AI for Secure Networks Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7294
Last Updated: September 13, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

ID: M001226

Follow the money

The bill

AI for Secure Networks Act

HR. 7294, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.

The sponsor

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$74,000 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 720-722 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

August 31, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of H.R. 7294: AI for Secure Networks Act**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 7294 is to mandate a one-year study by the Secretary of Commerce on how artificial intelligence (AI) impacts the security of telecommunications networks. Ostensibly, this is about safeguarding critical infrastructure from cyber threats using cutting-edge tech. In reality, it’s a bureaucratic placebo: Congress, unable or unwilling to pass actual cybersecurity regulations, opts instead to commission another feel-good study that will gather dust alongside the last dozen similar reports. The objective isn’t security—it’s the appearance of action while avoiding hard choices like funding, mandates, or holding telecom giants accountable for their chronically patchwork networks.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill creates no new regulations, standards, or enforcement mechanisms. It merely directs the Secretary of Commerce (via NTIA) to study: - AI’s potential to improve threat detection, zero-trust architectures, resiliency, energy efficiency, and Open RAN/virtualized security integration. - Risks AI poses to telecom security (e.g., adversarial attacks, data poisoning, opaque decision-making). - Requires consultation with the FCC and industry stakeholders. - Mandates a report to Congress within one year, with optional legislative recommendations and a public comment period.

Crucially, it changes *nothing* in existing law. No funding is specified. No deadlines for implementation. No penalties for non-compliance. It’s a study about studying—a legislative Möbius strip designed to look productive while ensuring nothing actually changes.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Telecom giants (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile):** Win either way. If the study finds AI helpful, they get a taxpayer-funded R&D boost for technologies they were already investing in. If risks are highlighted, they can lobby to shape any future rules in their favor. - **AI and cybersecurity contractors:** Stand to gain consulting gigs, study contracts, and follow-on work—classic beltway grift. - **FCC and NTIA:** Get another unfunded mandate to perform, adding to their pile of ignored reports. - **Taxpayers:** Foot the bill for a study that will likely conclude: “AI could help, but also poses risks; more study and voluntary industry cooperation recommended.” - **The public:** Gets nothing but the illusion that Congress is “doing something” about network security while 5G infrastructure remains vulnerable to both cyber threats and corporate neglect.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** Impact: Negligible. Unless Congress acts on the report (unlikely without a crisis), this bill will have zero effect on actual network security. Its real function is political cover—letting members claim they’re “tackling AI threats” while avoiding substantive oversight of an industry that routinely prioritizes shareholder returns over resilience.

Implications: This bill exemplifies the modern legislative approach to complex tech problems: outsource thinking to consultants, delay action with studies, and pretend that understanding a problem is the same as solving it. It’s not just ineffective—it’s insulting. Like prescribing a placebo for a septic wound and calling it preventive care. The only thing this act will securely network is the revolving door between Congress, telecom lobbyists, and the consulting firms that will inevitably profit from the study. In short: another expensive exercise in legislative masturbation—lots of motion, no climax, and everyone involved pretending it meant something.

Related Topics

Research & Innovation PolicyTelecommunications & Broadband AccessCybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$74,000
25 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$11,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$62,900

No PAC contributions found

1
SCARINCI & HOLLENBECK
2 transactions
$3,600
2
ACTBLUE
5 transactions
$3,500
3
SAMPSON FOR ASSEMBLY
1 transaction
$1,000
4
FRANK X SCHILLARI FOR SHERIFF
1 transaction
$1,000
5
SOPHIA ROOFTOP LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
6
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
MUHAJ, AHMET
1 transaction
$3,500
2
LEFRAK, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
3
MASON, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$3,300
4
ECKART, SCOTT
1 transaction
$3,300
5
CECCHI, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,300
6
GURAL, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$3,300
7
GARCIA, GILBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
8
GARCIA, DEANNA
1 transaction
$3,300
9
HERLINSKY, VICTOR
1 transaction
$3,300
10
COHEN, WAYNE
1 transaction
$3,300
11
LEFRAK, HARRISON
1 transaction
$3,300
12
DANG, RUBY
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FISHER, CYNTHIA
1 transaction
$3,300
14
AGNELLO, JOHN M.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
DANG, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$3,300
16
LEFRAK, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HEGYI, ALBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
18
BROWNSTEIN, NORMAN
1 transaction
$3,300
19
AGNELLO, JOHN M
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

