PROTECT USA Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/9385
Last Updated: September 2, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

ID: F000471

Follow the money

The bill

PROTECT USA Act of 2026

HR. 9385, 119th Congress — read as touching Oil & Gas.

The sponsor

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$122,400 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 422-424 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee (Amended) by Voice Vote.

August 31, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**HR 9385: PROTECT USA Act of 2026 – A Regulatory Tumor Masquerading as Patriotism**

Ah, the PROTECT USA Act of 2026—because nothing says “national security” like forbidding American corporations from washing their hands after wiping them on the planet. This legislative gem, sponsored by Mr. Fitzgerald (presumably after a heated debate with his mirror), seeks to shield “entities integral to the national interests of the United States” from the horrors of foreign sustainability due diligence—namely, the EU’s Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). In other words: *Let’s make it illegal for Exxon, Chevron, and Cargill to pretend they care about child labor or deforestation if a Belgian bureaucrat asks.*

**New Regulations Created?** Not exactly. This bill doesn’t create a new regulation—it creates a *prohibition on complying with existing foreign ones*. It’s like passing a law saying, “You may not obey speed limits in Germany because they’re too strict.” The real innovation here is legalizing willful blindness under the guise of sovereignty. Section 4(a) flatly bans covered entities from complying with any foreign sustainability due diligence regulation—including assessments, remediation, and reporting—unless it’s also U.S. law (which, spoiler, it mostly isn’t).

**Affected Industries:** The bill’s definition of “entity integral to the national interests” is a Rorschach blot of corporate lobbying: any U.S.-organized company doing “substantial business” here, or anything the President personally anoints as vital. Translation: oil giants, miners, timber barons, Big Ag, and any manufacturer with a PAC and a grudge against ESG. Section 2’s findings worship extractives and manufacturing like they’re the last bastions of civilization—ignoring that these sectors are also the leading contributors to climate change, biodiversity loss, and labor abuses abroad.

**Compliance Requirements & Timelines:** Irony alert: the bill *forbids* compliance. So if you’re Shell and the EU demands you audit your Niger Delta operations for human rights impacts, you must now refuse—or face U.S. penalties. Subsection (b) offers a fig leaf: you can still do sustainability work if it’s for U.S. law or “ordinary course of business” (read: if investors or customers ask nicely). Subsection (c) creates a hardship exemption process where entities can beg the President for mercy—and, per 4(c)(2)(A), exemptions shall be granted *unless* the President bothers to write a denial letter within 30 days. In other words: the fix is in, and the hardship relief is a rubber stamp with a presidential signature line.

**Enforcement & Penalties:** Curiously, the bill text provided doesn’t specify penalties for violating the prohibition—likely because the real enforcement is political: primary challenges, lobbyist wrath, and the quiet understanding that defying this law means losing access to federal contracts, subsidies, or the President’s good graces. Expect enforcement to be selective, arbitrary, and inversely proportional to campaign contributions.

**Economic & Operational Impacts:** This is less a policy and more a corporate get-out-of-jail-free card wrapped in a flag. By forbidding compliance with extraterritorial sustainability rules, the bill lets U.S. firms avoid costly supply chain audits, emissions tracking, and labor monitoring—saving money in the short term while guaranteeing long-term reputational and legal risk. It invites retaliatory measures from the EU (market access restrictions, tariffs, blacklisting) and signals to global investors that American firms are doubling down on opacity. In essence: we’re not protecting national interests—we’re subsidizing corporate irresponsibility and calling it sovereignty.

**Diagnosis:** This bill is a malignant neoplasm of regulatory capture—born from the delusion that ignoring global accountability makes you stronger. It treats sustainability due diligence like a foreign virus, when in reality it’s the body’s immune response to decades of unchecked extraction. The PROTECT USA Act doesn’t shield national interests—it exposes them as brittle, shortsighted, and morally bankrupt. Prognosis

Related Topics

Water & Air Quality RegulationsTaxation & IRS RegulationsClimate Change & Sustainability
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$122,400
19 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$122,400

