Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/901
Last Updated: July 18, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

ID: S001220

Follow the money

The bill

Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act

HR. 901, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$89,900 raised

26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 161-163 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

March 10, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Research Security and Accountability in DHS Act (HR 901) claims to safeguard research and development from unauthorized access or disclosure of sensitive information within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). How noble. In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, attempting to address the symptoms rather than the root cause of the problem: government incompetence.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new paragraph (15), which requires the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate to develop a Department-wide policy and process for safeguarding research and development. Wow, what a groundbreaking idea! The government will now create more bureaucracy to "protect" sensitive information. Because that's exactly what we need: more red tape.

The bill also mandates a report from the Comptroller General within one year, which will undoubtedly be a thrilling read. I'm sure it'll reveal shocking insights into the DHS's compliance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-33 (NSPM-33) and its adoption of the National Science and Technology Council's 2022 implementation guidance. Yawn.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:

* The Department of Homeland Security, which will get to create more policies and procedures to "protect" sensitive information. * The Comptroller General, who'll have to waste time writing a report that no one will read. * Researchers and developers within the DHS, who'll have to navigate even more bureaucratic hoops to do their jobs.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of security while doing nothing to address the underlying issues. The real impact will be:

* More bureaucracy and red tape for researchers and developers. * A false sense of security among lawmakers and the public. * A potential increase in funding for "research security" initiatives, which will likely line the pockets of contractors and consultants.

In conclusion, HR 901 is a textbook example of legislative malpractice. It's a shallow attempt to address a complex problem, driven by politics rather than substance. The real disease here is government incompetence, and this bill is just another symptom of that deeper illness.

Related Topics

National Security & IntelligenceCybersecurity & Data PrivacyResearch & Innovation Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$89,900
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$13,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$76,000

No PAC contributions found

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
2 transactions
$5,300
3
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
1 transaction
$1,000
4
JOHN PLUNK ATTORNEY PC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
LEE, ARNOLD
1 transaction
$6,600
2
HINCHMAN, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
3
STIERS, WILLIAM
2 transactions
$6,600
4
ALMODOVAR, ANGEL R.
2 transactions
$6,600
5
LUCKEY, PALMER
2 transactions
$6,600
6
LIPTON, LEE
1 transaction
$5,000
7
BENTLEY, PHILIP W. III
1 transaction
$5,000
8
GUERRERI, CARL N.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
REESE, MARK A.
1 transaction
$3,300
10
OZMEN, FATIH
1 transaction
$3,300
11
MCCARTER, ANGELA
1 transaction
$3,300
12
GILCHRIST, WADE
1 transaction
$3,300
13
SAYLOR, ANNIE
1 transaction
$3,300
14
KRETZSCHMAR, RICHARD
1 transaction
$3,300
15
BRAUN, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
BAILEY, WILLIAM C.
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BARON, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7]

ID: G000590

Top Contributors

10

1
HAND, J.R.
HAND FAMILY COMPANIES • CEO
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
May 20, 2024
2
SCARLETT, DOROTHY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Jun 11, 2024
3
CRABBE, JENNELL
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
4
CRABBE, JOHN
SELF • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
5
EVANS, BARBARA
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
EVANS, JOHN
PRESIDENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
7
KEMMERER, KAREN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualJACKSON, WY
$6,600
May 16, 2023
8
GONTOWNIK, YONI
GIC • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualENGLEWOOD, NJ
$6,600
Aug 1, 2024
9
SCARLETT, JOE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Sep 9, 2024
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Top Contributors