ID: P000048

Top Contributors

23

1
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Apr 18, 2024
2
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Jun 30, 2023
3
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 27, 2024
4
DIMEMMO, COLETTE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualFORT MYERS, FL
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
5
PUDWILL, JAMES
IndividualNIPOMO, CA
$6,600
Sep 16, 2024
6
GELBMAN, JOEL
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Sep 16, 2024
7
GELBMAN, JOEL
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Aug 26, 2024
8
PUDWILL, JAMES
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNIPOMO, CA
$6,600
Aug 3, 2024
9
WILSON, CELIA R
OIL AND GAS • SELF-EMPLOYED
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$5,800
Mar 31, 2024
10
WILSON, CELIA R
SELF • OIL AND GAS
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$5,800
Apr 9, 2024

Rep. McClellan, Jennifer L. [D-VA-4]

ID: M001227

Top Contributors

26

1
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 24, 2023
2
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,500
May 24, 2023
3
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 21, 2023
4
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 21, 2023
5
STARLEY LLC
OrganizationNORTH CHESTERFIELD, VA
$250
Oct 13, 2024
6
STARLEY LLC
OrganizationNORTH CHESTERFIELD, VA
$250
Oct 13, 2024
7
RICE, NANCY
LITTLE DIFFICULT RUN • CONSULTANT
IndividualVIENNA, VA
$6,600
Sep 23, 2024
8
RICE, NANCY
LITTLE DIFFICULT RUN • CONSULTANT
IndividualVIENNA, VA
$6,600
Sep 23, 2024
9
ABRAMSON, RONALD D
BUCHANAN INGERSOLL & ROONEY • ATTORNEY
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 15, 2023
10
FRIED, BARBARA J.
FRIED COMPANIES INC. • REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
IndividualCROZET, VA
$3,300
Dec 19, 2023

Rep. Landsman, Greg [D-OH-1]

ID: L000601

Top Contributors

23

1
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Dec 1, 2023
2
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$1,000
Mar 19, 2024
3
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SOSNICK, AARON
IndividualRENO, NV
$3,392
Jun 30, 2024
5
FISHER, CYNTHIA
PATIENTRIGHTSADVOCATE.ORG • FOUNDER AND CHAIRMAN
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
6
HIRSCHTICK, JON
PTC • MANAGER
IndividualLEXINGTON, MA
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
7
PFAUTCH, ROY
SELF EMPLOYED • GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
8
TISCH, JONATHAN
LOEWS HOTELS • EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
9
TISCH, LIZZIE
LTD X LIZZIE TISCH • CHIEF CURATOR
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
10
BEEUWKES, REINIER
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualCONCORD, MA
$3,300
Nov 7, 2023

Rep. Carter, Troy A. [D-LA-2]

ID: C001125

Top Contributors

31

1
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$3,400
Nov 25, 2024
2
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$3,400
Jun 20, 2023
3
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$3,300
Feb 28, 2024
5
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$3,300
Jun 20, 2023
6
TUNICA-BILOXI TRIBE OF LOUISIANA
OrganizationMARKSVILLE, LA
$3,300
Jun 20, 2023
7
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS GENERAL FUND
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Jun 30, 2023
8
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$2,500
Jul 30, 2024
9
THE AUGUST GROUP
OrganizationBATON ROUGE, LA
$1,000
Jul 18, 2024
10
CAPITELLI & WICKER
OrganizationNEW ORLEANS, LA
$1,000
Mar 26, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

22

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELF • ACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELF • MD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELF • REAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 55 nodes and 72 connections

Total contributions: $72

Top Donors - Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8]

Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2(a) requires a study on the impacts of artificial intelligence technology with respect to the security of telecommunications networks, which may lead to improved security solutions and increased resiliency for telecommunications networks.

