Ratepayer Justice and Commercial Power Accountability Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/9700
Last Updated: August 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]

ID: K000009

Follow the money

The bill

Ratepayer Justice and Commercial Power Accountability Act

HR. 9700, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.

The sponsor

Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$73,500 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Sponsor introductory remarks on measure. (CR H4617)

July 15, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 9700: Ratepayer Justice and Commercial Power Accountability Act** *Diagnosis: A well-intentioned bandage on a gangrenous limb of regulatory capture and utility greed.*

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill claims to right the wrongs inflicted on electricity and gas consumers by corrupt utilities and their C-suite executives—think Enron with a PG&E aftertaste. Its stated goal is to create a federal slush fund (the *Ratepayer Justice Fund*) to reimburse ratepayers fleeced through rigged rates, bribed regulators, nuclear boondoggles, and executive looting. In reality, it’s an admission that state utility commissions are either captured, comatose, or criminally negligent—and that federal taxpayers will now be on the hook for cleaning up the mess utilities made while pretending to serve the public interest. The bill’s remedial purpose? To pretend we can undo a decade of regulatory capture with a paper trail and a Treasury direct deposit.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** - Establishes the **Ratepayer Justice Fund** in the Treasury, funded not by appropriations but by **assessments on utilities, executives, and lobbyists** found liable for “misconduct events.” - Defines “misconduct events” broadly: corruption in rate-setting, anticompetitive behavior, fraudulent regulatory approvals, and criminal negligence—especially in nuclear power (looking at you, Vogtle and Summer). - Requires the Treasury Secretary (with FERC, DOJ, and DOE) to publish and update a **public list of qualifying misconduct events**, with a citizen petition process—because nothing says “accountability” like letting consumer advocates beg bureaucrats to acknowledge the obvious. - Funds are allocated: - Direct payments to harmed ratepayers (Treasury), - Reimbursements to state consumer advocate offices (DOE), - Up to 5% for “Ratepayer Community Restoration Grants” (DOE)—a.k.a. pork for politically favored towns. - Assessments include disgorgement of **unjust enrichment**, interest, and even funds siphoned from employee pension plans to finance misconduct—because stealing from workers’ retirements to pay for lobbying is apparently a line item now.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Utilities & Executives:** Finally face potential clawbacks—not just fines they treat as licensing fees. C-suite bonuses tied to rigged rate cases? Now subject to restitution. Lobbyists who greased regulators? Not spared. - **Ratepayers:** Promised refunds for years of overcharges—though collecting will require proving harm, navigating federal bureaucracy, and waiting for a “Final Determination” that may outlast their lifespans. - **State Consumer Advocates:** Get a lifeline—federal reimbursement to do the job their own states refused to fund. - **Taxpayers:** Indirectly on the hook if assessments fall short (spoiler: they will). The Fund relies on utilities paying up—good luck collecting from bankrupt entities or those with armies of tax lawyers. - **Attorney General & FERC:** Now tasked with determining liability in complex, decades-long schemes—because nothing says “efficient justice” like adding another layer of federal review to a broken system.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This is less a remedy and more a **funeral dirge for state utility regulation**. By federalizing reimbursement, the bill concedes that states have failed utterly to protect consumers—either through corruption, incompetence, or ideological surrender to utility lobbyists. If enforced, it could deter some egregious misconduct by making crime *less* profitable—but only if assessments are aggressive, timely, and immune to legal delay tactics (they won’t be). More likely, it becomes a **full-employment program for lawyers, forensic accountants, and grant writers**, while ratepayers get pennies on the dollar after a decade of litigation. The nuclear focus is telling: this bill was likely sparked

Related Topics

Government Operations & AccountabilityResearch & Innovation PolicyTaxation & IRS Regulations
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$73,500
22 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$7,300
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,200

