PROTECT Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/s/3125

Last Updated: November 10, 2025

PROTECT Act of 2025

S. 3125, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.

The sponsor

Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$82,472 raised

23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 168-170 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

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Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

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Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The PROTECT Act of 2025. A quaint attempt at reform, no doubt driven by the inefficiencies of democratic processes. Let's dissect this bill and assess its implications on my interests.

**Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill aims to introduce Senate confirmation for the Director of the United States Secret Service, ostensibly to provide "real oversight and transparency." I'll translate: it's a power play to exert more congressional control over the agency.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, by adding a requirement for Senate confirmation of the Secret Service Director. The Director will serve a 10-year term, with a limit of one term. This change is intended to take effect after the President's next appointment.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders** The primary stakeholders are the Secret Service, the White House, and Congress. However, I'm more concerned about the potential ripple effects on my business interests. As a major player in the private security sector, any changes to the Secret Service's leadership or operations could impact my company's contracts, partnerships, or future opportunities.

**Potential Impact & Implications** From my perspective, this bill is a minor nuisance. The added layer of Senate confirmation may introduce some uncertainty and delays in the appointment process, but it won't significantly alter the agency's overall direction. I'm more concerned about potential future legislation that could affect my business interests or the broader regulatory landscape.

In terms of dollar projections, I estimate that this bill will have a negligible impact on my company's bottom line – perhaps a 0.5% to 1% variation in our annual revenue. However, as a thought experiment, let's consider the potential benefits of privatizing certain aspects of the Secret Service. A more efficient, market-driven approach could yield significant cost savings and innovation opportunities. I'll be keeping an eye on this space for future developments.

In conclusion, the PROTECT Act is a minor speed bump in the grand scheme of things. Its impact will be limited, and I'll continue to monitor its progress with mild interest. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have more pressing matters to attend to – like optimizing my company's tax strategy and exploring new opportunities for growth.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$130,307

63 donors

PACs

Organizations

Committees

$3,000

Individuals

$127,307

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA

1 transaction

$2,000

SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY

1 transaction

$1,000

KUMAR, SHALLI

2 transactions

$9,900

SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE

2 transactions

$9,900

SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN

2 transactions

$9,900

ARVIG, ALLEN

3 transactions

$6,710

STARRETT, RONALD

2 transactions

$5,800

COLLINS, RICHARD

1 transaction

$5,523

MALONE, KIP

6 transactions

$4,520

DETERMAN, MARK

1 transaction

$3,300

MCKEE, JACK C

1 transaction

$3,300

WEISS, LUKE

1 transaction

$3,300

PECK JR, JOHN

1 transaction

$2,900

LEIGH, JOHN

4 transactions

$2,715

COLLINS, III, HENRY L.

1 transaction

$2,601

POSNER, IDA MOLLOY

1 transaction

$2,500

VANDERHAAG, JOHN

3 transactions

$2,500

DIMARE, SCOTT

3 transactions

$1,500

RADY, PAUL

2 transactions

$1,500

VANDER HAAG, JOHN C

1 transaction

$1,500

RICHARDS, MARY

2 transactions

$1,435

NWANERI, MATTHEW

1 transaction

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FRENCH, ARTHUR

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JUCKETTE, LINDA

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KOROLOGOS, TOM C

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LARSON, ELLEN T

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MANATOS, ANDREW E

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MERCHANT, AHMED

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PATRICK, CHRIS MR..

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ROGERS, DIRKSEN

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SABIN, DANIEL

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SCUDDER, JACK

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SMITH, JAMES A

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SMITH, THOMAS STUART MR..