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
SHAFFER, JOHN E
2 transactions
$10,000
2
HENDRICKS, DIANE M
1 transaction
$6,600
3
ROWAN, CAROLYN
1 transaction
$6,600
4
ROWAN, MARC J.
1 transaction
$6,600
5
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$6,600
6
SCHMIDT, TIM
1 transaction
$6,600
7
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
LEVY, EDWARD
1 transaction
$6,600
9
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMU, .
1 transaction
$6,600
10
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
11
FISHER, KENNETH
1 transaction
$6,600
12
FRYE, NATALIE
1 transaction
$6,600
13
UIHLEIN, ELIZABETH A
1 transaction
$6,600
14
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
1 transaction
$6,600
15
TRUNZO, ANNE
1 transaction
$5,800
16
HOLLFELDER, BEA M
1 transaction
$5,800
17
SCHWERTFEGER, RUTH
1 transaction
$5,000
18
SCHWERTFEGER, FREDERICK F
1 transaction
$5,000
19
WALL, TERRENCE R
1 transaction
$5,000

Donor Network - Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 39 nodes and 37 connections

Total contributions: $37

Top Donors - Rep. Fitzgerald, Scott [R-WI-5]

Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount

19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Oil & Gasconfidence 0.80

    Section 2 findings (2) and (3) suggest the bill aims to support entities in the extractive sector, including energy, which would benefit the oil and gas industry.

  • +Coal Miningconfidence 0.80

    Section 2 findings (2) and (3) suggest the bill aims to support entities in the extractive sector, including mining, which would benefit the coal mining industry.

  • Section 2 findings (3) and (5) mention the importance of maintaining a robust United States energy supply, which would benefit the energy infrastructure industry.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 422-424AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PROTECT USA Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on protecting U.S. energy sovereignty, opposing extraterritorial climate-related regulations (like climate reparations), and advancing American energy dominance by shielding critical industries from foreign ESG mandates that could undermine national and economic security."

Key themes:energy sovereigntyopposition to climate reparationsforeign regulatory overreachprotection of critical industriesU.S. economic interests

— 389 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions policy and how it affects foreign policy, as well as the international energy landscape and how it affects U.S. national and economic security. l Develop a strategy for identifying and accessing resources and advancing U.S. economic interests. America has recently become a net energy exporter, but it still imports large amounts of essential energy resources such as oil and natural gas as well as such materials as uranium (including yellowcake), lithium, certain rare earth minerals, and energy generation and transmission components and technology. The United States needs a clear understanding of its global energy and economic interests and a strategy for protecting them. l Oppose “climate reparations.” During the November 2022 United Nations climate conference in Egypt, the Biden Administration and other “developed” countries agreed to provide “climate reparations” to developing countries for the harm allegedly caused by the developed countries’ use of fossil fuel.76 A reparations slush fund administered by a non-U.S. organization provides no assurance that U.S. interests will be protected and should not be supported in any form. New Policies l Identify U.S. energy security interests and promote American energy dominance. To this end, IA should work closely with the DESAS Office of Policy on the National Energy Security Strategy. l Strengthen the new DESAS vis-à-vis the Department of State. The State Department’s Bureau of Energy Resources has generally excluded IA from serious discussions of international affairs to the detriment of DOE and broader interagency policy development. In addition, DOE embassy representatives are generally excluded from giving policy advice to senior diplomats and are used merely as sources of information instead of being active advocates for the Secretary’s priorities. The Secretary of Energy is a senior member of the President’s National Security Council and should function as such. The DOE’s Deputy Secretaries, Under Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries should be guaranteed representation at all Deputies and Policy Coordination Committee meetings. In addition, senior political and career staff should hold positions on the NSC staff equivalent to their counterparts at State, Defense, Treasury, and the Intelligence Community (IC). DESAS billets should replace State Department Bureau of Energy Resources billets at the relevant posts worldwide. — 390 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stop “climate reparations.” The President should refuse to provide climate reparations under an unratified treaty, and IA should encourage other countries to reconsider their desire to provide reparations. ARCTIC ENERGY OFFICE (AE) Mission/Overview AE was established during the Trump Administration to create a central office overseeing U.S. Arctic interests in Alaska and the other Arctic nations in response to the growing strategic sensitivity of this geographic region and the natural resources it contains. It “serves as the principal advisor to the Under Secretary on all domestic Arctic issues, including energy, science, and national security.”77 Needed Reforms In October 2022, the Biden Administration released its National Strategy for the Arctic Region.78 Although recognizing national security threats in the Arctic, it also focuses heavily on climate change, sustainability, and international cooperation. The United States must establish a strategic plan to promote its national security, energy, and economic interests in the Arctic. An analysis and plan to support the responsible development of Alaska’s energy assets should be a priority. New Policies l Defend American interests in the Arctic Circle. The next Administration needs to define American strategic and economic interests in the Arctic Circle. AE should help to identify those interests, as well as threats posed by countries like Russia and China, and develop appropriate policy options for the President’s consideration. l Ensure that AE is clearly focused. In particular, this means identifying U.S. energy interests in the Arctic Circle, identifying foreign government and commercial interests and activity in the region, and ensuring that the United States does not forgo important energy and national security interests in the Arctic. l Expand AE’s operations in Alaska. AE’s operations in Alaska should be expanded to encompass broader national energy security interests in the region including rare earths, oil, and natural gas. AE should also be the lead for DOE Antarctic operations as a counter to growing Russian and Chinese interest in Antarctic resources.

