The bill
Protecting Investors’ Personally Identifiable Information Act
HR. 1483, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]
ID: L000583
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1483, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Trade" section, p. 863-865 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 687.
August 31, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
HR 1483, the "Protecting Investors’ Personally Identifiable Information Act," is a masterclass in legislative misdirection—like naming a tapeworm "Digestive Wellness Supplement." At its core, this bill doesn’t protect investors; it kneecaps the SEC’s ability to monitor market manipulation by banning the collection of personally identifiable information (PII) under the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) system.
Let’s diagnose the real illness: CAT was born after the 2010 Flash Crash to track orders across markets in real time—think of it as a surveillance camera for high-frequency trading. PII (names, SSNs, IPs, etc.) isn’t collected for fun; it’s essential to link trades to actual humans, not just algos hiding behind shell entities. Without it, CAT becomes a blurry fingerprint—useful only if you enjoy guessing who robbed the bank.
This bill prohibits the SEC from requiring PII in CAT reporting. Translation: It lets bad actors trade anonymously while pretending to protect privacy. Affected industries? Securities exchanges, broker-dealers, HFT firms—basically anyone who profits from opacity. Compliance? They’ll celebrate by doing nothing, since the SEC loses its enforcement teeth. Timeline? Immediate relief for crooks; long-term damage to market integrity.
Enforcement? There isn’t any. The bill doesn’t add penalties—it removes the SEC’s ability to enforce existing rules. Economic impact? Short-term gain for firms that want to hide illicit trades; long-term erosion of trust as markets become more prone to spoofing, layering, and insider trading—all harder to trace without PII.
The sponsors claim this protects investors from data breaches. Adorable. As if the real threat to investors isn’t being front-run by a Citadel algo using dark pool whispers, but some hacker stealing your email from a SEC server that, spoiler alert, doesn’t even store PII in CAT—it’s hashed and tokenized. This bill solves a phantom problem while enabling very real ones.
In short: HR 1483 isn’t about privacy. It’s about letting Wall Street trade in the dark, where the only thing more opaque than the motives is the logic. Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity with complications of greed. Prognosis: Markets will survive—but investors won’t, not without a fight.
Rep. Loudermilk, Barry [R-GA-11]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: W000812
Top Contributors
24
ID: M001204
Top Contributors
22
ID: H001058
Top Contributors
28
ID: N000193
Top Contributors
24
ID: D000634
Top Contributors
21
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 24 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $30
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(a) prohibits the SEC from requiring personally identifiable information under consolidated audit trail reporting requirements, which could reduce regulatory burdens on national securities exchanges and associations, potentially benefiting investment banking and securities firms.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1483 directly supports Project 2025's objective to terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program by prohibiting the SEC from requiring collection of personally identifiable information under CAT reporting, aligning with the goal of reducing regulatory burden and enhancing market efficiency."
— 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales. — 832 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Congress should: l Prohibit the SEC from requiring issuer disclosure of social, ideological, political, or “human capital” information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns. The proposed SEC climate change rule, which would quadruple the costs of being a public company, is particularly problematic.21 l Repeal the Dodd–Frank mandated disclosures relating to conflict minerals, mine safety, resource extraction, and CEO pay ratios.22 l Oppose efforts to redefine the purpose of business in the name of social justice; corporate social responsibility (CSR); stakeholder theory; environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria; socially responsible investing (SRI); sustainability; diversity; business ethics; or common- good capitalism. l Prohibit securities regulators, including SROs, from promulgating rules or taking other actions that discriminate, either favorably or unfavorably, on the basis of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group. SEC ADMINISTRATION To enable it to achieve its core mission more effectively, the SEC should:23 l Publish better data on securities offerings, securities markets, and securities law enforcement and publish an annual data book of time series data on these matters. Specifically, the SEC Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) needs to do a much better job of collecting and reporting fundamental data regarding offerings, regulatory costs, violations, enforcement, investors, state regulator taxes, fees and activities, and other matters. l Ensure that SEC resources flow toward its core functions and away from ancillary and support functions or from missions that do not fall within the SEC’s statutory charge. l Ensure that any three SEC Commissioners are empowered to place an item on the agenda and to receive adequate staff support to do so even without the Chairman’s support.
AI Analysis:
"HR 1483 aligns with Project 2025's critique of SEC overreach by seeking to limit the agency's authority to collect personally identifiable information under consolidated audit trail reporting, reflecting a shared goal of reducing regulatory burdens on market participants and preventing what Project 2025 describes as impediments to capital formation."
— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:
AI Analysis:
"HR 1483 focuses on limiting SEC collection of investors' personally identifiable information in financial markets, while the Project 2025 IC section concerns protecting intelligence officers' identities and resisting EU data‑privacy constraints on U.S. intelligence collection. Both touch on privacy and government data collection, but their domains and objectives differ significantly."