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VANDERPOOL, MARYLEE

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JOHNS, SUSAN

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PHELPS, DICK

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HESS, CURTIS

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LUO, KERRI

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WILLIAMS, ANGELA

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AXMEAR, FRED

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FRANKEN, KEN

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HARKEN, MARY J

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HASKENHOFF, TINA

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HILL, VERNON

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HUSSAIN, SULEMAN

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JOHNSON, WAYNE

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KOESTNER, RICHARD

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LILLIS, TERRY

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MCKEON, PATRICIA

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MCMICKLE, JOHN

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MOGLER, DEVIN

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PECK, JOHN

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RITTS, SUSAN BUTLER

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SUTTER, THEODORE

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VANDER HAAG, RUTH

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VANKERCKHOVE, BRUCE

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VIGO, JUDITH

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WHITCOMB, STANLEY

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Donor Network - Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]

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Showing 43 nodes and 23 connections (59 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $82,472

Top Donors - Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]

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1 PAC2 Committees12 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

+Law Enforcement & Surveillance Techconfidence 0.80
Section 2 of the bill establishes Senate confirmation for the Director of the United States Secret Service, which could be seen as providing more oversight and transparency, potentially benefiting law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors by promoting stability and accountability in the agency.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 168-170AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PROTECT Act of 2025 aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on Senate-confirmed leadership positions within DHS, particularly in enhancing accountability and oversight of agency heads. While the bill focuses on the Secret Service (a DHS component), it supports the broader goal of ensuring politically vetted, Senate-confirmed leadership, though it does not address the specific DHS restructuring or personnel redistribution priorities outlined in the policy."

Key themes:Senate confirmationleadership accountabilityagency oversightpolitical appointees

— 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further, — 137 — Department of Homeland Security individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled. Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential deci- sion to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and opera- tional responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical functions without its current bloated bureaucracy. Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maxi- mize law enforcement capacity. Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Adminis- tration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and dis- tributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demon- strate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain pre- conditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions should include at least the following: l Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers. l Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states

Executive Office of the President of the United States

Weak

Vector: 69%

Pages: 96-98AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on Senate confirmation for the Secret Service Director to increase accountability, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses the Vice President's role as a Senate emissary and policy influencer. Both involve Senate interactions but address different institutions and objectives, resulting in only a weak thematic connection."

Key themes:Senate relationsPresidential appointmentsGovernment oversight

— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 242-244AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasize increasing accountability and reducing politicization of agency leadership, but the bill targets the Secret Service while the policy focuses on the CIA, resulting only in tangential thematic overlap."

Key themes:accountabilityoversightleadership independencepoliticization

— 209 — Intelligence Community l The Director and Deputy Director should request briefings on all CIA activities and presence overseas, as well as any CIA-controlled access programs and existing covert action findings, without exception. l The Director and Deputy Director should meet with all directorates and mission centers, prioritizing those that are aligned most closely with the President’s priorities and calibrating collection and operations based on the President’s intelligence requirements. This includes any areas where the CIA might be conducting its own diplomacy parallel to official State Department policy. It must be clear that the CIA’s liaison relationships overseas must follow and not contradict those set at the policy level by the President through the State Department. The other principal offices responsible for executing the CIA’s mission include the Directorate of Operations, Directorate of Analysis, Directorate of Science and Technology, Directorate of Support, and Directorate of Digital Innovation. If senior leadership finds any program or operation to be inconsistent with the President’s agenda, the Director should immediately halt that program or operation. Reining in Bureaucracy. The CIA’s bureaucracy continues to grow. Because mid-level managers lack accountability, there are areas in which personnel are not responsive to any authority, including the President. The President should instruct the Director to hire or promote new individuals to lead the various directorates and mission centers. This new crop of mid-level leaders should carry out clear directives from senior CIA leadership, which means more accountability and new ways of thinking to benefit the mission. In addition, the President should task the Director with significantly broadening recruitment, expediting onboarding practices, and shifting resources away from headquarters, including terminal generalist GS-15s when OPM buyouts, forced rotations, or up-and-out personnel policies are set for particular positions. The CIA must find creative ways to align mission requirements with hiring needs, recruit diverse sets of individuals with unique backgrounds, and become more open to hiring private-sector experts directly into senior positions. In addition, the Director should break the cabal of bureaucrats in D.C. by permanently moving various directorates, such as Support and Science and Technology, out of Virginia and possibly open campuses outside of D.C. where analysts and other experts could contribute virtually. Redirecting Resources. Certain CIA employees and offices have focused on promoting divisive ideological or cultural agendas and fostering a damaging cul- ture of risk aversion and complacency. As soon as possible, the Director should divert resources from any activities that promote unnecessary and distracting social engineering. The Director should implement changes in promotion criteria — 210 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise that reward individuals for creative thinking and quality of recruitments and prod- ucts rather than numeric metrics or the achievement of benchmarks that are not essential to the mission. Not all careers in espionage are created equal, and the Director should incentiv- ize and reward applicants who are willing to accept high risks over those who are climbing the ranks simply by doing business as usual. The Director should refocus the CIA to an OSS-like culture and mandate that all CIA employees acquire, as a condition of securing senior (GS-14+) rank, additional or enhanced language skills, technical or cyber expertise, or field training or serve in overseas assignments. COVERT ACTION Covert action can be a valuable tool in helping further the President’s foreign policy agenda if implemented in concert with other forms of government power. As codified in the U.S. Code, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military con- ditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly….”16 The President initiates a covert action with a written finding that explains why “such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States.”17 The statute assumes the President will use the CIA as the principal action element to achieve the objectives of covert action findings; however, the President need not feel constrained to utilize only the CIA: “[E]ach finding shall specify each depart- ment, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action.”18 For example, the Department of Defense maintains certain clandestine capa- bilities under Title 10 authorities that may resemble but far exceed in scale similar capabilities outside of DOD. Generally, such DOD capabilities can be employed outside a combat theater only if they are determined to be traditional military activities. In practical terms, this means that many DOD capabilities, including those in the space and cyber domains, can be employed only after the initiation of armed conflict.19 Given the range of global threats the United States faces today, the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used to support potential covert actions. The problem, unfortunately, is that certain elements in the State Department, IC, and DOD trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution of the President’s foreign policy goals. A future conservative President should therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key NSC, CIA, ODNI, and DOD positions. These knowledgeable teams can assist in any review of current covert actions and, potentially, planning for new actions.

