To provide for the public diplomacy authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.

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Bill ID: 119/hr/5251

Last Updated: December 14, 2025

To provide for the public diplomacy authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.

HR. 5251, 119th Congress — read as touching Print & Broadcast Media.

The sponsor

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$323,650 raised

28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of State" section, p. 226-228 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 48 - 0.

September 17, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

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Became Law

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1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

**Analysis of HR 5251: A Bill to Consolidate Public Diplomacy Authorities**

As a visionary entrepreneur and thought leader, I'll dissect the implications of this bill on my interests and the global landscape.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** HR 5251 aims to reorganize public diplomacy authorities within the Department of State, creating an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and an Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. The bill's primary objective is to streamline public diplomacy efforts, enhance strategic communications, and promote American interests abroad.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill establishes a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, responsible for overseeing global public diplomacy, information operations, and educational exchange programs. It also creates an Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, focusing on academic, cultural, and professional exchanges. The legislation authorizes appropriations for fiscal years 2026 and 2027 to support these initiatives.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The Department of State, the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, and various stakeholders in the private and nonprofit sectors will be impacted by this bill. My own interests, as a global entrepreneur, may also be affected by the potential expansion of public diplomacy efforts.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** From my perspective, this bill presents both opportunities and challenges:

* **Consolidation of Power:** The creation of an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy could lead to more efficient decision-making and resource allocation. This might result in a stronger, more unified American presence on the global stage. * **Increased Funding:** Authorized appropriations for public diplomacy efforts may provide new avenues for collaboration between government agencies and private sector entities like mine. * **Regulatory Environment:** The bill's focus on strategic communications and information operations could lead to increased scrutiny of online platforms and digital media. As a major player in the tech industry, I'll need to monitor these developments closely.

However, I remain skeptical about the effectiveness of this legislation in achieving its objectives. Bureaucratic reorganization often leads to inefficiencies and redundancies. Moreover, the bill's emphasis on public diplomacy may distract from more pressing issues, such as trade policy and economic development.

Ultimately, HR 5251 is a minor perturbation in the grand scheme of global politics. As a visionary entrepreneur, I'll continue to adapt and thrive in this ever-changing landscape, leveraging my influence and resources to shape the future according to my interests.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$323,650

24 donors

PACs

Organizations

$8,550

Committees

Individuals

$315,100

No PAC contributions found

POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS

1 transaction

$3,300

THALOP LLC

2 transactions

$2,000

BARREL DOG, LLC

1 transaction

$1,000

NOAH HOMES LLC

1 transaction

$1,000

B&B DAIRY

2 transactions

$1,000

STRAIGHT LINE RED ANGUS

1 transaction

$250

No committee contributions found

VAN ANDEL, AMY

1 transaction

$75,000

VAN ANDEL, STEPHEN

1 transaction

$75,000

HAWORTH, RICHARD G

1 transaction

$47,900

SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE H.

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN A

1 transaction

$11,600

HAWORTH, MATT R

1 transaction

$11,600

QUINTILIAN, JOSEPH

1 transaction

$11,600

HIBMA, DANIEL

2 transactions

$11,600

SHINELDECKER, SHAR

2 transactions

$10,200

KLINSKY, STEVEN B.

1 transaction

$6,600

DIPRISCO, GREGORY

1 transaction

$6,600

PAYNE, ROBERT

1 transaction

$5,800

BAKER, JEFFREY

1 transaction

$5,000

CARMICHAEL, CATHRYN B

1 transaction

$5,000

PETERS, JAMES

1 transaction

$5,000

LANTING, ARLYN

1 transaction

$5,000

LANTING, MARCIA

1 transaction

$5,000

WORKMAN, JOHN

1 transaction

$5,000

Donor Network - Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

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Total contributions: $323,650

Top Donors - Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

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Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped, 2 harmed.

+Print & Broadcast Mediaconfidence 0.90
Section 702 authorizes appropriations for public diplomacy, including support for United States-funded media, which could benefit print and broadcast media outlets
−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80
Section 721(b)(8) mentions opposing censorship by foreign governments, which could impact big tech platforms' operations in certain countries
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.70
Section 721(b)(6) talks about advancing circumvention and access tools, which might affect telecommunications companies' business models

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of State

Strong

Vector: 71%

Pages: 226-228AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5251 aligns strongly with Project 2025's objective to make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests by strengthening the State Department's public diplomacy structure, enhancing information operations targeting foreign audiences, and promoting educational and cultural exchanges to advance U.S. values and counter malign influence."