  • Section 2(a)(1) mentions the use of artificial intelligence technology to improve telecommunications networks, which could benefit AI and cloud infrastructure providers.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.70

    Section 2(a)(1)(A) specifically mentions real-time threat and malware detection and zero trust security solutions, which could benefit cybersecurity companies.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ-8])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 4 contributions
    • GONZALES, MARC$3,300
    • WHITEHOUSE, LIN$500
    • EDWARDS, THOMAS$300

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 62%
Pages: 720-722AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on NTIA's role in telecommunications security, spectrum utilization, and defending U.S. interests in critical infrastructure, particularly through AI-driven network resilience and threat mitigation. Both prioritize securing telecom supply chains and leveraging technology for national security without compromising innovation."

Key themes:NTIA leadershiptelecom securityspectrum utilization5G deploymentnational security

— 687 — Department of Commerce that do not allow open access to their markets should not be setting the standards for markets that do allow open access. The incoming Administration should consider increased government-sponsored participation by private companies and government employees with relevant expertise. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SERVICE The independent National Telecommunications and Information Service (NTIS) is charged with ensuring that federally funded research and data are accessible to the public. NTIS operates through user fees but is largely obsolete due to modern usage of the internet by federal agencies and researchers. NTIS’s functions should be moved to NIST and consolidated with the Tech Transfer and ROI initiatives. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION The National Telecommunications and Information Agency (NTIA) is the exec- utive branch’s statutory lead on telecommunications and information policy. It focuses on broadband access, spectrum utilization, and other issues that are crucial to the high-tech economy. For decades, NTIA has suffered from organizational malaise and will require strong and energetic leadership by political appointees to implement conservative policies. The next Administration will face the primary challenge of rapidly deploying 5G without compromising other priorities. Further recommendations include: l Support free speech and hold big tech accountable. Immediately conduct a thorough review of federal policy regarding free speech online and provide policy solutions to address big tech’s censorship of speech. l Utilize new tools to eliminate threats to national security. Fully implement the Trump Administration’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (ICTS) Executive Order authorities in a way that ensures long-term success and the legal viability of this new national security tool.9 l Expand utilization of federal spectrum. Begin short term, temporary leasing of government allocated spectrum to ensure optimum utilization while preserving federal agency use rights. l Support the commercial space industry. Advocate for licensing decisions at the Federal Communications Commission that continue to enable U.S. dominance in the commercial space industry. — 688 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Defend U.S. interests in international bodies. Strong representation at the International Telecommunication Union should protect the interests of both private and government users of spectrum. The U.S. has differing needs from many other countries, for instance, because of U.S. government satellites and commercial space industry. NTIA should work with the U.S. delegation to ensure maximum adoption of the U.S. position. l Set fresh priorities in broadband grant programs. Reevaluate broadband grant programs and, when possible, establish Administration priorities in how each grant is structured. First and foremost, widespread deployment of infrastructure is needed for 5G adoption in rural and exurban areas, which will be a key factor in future economic competitiveness for these under-served communities. l Review FirstNet. Evaluate the performance and long-term value proposition of FirstNet in view of modern technologies that will render it obsolete. CONCLUSION The above policies, strategies, and tactics will set a new Administration on firm footing that allows the Department of Commerce to assist the President in implementing a bold agenda that delivers economic prosperity and strong national security to the American people. While many of the department’s functions fall outside the remit of the federal government, its unique authorities in diverse areas provide critical tools that can and should be brought to bear in implementing a conservative governing philosophy that keeps Americans safe and provides oppor- tunity for all. AUTHOR’S NOTE: This chapter includes invaluable input from over a dozen alumni of the Department of Commerce and numerous other members of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but James Rockas, Nazak Nikakhtar, Louis Heinzer, Robert Burkett, Iain Murray, Michael Gonzalez, David Legates, and Kristen Eichamer deserve special recognition. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on AI-driven security for telecommunications networks, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening intelligence community capabilities to counter technological threats from China and improving cyber threat information sharing with the private sector. Both address securing critical infrastructure against emerging threats, though the bill is more narrowly focused on AI in telecom while Project 2025 emphasizes broader IC reform and real-time intelligence sharing."

Key themes:cybersecuritycritical infrastructure protectionintelligence sharingAI and emerging threatsprivate sector collaboration

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Intelligence Community

Moderate
Vector: 62%
Pages: 260-262AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on AI in telecommunications security aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on AI and machine learning as critical priorities for the Intelligence Community's IT portfolio, though the bill is civilian-focused while the policy centers on IC-specific technology governance."

