Bureau of Industry and Security License Administration Enhancement Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8284

Last Updated: August 2, 2026

Bureau of Industry and Security License Administration Enhancement Act

HR. 8284, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$500,500 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 43 - 1.

April 21, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Bureau of Industry and Security License Administration Enhancement Act, HR 8284, is a bill that aims to enhance the administration of export control licenses under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. As a self-serving billionaire political analyst, I will provide an objective summary of the bill's main purpose, key provisions, affected parties, and potential impact.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The primary objective of HR 8284 is to streamline the export control license administration process by introducing new procedures for handling licenses and authorizations. The bill aims to enhance national security by preventing the transfer of sensitive technologies to foreign adversaries.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces several key provisions, including:

1. Enhanced administration of export control licenses: The Secretary shall administer any export control license or other authorization considered pursuant to an is-informed letter or similar targeted regulatory guidance or supplemental license requirement communication sent to a United States person or foreign person by the same interagency process as any license or other authorization administered pursuant to the Export Administration Regulations. 2. Publication of standards and factors: The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register the standards and factors that licensing officers should consider when considering a license under a presumption of denial standard. 3. Establishment of technical advisory committees: The bill establishes technical advisory committees to advise the Secretary on various topics, including computing technologies, biotechnologies, automation, aerospace and space technologies, advanced materials, weapons of mass destruction, emerging and foundational technologies, regulations, and procedures.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties and stakeholders include:

1. Exporters and importers of sensitive technologies 2. National security experts 3. Technical specialists from relevant industries 4. Academic experts in relevant fields 5. Government agencies, including the Department of Commerce, Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy

**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact and implications of HR 8284 include:

1. Enhanced national security: The bill aims to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to foreign adversaries, which could enhance national security. 2. Streamlined export control license administration process: The bill's provisions could lead to a more efficient and effective export control license administration process. 3. Increased transparency: The publication of standards and factors for licensing officers could increase transparency in the export control license administration process.

In conclusion, HR 8284 is a bill that aims to enhance the administration of export control licenses under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018. While the bill's provisions may have potential benefits, such as enhanced national security and streamlined export control license administration, it is crucial to consider the potential implications for affected parties and stakeholders. As a self-serving billionaire political analyst, I will continue to monitor the progress of this bill and assess its potential impact on my business interests.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$500,500

20 donors

PACs

Organizations

$4,300

Committees

Individuals

$496,200

No PAC contributions found

SOUTH SPUR LP

1 transaction

$3,300

TRACEY FOX KING & WALTERS

1 transaction

$1,000

No committee contributions found

CHILDS, JOHN W.

2 transactions

$88,400

CHILDS, JOHN W

2 transactions

$71,800

LANIER, BECKY MRS.

1 transaction

$50,000

LANIER, MARK W.

1 transaction

$50,000

CARLTON, C. CRAIG MR.

1 transaction

$25,000

LUROS, HILARY

1 transaction

$25,000

WAHID, M RON

1 transaction

$25,000

NASH, JERRY A.

1 transaction

$23,200

HALILI, RUZHDI

1 transaction

$19,000

YACOUB, CLAUDE

1 transaction

$15,800

FERGUSON, KENNETH B. MR.

1 transaction

$15,000

MARTIN, EDWARD E. MR. JR.

1 transaction

$13,200

ADAMS, MARK E. MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

JAIN, ANURAG

1 transaction

$13,200

MORAN, PATRICK J. MR.

1 transaction

$13,200

YALAMANCHILI, CHOWDARY V. MR.

1 transaction

$12,000

HYSENI, EKREM

1 transaction

$11,600

GRANIERI, ROBERT

1 transaction

$11,600

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP

OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY

$1,000

Feb 24, 2024

BATMASIAN, JAMES

INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 27, 2023

BATMASIAN, JAMES

IndividualBOCA RATON, FL

$6,600

Sep 29, 2023

AUSTIN, ROBERT

UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN

IndividualDALLAS, TX

$6,600

Jul 18, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 15, 2024

SILVERMAN, JEFFREY

IndividualSURFSIDE, FL

$6,534

Feb 22, 2024

SCALA, MARY ELLEN

RETIRED • RETIRED

IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY

$5,300

Aug 27, 2023

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

SELF • PRESIDENT

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 24, 2024

DEUTSCH, SHMULEY

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,900

Jun 25, 2024

PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL

GOLDEN TASTE • CEO

IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY

$3,400

Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Olszewski, Johnny [D-MD-2]

ID: O000176

Top Contributors

CAPITOL STRATEGIES LLC

OrganizationANNAPOLIS, MD

$3,300

Aug 11, 2023

F L & M CORPORATION

OrganizationBALTIMORE, MD

$600

Jul 28, 2024

F L & M CORPORATION

OrganizationBALTIMORE, MD

$600

Jul 10, 2024

JONES JUNCTION, INC.