Key themes:public diplomacy reformstrategic communicationscountering foreign malign influenceeducational and cultural exchangesorganizational streamlining

— 193 — Department of State the supply of federal dollars to the WHO and other health-focused international organizations pending adjustment of their policies. The United States must return to treating international organizations as vehi- cles for promoting American interests—or take steps to extract itself from those organizations. SHAPING THE FUTURE Development of a grand foreign policy strategy is key to the next Administra- tion’s success, but without addressing structural and related issues of the State Department, this strategy will be at risk. The Hart–Rudman Commission called for a significant restructuring of the State Department specifically and foreign assis- tance programs generally, stating that funding increases could only be justified if there was greater confidence that institutions would use their funding effectively.22 Sadly, the exact opposite has occurred. The State Department has metastasized in structure and resources, but neither the function of the department nor the use of taxpayer dollars has improved. The next Administration can take steps to remedy these deficiencies. The State Department’s greatest problem is certainly not an absence of resources. As noted, the department boasts tens of thousands of employees and billions of dollars of funding—including significant amounts of discretionary fund- ing. It also exists among a broader array of federal agencies that are duplicative, particularly when it comes to the provision of direct and indirect foreign assistance. Realistically, meaningful reform of the State Department will require significant streamlining. Below are some key structural and operational recommendations that will be essential for the next Administration’s success, and which will lay crucial founda- tions for other necessary reforms. l Develop a reorganization strategy. Despite periodic attempts by previous Administrations (including the Trump Administration) to make more than cosmetic changes to the State Department, its structure has remained largely unchanged since the 20th century.23 The State Department will better serve future Administrations, regardless of party, if it were to be meaningfully streamlined. The next Administration should develop a complete hypothetical reorganization of the department—one which would tighten accountability to political leadership, reduce overhead, eliminate redundancy, waste fewer taxpayer resources, and recommend additional personnel-related changes for improvement of function. Such reorganization could be creative, but also carefully review specific structure-related problems that have been documented over the years. This reorganization effort would necessarily assess what office closures — 194 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise can be carried out with and without congressional approval. Timelines for action on these fronts should be developed accordingly, but speed should be a priority. l Consolidate foreign assistance authorities. Foreign assistance is a critical foreign policy tool that is too often disconnected from the federal government’s practice of foreign policy. Bureaucrats spend significant energy resisting the use of non-emergency foreign assistance to leverage positive results for the United States, even though it is a perfectly reasonable proposition. The coordination of foreign assistance dollars is also difficult because the foreign assistance budget and foreign loan issuance authorities are divided across numerous Cabinet departments, smaller agencies, and other offices. The next Administration should take steps to ensure that future foreign assistance clearly and unambiguously supports the President’s foreign policy agenda. For example, the next administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is technically subordinate to the State Department, should be authorized to take on the additional role of Director of Foreign Assistance with the rank of Deputy Secretary and oversee all foreign assistance. This role—which existed briefly during the George W. Bush Administration before it was eliminated by the Obama Administration—would empower the dual-hatted official to better align and coordinate with the manifold foreign assistance programs across the federal government. The next Administration should also evaluate whether these multiple sources of foreign assistance are in the national interest and, if not, develop a plan to consolidate foreign assistance authorities. l Make public diplomacy and international broadcasting serve American interests. A key part of U.S. foreign policy is the ability to communicate with not only governments but with the peoples of the world. Indeed, in some ways, communicating directly with the public is more important than communicating with governments, particularly in times of governmental conflict or disagreement. Public diplomacy has historically been, and remains, vital to American foreign policy success. Unfortunately, U.S. public diplomacy, which largely relies on taxpayer-funded international broadcasting outlets, has been deeply ineffective in recent years. The U.S. government’s first foray into international broadcasting started with the Voice of America radio broadcast in 1942, which was intended as

Department of Homeland Security

Strong

Vector: 68%

Pages: 201-204AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5251 strengthens the State Department's public diplomacy structure and capabilities, directly supporting the Project 2025 goal of making the department a lean, functional machine that implements the President's national security and foreign policy agenda."

Key themes:public diplomacystrategic communicationsorganizational efficiencypresidential agendanational interest

— 169 — Department of Homeland Security 19. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Management Directive No. 0810.1, June 10, 2004, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_0810_1_the_office_of_inspector_general. pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 20. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/5005 (accessed January 18, 2023). — 171 — 6 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Kiron K. Skinner The U.S. Department of State’s mission is to bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally implement the President’s foreign policy priorities; to serve U.S. citizens abroad; and to advance the economic, foreign policy, and national security interests of the United States. Since the U.S. Founding, the Department of State has been the American gov- ernment’s designated tool of engagement with foreign governments and peoples throughout the world. Country names, borders, leaders, technology, and people have changed in the more than two centuries since the Founding, but the basics of diplomacy remain the same. Although the Department has also evolved throughout the years, at least in the modern era, there is one significant problem that the next President must address to be successful. There are scores of fine diplomats who serve the President’s agenda, often helping to shape and interpret that agenda. At the same time, however, in all Administrations, there is a tug-of-war between Presidents and bureaucracies— and that resistance is much starker under conservative Presidents, due largely to the fact that large swaths of the State Department’s workforce are left-wing and predisposed to disagree with a conservative President’s policy agenda and vision. It should not and cannot be this way: The American people need and deserve a diplomatic machine fully focused on the national interest as defined through the election of a President who sets the domestic and international agenda for the nation. The next Administration must take swift and decisive steps to reforge the department into a lean and functional diplomatic machine that serves the

Department of State

Moderate

Vector: 70%

Pages: 208-210AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both HR 5251 and the Project 2025 State Department section aim to strengthen the Department's effectiveness and coordination, particularly in countering foreign adversaries like China, though HR 5251 focuses on public diplomacy structures while Project 2025 emphasizes treaty processes and constitutional alignment."