Department of Agriculture

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 344-346AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PROTECT USA Act aligns with Project 2025's skepticism toward expansive federal and international environmental regulations, particularly those affecting agriculture and industry, by resisting foreign ESG mandates that could impact U.S. farming and supply chains. However, the bill focuses on blocking foreign compliance rather than advancing domestic agricultural reform, resulting in moderate thematic overlap."

Key themes:agricultural sovereigntyESG regulation resistancesupply chain protectionlimited federal overreach

— 311 — Department of Agriculture ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/ files/documents/2023-usda-budget-summary.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 2. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System,” https://www.usda. gov/fst (accessed December 14, 2022). 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p.1. 4. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “USDA Celebrates 150 Years,” https://www.usda.gov/our-agency/about-usda/ history (accessed December 16, 2022). 5. The law stated, “[T]here is hereby established at the seat of government of the United States a Department of Agriculture, the general designs and duties of which shall be to acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful information on subjects connected with agriculture in the most general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and plants.” Gladys L. Baker et al., Century of Service: The First 100 Years of the United States Department of Agriculture, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963) p. 13, https://babel. hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4254098&view=1up&seq=33 (accessed December 16, 2022). 6. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Summary, p. 2. 7. Ibid., p. 2. 8. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, p. 3, https://www.usda.gov/sites/ default/files/documents/usda-fy-2022-2026-strategic-plan.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 9. News release, “USDA Announces Framework for Shoring Up the Food Supply Chain and Transforming the Food System to Be Fairer, More Competitive, More Resilient,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, June 1, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/06/01/usda-announces-framework-shoring-food-supply- chain-and-transforming (accessed December 14, 2022). 10. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Transforming the U.S. Food System.” 11. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2022–2026, pp. 1–2. 12. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Background on the U.S. Approach to the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit,” August 4, 2021, https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Background-on-US-approach-2021-UN- Food-Systems-Summit.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 13. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “UN Food Systems Summit,” https://www.usda.gov/oce/sustainability/un- summit (accessed December 14, 2022). 14. Mark Bittman et al., “How a National Food Policy Could Save Millions of American Lives,” The Washington Post, November 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-a-national-food-policy-could- save-millions-of-american-lives/2014/11/07/89c55e16-637f-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html (accessed December 14, 2022); Daren Bakst and Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, “No, We Don’t Need to Transform the American Food System,” The Daily Signal, February 26, 2021, https://www.dailysignal.com/2021/02/26/ no-we-dont-need-to-transform-the-american-food-system/ (accessed December 14, 2022); and Daren Bakst, “Biden’s Food Conference Should Put People First, Not Environmental Extremism,” The Daily Signal, September 22, 2022, https://www.dailysignal.com/2022/09/22/bidens-food-conference-should-put-people- first-not-environmental-extremism/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 15. News release, “USDA to Invest Up to $300 Million in New Organic Transition Initiative,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, August 22, 2022, https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2022/08/22/usda-invest-300- million-new-organic-transition-initiative (accessed December 14, 2022). 16. Gary Baise, “Sri Lanka’s Green New Deal Was a Disaster,” Farm Futures, November 14, 2022, https://www. farmprogress.com/commentary/sri-lankas-green-new-deal-was-disaster (accessed December 16, 2022). 17. See, for example, Catherine Greene et al., “Growing Organic Demand Provides High-Value Opportunities for Many Types of Producers,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, February 6, 2017, https://www. ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2017/januaryfebruary/growing-organic-demand-provides-high-value-opportunities- for-many-types-of-producers/#:~:text=ERS%20research%20shows%20that%20many,flavor%20desired%20 by%20the%20consumer (accessed December 14, 2022), and Andrea Carlson, “Investigating Retail Price Premiums for Organic Foods,” Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, May 24, 2016, https://www.ers. usda.gov/amber-waves/2016/may/investigating-retail-price-premiums-for-organic-foods/ (accessed December 16, 2022). Further, there are many myths, such as those regarding the alleged health benefit of organic food. One — 312 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise meta study found that “[t]he published literature lacks strong evidence that organic foods are significantly more nutritious than conventional foods.” Crystal Smith-Spangler et al., “Are Organic Foods Safer or Healthier Than Conventional Alternatives,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Vol. 157, No. 5 (September 4, 2012), pp. 348–366, https:// www.acpjournals.org/doi/epdf/10.7326/0003-4819-157-5-201209040-00007 (accessed December 16, 2022). 