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 242-244AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on Senate confirmation and term limits for the Secret Service Director, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section deals with CIA/ODNI reforms, covert action, and talent management. Both share a theme of increasing oversight of agency leadership, but they address different agencies and policy areas, resulting in only weak alignment."

Key themes:Senate confirmationagency leadership accountabilityoversight

— 210 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise that reward individuals for creative thinking and quality of recruitments and prod- ucts rather than numeric metrics or the achievement of benchmarks that are not essential to the mission. Not all careers in espionage are created equal, and the Director should incentiv- ize and reward applicants who are willing to accept high risks over those who are climbing the ranks simply by doing business as usual. The Director should refocus the CIA to an OSS-like culture and mandate that all CIA employees acquire, as a condition of securing senior (GS-14+) rank, additional or enhanced language skills, technical or cyber expertise, or field training or serve in overseas assignments. COVERT ACTION Covert action can be a valuable tool in helping further the President’s foreign policy agenda if implemented in concert with other forms of government power. As codified in the U.S. Code, “the term ‘covert action’ means an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military con- ditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly….”16 The President initiates a covert action with a written finding that explains why “such an action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States and is important to the national security of the United States.”17 The statute assumes the President will use the CIA as the principal action element to achieve the objectives of covert action findings; however, the President need not feel constrained to utilize only the CIA: “[E]ach finding shall specify each depart- ment, agency, or entity of the United States Government authorized to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in such action.”18 For example, the Department of Defense maintains certain clandestine capa- bilities under Title 10 authorities that may resemble but far exceed in scale similar capabilities outside of DOD. Generally, such DOD capabilities can be employed outside a combat theater only if they are determined to be traditional military activities. In practical terms, this means that many DOD capabilities, including those in the space and cyber domains, can be employed only after the initiation of armed conflict.19 Given the range of global threats the United States faces today, the President should consider whether DOD’s complete set of capabilities should be used to support potential covert actions. The problem, unfortunately, is that certain elements in the State Department, IC, and DOD trade on risk aversion or political bureaucracy to delay execution of the President’s foreign policy goals. A future conservative President should therefore identify individuals on the transition team who are familiar with the implementation of covert action with a view to placing them in key NSC, CIA, ODNI, and DOD positions. These knowledgeable teams can assist in any review of current covert actions and, potentially, planning for new actions. — 211 — Intelligence Community Immediately after the inauguration, the President should task the NSC’s Senior Director for Intelligence Programs with conducting a 60-day review of any current covert action findings, including their effectiveness; evaluating new covert actions that might be needed to implement the President’s foreign policy goals; and report- ing back to the President. Such an assessment should be conducted independently of the agencies responsible for the actions under review. As part of the review, the Senior Director for Intelligence Programs should identify which departments or agencies, such as the CIA or DOD, are best equipped to achieve the objectives set out in new and existing findings. After the 60-day review, the President should demand creative thinking and a clear strategy as to how covert action fits within the President’s broader foreign policy strategy, to include possibly modifying or rescinding any current findings, drafting new findings, and streamlining or eliminating needless bureaucracy, par- ticularly at State, to facilitate more expeditious decisions on tactical covert action. Careful thought should be given to the metrics by which the effectiveness of covert action programs will be measured to ensure the appropriate use of government resources and to guard against the possibility of covert action’s being used with little scrutiny in ways that are inconsistent with overt foreign policy goals. ODNI AND CIA ORGANIZATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS The ODNI and CIA operate under authority provided by the Central Intelli- gence Agency Act of 1949,20 which means they have greater latitude than the rest of the federal government with respect to the hiring and firing of personnel. Both organizations and other areas of the IC have struggled from a human resources and talent management standpoint to recruit, onboard, and maintain personnel in a timely fashion to fill the IC’s ever-changing needs. At a time when the Intelli- gence Community needs significantly more personnel with the proper technical, language-capable, and diverse backgrounds, including applicants from elements of the business community, the incoming Directors of both agencies need to make this effort a top priority. Past DNIs’ Chiefs of Staff and additional front-office staff historically have come from outside the IC, commonly under a misconstrued “staff-reserve” structure that is intended to avoid a Schedule C designation within the IC. The Director should handpick qualified, properly cleared personnel for front-office and mana- gerial leadership positions, such as the DNI’s Chief of Staff and heads of Legislative Affairs and Strategic Communications, to oversee those divisions with career IC staff reporting to them. The incoming DNI and CIA Director should also consider changes in the Senior National Intelligence Service (SNIS)/Senior Intelligence Services (SIS). Senior officers should be required to sign mobility agreements that allow ODNI and CIA leadership to move them within the IC every two years if necessary. Many qualified

Intelligence Community

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 239-241AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The PROTECT Act focuses on Senate confirmation and term limits for the Secret Service Director, which is a law‑enforcement protective service, while the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section centers on security clearance reform, DNI authority, and CIA leadership. The only common thread is the emphasis on oversight and accountability through Senate confirmation."

Key themes:Senate confirmationoversight/accountabilityleadership appointment

— 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the — 208 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. They can also aid the development of export control mechanisms and potential outbound investment screening where necessary. Brief, specific governance language should be considered that would apply counterterrorist authority models to the broader functions of the U.S. government insofar as they are needed to counter 21st century nation-state threats. The success of any DNI rests with support from the President. Any revised Executive Order 12333 must serve to express unequivocal support for the DNI in executing the mandates that an amended order would provide. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) The CIA is a foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting human intelligence (HUMINT), providing all-source intelligence analysis and report- ing, and conducting covert action when required to do so by the President. The CIA has its roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which the United States established during World War II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection orga- nization. After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, and the CIA was established in law by the National Security Act of 1947. As with every agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda for the country. Public servants must be mindful that they are required to help the President implement that agenda while remaining apolitical, upholding the Constitution and laws of the United States, and earning the public trust. The Pres- ident requires a CIA that provides unbiased and apolitical foreign intelligence information and, when necessary, can act capably and effectively on any covert action findings. Executing the Mission. The CIA’s success depends on firm direction from the President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive senior leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and be willing to take calculated risks. Therefore: l The next President-Elect and incoming Presidential Personnel Office should identify a Director nominee who can foster a mission-driven culture by making necessary personnel and structural changes. l The President-Elect should choose a Deputy Director who, without needing Senate confirmation, can immediately begin to implement the President’s agenda. This includes halting all current hiring to prevent the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel. Additional appointees should be placed within the agency as needed to assist the Director in supervising its functioning.

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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