10

1
WRIGHT, ELIZABETH
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Jun 29, 2024
2
WOODWARD, JOHN
SPIERER WOODWARD • ATTORNEY
IndividualGREENWOOD VILLAGE, CO
$6,600
Sep 19, 2023
3
BERGSTROM, ROBERT
BT CONSTRUCTION • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualFORT LUPTON, CO
$6,600
Oct 13, 2024
4
ERICKSON, GARY
EXECUTIVE CUSTOM CONSTRUCTION • GENERAL CONTRACTOR
IndividualCOLORADO SPRINGS, CO
$6,600
Oct 15, 2024
5
HASELDEN, BYRON
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CEO
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
6
HASELDEN, EDDIE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CHAIRMAN
IndividualCENTENNIAL, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
7
HASELDEN, MIKE
HASELDEN CONSTRUCTION • CO-CHAIRMAN
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$6,600
Oct 14, 2024
8
WAGNER, BRUCE
WAGNER EQUIPMENT • PRES
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$5,000
Sep 20, 2024
9
DUKE, D. A.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualENGLEWOOD, CO
$5,000
Oct 9, 2024
10
MCDONALD, BRUCE
MCDONALD INSURANCE GROUP • OWNER
IndividualLITTLETON, CO
$3,868
Sep 30, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 55 nodes and 32 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $129,500

Top Donors - Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

4 Orgs17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(a)(3) adds paragraph (15) requiring the Under Secretary of the Science and Technology Directorate to develop a Department-wide policy and process to safeguard research and development from unauthorized access or disclosure of sensitive information in R&D acquisitions, which benefits cybersecurity firms that provide such safeguarding services.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(b)(1) requires a GAO report on DHS compliance with NSPM-33 and NSTC guidance regarding federal research security, which may increase oversight and contracting opportunities for defense contractors involved in secure R&D.

  • Section 2(b)(2) addresses coordination with guidelines from NSF, NSTC, OSTP, and other agencies on federal research security, which may drive demand for secure AI and cloud infrastructure providers supporting DHS research.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

  • from 31 contributions
    • KING, DAVID A.$2,000
    • BELL, THOMAS$2,000
    • STEVENS, ROY$1,000
    • HULL, STEVE$1,000
    • PORTER, ELIZABETH$1,000

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 901’s focus on securing DHS research and development from unauthorized access aligns with Project 2025’s defense‑oriented emphasis on protecting sensitive information, ensuring compliance with national security directives, and addressing great‑power competition risks to defense and intelligence assets."

Key themes:research securitynational security complianceintelligence community oversightgreat power competitiondefense acquisition safeguards

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Department of Energy and Related Commissions

Moderate
Vector: 67%
Pages: 425-427AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 901 focuses on securing DHS research and development from unauthorized access, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on protecting taxpayer-funded R&D as a national security asset and preventing economic espionage. However, the bill is specific to DHS and does not directly address DOE, the Office of Science, or technology transfer to the private sector as outlined in the Project 2025 policy."

Key themes:research securityprotection of taxpayer-funded R&Dnational securityprevention of unauthorized disclosureoversight and accountability