OrganizationBEL AIR, MD

$500

Mar 29, 2024

JONES JUNCTION, INC.

OrganizationBEL AIR, MD

$500

Mar 31, 2024

BURTON, ALICE L.

BURTON POLICY CONSULTING LLC • OTHER

IndividualOWINGS MILLS, MD

$4,000

Mar 19, 2024

BERNDT, RICHARD O.

GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES LLP • ATTORNEY

IndividualBALTIMORE, MD

$3,300

Sep 26, 2024

SIDH, SUSHANT

CAPITOL STRATEGIES • CONSULTING

IndividualANNAPOLIS, MD

$3,300

Aug 28, 2024

DAVIS, JAMES C

REDWOOD CAPITAL • ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT

IndividualHANOVER, MD

$3,300

Jul 2, 2024

GILL, GARY T.

MACKENZIE VENTURES • CEO

IndividualLUTHERVILLE, MD

$3,300

Jul 30, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

Show Also Donated To

PACs

Organizations

Individuals

Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Showing 36 nodes and 39 connections

Total contributions: $39

Top Donors - Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

2 Orgs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 2 harmed.

−Semiconductors & Hardwareconfidence 0.90
Section 4 requires review and reporting on the implementation of the interim final rule regarding 'Implementation of Additional Due Diligence Measures for Advanced Computing Integrated Circuits', which directly impacts semiconductor export controls and could lead to stricter regulations affecting the industry.
−AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Section 3(g)(2)(A) establishes a technical advisory committee for 'Computing technologies and information systems, including semiconductors, microelectronics, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing', indicating increased oversight and potential regulatory scrutiny for AI and cloud technologies.
+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
The bill enhances export control administration and establishes technical advisory committees that include aerospace and space technologies (Section 3(g)(2)(D)), which could lead to more defense contracts and streamlined licensing for defense-related exports.
+Aerospace (Commercial)confidence 0.75
Section 3(g)(2)(D) specifically includes 'Aerospace and space technologies' as a topic for technical advisory committees, suggesting potential benefits for commercial aerospace through improved export licensing processes.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. McCaul, Michael T. [R-TX-10])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

AI & Cloud Infrastructure$9,900
from 2 contributions
- HARRIS, JOSH$9,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong

Vector: 64%

Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8284 directly implements Project 2025's call to strengthen export controls under the Bureau of Industry and Security to prevent technology transfer to adversaries like China, enhance national security, and protect critical and emerging technologies through stricter licensing and interagency coordination."

Key themes:export controlstechnology transfer preventionChina strategic competitionnational securityemerging technologies

— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 71%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8284 aligns closely with Project 2025's goals by enhancing interagency coordination, increasing transparency in licensing decisions, and strengthening controls on sensitive technologies to prevent adversary access—core objectives in the Commerce section of Project 2025."

Key themes:export control licensinginteragency processtransparencynational securitytechnology transfer restrictions

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 71%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8284 aligns closely with Project 2025's goals for modernizing export controls, particularly through enhancing interagency coordination, establishing a presumption of denial standard, and tightening licensing practices to prevent technology transfer to foreign adversaries like China and Russia."

Key themes:export control modernizationpresumption of denialinteragency coordinationtechnology transfer restrictionsnational security focus

— 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers. — 674 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The next few years will prove or disprove the assertion that the U.S. stands on the precipice of a Cold War with China. Many believe that a Cold War has already begun; if so, then strategic decoupling from China is necessary and, fundamentally, any exports of goods, software, and technology to countries of concern, whether directly or indirectly, should be prohibited or controlled in the absence of good cause (e.g., humanitarian and medical aid, food aid). Entity List and Sanctions. There are currently just over 500 Chinese and over 500 Russian companies on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, which reg- ulates exports of controlled and uncontrolled items to designated entities. Given China’s Civil–Military Fusion Strategy and Russia’s massive war efforts facili- tated by a broad range of the Russian economy, BIS must add more entities to the Entity List and apply a license review “policy of denial” that prohibits exports to these entities. Entity List parties that violate export controls should be placed on the BIS Denied Persons List (and thereby lose export privileges) and, if the violations are significant enough, they should also be sanctioned by the Department of Treasury. Data Transfer and Apps Used for Surveillance. Department of Commerce leadership should work across government agencies to address privacy and data concerns arising out of “big tech” from national security and export control per- spectives. In particular, they should draft and implement an executive order (EO) based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which expands export control authority beyond ECRA’s scope (goods, software, technology) to regulate and restrict exports of U.S. persons’ data to countries of concern. The EO should establish a framework for the types of personal data subject to export controls and licensing policy by country, and the BIS should implement the EO through regulations. BIS should additionally designate app providers (such as WeChat and Byte Dance/TikTok) known for undermining U.S. national security through data collection, surveillance, and influence operations, to the Entity List. This listing would prevent app users from program updates, which would quickly make these apps non-operational in the United States. NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION Break Up NOAA. The single biggest Department of Commerce agency outside of decennial census years is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, which houses the National Weather Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, and other components. NOAA garners $6.5 billion of the department’s $12 billion annual operational budget and accounts for more than half of the department’s personnel in non-decadal Census years (2021 figures). NOAA consists of six main offices: l The National Weather Service (NWS);

Department of Commerce

Strong

Vector: 69%

Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 8284 aligns closely with Project 2025's goals by enhancing BIS's export control administration, increasing transparency, strengthening interagency coordination, and improving oversight—key themes in the policy directive. Both emphasize modernizing licensing procedures, expanding technical input, and ensuring national security through stricter controls on emerging technologies."

