NRC Staff Pay Alignment Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/9614
Last Updated: August 20, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

ID: M001226

Follow the money

The bill

NRC Staff Pay Alignment Act

HR. 9614, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.

The sponsor

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$74,000 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy" section, p. 106-108 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

July 13, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

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3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 9614 – NRC Staff Pay Alignment Act: A Symptomatic Band-Aid on a Festering Bureaucratic Wound**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of HR 9614 is to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to grant the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman authority to set compensation for certain career appointees up to 110% of the Senior Executive Service (SES) maximum pay rate. In plain English: it’s a pay raise for NRC lifers who’ve somehow avoided promotion into the SES but still want to be paid like they belong there. The bill’s title—*NRC Staff Pay Alignment Act*—is a masterpiece of bureaucratic euphemism. What it really aligns is not pay with performance, but pay with the quiet desperation of career civil servants who’ve realized the SES is a club they’ll never join, so they’re lobbying Congress to rewrite the rules instead.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill inserts a new subsection (d) into Section 161B of the Atomic Energy Act, allowing the NRC Chairman to unilaterally boost pay for “career appointees” (defined via Title 5, §3132(a)—essentially, non-political, tenured federal employees) without regard to when they were hired. It also tweaks reporting requirements to track how many such appointees receive these bumped salaries and ensures the change doesn’t interfere with performance appraisal certification—because God forbid we accidentally incentivize competence. A conforming amendment to the ADVANCE Act of 2024 simply adds subsection (d) to a list of referenced sections, proving that even the bill’s housekeeping is an afterthought.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **NRC Career Appointees**: The direct beneficiaries—mid-to-senior level technocrats who’ve hit a pay ceiling and now get a legislative loophole to inflate their salaries. - **NRC Chairman**: Gains unilateral power to reward loyalty or silence dissent via pay bumps, bypassing SES scrutiny. - **Taxpayers**: Foot the bill for what amounts to a retention bonus for people who couldn’t cut it in the SES but are too entrenched to fire. - **Watchdogs & Good-Government Groups**: Will likely ignore this, because it’s too boring to outrage over—even though it’s a classic case of mission creep disguised as administrative efficiency. - **SES Members**: May quietly resent the creation of a “SES-lite” pay tier that undermines the prestige (and exclusivity) of their own compensation band.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This isn’t about fixing a pay gap—it’s about avoiding the hard work of reform. The NRC, like many agencies, struggles with rigid GS/Ses pay structures that don’t reward niche technical expertise. Instead of overhauling the system, Congress is carving out a special privilege for a favored class—creating a two-tiered bureaucracy where the connected get paid like SES without the accountability. The real disease? A legislature that would rather pass opaque, niche pay tweaks than confront the fact that federal compensation is a relic of 1949, designed for a world where lifetime employment was a virtue, not a liability. Expect more of these “alignment” acts—each one a tiny tumor in the body politic, growing unnoticed until the whole system can’t stand upright.

In summary: HR 9614 is less a reform and more a palliative for bureaucratic envy—prescribing a raise to numb the pain of irrelevance, while pretending it’s about fairness. The patient isn’t getting better. They’re just getting more expensive to keep alive.

Related Topics

Labor & Employment PolicyResearch & Innovation PolicyCongressional Rules & Procedures
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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$74,000
25 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$11,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$62,900

No PAC contributions found

1
SCARINCI & HOLLENBECK
2 transactions
$3,600
2
ACTBLUE
5 transactions
$3,500
3
SAMPSON FOR ASSEMBLY
1 transaction
$1,000
4
FRANK X SCHILLARI FOR SHERIFF
1 transaction
$1,000
5
SOPHIA ROOFTOP LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
6
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
MUHAJ, AHMET
1 transaction
$3,500
2
LEFRAK, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
3
MASON, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$3,300
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ECKART, SCOTT
1 transaction
$3,300
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CECCHI, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
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GURAL, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$3,300
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GARCIA, GILBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
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GARCIA, DEANNA
1 transaction
$3,300
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HERLINSKY, VICTOR
1 transaction
$3,300
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COHEN, WAYNE
1 transaction
$3,300
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LEFRAK, HARRISON
1 transaction
$3,300
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DANG, RUBY
1 transaction
$3,300
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FISHER, CYNTHIA
1 transaction
$3,300
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AGNELLO, JOHN M.
1 transaction
$3,300
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DANG, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$3,300
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LEFRAK, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
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HEGYI, ALBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BROWNSTEIN, NORMAN
1 transaction
$3,300
19
AGNELLO, JOHN M
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 55 nodes and 72 connections

Total contributions: $72

Top Donors - Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Nuclear Powerconfidence 0.80

    Section 2 of the bill amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to provide compensation authority for certain career appointees, which may benefit the nuclear power industry by allowing for more competitive pay for its employees, as seen in subsection (d) of Section 161B.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 106-108AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on performance-based compensation and merit pay by granting the NRC Chairman authority to adjust pay for career appointees based on performance and retention needs, reinforcing accountability and managerial discretion in federal workforce management."

