The bill
Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026
S. 3900, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
Sponsored by
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
ID: M001243
Follow the money
The bill
S. 3900, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 217-219 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 504.
July 26, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of S. 3900: Iran Human Rights, Internet Freedom, and Accountability Act of 2026**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill purports to champion human rights and internet freedom in Iran—a noble-sounding mission that, in reality, serves as political theater dressed in humanitarian garb. Its stated goals—promoting free expression, expanding uncensored internet access, documenting regime abuses, and enforcing sanctions—are less about empowering Iranians and more about allowing Congress to feel morally superior while avoiding any real risk or cost. The bill’s true objective? To let lawmakers grandstand on Iran’s repression without confronting the futility of decades of sanctions, covert ops, and empty rhetoric that have done little to loosen the regime’s grip.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** S. 3900 amends the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 by mandating the State Department to: - Evaluate and expand access to tools like VPNs and direct-to-cell satellite tech for Iranian activists. - Ensure Treasury and Commerce Department sanctions enforcement doesn’t inadvertently block civilian internet access tools (a rare nod to unintended consequences). - Develop strategies to circumvent regime-imposed internet blackouts. It also requires interagency coordination under the Secretary of State, effectively creating another bureaucratic layer to manage what amounts to a high-tech cat-and-mouse game with Iran’s surveillance apparatus. Notably, the bill avoids any mention of military action, direct aid to opposition groups, or meaningful diplomatic engagement—preferring instead to fund circumvention tech and issue reports that will gather dust alongside previous Iran human rights mandates.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Iranian civilians**: Theoretically beneficiaries of improved internet access, but likely to see minimal tangible change due to regime countermeasures and the bill’s lack of funding guarantees. - **U.S. tech and satellite companies**: May gain new markets or licenses to provide circumvention tools, assuming sanctions loopholes are navigated. - **Iranian dissidents and activists**: Could receive marginally better tools, though increased surveillance risks may offset gains. - **U.S. taxpayers**: Will fund yet another unfunded mandate with no clear metrics for success. - **The Iranian regime**: Unfazed, as it has consistently adapted to internet circumvention efforts and views such bills as proof of American meddling—fueling its propaganda narrative. - **Congress**: The real winners, gaining a veneer of moral authority ahead of elections without risking political capital or challenging powerful lobbies invested in the status quo.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The bill’s impact will be largely symbolic. While expanding access to anti-censorship tools could help some Iranians organize and document abuses, the regime’s sophisticated surveillance and repression apparatus—bolstered by Russian and Chinese tech—will likely neutralize most gains. The bill’s avoidance of funding specifics or enforcement teeth renders it aspirational at best. More troublingly, it reinforces the delusion that technical fixes can substitute for coherent strategy, ignoring that Iran’s repression is rooted in systemic corruption and ideological fervor, not just bandwidth limitations. Ultimately, S. 3900 is less a policy initiative and a legislative placebo: designed to soothe congressional guilt and voter outrage while changing nothing fundamental about the U.S.’s impotent, performative approach to Iran. It’s not medicine—it’s a sugar pill labeled “freedom,” prescribed to a patient dying of gangrene.
Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: R000608
Top Contributors
42
ID: C001114
Top Contributors
25
ID: G000555
Top Contributors
25
ID: B001299
Top Contributors
21
ID: S001150
Top Contributors
64
ID: C001035
Top Contributors
21
ID: K000367
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25
ID: C001047
Top Contributors
23
ID: B001288
Top Contributors
22
ID: S001198
Top Contributors
75
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 49 nodes and 48 connections
Total contributions: $48
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 7 provides for cybersecurity training and tools for civil society in Iran, which could benefit cybersecurity companies by increasing demand for their services.
Section 3 and Section 4 promote internet freedom in Iran, which could benefit telecommunications companies by expanding their market and services.
The development of low-cost, easily scalable, and rapidly deployable technologies to counter internet shutdowns (Section 4) might involve AI and cloud infrastructure, potentially benefiting companies in this sector.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. McCormick, David [R-PA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on promoting human rights, internet freedom, and sanctions against Iranian regime violators directly supports Project 2025's objectives of backing freedom-seeking Iranians, reinstating/expanding sanctions, and balancing human rights with strategic considerations."