18. Steve Savage, “USDA Data Confirm Organic Yields Significantly Lower Than With Conventional Farming,” Genetic Literacy Project, February 16, 2018, https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2018/02/16/usda-data-confirm- organic-yields-dramatically-lower-conventional-farming/ (accessed December 16, 2022). 19. See, for example, U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021, https://www.regulations. gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001 (accessed December 16, 2022). 20. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, Public Law 117–169. 21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Productivity Growth in U.S. Agriculture (1948–2019),” https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity-in-the-u-s/productivity- growth-in-u-s-agriculture-1948-2019/ (accessed December 14, 2022). 22. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, “Total Food Budget Share Increased from 9.4 Percent of Disposable Income to 10.3 Percent in 2021,” July 15, 2022, https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ chart-gallery/gallery/chart-detail/?chartId=76967 (accessed December 14, 2022). 23. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Quintiles of Income Before Taxes: Annual Expenditure Means, Shares, and Standard Errors, and Coefficients of Variation, Consumer Expenditure Surveys,” 2021, Table 1101, https://www.bls.gov/cex/tables/calendar-year/mean-item-share-average-standard-error/cu- income-quintiles-before-taxes-2021.pdf (accessed December 16, 2022), and Daren Bakst and Patrick Tyrrell, “Big Government Policies That Hurt the Poor and How to Address Them,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No.176, April 5, 2017, p. 7, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-04/SR176.pdf. 24. Daren Bakst and Joshua Sewell, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power and Rein in the USDA Slush Fund,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6052, February 19, 2021, p. 2, https://www.heritage.org/ budget-and-spending/report/congress-should-stop-abrogating-its-spending-power-and-rein-the-usda. 25. Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act of 1948, Public Law 80–806. 26. Bakst and Sewall, “Congress Should Stop Abrogating Its Spending Power.” 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Daren Bakst, “Comment from Bakst, Darren” on “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program, Request for Comments,” USDA–2021–0010, October 21, 2021,” November 1, 2021, https://www. regulations.gov/document/USDA-2021-0010-0001/comment?filter=bakst (accessed December 16, 2022). 29. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Notice: Climate-Smart Agriculture and Forestry Partnership Program.” 30. Megan Stubbs, “The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated January 14, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44606 (accessed December 16, 2022). 31. “Overall, 34 percent of all farms reported receiving some type of Government payment in 2021,” and “[o]verall, 14 percent of U.S. farms participated in Federal crop insurance programs.” Christine Whitt, Noah Miller, and Ryan Olver, “America’s Farms and Ranches at a Glance: 2022 Edition,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, pp. 24 and 26, https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/105388/eib-247. pdf?v=527.4 (accessed March 18, 2023). This data, which apparently does not cover crop insurance, included payments beyond just commodity payments, such as conservation payments. 32. Randy Schnepf, “Farm Safety-Net Payments Under the 2014 Farm Bill: Comparison by Program Crop,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, August 11, 2017, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44914.pdf (accessed December 14, 2022). 33. Although livestock and specialty crop producers do receive some subsidies, former American Farm Bureau Federation President Bob Stallman captured the subsidy issue well. He “dismisse[d] outright the claim that farmers couldn’t survive without subsidy money. ‘Why does the livestock industry survive without subsidies?’ he ask[ed]. ‘Why does the specialty crop [fruit and vegetable] industry survive?’” Tamar Haspel, “Why Do Taxpayers Subsidize Rich Farmers?” The Washington Post, March 15, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost. com/lifestyle/food/why-do-taxpayers-subsidize-rich-farmers/2018/03/15/50e89906-27b6-11e8-b79d- f3d931db7f68_story.html (accessed March 18, 2023).

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 443-445AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PROTECT USA Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on protecting U.S. energy and industrial sectors from external regulatory burdens, particularly by resisting foreign ESG mandates that could impact domestic energy production and supply chains. Both prioritize energy sovereignty and reducing regulatory obstacles for key industries like energy, mining, and manufacturing."

Key themes:energy sovereigntyregulatory resistanceindustrial competitivenesssupply chain securityESG policy opposition

— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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