The bill
BRACE Act
HR. 9615, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Vehicles & Batteries.
Sponsored by
Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]
ID: M001215
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9615, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Vehicles & Batteries.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
25 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 443-445 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
September 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9615 – The BRACE Act (Battery Recycling for America's Competitive Economy Act)** *119th Congress, 2d Session*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The BRACE Act purports to address the growing environmental and safety hazards posed by end-of-life lithium-ion batteries—ubiquitous in everything from smartphones to electric vehicles—by establishing a federal framework for their recycling and recovery of critical minerals. Ostensibly, it aims to reduce fire risks in landfills, curb toxic leakage, and bolster domestic supply chains for materials like lithium, cobalt, and nickel. In reality, it’s a belated, half-measured attempt to clean up a mess decades in the making, driven more by panic over supply chain vulnerabilities than genuine environmental stewardship. The bill’s lofty title masks a reactive patch job: instead of preventing waste through better design or extended producer responsibility, it focuses on managing the fallout after batteries have already become hazardous e-waste.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends two key statutes: - **Section 2** creates interim EPA rules for lithium-ion battery handling *until* a formal universal waste rule is issued within 18 months. It subjects storage facilities to stricter standards—applying large quantity handler universal waste requirements (40 CFR §§ 273.33, 273.35–.37) even if they’re not formally classified as such—while also imposing transport and labeling rules as if batteries weren’t being stored at all (per 40 CFR § 273.60(b)). This contradictory dual-standard approach is regulatory schizophrenia, designed to appease both industry (by delaying full rulemaking) and activists (by imposing tougher interim controls). - **Section 3** updates the Mercury-Containing and Rechargeable Battery Management Act by replacing outdated 1995 EPA regulations with a reference to the current universal waste framework (40 CFR Part 273), effectively folding lithium-ion batteries into an existing—but inadequate—regulatory bucket.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Battery manufacturers and recyclers** face imminent compliance costs under interim rules, though they’ll likely lobby to weaken the final rule. - **Waste handlers and municipalities** gain clearer (if burdensome) guidance but inherit liability for fires and contamination. - **Consumers** see no direct benefit—no take-back mandates, no fees on producers, no design incentives. They’re expected to magically dispose of batteries correctly, despite zero infrastructure or education. - **The EPA** gets another unfunded mandate to draft a complex rule in 18 months—about as realistic as expecting a sober congressman. - **Taxpayers** ultimately foot the bill for enforcement, cleanup, and the inevitable failures of voluntary compliance.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** If implemented competently (a dubious assumption), the BRACE Act could reduce landfill fires, recover valuable minerals, and create a nascent recycling industry. But given the absence of funding, producer accountability, or consumer education, it’s more likely to become another ignored regulation—honored in the breach. The real impact? It lets Congress *look* proactive on clean energy and national security while avoiding the hard truths: that recycling alone can’t solve a waste crisis born of planned obsolescence, and that without mandates on producers, this is just expensive theater. In short, it’s a bandage on a bullet wound—well-intentioned, perhaps, but catastrophically insufficient. The BRACE Act doesn’t fix the disease; it just labels the symptoms and hopes no one notices the patient is still bleeding out.
Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: R000599
Top Contributors
70
ID: M001226
Top Contributors
31
ID: H001086
Top Contributors
20
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 64 nodes and 57 connections
Total contributions: $57
Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 4 helped.
Section 2(c) supports the recycling of lithium-ion batteries, which is crucial for the electric vehicle industry, by considering universal waste requirements and regulatory changes to support recycling and recovery of critical minerals.
Section 2(c) aims to support the recovery of critical minerals, which can benefit energy infrastructure by promoting a stable supply of essential materials.
Section 2(c) considers regulatory changes to support the recycling of lithium-ion batteries, which can benefit the semiconductor and hardware industry by ensuring a stable supply of critical materials.
Section 2(c) supports the recycling and recovery of lithium-ion batteries, which can benefit the renewable energy industry by promoting sustainable energy storage solutions.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Miller-Meeks, Mariannette [R-IA-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The BRACE Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on securing domestic supply chains for critical minerals and supporting clean energy infrastructure, particularly through enhancing lithium-ion battery recycling to reduce reliance on imports and strengthen energy security. While not directly tied to grid security or DOE-specific initiatives cited in the Project 2025 excerpt, it supports broader energy independence and clean energy transition goals referenced in the document."
— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.
AI Analysis:
"The BRACE Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on energy security and critical mineral supply chains by promoting domestic recycling of lithium-ion batteries to reduce reliance on imports and support clean energy technologies, though it does not directly address DOE's core missions in nuclear energy, grid reliability, or environmental cleanup highlighted in the provided text."