— 185 — Department of State l First, the U.S. must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear technology and delivery capabilities and more broadly block Iranian ambitions. This means, inter alia, reinstituting and expanding Trump Administration sanctions; providing security assistance for regional partners; supporting, through public diplomacy and otherwise, freedom-seeking Iranian people in their revolt against the mullahs; and ensuring Israel has both the military means and the political support and flexibility to take what it deems to be appropriate measures to defend itself against the Iranian regime and its regional proxies Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. l Second, the next Administration should build on the Trump Administration’s diplomatic successes by encouraging other Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to enter the Abraham Accords. Related policies should include reversing, as appropriate, the Biden Administration’s degradation of the long-standing partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Palestinian Authority should be defunded. A further key priority is keeping Türkiye in the Western fold and a NATO ally. This includes a vigorous outreach to Türkiye to dissuade it from “hedging” toward Russia or China, which is likely to require a rethinking of U.S. support for YPG/PKK [People’s Protection Units/Kurdistan Worker’s Party] Kurdish forces, which Ankara believes are an existential threat to its security. For the foreseeable future— and much longer than one new Administration—Middle Eastern oil will play a key role in the world economy. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to support its allies and compete with its economic adversaries, including China. Relations with Saudi Arabia should be strengthened in a way that seriously curtails Chinese influence in Riyadh. l Third, it is in the U.S. national interest to build a Middle East security pact that includes Israel, Egypt, the Gulf states, and potentially India, as a second “Quad” arrangement. Protecting freedom of navigation in the Gulf and in the Red Sea/Suez Canal is vital to the world economy and therefore to U.S. prosperity as well. In North Africa, security cooperation with European allies, especially France, will be vital to limit growing Islamist threats and the incursion of Russian influence through positionings of the Wagner Group. l The U.S. cannot neglect a concern for human rights and minority rights, which must be balanced with strategic and security considerations. Special attention must be paid to challenges of religious freedom, especially the status of Middle Eastern Christians and other religious minorities, as well as the human trafficking endemic to the region. — 186 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Sub-Saharan Africa Africa’s importance to U.S. foreign policy and strategic interests is rising and will only continue to grow. Its explosive population growth, large reserves of industry-dependent minerals, proximity to key maritime shipping routes, and its collective diplomatic power ensure the continent’s global importance. Yet as Afri- ca’s strategic significance has grown, the U.S.’s relative influence there has declined. Terrorist activity on the continent has increased, while America’s competitors are making significant gains for their own national interests. The PRC’s companies dominate the African supply chain for certain minerals critical to emerging tech- nologies. African nations comprise major country-bloc elements that shield the PRC and Russia from international isolation for their human rights abuses—and African nations staunchly support PRC foreign policy goals on issues such as Hong Kong occupation, South China Seas dispute arbitration, and Taiwan. The new Administration can correct this strategic failing of existing policy by prioritizing Africa and by undertaking fundamental changes in how the United States works with African nations. At a bare minimum, the next Administration should: l Shift strategic focus from assistance to growth. Reorient the focus of U.S. overseas development assistance away from stand-alone humanitarian development aid and toward fostering free market systems in African countries by incentivizing and facilitating U.S. private sector engagement in these countries. Development aid alone does little to develop countries and can fuel corruption and violent conflict. While the United States should always be willing to offer emergency and humanitarian relief, both U.S. and African long-term interests are better served by a free market-based, private growth-focused strategy to Africa’s economic challenges. l Counter malign Chinese activity on the continent. This should include the development of powerful public diplomacy efforts to counter Chinese influence campaigns with commitments to freedom of speech and the free flow of information; the creation of a template “digital hygiene” program that African countries can access to sanitize and protect their sensitive communications networks from espionage by the PRC and other hostile actors; the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti; and a focus on supporting American companies involved in industries important to U.S. national interests or that have a competitive advantage in Africa. l Counter the furtherance of terrorism. African country-based terrorist groups like Boko Haram may currently lack the capability to attack the
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on promoting internet freedom and human rights in Iran through technology access and sanctions coordination, while the Project 2025 FCC policy centers on reforming Section 230 to rein in Big Tech and increase transparency. Both address internet governance and corporate power, but the bill’s foreign policy and human rights focus differs from the domestic regulatory agenda of Project 2025."
