The bill
Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act
S. 2626, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.
Sponsored by
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
ID: M001243
Follow the money
The bill
S. 2626, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Agency for International Development" section, p. 288-290 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 240.
October 29, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose its true intentions.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act (S 2626) claims to strengthen U.S. leadership at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). In reality, it's a thinly veiled attempt to counter China's growing influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill instructs the Secretary of the Treasury to:
1. Review IDB projects involving Chinese entities for potential national security risks. 2. Vote against projects that pose such risks or involve Chinese trust funds. 3. Advocate for increased procurement from U.S. and partner country entities, rather than Chinese ones. 4. Encourage collaboration between the IDB and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.
These provisions are nothing more than a desperate attempt to slow down China's economic expansion in the region. It's like trying to hold back a tsunami with a broken reed.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. The IDB, which will be forced to navigate this new web of bureaucratic red tape. 2. Chinese entities, which will face increased scrutiny and potential exclusion from IDB projects. 3. U.S. corporations and partner country entities, which may benefit from the bill's procurement provisions. 4. Latin American and Caribbean countries, which will be caught in the middle of this great power struggle.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "too little, too late." China has already established itself as a major player in the region, and this legislation won't change that fact. Instead, it may:
1. Strain U.S.-China relations further. 2. Create new bureaucratic hurdles for IDB projects, potentially slowing down development in the region. 3. Benefit U.S. corporations at the expense of Chinese ones, but ultimately fail to address the underlying issues driving China's growth.
In conclusion, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a pathetic attempt to stem the tide of China's rise, and it will likely achieve nothing more than to further entrench the status quo. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again.
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000384
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 53 nodes and 33 connections (48 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $277,650
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 5 encourages collaboration between the IDB and the United States International Development Finance Corporation, which may lead to increased investment opportunities for private equity and hedge funds in IDB borrowing member countries.
Section 4 promotes IDB procurement policies that prioritize value for money, transparency, and integrity, which may benefit commercial banks involved in IDB projects.
Section 5 encourages collaboration between the IDB and the US International Development Finance Corporation, which may lead to increased construction and engineering projects in IDB borrowing member countries.
Section 3 instructs the US Executive Director to review IDB projects involving PRC entities, potentially reducing Chinese investment in energy infrastructure projects in IDB member countries.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's objective of countering China's development influence by directing U.S. leadership at the IDB to scrutinize and oppose PRC-linked projects, promote U.S. procurement, and enhance coordination with U.S. development finance institutions—mirroring the call to align foreign assistance with national security and resist China's debt diplomacy."
— 255 — Agency for International Development The USAID Administrator should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) with the rank of Deputy Secretary at the Department of State in charge of all U.S. foreign assistance. The DFA role would empower this person to align and coordinate the countless foreign assistance programs across the U.S. government and carry out the agenda of the next con- servative President more effectively. A version of this role existed during the last two years of the George W. Bush Administration, but the Obama Administration eliminated it in 2009. Countering China’s Development Challenge. Through its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has directed billions of dollars in loans and investments to advance its geostrategic objective of displacing the United States as the premier global power. The PRC leverages its transactions—termed “debt traps” by many critics—to strengthen its global influence, extract natural resources, isolate Taiwan, win political support at international fora, and access ports and bases for its military. In Latin America, 25 of 29 countries participate in the BRI, and the PRC ranks as the region’s largest trading partner. Since 2005, Chinese state-owned banks have issued $138 billion in loans to Latin American countries, and other Chinese entities have invested an additional $140 billion. In Africa, China has issued $160 billion in loans and dominates the continent’s rare earth mining sector, which is critical to global energy development. The World Bank estimates that 60 percent of all BRI loans are in financial distress, leading many countries to seek emergency financial help from Western donors. Chinese-funded projects are known for employing substandard labor and environmental practices, fueling corruption, promoting wasteful financial deci- sions by governments, advancing China’s geostrategic interests, and creating an unequal trade relationship in which China secures raw materials from developing countries and sells those countries manufacturing products. For example, Brazil, a world leader in shoe production, saw its industry collapse under a flood of cheap Chinese imports. China’s mercantilist penetration of the developing world and the negative consequences for developing countries’ healthy economic growth have undercut U.S. strategic relationships in those countries and wasted billions in U.S. foreign aid. During the Trump Administration, USAID: l Inaugurated a robust counter-China response called Clear Choice3 that contrasted America’s development approach based on liberty, sovereignty, and free markets with China’s mercantilist authoritarianism that pursued predatory financing schemes and economic and political subordination to Beijing. — 256 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Launched its first Digital Strategy4 to promote safe 5G access in emerging markets and combat Beijing’s efforts to equip regimes with tools to stifle democracy. l Struck bilateral development relationships with Japan, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Taiwan to support projects in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. l Established an office in Greenland to help counter China’s claims of being “a near Arctic state” and reoriented its programming across Asia—including establishing a USAID Mission to Central Asia—in line with America’s Indo- Pacific strategy.5 l Joined with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to help coastal countries detect and halt illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and confront criminal activities practiced by state-run Chinese fishing fleets that violate international norms, ravage fishing industries in developing countries, worsen food insecurity, rob vulnerable communities of their livelihoods, and deplete maritime resources. USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. A senior executive–level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Adminis- trator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat. The Biden Administration discontinued these programs and allowed USAID’s counter-China architecture to waste away, subordinating our national security interests to progressive climate politics in which Communist China is viewed as a global partner. The next conservative Administration should restore and build on the Trump Administration’s counter-China infrastructure at USAID, end the climate policy fanaticism that advantages Beijing, and assess bilateral aid through the lens of U.S. national security interests, rewarding those countries that resist China’s debt diplomacy. It should finance programs designed to counter specific Chinese efforts in strategically important countries and eliminate funding to any partner that engages with Chinese entities directly or indirectly. USAID’s Bangkok-based Regional Development Mission for Asia should focus its strategic attention on supporting cross-border initiatives designed to counter Chinese influence.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on countering Chinese influence in development finance, promoting U.S. leadership in international institutions, and advancing private-sector partnerships in regions like Asia and the Middle East. Both emphasize using development tools to serve U.S. national security and economic interests while reducing reliance on or influence from adversarial powers like China."