— 414 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 81. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Technology Transitions, “About Us: Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ technologytransitions/mission-0 (accessed February 13, 2023). 82. Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR); Basic Energy Sciences (BES); Biological and Environmental Research (BER); Fusion Energy Sciences (FES); High-Energy Physics (HEP); Nuclear Physics (NP); Isotope R&D and Production (IRP); and Accelerator R&D and Production (ARDAP). U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, pp. 10–14, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-5- science-v2.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 83. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act authorizes $50 billion for the Office of Science. U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by Secretary Granholm on Congressional Passage of the CHIPS and Science Act,” July 28, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-granholm-congressional-passage-chips-and- science-act (accessed February 13, 2023). 84. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, p. 7, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe- fy2023-budget-volume-5-science-v2.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 85. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/em/ mission (accessed March 1, 2023). 86. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Cleanup Sites,” https://www.energy.gov/ em/cleanup-sites (accessed March 1, 2023). 87. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE’s Environmental Liability,” GAO-21-585R, June 2021, p. 2, https:// www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-585r.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 88. Chart, “EM’s Annual Spending and Estimated Environmental Liability (Fiscal Years 2011–2020),” in ibid., p. 1. 89. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 90. Ibid. 91. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE Needs Greater Leadership Stability and Commitment to Accomplish Cleanup Mission, GAO-22-104805, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104805. pdf#:~:text=DOE%20Needs%20Greater%20Leadership%20Stability%20and%20Commitment%20to,May%20 2022%20GAO-22-104805%20United%20States%20Government%20Accountability%20Office May 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023). 92. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 93. 93. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title I, Subtitle B. 94. Ibid., Title III, § 304. 95. See, for example, Chapter 4, “The Need for Geologic Disposal,” in Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012, pp. 27–31, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 96. Press release, “DOE Announces $16 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 20, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-16-million- support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel (accessed February 14, 2023). 97. U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2022, DOE/CF-0191, p. 58, https://www. energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/fy-2022-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 98. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title III, § 302. 99. Ibid., p. 57. 100. Table, “Department of Energy Comparative Organization by Congressional Control, FY 2023,” p. 5, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, “FY 2023 Budget Justification: Summary Budget Documents,” https://www.energy.gov/cfo/articles/fy-2023-budget-justification (accessed March 13, 2023). 101. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Missions,” https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/missions#:~:text=NNSA%20ensures%20the%20United%20States%20maintains%20a%20safe%2C,of%20 nuclear%20and%20radiological%20terrorism%20around%20the%20world (accessed March 2, 2023). — 415 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 102. S. 1059, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, 106th Congress, October 5, 1999, §§ 3201–3299, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ65/PLAW-106publ65.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 103. See Geller, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons.” 104. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20, https://media.defense. gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed March 2, 2023). 105. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Plutonium Pit Production,” https:// www.energy.gov/nnsa/plutonium-pit-production (accessed March 13, 2023). 106. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 27. 107. 16 U.S. Code § 824o, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824o (accessed March 2, 2023). 108. 16 U.S. Code § 824o-1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824o-1 (accessed March 2, 2023). 109. For example, the California blackouts in August 2020 and the Texas blackouts and deaths in February 2021. 110. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Announcement: Extreme Weather Heightens Reliability Risks This Summer,” May 18, 2022, https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/May%2018%202022%20SRA%20 Announcement.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 111. Ethan Howland, “ISO-NE, ERCOT, MISO Face Possible Capacity Shortfalls in Extreme Winter Weather: FERC,” Utility Dive, October 21, 2022, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/FERC-iso-ne-ercot-miso-extreme-winter- weather-report/634682/ (accessed February 14, 2023), and North American Energy Reliability Corporation, “Announcement: NERC Warns Generation Resources Tight in Large Portion of North America This Winter,” November 17, 2022, https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/2022%20WRA%20Release%20final.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 112. Note that the challenges to the grid are coming mainly from subsidized renewable resources. Renewable resources have beneficial attributes, and the electric grid can benefit from embracing an all-of-the-above approach to power generation. 113. See U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Glossary: Reserve Margin,” https:// www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=reserve_margin (accessed February 14, 2023). 114. Dan Frosch and Ginger Adams Otis, “North Carolina Power Outage Leaves 33,000 Without Electricity After Substation Attack,” The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ attack-on-north-carolina-power-substations-leaves-45-000-without-electricity-11670200585 (accessed February 14, 2023). 115. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Power Sales and Markets: RTOs and ISOs,” last updated May 3, 2022, https://www.ferc.gov/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos (accessed February 14, 2023). 116. Such as the blackouts and shortages in California (August 2020, summer 2022) and Texas (February 2021, summer 2022). 117. See notes 110 and 111, supra; North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “2022 Summer Reliability Assessment,” May 2022, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_ SRA_2022.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023); and North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “2022–2023 Winter Reliability Assessment,” November 2022, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20 Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2022.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 118. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Building for the Future Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 86 (May 4, 2022), pp. 26504–26611, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2022-05-04/pdf/2022-08973.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023), and U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 127 (July 5, 2022), pp. 39934–40032, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-07-05/pdf/2022-13470.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The BRACE Act focuses on domestic battery recycling and environmental regulation, while the Project 2025 policy centers on export controls, national security, and restricting technology transfers to adversarial nations. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address export licensing, end-use checks, or Commerce Department authority over emerging technologies."
— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Tradeable Energy Performance Standards Act
Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Department of Energy relating to "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Coolers and Walk-In Freezers".
CORE Act of 2025