No PAC contributions found

1
HECATE ENERGY LLC
1 transaction
$4,000
2
RMS INVESTMENT GROUP LLC
1 transaction
$3,300

No committee contributions found

1
HOWLEY, JO ANN
1 transaction
$3,500
2
ANSPACH, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
3
BRANDT, JANICE
1 transaction
$3,300
4
CHOWDHURY, MANIDIPA
1 transaction
$3,300
5
CHOWDHURY, SAILESH
1 transaction
$3,300
6
CONOVER, CATHERINE M
1 transaction
$3,300
7
EGNOR, DANIEL
1 transaction
$3,300
8
HELLMAN, FRANCES
1 transaction
$3,300
9
LANDAU, JON
1 transaction
$3,300
10
MAESE, KAREN
1 transaction
$3,300
11
MAESE, TIMOTHY
1 transaction
$3,300
12
MOORE, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
13
MOURAD-FRIEDMAN, SENA
1 transaction
$3,300
14
CLUBOK, ANDY
1 transaction
$3,300
15
HUGHES, CARL F F
1 transaction
$3,300
16
MORINO, MARIO
1 transaction
$3,300
17
PEPPER, FRANCES G
1 transaction
$3,300
18
SHACKELFORD, LEE
1 transaction
$3,300
19
CANNEY, LES
1 transaction
$3,300
20
CASEY, GEORGE
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

22

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELF • ACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELF • MD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 47 nodes and 45 connections

Total contributions: $45

Top Donors - Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9]

Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 2 harmed.

  • −Nuclear Powerconfidence 0.90

    Section 12 requires an executive branch assessment report on the operational and safety conditions of nuclear power plants affected by misconduct events, which may lead to increased regulatory scrutiny and costs for nuclear power companies.

  • −Electric Utilitiesconfidence 0.80

    Section 4 imposes assessments and collections on covered utilities, which includes electric utilities, to fund the Ratepayer Justice Fund.

  • +Renewable Energyconfidence 0.60

    Section 7 allows for Ratepayer Community Restoration Grants to be used for clean energy projects, which may benefit renewable energy companies.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Kaptur, Marcy [D-OH-9])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 10 contributions
    • WIDMAR, MARK$3,500
    • KORALEWSKI, MIKE$1,500
    • GLOECKLER, MARKUS$1,000
    • DYMBORT, JASON$1,000
    • BUEHLER, PAT$500

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 67%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on utility misconduct and ratepayer compensation in the energy sector, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses the CFPB's Civil Penalty Fund and financial regulatory agency structure—topics that are thematically related to financial accountability but operate in different regulatory domains (energy vs. consumer finance)."

Key themes:financial accountabilitypenalty fundsregulatory oversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 872-874AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on utility accountability and ratepayer compensation in the energy sector, while the Project 2025 policy targets the abolition and restructuring of the CFPB in financial regulation. There is no direct thematic overlap, though both involve federal agency oversight and consumer protection concepts in different domains."

Key themes:consumer protectionfederal agency oversightfinancial accountability

— 839 — Financial Regulatory Agencies On February 27, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari.51 The Court should issue its final decision by 2024. The CFPB is a highly politicized, damaging, and utterly unaccountable federal agency.52 It is unconstitutional. Congress should abolish the CFPB and reverse Dodd–Frank Section 1061, thus returning the consumer protection function of the CFPB to banking regulators53 and the Federal Trade Commission. Provided the Supreme Court affirms the Fifth Circuit holding in Community Financial Ser- vices Association of America, the next conservative President should order the immediate dissolution of the agency—pull down its prior rules, regulations and guidance, return its staff to their prior agencies and its building to the General Services Administration. Until this can be accomplished, however, Congress should: l Ensure that any civil penalty funds not used to recompense wronged consumers go to the Department of the Treasury. The funds should not be retained by the Bureau to be dispensed at the pleasure of the Director— potentially to political actors. Moreover, the CFPB should not have a financial incentive to impose penalties. l Repeal Dodd–Frank Section 1071. This section, which relates to small- business data collection, imposes requirements on financial institutions’ lending to small firms, raises costs, and limits small businesses’ access to capital.54 l Require that no CFPB funds are spent on enforcement actions that are not based on a rulemaking that complies with the Administrative Procedure Act.55 l Require that respondents in administrative actions be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in an administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.56 l Specify the nature of “deceptive, unfair, and abusive” practices to define the scope of the CFPB mission more precisely. — 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 437-439AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on utility accountability and ratepayer compensation for misconduct, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes FERC-led reforms to RTOs, grid reliability, and transmission cost allocation—resulting in only tangential alignment around energy market oversight."