— 225 — Intelligence Community Cover in the Digital Age. Even in the public domain, it is becoming increas- ingly clear that protecting the identities of undercover intelligence officers is difficult in the digital age.41 The truth is that as our daily activities are conducted predominantly in the digital domain, our antiquated system for providing cover to undercover officers has lagged woefully behind the threat from foreign adversaries. The DIA, CIA, and FBI are increasingly aware of this threat and are devoting resources to the problem. Their back-office infrastructure, however, is such that they are still using methods for providing cover from decades past that put valuable intelligence officers at unnecessary risk. How intelligence officers and their fami- lies are taught to use smartphones and social media, travel, conduct banking, and take and share pictures—even how and when they are paid—can make it difficult to protect identities.42 Legends, fake backstories, and identities are often weak, incomplete, and unable to stand up to a basic Google search.43 Officers operat- ing under nonofficial cover are offered even less protection and training to help them succeed. In addition, ubiquitous technical surveillance (UTS) techniques being refined by technologies emanating from the regimes in China and Russia will continue to be highly challenging for intelligence officers. An incoming Administration will need to double down on resourcing and training so that members of the IC will have the expertise they need to operate clandestinely (and successfully) against hard targets. Privacy Shield. For many years, the European Union (EU) has tried to force U.S. companies operating in Europe to follow its data privacy regulations. Misleading claims in the 2013 Snowden leaks destroyed the initial Safe Harbor Framework44 that allowed American companies to transfer data across the Atlantic; its succes- sor, the Privacy Shield Framework,45 was struck down by European courts on the grounds that it provides insufficient protections for EU citizens against hypothet- ical U.S. government surveillance. Those same European courts exempted the intelligence services of EU member states from the standards applied to the U.S., suggesting that trade protectionism may be the real motive behind data privacy regulations. In 2022, the Biden Administration negotiated a new agreement, the Trans-At- lantic Data Privacy Framework,46 intended to withstand European legal challenges. Given the fate of its predecessors, it is not certain that it will survive. Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activi- ties,”47 implements this new framework by attempting to align signals intelligence collection practices with European privacy regulations. At most, the executive order’s changes will be helpful support for the framework in future European litigation; at worst, they could throw sand in the gears of important intelli- gence programs. An incoming conservative President should reset Europe’s expectations. Brus- sels has always arbitraged the difference between being a military ally against, for — 226 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise example, Russia and conducting a full-blown trade conflict with the United States. Restrictions on data exports have been part of the trade conflict, but now they could seriously harm our military and intelligence capabilities. Moreover, restrictions on U.S. intelligence collection hurt the Europeans themselves, especially as the United States shares unprecedented amounts of intelligence on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Europeans.48 Europe is telling the United States to meet intelligence oversight standards that no European country meets. At the same time, exports of data to China are unexamined and (so far) free from legal challenges. That violates World Trade Organization agreements as an arbitrary and discriminatory data protection stan- dard. It is a betrayal by a nominally allied jurisdiction. European court rulings that struck down prior data privacy frameworks were grounded not in constitutional law but in a treaty among European nations. If the EU accepted an international agreement that data may flow to the United States under a more reasonable stan- dard than the one adopted by the court, that interpretation would be binding, at least as a gloss on the earlier treaty. The United States has never seriously pushed back against the EU; now is the time. An incoming President should ask for an immediate study of the implemen- tation of Executive Order 14086 and suspend any provisions that unduly burden intelligence collection. At the same time, in negotiations with the Europeans, the United States should make clear that the continued sharing of intelligence with EU member states depends on successful resolution of this issue within the first two years of a President’s term. It is time for a real solution, not the 30 years of stopgaps imposed by Brussels. President’s Daily Brief (PDB). An incoming conservative President should make clear what the President’s Daily Brief is and is not. The PDB should be for the President specifically, with a much narrower distribution and addressing areas of strategic concern. During the transition, the future National Security Advisor, along with the DNI, should conduct a review of current PDB recipients and deter- mine which should remain recipients when the President’s term begins. Instead of being used as the statement of record for the agencies, the PDB often misses the areas of interest for Presidents and their senior advisers. The President should want the PDB to focus on providing the information needed for the often imperfect and complex decisions that a President needs to make, which should always be based on the best intelligence that can be gathered. Where consensus and agreement are possible, an IC-coordinated product is excellent, but insights provided by properly channeled dissent can lead a President to ask relevant ques- tions of his DNI and IC. A future DNI determines the PDB briefer based on recommendations made by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration (MI). His- torically, briefers have come from the CIA, but a future President and DNI should
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.