Key themes:merit payperformance appraisalcompensation flexibilitymanagerial accountabilityfederal workforce reform

— 73 — Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy that would change regularly to depress cheating. President Donald Trump’s OPM planned to implement such changes but was delayed because of legal concerns over possible disparate impact. Courts have agreed to review the consent decree if the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures setting the technical requirements for sound exams are reformed. A government that is unable to select employees based on KSA-like test qualifications cannot work, and the OPM must move forward on this very basic personnel management obligation. The Centrality of Performance Appraisal. In the meantime, the OPM must manage the workforce it has. Before they can reward or discipline federal employees, managers must first identify who their top performers are and who is performing less than adequately. In fact, as Ludwig von Mises proved in his classic Bureaucracy,14 unlike the profit-and-loss evaluation tool used in the private sector, government performance measurement depends totally on a functioning appraisal system. If they cannot be identified in the first place within a functioning appraisal system, it is impossible to reward good performance or correct poor performance. The problem is that the collegial atmosphere of a bureaucracy in a multifaceted appraisal system that is open to appeals makes this a very challenging ideal to implement successfully. The GAO reported more recently that overly high and widely spread perfor- mance ratings were again plaguing the government, with more than 99 percent of employees rated fully successful or above by their managers, a mere 0.3 percent rated as minimally successful, and 0.1 percent actually rated unacceptable.15 Why? It is human nature that no one appreciates being told that he or she is less than outstanding in every way. Informing subordinates in a closely knit bureaucracy that they are not performing well is difficult. Rating compatriots is even consid- ered rude and unprofessional. Moreover, managers can be and often are accused of racial or sexual discrimination for a poor rating, and this discourages honesty. In 2018, President Trump issued Executive Order 1383916 requiring agen- cies to reduce the time for employees to improve performance before corrective action could be taken; to initiate disciplinary actions against poorly performing employees more expeditiously; to reiterate that agencies are obligated to make employees improve; to reduce the time for employees to respond to allegations of poor performance; to mandate that agencies remind supervisors of expiring employee probationary periods; to prohibit agencies from entering into settlement agreements that modify an employee’s personnel record; and to reevaluate proce- dures for agencies to discipline supervisors who retaliate against whistleblowers. Unfortunately, the order was overturned by the Biden Administration,17 so it will need to be reintroduced in 2025. The fact remains that meaningfully evaluating employees’ performance is a critical part of a manager’s job. In the Reagan appraisal process, managers were evaluated on how they themselves rated their subordinates. This is critical to — 74 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise responsibility and improved management. It is essential that political executives build policy goals directly into employee appraisals both for mission success and for employees to know what is expected. Indistinguishable from their coworkers on paper, hard-working federal employees often go unrewarded for their efforts and are often the system’s greatest critics. Federal workers who are performing inadequately get neither the benefit of an honest appraisal nor clear guidance on how to improve. Political executives should take an active role in supervising per- formance appraisals of career staff, not unduly delegate this responsibility to senior career managers, and be willing to reward and support good performers. Merit Pay. Performance appraisal means little to daily operations if it is not tied directly to real consequences for success as well as failure. According to a survey of major U.S. private companies—which, unlike the federal government, also have a profit-and-loss evaluation—90 percent use a system of merit pay for performance based on some type of appraisal system. Despite early efforts to institute merit pay throughout the federal government, however, compensation is still based primarily on seniority rather than merit. Merit pay for executives and managers was part of the Carter reforms and was implemented early in the Reagan presidency. Beginning in the summer of 1982, the Reagan OPM entered 18 months of negotiations with House and Senate staff on extending merit pay to the entire workforce. Long and detailed talks between the OPM and both Democrats and Republicans in Congress ensued, and a final agreement was reached in 1983 that supposedly ensured the passage of legislation creating a new Performance Management and Recognition System (PMRS) for all, (not just management) GS-13 through GS-15 employees. Meanwhile, the OPM issued regulations to expand the role of performance related to pay throughout the entire workforce, but congressional allies of the employee unions, led by Representative Steny Hoyer (D) of government employee– rich Maryland, stoutly resisted this extension of pay-for-performance and, with strong union support, used the congressional appropriations process to block OPM administrative pay reforms. Bonuses for SES career employees survived, but per- formance appraisals became so high and widely distributed that there was little relationship between performance and remuneration. Ever since the original merit pay system for federal managers (GM-13 through GM-15 grade levels, just below the SES) was allowed to expire in September 1993, little to nothing has been done either to reinstate the federal merit pay program for managers or to distribute performance rating evaluations for the SES, much less to extend the program to the remainder of the workforce. A reform-friendly President and Congress might just provide the opportunity to create a more comprehensive performance plan; in the meantime, however, political executives should use exist- ing pay and especially fiscal awards strategically to reward good performance to the degree allowed by law.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 440-442AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns with Project 2025's goal of reforming the NRC to improve its efficiency and effectiveness in regulating nuclear energy, particularly by enhancing its ability to retain experienced staff through modernized compensation authority. This supports the broader objective of reducing regulatory barriers to nuclear power advancement."