— 847 — Federal Communications Commission The FCC has facilitated the transition from 3G to 4G and now 5G offerings in two ways. First, it has freed spectrum—the airwaves needed to deliver wireless ser- vices. Second, it has preempted state and local siting and permitting laws that could otherwise slow down the buildout of next-generation infrastructure. One of the FCC’s great success stories from 2017 to 2020 was securing U.S. leadership in 5G. The FCC also administers an approximately roughly $9 billion-a-year program called the Universal Service Fund (USF), which has been funded by a line-item charge that traditional telephone companies add to consumers’ monthly bills. Expenditures from this fund subsidize rural broadband networks and low-income programs as well as connections for schools, libraries, and rural health care facil- ities. Through various COVID-era laws, Congress has also provided the FCC with a one-time $24 billion appropriation for various low-income initiatives. POLICY PRIORITIES The FCC needs to change course and bring new urgency to achieving four main goals: l Reining in Big Tech, l Promoting national security, l Unleashing economic prosperity, and l Ensuring FCC accountability and good governance.15 Reining in Big Tech. The FCC has an important role to play in addressing the threats to individual liberty posed by corporations that are abusing dominant positions in the market. Nowhere is that clearer than when it comes to Big Tech and its attempts to drive diverse political viewpoints from the digital town square. Today, a handful of corporations can shape everything from the information we consume to the places we shop. These corporate behemoths are not merely exercising market power; they are abusing dominant positions. They are not simply prevailing in the free market; they are taking advantage of a landscape that has been skewed—in many cases by the government—to favor their business models over those of their competitors. It is hard to imagine another industry in which a greater gap exists between power and accountability. That is why a new Adminis- tration should support FCC action on several fronts. Specifically, the FFC should: l Eliminate immunities that courts added to Section 230. The FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230 in a way that eliminates the expansive, non-textual immunities that courts have read into the statute. — 848 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise As one of the FCC’s previous General Counsels noted, the FCC has authority to take this action because Section 230 is codified in the Communications Act.16 The FCC’s Section 230 reforms should track the positions outlined in a July 2020 Petition for Rulemaking filed at the FCC near the end of the Trump Administration.17 Any new presidential Administration should consider filing a similar or new petition. As Justice Clarence Thomas has made clear, courts have construed Section 230 broadly to confer on some of the world’s largest companies a sweeping immunity that is found nowhere in the text of the statute.18 They have done so in a way that nullifies the limits Congress placed on the types of actions that Internet companies can take while continuing to benefit from Section 230. One way to start correcting this error is for the FCC to remind courts how the various portions of Section 230 operate. At the outset, the FCC can clarify that Section 230(c)(1) does not apply broadly to every decision that a platform makes. Rather, its protections apply only when a platform does not remove information provided by someone else. In contrast, the FCC should clarify that the more limited Section 230(c)(2) protections apply to any covered platform’s decision to restrict access to material provided by someone else. Combined, these actions will appropriately limit the number of cases in which a platform can censor with the benefit of Section 230’s protections. Such clarifications might also include drawing out the traditional legal distinction between distributor and publisher liability; Section 230 did not do away with the former, nor does it collapse into the latter. l Impose transparency rules on Big Tech. Today, Big Tech offers a black box. After Google manipulates search results, a small business can see its web traffic drop precipitously overnight for no apparent reason, potentially flipping its outlook from black to red. On Facebook, social media posts are left up or taken down, accounts suspended or permanently banned, without any apparent consistency. Out of the blue, YouTube can demonetize individuals who have risked their capital and invested their labor to build online businesses. At present, the FCC requires broadband providers to comply with a transparency rule that can provide a good baseline for Big Tech. Under the FCC’s rule, broadband providers must provide detailed disclosures about practices that would shape Internet traffic—from blocking to prioritizing or discriminating against content. The FCC could take a similar approach to
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on promoting internet freedom and human rights in Iran through diplomatic and technological means, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasizes workforce diversity, retention, politicization, and oversight mechanisms—showing only tangential alignment in broader national security and information domains."
— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
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