The bill
Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act
S. 2626, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.
Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act
Download PDFBill ID: 119/s/2626
Last Updated: January 29, 2026
Sponsored by
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
ID: M001243
Follow the money
The sponsor
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
$273,350 raised
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
67% match to Project 2025
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 288-290 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 240.
October 29, 2025
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
🏛️
Committee Review
🗳️
Floor Action
✅
Passed Senate
🏛️
House Review
🎉
Passed Congress
🖊️
Presidential Action
⚖️
Became Law
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose its true intentions.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act (S 2626) claims to strengthen U.S. leadership at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to counter China's growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to:
1. Review IDB projects involving Chinese entities for potential national security risks. 2. Vote against projects that pose such risks or involve Chinese trust funds. 3. Advocate for increased procurement from U.S. and partner country entities, rather than Chinese ones. 4. Encourage collaboration between the IDB and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
These provisions are nothing more than a desperate attempt to slow down China's economic expansion in the region. It's like trying to hold back a tsunami with a broken reed.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. The IDB, which will be forced to navigate this new web of bureaucratic red tape. 2. Chinese entities, which will face increased scrutiny and potential exclusion from IDB projects. 3. U.S. corporations and partner country entities, which may benefit from the bill's procurement provisions. 4. Latin American and Caribbean countries, which will be caught in the middle of this great power struggle.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "too little, too late." China has already established itself as a major player in the region, and this legislation won't change that fact. Instead, it may:
1. Strain U.S.-China relations further. 2. Create new bureaucratic hurdles for IDB projects, potentially slowing down development in the region. 3. Benefit U.S. corporations at the expense of Chinese ones, but ultimately fail to address the underlying issues driving China's growth.
In conclusion, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a pathetic attempt to stem the tide of China's rise, and it will likely achieve nothing more than to further entrench the status quo. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again.
Related Topics
Foreign Aid & DiplomacyFederal Budget & Appropriations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
Total Contributions
$273,350
29 donors
PACs
$2,500
Organizations
$33,250
Committees
$0
Individuals
$237,600
1
SIG SAUER PAC
$2,500
1
SEGURO MEDICO LLC
$10,000
2
CLEMENTS MIDWAY PARTNERS LLC
$10,000
3
BLOOMSBURG INDUSTRIAL VENTURES LLC
$4,700
4
SUN CENTER LP
$2,500
5
UTILITY ADVISORY GROUP LLC
$1,500
6
MODEVITY LLC
$1,500
7
O'DONNELL PARTNERS LLC
$1,500
8
KRAUSE & ASSOCIATES LP
$1,000
9
GVH PARTNERS
$500
10
MARSHALL LINE FENCE LLC
$50
No committee contributions found
1
ATKINS, PAUL S.
$13,200
2
KUEHNER, CARL
$13,200
3
TSYGANSKIY, IGOR
$13,200
4
SCARAMUCCI, ANTHONY
$13,200
5
REIBEL, JAMES
$13,200
6
CHAI, CHUCKRA
$13,200
7
BREED, ALAN
$13,200
8
DUBIN, GLENN
$13,200
9
MCCORMICK, DOUG
$13,200
10
THOMAS, AMY L.
$13,200
11
WALLACE, JENNIFER A.
$13,200
12
MCGAVICK, MICHAEL
$13,200
13
PATEL, CHIRAG
$13,200
14
PSAROS, MICHAEL
$13,200
15
OBERNDORF, WILLIAM
$13,200
16
MINNIS, CHRISTINA MRS.
$13,200
17
LACKIE, JAMES D. MR.
$13,200
18
KERKO, DAVID
$13,200
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Kaine, Tim [D-VA]
ID: K000384
Top Contributors
10
1
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$2,300
Jun 18, 2024
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 26, 2023
3
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$1,000
Jun 18, 2024
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jun 25, 2024
5
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 18, 2024
6
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$1,000
Oct 15, 2024
7
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 29, 2023
8
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$600
Oct 25, 2023
9
STONEHALL FARM
OrganizationTHE PLAINS, VA
$500
Jun 30, 2024
10
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$400
Oct 25, 2023
Donor Network - Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Loading...