Key themes:NRC reformregulatory efficiencynuclear energy advancementstaff retentioncompensation modernization

— 408 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FERC is considering policy statements that would consider GHG emissions as part of its NEPA review and its NGA determination as to whether approval of an LNG export facility is consistent with the public interest. New Policies Since Congress through the NGA has already determined that LNG exports to countries with free trade agreements are in the public interest,129 and because LNG exports help to ensure America’s ability to support our friends and allies around the world while also supporting domestic natural gas production, FERC: l Should not use environmental issues like climate change as a reason to stop LNG projects. l Should ensure that the natural gas pipelines that are needed deliver more of the product to market, both for domestic use and export, and are reviewed, developed and constructed in a timely manner. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mission/Overview The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974130 created the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC). Before then, the commercial nuclear industry was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.131 Importantly, the AEC was responsible for encouraging and regulat- ing commercial nuclear power. Broad criticism of this dual function was a major factor in the establishment of the NRC, which held regulatory authority while the newly established Department of Energy held the advocacy function. Today, the NRC is responsible for a broad range of regulatory activities, including reactor safety, oversight of nuclear materials, and protection against radiation as well as permitting new reactors, certifying new reactor designs, and regulating nuclear waste management activities. Needed Reforms In 1989, the NRC established alternative licensing processes that were meant to provide a more predictable and efficient regulatory pathway for new Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by combining construction and operating nuclear power plant licenses, allowing for Early Site Permits, and establishing a framework for pre- approval of reactor designs. More recently, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act directed the NRC to establish a technology-neutral licensing process for new, advanced reactor technologies.132 Despite these efforts, the NRC remains a significant cost and regulatory barrier to new nuclear power. Especially — 409 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions frustrating is that these costs to a large extent are due to the agencies being overly prescriptive rather than outcomes-focused and fall on well-known and understood LWR reactor technologies. New Policies While refocusing its regulatory efforts on new reactor technologies, the NRC should also continue to ensure the security of radiological sources and mitigate cybersecurity risks across the industry. Applications for Combined Operating Licenses (COLs) and design certifications that rely on light-water technology should generally be completed within two years. Early Site Permits should gener- ally be issued within one year for construction on or adjacent to an existing reactor site. Additionally, the NRC should: l Expedite the review and approval of license extensions of existing reactors, which will require the NRC to streamline and focus its NEPA review process. l Set clear radiation exposure and protection standards by eliminating ALARA (“as low as reasonably achievable”) as a regulatory principle and setting clear standards according to radiological risk and dose rather than arbitrary objectives. l Work with Congress to reform its funding approach so that licensee fees are generally required for activities that are specific to a regulated entity, with other agency costs being provided through normal appropriations. Budget In FY 2022, the NRC was required to recover approximately 85 percent of its $887.7 million budget through licensee fees.133 The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act requires the NRC to recover nearly all of its costs through fees. These reforms would likely not cost additional money but could rebalance the fee-versus-appropriations calculation. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was the work of many individuals. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but I wish to give special thanks to Brent Bennett, Willis Bixby, Travis Fisher, Ben Lieberman, Brian McCormack, Tom Pyle, Mark Robeck, Daniel Simmons, Jack Spencer, Katie Tubb, and David Walsh. Though informed by many, the author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any particular individual.

Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 112-114AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on enhancing NRC's compensation flexibility to improve recruitment and retention of career employees, which aligns with Project 2025's broader goal of managing the bureaucracy through performance-based personnel reforms. While both address career civil service effectiveness, the bill does not directly implement Project 2025's specific proposals like freeze on top career hiring or performance-based layoff priorities."

