Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5167
Last Updated: April 4, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]

ID: C001087

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 339.

November 28, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

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Floor Action

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Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

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Passed Congress

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Presidential Action

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Became Law

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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity, shall we?

**Diagnosis:** "Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026" - a.k.a. "The Spy Budget Bill"

**Symptoms:** This bill is a classic case of "Money-itis," where politicians throw billions at the intelligence community without any real oversight or accountability.

**Total Funding Amounts and Budget Allocations:** $63.5 billion for FY 2026, an increase of $2.4 billion from last year's budget. Because what's a few billion more when you're already hemorrhaging cash?

**Key Programs and Agencies Receiving Funds:**

* The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) gets a whopping $15.3 billion, because who needs transparency when you can just throw money at the problem? * The National Security Agency (NSA) receives $10.8 billion, likely to be used for more "accidental" mass surveillance and data collection. * The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) gets $2.5 billion, probably to fund their next big failure in predicting global events.

**Notable Increases or Decreases:** The biggest increase goes to the CIA's covert operations budget, up by 15% from last year. Because what could possibly go wrong with more secret wars and regime changes?

**Riders or Policy Provisions Attached to Funding:**

* Section 302 establishes a new National Counterintelligence Center, because we clearly need another bureaucratic layer to "coordinate" our intelligence efforts. * Section 405 prohibits the use of DeepSeek on intelligence community systems. Ah, finally, someone's paying attention to those pesky AI ethics concerns... just kidding, this is probably just a token gesture.

**Fiscal Impact and Deficit Implications:** This bill will add another $2.4 billion to our already bloated national debt. But hey, who needs fiscal responsibility when you can just print more money?

In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a textbook example of how politicians prioritize pork-barrel spending over actual intelligence reform. It's a never-ending cycle of waste, inefficiency, and bureaucratic bloat.

**Prescription:** Take two aspirin, call me in the morning, and for the love of all things sane, elect competent leaders who can actually balance a budget.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & Appropriations State & Local Government Affairs Congressional Rules & Procedures Civil Rights & Liberties Transportation & Infrastructure Small Business & Entrepreneurship Government Operations & Accountability Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement National Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

đź’° Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$66,000
17 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
KAMPETER, MICHAEL MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
2
WALTON, ROB MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
3
STEPHENS, WARREN A. MR.
2 transactions
$6,600
4
SILBEY, ALEXANDER MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
5
HEDGE, BETTY MRS.
1 transaction
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HEDGE, RANDY MR.
1 transaction
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7
DILLARD, DENNIS ALEXANDER MR.
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LAMBERT, RYAN MR.
1 transaction
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COOPER, JOHN A. MR. III
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WALTON, ALICE
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WALTON, JIM C. MR.
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WALTON, STEUART MR.
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CHRISTIAN, ROBERT MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
14
CAMERON, RONALD M. MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
WALTON, THOMAS L. MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
16
ADDISON, DAVID MR.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BRUDER, ERIC V. MR.
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]

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Total contributions: $66,000

Top Donors - Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]

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Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Introduction

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 239-241 AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives by enhancing the DNI's role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and promoting transparency, accountability, and innovation in the intelligence community. However, it does not directly address all aspects of the policy, such as security clearance reform and the DNI's authority."

Key themes: Intelligence Community Reform DNI Authority Budget Oversight Transparency and Accountability

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the

Introduction

Moderate
Vector: 68%
Pages: 239-241 AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill moderately aligns with the Project 2025 policy by providing funding for intelligence agencies and promoting transparency, but it does not directly address the policy's specific objectives regarding the DNI's role in overseeing the National Intelligence Program budget or clarifying the DNI's authority to address emerging threats."

Key themes: Intelligence Community Funding National Intelligence Program Director of National Intelligence Authority

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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