Sponsored by
Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]
ID: C001087
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8035, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 248-250 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Rule H. Res. 1175 failed passage of House.
April 16, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of HR 8035 is to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 through October 20, 2027. Because, you know, the surveillance state just can't get enough of spying on its own citizens. The objective? To perpetuate the illusion of national security while feeding the insatiable hunger of the intelligence community for more power and less oversight.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 by extending the repeal date of title VII from "two years after" the enactment of the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act to October 20, 2027. Wow, what a bold move! Essentially, they're kicking the can down the road, ensuring that the same outdated, draconian surveillance provisions remain in place for another year. The changes are merely cosmetic, designed to create the appearance of reform while maintaining the status quo.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies, and – oh, yes – the American people, who will continue to have their Fourth Amendment rights trampled upon. The stakeholders? Well, that would be the politicians who get to grandstand about national security while lining their pockets with campaign contributions from the defense and surveillance industries.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is a further erosion of civil liberties, as the government continues to exploit the fear of terrorism to justify its Orwellian surveillance apparatus. The implications? A perpetuation of the surveillance state, where the government can spy on its citizens with impunity, and the intelligence community can continue to operate in the shadows, free from meaningful oversight.
In conclusion, HR 8035 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice – a cynical attempt to maintain the surveillance status quo while pretending to address concerns about national security. It's a disease, really – a metastasizing tumor of government overreach and corporate greed, fed by the ignorance and apathy of the American people. And, of course, our esteemed lawmakers are happy to play along, too cowardly or corrupt to challenge the surveillance state's stranglehold on our democracy. Bravo, Congress! You've managed to create another masterpiece of legislative theater, a farce that will only serve to further undermine the already-tattered fabric of our civil liberties.
Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 20 connections (31 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $66,000
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 1 extends the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which includes provisions related to surveillance and data collection, potentially benefiting telecommunications companies that provide services to intelligence agencies (e.g., Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008).
The extension of title VII authorities may also benefit cybersecurity companies that provide services to protect against foreign intelligence threats (e.g., Section 404(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008).
The bill's extension of surveillance authorities may impose costs on big tech platforms that must comply with intelligence agency requests for user data (e.g., Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008).
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.
PROTECT Act of 2025
Strengthening Oversight of DHS Intelligence Act
Of inquiry requesting the President of the United States to furnish certain information to the House of Representatives relating to the operations of the Social Security Administration after January 20, 2025, including information on the Department of Government Efficiency's access to the Social Security Administration and to information in the possession of such Administration.