the strategic landscape; and expand or reprioritize the list as appropriate. 6. Help small businesses to become medium-size and large vendors, which encourages a more resilient industrial base and fosters competition. Encourage and plan for durable supply chains for small businesses so they also have commercial/private-sector customers and are not solely dependent on defense orders, which can be highly specialized, expensive, and irregular. 7. Increase external engagement among small businesses to inform them of DOD’s needs and how they could work with DOD to meet national security priorities. l Optimize the DOD acquisition community. 1. Create incentives to emphasize speed and agility in decision-making for prototyping and program-of-record starts and terminations. Most bureaucrats would rather follow a checklist and fail than go outside the procedures and win because failure means negative

Department of Defense

Moderate
Vector: 68%
Pages: 134-136AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on increasing domestic procurement of strategic materials to strengthen defense supply chains, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of improving defense supply chain health and industrial base planning, though it does not address exportability, FMS processes, or congressional notification reforms."

Key themes:defense supply chaindefense industrial basestrategic materialsnational securityprocurement

— 101 — Department of Defense 1. Ensure that senior U.S. military leadership emphasizes exportability in the initial development of defense systems that are both available and interoperable with our partners and allies. 2. Create a funding mechanism to incentivize exportability in initial planning, which can be recouped after future FMS transactions. l End informal congressional notification. Informal congressional notification or “tiered review” is a hinderance to ensuring timely sales to our global partners. The tiered review process is not codified in law; it is merely a practice by which the Department of State provides a preview of prospective arms transfers before Congress is formally notified.9 1. End the tiered review process to eliminate at least 20 days from the FMS process. 2. Use the tiered review process only when unanimous congressional support is guaranteed in order to eliminate the “weaponization” by select Members of Congress that has prevented billions of dollars of arms sales from moving into formal congressional notification. l Minimize barriers to collaboration. The high cost of developing advanced defense platforms requires the United States to collaborate with key allies to minimize waste, complement strengths, and supplement our defense industrial base to create a system that is greater than that of the United States alone. 1. Enhance defense industrial base planning with partners to allow them to focus on niche areas where there are cost advantages for the United States. 2. Decrease International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to facilitate trade with such allies as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. 3. Create opportunities to improve the health of the defense supply chain with added opportunities for partners and allies to contribute. l Reform the FMS contracting process. The contracting timeline for the FMS process is shockingly slow. On average, the DOD contracting timeline takes approximately 18 months because of slow bureaucratic processes and chronic understaffing.10

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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