National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026

— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures — 194 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority. l Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices. The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities. l Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately, U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years. The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as

— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures

— 267 — Agency for International Development benefits financially from extending and expanding these large-scale programs for years, even decades, ensures little scrutiny of these ever-increasing appropriations. The massive growth in “emergency” aid distorts humanitarian responses, wors- ens corruption in the countries we support, and exacerbates the misery of those we intend to help. The permanence of this assistance, particularly in countries where we have little to no in-country presence and must rely on U.N. agencies to self-monitor, has morphed into a co-governance scheme in which the U.S. govern- ment effectively finances the social services obligations of corrupt regimes that threaten the United States. These governments can then redirect scarce budget resources away from costly health and education toward financing their wars, sup- porting terrorism, repressing their citizens, and enriching themselves. Examples of this abuse are spread throughout the world. l Over the past decade, the U.S. government has expended $14 billion in aid to Syria where the bloody regime of Bashar al-Assad—a close ally of Iran and Russia—skims nearly half of foreign aid through inflated official exchange rates, the diversion of food baskets to its military units, and procurement arrangements with compromised local contractors. l Yemen, once the breadbasket of the Arabian Peninsula, is now dependent on billions of dollars of aid as formerly productive Yemeni farmers cannot compete against “free food” while irrigation systems remain in disrepair, leaving the country to suffer from water shortages during long summer droughts and flooding during its rainy season. Iran-backed Houthi rebels divert substantial amounts of aid to support their war efforts. l In Afghanistan, the aid infrastructure built over 20 years of American military presence that three Presidents wanted to end collapsed with the failure of U.S.-trained Afghan forces to repel the Taliban’s 2021 advances. Yet the country has received nearly $1 billion more in U.S. humanitarian aid since the Taliban’s takeover and absent a U.S. embassy to ensure that it is not diverted to the Taliban and other terrorist groups. l In Burma, U.S. aid finances all of the food and medical care for hundreds of thousands of persecuted Rohingya that the military regime forces to live in open-air concentration camps. l In northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Yazidis—targeted for genocidal extermination by ISIS—remain in miserable camps unable to return home because of the Iraqi government’s refusal to clear out Iran-backed militias occupying their homeland. — 268 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise In effect, humanitarian aid is sustaining war economies, creating financial incentives for warring parties to continue fighting, discouraging governments from reforming, and propping up malign regimes. Nefarious actors reap billions of dollars in profits from diversions of our human- itarian assistance, but so do international organizations. The WFP charges 36 percent in overhead while Oxfam International’s overhead has reached 70 percent in Yemen, reflecting the high costs of foreign staff, security, and logistics. With pow- erful lobbies in Washington, D.C., and in leadership positions throughout USAID and the Department of State, the aid industry adroitly exploits Congress’s dispo- sition to increase funding year on year to assist those in dire need but provides no evidence to justify the mounting budget requests. In 2020, USAID’s leadership fused formerly bifurcated food and nonfood emergency relief operations into a single Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance to improve the management of the agency’s largest portfolio, but this reform was not sufficient to address the problem. The next Administration should resize and repurpose USAID’s humanitarian aid portfolio to restore its original purpose of providing emergency short-term relief, prepare vulnerable communities for tran- sition, and do no harm in the following ways: l Work with Congress to make deep cuts in the IDA budget by ending programs that do more harm than good in places controlled by malign actors, such as in Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan, where our aid is consumed by fraud, diversion, and partner overhead costs. l Require USAID and the State Department to devise country-based exit strategies that term-limit the duration of humanitarian responses and transition funding from emergency to development projects. This will require robust diplomacy to press host governments to integrate displaced persons in lieu of keeping them in expensive and dehumanizing camps financed by the international community. l Transition from large awards to expensive, inefficient, and corrupt U.N. agencies, global NGOs, and contractors to local, especially faith-based, entities that are already operating on the ground. This approach provides a far less expensive and more effective alternative for aid delivery. Local partners more ably navigate corrupt environments and are more likely to steer vulnerable populations away from dependence on aid toward self-sufficiency. l Require that BHA avail itself of existing IDA authorities that it fails to use, including to dispense with the cost-reimbursement model that disqualifies