— 273 — Agency for International Development of the agency’s non-health, nonhumanitarian funding as well as almost all of its sectoral appropriations directives, including those that reflect the pet projects of individual Members of Congress. The Bureau is the policy and financial nexus at USAID for most of the Biden Administration’s radical priorities in foreign assis- tance, including gender, climate change, and the promotion of identity-based politics. On the positive side, DDI is also the Bureau in charge of areas that will be crucial to a reorientation of USAID, including trade, economic growth, inno- vation, partnerships with the private sector, and the agency’s relationship with communities of faith. The next conservative Administration should make the rapid staffing of key DDI positions a high priority. Besides the Senate-confirmed Assistant Administrator, the Directors of each of the Centers and Hubs in the Bureau will need political leadership. Almost every one of the agencywide policies that cover DDI’s areas of responsibility will need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central appropriations to fund new priorities, especially working with ethnic and religious minorities and faith-based organizations and joint ventures with the private sector in education and energy. All DDI programs should issue funding opportunities restricted to new and underutilized partners modeled on the NPI. REGIONS Asia. Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against Communist China’s efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for geopolitical gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s approaches to disbursing foreign aid in the region. USAID should intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India so that they can jointly advance private-sector solutions to secure financing for power generation, infrastructure, digital con- nectivity, investment and trade expansion, and other economic activities. USAID enjoys a strong in-country presence in India, buttressed by recent coordination on the global response to COVID-19 as India is a global leader in vaccine produc- tion. Those ties should be expanded. So too should development cooperation with Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared with developing countries. China’s island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct strategic threat to U.S. maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China’s ille- gal fishing. While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital. — 274 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pakistan is a prime example of foreign aid policies disconnected from U.S. national interests. The country has been the recipient of more than $12 billion in U.S. foreign aid since 2010, yet it remains intensely anti-American and corrupt, has backed the Taliban continuously since 2001, jump-started North Korea’s nuclear bomb program, brutalizes its religious minorities, and is a willing client of China while taking on unrepayable loans from the U.S. taxpayer-funded International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Middle East. The Middle East is far more vulnerable today than it was in 2020 because the Biden Administration’s strategy for the region is adrift. Tunisia has slid into autocracy, Iraq is plummeting further into Iran’s orbit, and U.S. soldiers continue to risk their lives for unclear ends amid the ruins of Syria. Meanwhile, billions of dollars in U.S. foreign aid props up regimes allied with Iran. President Trump’s Abraham Accords signaled the end of the centrality of the Arab–Israeli conflict, which paralyzed U.S. approaches to the region, and focused instead on Iran as the principal threat to America from this region. During the Trump Administration, USAID’s allocations reflected the new opportunities created by the Accords and sought to strengthen regional alliances against Iran through expanded regional trade and investment and to promote genuine polit- ical stability tethered to strong American leadership. USAID formally partnered with the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Morocco, Qatar, and Kuwait to catalyze regional partnerships in Africa. Under the Biden Administration, however, USAID has returned to a model that deepens the region’s dependence on aid. A new conservative President should reset USAID’s programming in the Middle East in line with our national security interests and committed to the goal of ending the need for foreign aid through development that is led by the private sector. Specifically: l Foreign aid must advance the Abraham Accords. Increased trade and investment between Israel and its Arab neighbors represent the most effective path toward reducing poverty, fostering the emergence of a middle class, and solidifying peace. USAID should therefore focus its development assistance on countries such as Morocco and Sudan through joint investment collaboration with the more economically advanced economies such as the UAE and Israel. l USAID should consider cutting aid to states allied to Iran, limiting assistance in these countries to the advancement of narrow strategic priorities and support for basic American values, such as aid to persecuted religious minorities. USAID continues to expend hundreds of millions of dollars in nonhumanitarian aid to antagonistic regimes in Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. After billions of dollars of aid and many
AI Analysis:
"The bill’s focus on reviewing and opposing IDB projects involving PRC entities, advocating for U.S. procurement, and countering China’s malign influence directly supports the Project 2025 ITA priorities of countering China’s influence, securing supply chains, and advancing U.S. economic interests."