Showing 53 nodes and 33 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $277,650
Top Donors - Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
1 PAC10 Orgs18 Individuals
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 1 harmed.
- +Private Equity & Hedge Fundsconfidence 0.80
Section 5 encourages collaboration between the IDB and the United States International Development Finance Corporation, which may lead to increased investment opportunities for private equity and hedge funds in IDB borrowing member countries.
- +Commercial Banksconfidence 0.70
Section 4 promotes IDB procurement policies that prioritize value for money, transparency, and integrity, which may benefit commercial banks involved in IDB projects.
- +Construction & Engineeringconfidence 0.70
Section 5 encourages collaboration between the IDB and the US International Development Finance Corporation, which may lead to increased construction and engineering projects in IDB borrowing member countries.
- −Pipelines & Energy Infrastructureconfidence 0.60
Section 3 instructs the US Executive Director to review IDB projects involving PRC entities, potentially reducing Chinese investment in energy infrastructure projects in IDB member countries.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HELPS
- Private Equity & Hedge Funds$234,075from 50 contributions
- GRIFFIN, KENNETH$16,500
- POLLOCK, JON$16,500
- MILLER, DAVE J. MR.$16,500
- COHEN, STEVE$16,500
- KERKO, DAVID$16,500
- Commercial Banks$26,990from 61 contributions
- WOLFF, CANDIDA PEROTTI$9,900
- MCINTOSH, BRENT$3,300
- NICHOLS, ROB$3,300
- WOLFF, CANDIDA P.$2,500
- KANE, JEFFREY$2,186
- Construction & Engineering$18,371from 11 contributions
- ALBERT, CRAIG$9,900
- KIMBALL, WALKER$3,570
- RYAN, CATHERINE$3,300
- COCHRAN, LARRY$1,046
- CREWS, PETER$500
Industries this bill HARMS
- from 4 contributions
- HARBERT, KAREN$2,082
- SPISAK, FRANCIS E. MR.$175
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
Introduction
Moderate67.4%
Pages: 288-290
— 255 — Agency for International Development The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next con- servative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration eliminated it in 2009. Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America, 25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development. The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial deci- sions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil, a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions in U.S. foreign aid. During the Trump Administration, USAID: l Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty, sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing. — 256 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Launched its first Digital Strategy4 to promote safe 5G access in emerging markets and combat Beijing’s efforts to equip regimes with tools to stifle democracy. l Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. l Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’s claims of being “a near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’s Indo- Pacific strategy.5 l Joined with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to help coastal countries detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront criminal activities practiced by state-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate international norms, ravage fishing industries in developing countries, worsen food insecurity, rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods, and deplete maritime resources. USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. A senior executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Adminis- trator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat. The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as a global partner. The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump Administration’s counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of U.S. national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China’s debt diplomacy. It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly. USAID’s Bangkok-based Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic attention on supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence.
Introduction
Moderate67.4%
Pages: 288-290
— 255 — Agency for International Development The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next con- servative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration eliminated it in 2009. Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America, 25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development. The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial deci- sions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil, a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions in U.S. foreign aid. During the Trump Administration, USAID: l Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty, sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing.