Key themes:career civil service reformperformance-based compensationbureaucratic efficiencySenior Executive Service (SES)federal workforce management

— 79 — Central Personnel Agencies: Managing the Bureaucracy What is needed at the beginning is a freeze on all top career-position hiring to prevent “burrowing-in” by outgoing political appointees. Moreover, four fac- tors determine the order in which employees are protected during layoffs: tenure, veterans’ preference, seniority, and performance in that order of importance. Despite several attempts in the House of Representatives during the Trump years to enact legislation that would modestly increase the weight given to performance over time-of-service, the fierce opposition by federal managers associations and unions representing long-serving but not necessarily well-performing constituents explains why the bills failed to advance. A determined President should insist that performance be first and be wary of costly types of reductions-in-force. Impenetrable Bureaucracy. The GAO has identified almost a hundred actions that the executive branch or Congress could take to improve efficiency and effec- tiveness across 37 areas that span a broad range of government missions and functions. It identified 33 actions to address mission fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the 12 areas of defense, economic development, health, homeland security, and information technology. It also identified 59 other opportunities for executive agencies or Congress to reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection across 25 areas of government.20 A logical place to begin would be to identify and eliminate functions and pro- grams that are duplicated across Cabinet departments or spread across multiple agencies. Congress hoped to help this effort by passing the Government Perfor- mance and Results Act of 1993,21 which required all federal agencies to define their missions, establish goals and objectives, and measure and report their per- formance to Congress. Three decades of endless time-consuming reports later, the government continues to grow but with more paper and little change either in performance or in the number of levels between government and the people. The Brookings Institution’s Paul Light emphasizes the importance of the increasing number of levels between the top heads of departments and the people at the bottom who receive the products of government decision-making. He esti- mates that there are perhaps 50 or more levels of impenetrable bureaucracy and no way other than imperfect performance appraisals to communicate between them.22 The Trump Administration proposed some possible consolidations, but these were not received favorably in Congress, whose approval is necessary for most such proposals. The best solution is to cut functions and budgets and devolve respon- sibilities. That is a challenge primarily for Presidents, Congress, and the entire government, but the OPM still needs to lead the way governmentwide in managing personnel properly even in any future smaller government. Creating a Responsible Career Management Service. The people elect a President who is charged by Article 2, Section 3 of the Constitution23 with seeing that the laws are “faithfully executed” with his political appointees democratically linked to that legitimizing responsibility. An autonomous bureaucracy has neither — 80 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise independent constitutional status nor separate moral legitimacy. Therefore, career civil servants by themselves should not lead major policy changes and reforms. The creation of the Senior Executive Service was the top career change intro- duced by the 1978 Carter–Campbell Civil Service Reform Act. Its aim was to professionalize the career service and make it more responsible to the democrat- ically elected commander in chief and his political appointees while respecting the rights due to career employees, very much including those in the top positions. The new SES would allow management to be more flexible in filling and reassigning executive positions and locations beyond narrow specialties for more efficient mission accomplishment and would provide pay and large bonuses to motivate career performance. The desire to infiltrate political appointees improperly into the high career civil service has been widespread in every Administration, whether Democrat or Republican. Democratic Administrations, however, are typically more successful because they require the cooperation of careerists, who generally lean heavily to the Left. Such burrowing-in requires career job descriptions for new positions that closely mirror the functions of a political appointee; a special hiring authority that allows the bypassing of veterans’ preference as well as other preference categories; and the ability to frustrate career candidates from taking the desired position. President Reagan’s OPM began by limiting such SES burrowing-in, arguing that the proper course was to create and fill political positions. This simultane- ously promotes the CSRA principle of political leadership of the bureaucracy and respects the professional autonomy of the career service. But this requires that career SES employees should respect political rights too. Actions such as career staff reserving excessive numbers of key policy positions as “career reserved” to deny them to noncareer SES employees frustrate CSRA intent. Another evasion is the general domination by career staff on SES personnel evaluation boards, the opposite of noncareer executives dominating these critical meeting discussions as expected in the SES. Career training also often underplays the political role in leadership and inculcates career-first policy and value viewpoints. Frustrated with these activities by top career executives, the Trump Adminis- tration issued Executive Order 1395724 to make career professionals in positions that are not normally subject to change as a result of a presidential transition but who discharge significant duties and exercise significant discretion in formulating and implementing executive branch policy and programs an exception to the com- petitive hiring rules and examinations for career positions under a new Schedule F. It ordered the Director of OPM and agency heads to set procedures to prepare lists of such confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, or policy-advocating positions and prepare procedures to create exceptions from civil service rules when careerists hold such positions, from which they can relocate back to the regular civil service after such service. The order was subsequently reversed by President

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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