Key themes:export control licensinginteragency coordinationtransparency and reportingtechnology safeguardsCongressional oversight

Trade

Weak

Vector: 62%

Pages: 834-836AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on enhancing export control administration and national security licensing, while Project 2025's Trade section emphasizes tariff repeal, trade agreement restoration, and WTO reform—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond broad trade policy concerns."

Key themes:trade policynational securityexport controls

— 801 — Trade l Repeal the Jones Act,48 a century-old “Buy American” maritime law that has decimated the U.S. shipbuilding industry. l Work with Congress to restore the President’s Trade Promotion Authority, which would expedite the negotiation of trade agreements with the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Taiwan, the European Union, and other allies, and keep trade-unrelated provisions out of trade agreements. l Restore the World Trade Organization’s dispute resolution process to full strength. l Create a successor to the WTO (assuming that it has been fatally wounded) that is open only to liberal democracies. This would prevent authoritarian countries like China from abusing the organization for their own ends. l Adopt a multi-pronged China strategy to convince the Chinese government to reform its illiberal human rights and trade policies. l Rejoin the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whose 11 members are developing institutional trade norms in an important geopolitical region without U.S. input or involvement. l Reorient the proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity to focus only on trade issues, which it currently ignores in favor of progressive wish-list policies. l Strengthen diplomatic pressure (in concert with allies) against Beijing’s abuses. Encourage cultural and intellectual engagement with the Chinese people, remembering that blue jeans and rock ’n’ roll helped to win the Cold War. Tariff Relief. When people try something repeatedly and it still doesn’t work, they should stop doing it—especially when the consequences turn out to be just what conservative economists have long predicted they would be.49 With tariffs, the proper reform is not only to get rid of the individual tariffs that have backfired, but also to build institutional safeguards against future abuse. We are five years into the biggest experiment with tariffs since the Great Depres- sion, and the results are in: The new tariffs raise consumer prices for ordinary Americans by about $1,200 per household every year50 and benefit only a small number of special interests. Steel and aluminum tariffs, enacted on national security grounds, angered allies. Beijing made not a single substantive reform in — 802 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise response to four rounds of tariffs plus an attempted Phase One agreement. The Biden Administration has left the tariffs in place and is expanding them to pursue progressive policy goals. The first order of business for a new Administration that is focused on American workers and consumers is to repeal all tariffs enacted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 196251 and Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.52 The President can do this unilaterally, and Congress can do it through legislation. The second order of business requires Congress to pass legislation repealing Sections 232, 201, and 301. The U.S. Constitution places all taxing authority with Congress53 and none with the President. Congress used those provisions of law to delegate some of its taxing authority to the President because it was having trouble passing “clean” tariff legislation in the 1960s and 1970s. Unless and until this constitutional question about delegation is addressed, important reforms are available to the next Congress and the next President. Congress faced a problem of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s. As a whole, Members generally wanted to lower tariffs, but few individual Members were will- ing to remove tariffs that benefited special interests in their districts. Trade bills were invariably watered down through amendments and logrolling. The thinking was that the President, whose constituency is the entire nation, would be less prone to special-interest pleading than Members of Congress would be, so Congress del- egated some of its tariff-making authority to the President in 1962 and 1974 trade legislation. Delegating tariff-making might have worked in the short run, but in the long run, it was both constitutionally dubious and ripe for abuse. That came to pass in 2018. The Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs, invoked in 2018 against Canada, Europe, and other allies on national security grounds, raised car prices by an aver- age of $250 per vehicle and gave America the world’s highest steel prices. They also harmed the construction, canned food and beverage, and other metal-us- ing industries. While this may have benefited the steel industry itself, each steel job saved cost an average of $650,000 per year that had been taken from elsewhere in the econo- my.54 That is no way to strengthen American manufacturing. The New York Federal Reserve estimated in 2019 that the Section 301 China tariffs cost the average house- hold $831 per year,55 a figure that has likely increased with inflation. The new tariffs have a clear record of failure—as conservative economists almost unanimously warned would be the case. Job number one for the next Administration is to return to sensible trade policies and eliminate the destruc- tive Trump–Biden tariffs. Strengthening American Manufacturing. The decline of American manu- facturing is a common political trope in both parties, typically invoked before a call for more government intervention. This narrative has several problems. One is that

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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