Key themes:artificial intelligencemachine learningnetwork securitytelecommunicationsIT portfolio priorities

— 227 — Intelligence Community consider a primary briefer or a rotation of briefers from other IC elements. Addi- tionally, the entirety of the PDB staff and production should be located at ODNI. National Intelligence Council (NIC). The National Intelligence Council is the IC’s premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC’s analysis within a regional (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber, counterproliferation, economics, etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National Intelligence Estimates on major strategic issues with the entire IC, overseeing and deconflicting the annual analytic plans of each agency, and weighing in on day-to-day major analytical issues, sometimes individually (for example, by writing the NIC’s strategic memos or pro- viding detailed expert briefings to the President before major decisions). Historically part of the CIA, the NIC was reorganized into the ODNI as was the PDB. It retains the CIA’s objective analytic culture and is staffed primarily with CIA officers; however, as many as 25 percent of its NIOs over the decades have come from academia or the private sector, bringing in much-needed outside expertise to collate and understand intelligence with perspective and skills that are not necessarily nurtured within the IC. In recent years, there has been a greater emphasis on encouraging officers from other agencies—particularly the DIA, NSA, and FBI—to serve as NIOs or as their deputies. To encourage greater analytic independence and debate, the incoming Admin- istration should require that non-CIA officers comprise at least 50 percent of the NIC’s membership and that the first-among-equals NIC Chairman is an outsider from one of the three major IC agencies with reporting responsibility to the PDDNI. Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analysts regardless of agency would also encourage the continued maturation of analytic cadres and tradecraft at those agencies and give them an equal voice in interagency analytical disputes, which in turn would give the President access to the best thinking and a variety of sources and perspectives from across the entire IC rather than from the CIA alone. IC Chief Information Officer. The Intelligence Community Chief Informa- tion Officer (ICCIO) directs and oversees all aspects of the classified IT budget for all of the IC’s 18 elements. As the DNI’s principal adviser for technology, the ICCIO must be well-versed in technology, acquisitions, operations, and intra-agency coop- eration to advance our technical prowess and simultaneously direct a bureaucracy that, left unchecked, will serve each element’s own preferences. To ensure that procured and implemented technology and policy reflect the Administration’s agenda, the ICCIO must have the support of the DNI and possess the ability to command cooperation between and promote interoperability across IC members. Because of the unique responsibilities entrusted to this position, incumbency has seesawed between political appointees and career civilians; due to its con- gressionally capped salary, the position is often filled by an SES-level member administratively detailed to support the DNI. At times, the ICCIO is incorrectly — 228 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise referred to as the ODNI CIO. By law, and to secure unbiased execution across all of the IC’s 18 elements, the same individual may not serve as ICCIO and ODNI CIO. They are two distinct positions. Critical areas and IC IT portfolio priorities for the ICCIO include but are not limited to: l Transparent accounting and allocation of IT investments across the IC, including commercial cloud computing and storage (C2E); l Recognized and uniform security access for people, systems, and capabilities to enable interoperability across IC elements; l 5G/6G data transmission and network interoperability, which is vital to IC element operations; l Artificial intelligence and machine learning; l Quantum cryptography and post-quantum encryption (PQE); and l Cybersecurity infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have realigned and reassigned management oversight and IT architecture responsibilities to NSA and DHS/CISA, conflicting with ICCIO- delineated roles. An incoming Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member of the DNI staff along with the ODNI General Counsel, IC Chief Financial Officer, and ODNI Chief Operating Officer. The President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress in imple- menting post-quantum encryption at a minimum for IC and Defense systems but preferably throughout the government. The President’s National Security Memo- randum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035”49 needs to be revised in light of the magnitude of the threat. Accounting for the investment that will be needed to secure IT systems for national security should be a top priority. ODNI, CIA, and IC Technology Issues. In recent years, the IC has had a mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelli- gence—needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China’s advancements in technology and data infrastructure. Many of the projects coming out of ODNI and CIA’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) focus on expen- sive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of effort in areas where the private sector and entrepreneurs are already making progress.

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