Key themes:FERC oversightenergy market accountabilityratepayer impactutility regulation

— 404 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Unlike vertically integrated utilities that are accountable to state elected officials and state public utility commissions, RTOs and their participants are accountable only to FERC. Even then, however, accountability is indirect through the tariffs (rules) that the RTOs adopt and FERC approves. In addition, unlike utilities, generators in an RTO have no obligation to serve customers. New Policies FERC must make reliability of the grid and service to end use top priorities. To do so, it should: l Reexamine the premise of RTOs. RTOs no longer seem to work for the benefit of the American people. Marginal price auctions for energy are not ensuring the reliability of the grid and are not passing the full economic benefits of subsidized renewables on to customers. FERC needs to reexamine the RTOs under its jurisdiction to make sure that they procure reliable and affordable electricity for the benefit of the American people. l Ensure that RTOs return to market fundamentals so that they serve customers, not special interests and political causes. FERC should require RTOs to ensure that reliable, dispatchable resources are properly valued to provide electricity when needed for the benefit of customers. Potential reforms could include: 1. Requiring renewable generators to provide intra-day backup by dispatchable on-demand generation so that bids by intermittent resources into RTOs equate fairly with far more valuable on-demand dispatchable resources; 2. Creating dual energy markets for dispatchable and nondispatchable resources; or 3. Eliminating capacity markets where intermittent resources participate and instead establishing “reliability” markets where dispatchable on-demand resources participate. Alternatives to marginal price auctions also should be considered. l Direct the RTOs to ensure that the economic benefits of renewables (like tax credits and no fuel costs) are passed on to customers. — 405 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l End undue discrimination that allows subsidized resources to distort price formation in RTOs. l Affirm its commitment that states will decide whether to join an RTO instead of imposing RTOs on regions that do not want them. FERC should also consider allowing states to enter into non-RTO power pools with alternative structures for the sharing of resources and electric generation. FERC: ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION Mission/Overview Under the Federal Power Act, FERC has the authority to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate electric transmission. (Pursuant to court cases, interstate transmission can be entirely within a state, although the part of Texas served by ERCOT is not under FERC transmission jurisdiction.) Needed Reforms FERC has been considering how to plan for and allocate costs for new trans- mission lines and how new generation resources will be interconnected to the transmission grid. (Transmission expansion and replacement decisions are usu- ally made by local utilities or by an RTO or regional planning entity). Through two major rulemakings,118 FERC is attempting to facilitate the building of more long-range transmission lines and to socialize more of the costs of transmission buildouts to more customers in order to make it cheaper for renewable develop- ers (primarily) to interconnect to the grid and sell their power. Socializing such costs is a form of subsidy for generators and will cause further price distortions in RTOs and ISOs that will make it less economical for reliable, dispatchable resources like coal, nuclear, and natural gas to stay operational and support reliability.119 Also, under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, DOE and FERC are granted authority to site and permit high-priority transmission lines as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (NIETCs). The Inflation Reduction Act provides funding to DOE to support transmission expansion.120 These initiatives will undermine state input and decision-making. FERC will consider rules on how NIETC transmission applications are to be made. New Policies FERC should either change course on its existing transmission rulemakings (if still in progress) or issue a new rulemaking to:

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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