Introduction
Moderate62.6%
Pages: 736-738
— 703 — Department of the Treasury l The U.S. should also examine increasing or decreasing its ownership levels in these institutions in order to achieve maximum leverage. CHINA AND OTHER GEOPOLITICAL THREATS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States should realign its priorities to meet the United States’ current foreign policy threats, especially from China. On October 20, 2022, the Treasury Department, which chairs CFIUS, adopted the first-ever CFIUS Enforcement and Penalty Guidelines50 on the committee’s national security risk mitigation requirements. However, there are no clear rules that guide CFIUS on mitigation monitoring, nor is there a published penalty sched- ule to standardize accountability when CFIUS pursues a civil money penalty for violators. In addition, Treasury—as chair of the committee—runs an opaque pro- cess that biases committee procedure toward corporate interests and away from national security interests. Finally, the committee’s jurisdiction does not extend over greenfield investments that Chinese state-owned enterprises have historically pursued in the United States, which leaves America vulnerable to an instrument of Chinese economic statecraft. Given these issues, the next steps for CFIUS should be to develop a more coherent—and transparent—mitigation monitoring program to complement the enforcement guidelines, give CFIUS agencies in charge of national security con- cerns an equal voice at the table, and petition Congress to amend the law to cover Chinese greenfield investments. CFIUS should publish a penalty schedule for violations of CFIUS reporting and mitigation requirements. Publishing a penalty schedule for CFIUS violations will reduce the discretion of the committee to waive penalties or impose mere “wrist slap” costs on violators of the law. Additionally, a standardized penalty schedule would likely increase the deterrence of CFIUS enforcement by reducing the per- ception among parties to covered transactions that they can avoid enforcement by the committee or secure special exceptions based on appeals to the commit- tee’s discretion. As a legal matter—and in application by CFIUS—mitigation monitoring has developed as the Wild West. There are no clear rules that guide the entire com- mittee on mitigation monitoring, nor is there the same level of oversight or accountability within and among the agencies as applies when CFIUS reviews a transaction or when it pursues a civil money penalty. Indeed, it is a credit to transaction parties and the professionalism of the governmental officials and con- tractors who conduct mitigation monitoring on behalf of the government that, by and large, mitigation monitoring has worked adequately during the last several decades. But dependency on the personality and capabilities of individuals creates unnecessary risk both for CFIUS and for transaction parties. — 704 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should make the Department of Defense (DOD) a CFIUS co-chair with the Department of Treasury. Making DOD an official CFIUS co-chair along with Treasury will establish a balanced committee process by elevating national security interests to an equal stature. The committee is currently imbalanced toward the interests of corporate America because Treasury is the sole chair of CFIUS and, in practice, runs a process that is not fully transparent and which biases it from the national security interests represented by DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC). For example, Treasury representatives will consult with the Commerce Depart- ment and the United States Trade Representative—which tend to favor permitting covered transactions to occur with little to no mitigation requirements—and these representatives will then obscure the results and purposes of such sidebar meet- ings from DOD and IC representatives. This hampers DOD, IC, and sometimes even State Department representatives from full participation in the process or from advocating national security interests as well as they should. Greenfield Investments. Congress should close the loophole on greenfield investments and require CFIUS review of investments in U.S.-based greenfield assets by Chinese-controlled entities to assess any potential harm to U.S. national and economic security. In the 2018 Foreign Risk and Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA),51 one important category of foreign transactions left out of the bill was greenfield investments, particularly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Greenfield investments by Chinese SOEs pose a unique threat, and they should be met with the highest scrutiny by all levels of government. Greenfield investments result in the control of newly built facilities in the U.S., and they were not addressed in FIRRMA primarily because governors and state governments embrace them. That is understandable; they typically bring the promise of creating American jobs. However, the goal of such Chinese SOEs is to siphon assets, technological innovation, and influence away from U.S. businesses in order to expand the global presence of the Chinese Communist Party. While the Chinese government keeps its domestic markets largely insulated from foreign influence, it regularly invests in the U.S. and other countries under the “green- field” model. Firms fully owned by China’s Communist regime are increasingly buying land, building factories, and taking advantage of state and local tax breaks on American soil. Treasury should examine creating a school of financial warfare jointly with DOD. If the U.S. is to rely on financial weapons, tools, and strategies to prosecute international defensive and offensive objectives, it must create a specially trained group of experts dedicated to the study, training, testing, and preparedness of these deterrents. Recent experience has demonstrated that the U.S. cannot depend on the rapid development and deployment of untested, academically developed finan- cial actions, stratagems, and weapons on an ad hoc basis.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.