— 393 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions l Ensure that R&D funds are used for projects that protect and advance that edge. l Ensure that successful advances, with a focus on new natural resource development technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and space, are transferred swiftly to American interests in the private sector. New Policies l Focus on benefits to Americans. OTT’s operations should be based on the recognition that the new technologies generated by American taxpayers’ investment in DOE are a significant national security asset rather than some neutral scientific gift to humanity. l Increase oversight and coordination. OTT needs to be vigilant in overseeing and coordinating OTT offices associated with each National Lab. For security and economic espionage reasons, the work funded by the American people needs to be protected, and when commercialized, it needs to go to American businesses. OFFICE OF SCIENCE (SC) Mission/Overview The Office of Science (SC) supports and oversees research facilities and pro- grams that cover basic science through its application to the demonstration and deployment of energy technologies. SC oversees 10 of the 17 DOE National Labs and 28 major federal research user facilities. Its mission is to preserve U.S. leader- ship in science, fund and perform basic research, and provide the scientific facilities that the private sector is unable or unwilling to provide. New initiatives include quantum information sciences and artificial intelligence. SC is led by a Senate-con- firmed Director at the Assistant Secretary level and has eight program offices.82 Needed Reforms The next conservative President should commit the United States to scientific dominance to support national and economic security, especially in light of similar efforts by China. To aid in this effort, the Office of Science should: l Return to its primary mission: nonpartisan and basic science. SC’s mission should be international leadership in basic and early applied science and provision of world-leading facilities for this work. The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and Inflation Reduction Act mark the major — 394 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise reorientation of DOE primarily from defense applications in the NNSA and basic and early applied science across SC and the applied offices to a massive federal research, development, demonstration, and commercialization body.83 Distraction from SC’s basic science mission should be prevented. l Increase the level of accountability. The National Laboratories need to be more directly accountable to the Secretary of Energy and Congress for their work and management. New Policies l Commit to U.S. science dominance. The United States is losing its dominance in scientific discoveries and technological development. China and other adversaries have been stealing American science and technology for years and are now on the verge of dominating science—a development that is fraught with negative strategic and economic implications for the United States. The next Administration must commit itself to ensuring that the U.S. continues to dominate scientific discovery and technological advancement. l Refocus on mission and eliminate duplication and waste. The Administration should work with Congress to rationalize the National Lab network to meet specific national objectives (such as the NNSA laboratories’ role in national defense) and conduct basic research that the private sector would not otherwise conduct. Activities that duplicate those of other government agencies or the private sector should be eliminated. l Properly manage the National Labs’ contributions to the private sector. SC should improve private-sector access to the National Labs, through programs like the GAIN voucher program and consistent with national security considerations, while ensuring that the economic benefits of taxpayer-funded technologies flow back to taxpayers through patent- review sharing or a revolving fund. Budget The Office of Science was appropriated slightly more than $7 billion in FY 2021, and DOE requested slightly less than $7.8 billion for FY 2023.84 OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (EM) Mission/Overview The Office of Environmental Management’s mission is to “complete the safe cleanup of [the] environmental legacy resulting from decades of nuclear

Department of Defense

Weak
Vector: 67%
Pages: 164-167AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 901 focuses on strengthening research security within DHS, while Project 2025's DHS section advocates for dismantling the department and redistributing its components, including moving S&T to DOD. The bill supports DHS's continued existence and internal reform, which conflicts with Project 2025's goal of eliminating DHS as a standalone entity."

Key themes:Department of Homeland SecurityScience and Technology Directorateresearch security

— 133 — 5 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ken Cuccinelli PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION Our primary recommendation is that the President pursue legislation to dis- mantle the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After 20 years, it has not gelled into “One DHS.” Instead, its various components’ different missions have outweighed its decades-long attempt to function as one department, rendering the whole disjointed rather than cohesive. Breaking up the department along its mission lines would facilitate mission focus and provide opportunities to reduce overhead and achieve more limited government. In lieu of a status quo DHS, we recommend that: l U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) be combined with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a stand- alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than 100,000 employees, making it the third largest department measured by manpower). l The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) be moved to the Department of Transportation. — 134 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be moved to the Department of the Interior or, if combined with CISA, to the Department of Transportation. l The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD). Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes. l The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) be divided in two, with the protective element moved to DOJ and the financial enforcement element moved to the Department of the Treasury. l The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) be privatized. l The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) be moved to DOD and the Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction be moved to the FBI. All of the remaining supporting components could be dismantled because their functions already exist in the moving components as well as the receiv- ing departments. Cutting these costs would save the American taxpayers significant sums. Unless and until this dismantling recommendation is pursued and achieved, however, DHS will statutorily continue to exist, and it needs many reforms. Accord- ingly, we now turn to recommended changes in DHS as it exists now. MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from and prepares for terrorism and other hazards in both the physical and cyber realms, provides for secure and free movement of trade and travel, and enforces U.S. immi- gration laws impartially. OVERVIEW The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent mailings of anthrax spores. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; minimize the damage from and assist in the recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and respond to natural and manmade crises and emergencies; and monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and interdict illegal drug trafficking.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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