— 666 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Advisory Committees. Due to the nature of the Department of Commerce’s portfolio, many of its advisory committees are populated by activists from organi- zations openly hostile to conservative principles who use the committees to impede conservative policy. Upon entering office, all such committees should be reviewed regarding whether they are required by statute and abolished if they are not. Mem- bership of the remaining committees should be reconstituted to ensure they are sources of genuine expert advice and productive contributions to the policy-making process. Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) compliance and awareness of any ways the committees have been written into regulations should be considered. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION The International Trade Administration is centrally placed to craft and implement U.S. trade policy. Core to ITA’s mission is the expansion of trade and investment and the fostering of job creation, innovation, and economic growth, while also providing research and analysis that support USTR’s trade negotiations. ITA carries out this mission on behalf of American workers, ranchers, and families. As discussed elsewhere, historically, conservatives have argued that many fed- eral government trade and investment-oriented functions amount to corporate welfare or protectionism. There is a growing counterargument within the conser- vative movement contending that, in a world in which managed trade is the norm rather than the exception, and in which authoritarian governments, especially China, continually seek to undermine U.S. interests, the U.S. cannot unilaterally disarm. To do so would harm the cause of free trade in the long term, and, in any event, Congress is not likely to drastically change the composition or authoriza- tion of the ITA. Thus, a policy and management agenda that serves conservative priorities is crucial. In a conservative Administration, the ITA should operate with the follow- ing priorities: l Counter the malign influence of China and other U.S. adversaries; l Enforce agreements vigorously and defend against trade violations; l Secure access to critical supply chains and technology; and l Enable the private sector to drive innovation and remain globally competitive. It is important to note that a deeply entrenched set of career Senior Executive Service officials have managed the ITA for over a decade. While most are truly non-partisan civil servants, some are not. Political leadership must manage accord- ingly. Strong political leadership is needed in ITA’s policymaking positions from — 667 — Department of Commerce Day One to ensure the bureau is fully implementing Administration policy. An incoming Administration should ensure that Assistant Secretary and Deputy Assis- tant Secretary positions are staffed by appointees as quickly as possible. Enforcement and Compliance. Strong enforcement of trade agreements is an indispensable function of the ITA carried out by Enforcement & Compliance (E&C). Free and fair trade is impossible without energetic enforcement of exist- ing agreements and without strong defense against dumping and illegal subsidies. Many free trade advocates consider antidumping and countervailing duty laws (AD/CVD) to be protectionist and thus antithetical to the conservative free market position. In their view, AD/CVD laws are overused, abused by certain industries, and harmful to American economic competitiveness by increasing costs to down- stream industries. Other conservatives maintain that AD/CVD tariffs are not conventional tariffs, but rather corrective actions meant to address anti-free market activities by other governments—a scalpel, not a hammer. In the short term, this may mean higher costs for U.S. businesses and consumers on a limited number of products from cer- tain offending countries, but those higher prices correct existing price distortions in the marketplace and ultimately ensure the healthy operation of market forces in the long term and a level playing field for U.S. manufacturers. Whatever the case, improvements to the current system must be made to both protect U.S. consumers and companies from improperly applied duties and defend against trade-distorting actions by other governments. Procedures governing the day-to-day administration of proceedings, as well as policies driving critical deci- sions in proceedings, require a fresh look. Ultimately, E&C’s mandate is to conduct a rigorous but also fair, objective, and balanced review of the record in each pro- ceeding and to make decisions without bias. It is exceedingly unlikely that Congress would abolish or limit the activity of E&C. Therefore, the proposals below are made under the assumption that an incoming Administration will operate E&C within its current legal, institutional, and political confines and set a path forward to wield E&C’s considerable power to achieve the goals of a conservative Administration. These proposals can be broken into three categories: process, policy, and addressing China. Process l Re-establish and expand suspended in-person pandemic-related verifications, particularly regarding the People’s Republic of China. Ensure that verifications are rigorous. l Implement advanced analytics and artificial intelligence to identify opportunities for self-initiation, detect circumvention, and prevent bad actors from gaming the system.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
American Battlefield Protection Program Amendments Act of 2025
119/s/3524
A bill to designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 10 East Main Street in Mahaffey, Pennsylvania, as the "Robert Allen Bishop, Sr., Post Office Building".
119/s/3835
Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026
119/s/3900