Key themes:State Department reformInteragency coordinationCountering China threatPublic diplomacy as a foreign policy toolCongressional engagement

— 175 — Department of State numerous logistical challenges in negotiating, approving, and implementing trea- ties and agreements. This is particularly true under the Biden Administration. For example, under the Biden Administration, the State Department was considered sufficiently unreliable in terms of alignment and effectiveness such that its political leadership invoked its Circular 175 (C-175) authority to delegate its diplomatic capacity to other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security. At time of publication, the State Department is negotiating (or seeking to nego- tiate) large-scale, sovereignty-eroding agreements that could come at considerable economic and other costs to the American people. Although such agreements should be evaluated and approved as are treaties, the Biden Administration is likely to simply call them “agreements.” The Biden State Department not only approves but also enforces treaties that have not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. This practice must be thoroughly reviewed—and most likely jettisoned. The next President should recalibrate how the State Department handles trea- ties and agreements, primarily by restoring constitutionality to these processes. He or she should direct the Secretary of State to freeze any ongoing treaty or inter- national agreement negotiations and assess whether those efforts align with the new President’s foreign policy direction. The next Administration should also direct the secretary to order an immediate stand-down on enforcement of any treaties that have not been ratified by the Senate, and order a thorough review of the degree to which such enforcement has impacted the department’s functions, policies, and use of resources. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Office of the Attorney General and the White House Counsel’s Office, should also conduct a review to identify “agreements” that are really treaty commitments within the ordinary public mean- ing of the Constitution,6 and suspend compliance pending presidential transmittal of those agreements to the Senate for advice and consent. The next Administration should also move to withdraw from treaties that have been under Senate consider- ation for 20 years or more, with the understanding that those treaties are unlikely to be ratified. Under circumstances in which ratification of a stale treaty before the Senate still serves national interests, the treaty letter of transmittal and sub- mission should be updated for current circumstances. The Secretary of State must revoke most outstanding C-175 authorities that have been granted to other agen- cies during previous Administrations, although such revocations should be closely coordinated with the White House for logistical reasons. Coordinate with Other Agencies. Interagency engagement in this new environment must be similarly adjusted to mirror presidential direction. Indeed, coordination among federal agencies is challenging even in the most well-oiled Administrations. Although such coordination is inescapable and sometimes produc- tive, agencies tend to leverage each other’s resources in ways that occasionally have off-mission consequences for the agency or agencies with the resources. Ideally, the — 176 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Secretary of State should work as part of an agile foreign policy team along with the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and other agency heads to flesh out and advance the President’s foreign policy. Bureaucratic stovepipes of the past should be less important than commitment to, and achievement of, the President’s foreign policy agenda. The State Department’s role in these interagency discussions must reflect the President’s clear direction and disallow resources and tools to be used in any way that detracts from the presidentially directed mission. Coordinate with Congress. Congress has both the statutory and appropri- ations authority to impact the State Department’s operations and has a strong interest in key aspects of American foreign policy. The department must therefore take particular care in its interaction with Congress, since poor interactions with Congress, regardless of intentions, could trigger congressional pushback or have other negative impacts on the President’s agenda. This will require particularly strong leadership of the Department of State’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs. The Secretary of State and political leadership should ensure full coordination with the White House regarding congressional engage- ment on any State Department responsibility. This may lead to, for example, the President authorizing the State Department to engage with Members of Congress and relevant committees on certain issues (including statutorily designated con- gressional consultations), but to remain “radio silent” on volatile or designated issues on which the White House wants to be the primary or only voice. All such authorized department engagements with Congress must be driven and handled by political appointees in conjunction with career officials who have the relevant expertise and are willing to work in concert with the President’s political appoin- tees on particularly sensitive matters. Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat. The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclu- sive international system.”7 Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department. Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the gov- ernment, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end. Review Immigration and Domestic Security Requirements. Arguably, the department’s most noteworthy challenge on the global stage has been its handling

Department of State

Moderate

Vector: 68%

Pages: 226-228AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 5251 aligns with Project 2025's call for structural reform and strategic realignment of the State Department by establishing clearer leadership in public diplomacy and streamlining responsibilities, though it does not explicitly address reducing redundancy or cutting funding to international organizations as emphasized in the policy."

Key themes:State Department restructuringstrategic communicationsaccountability to political leadershipstreamlining bureaucracypublic diplomacy enhancement

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 68%

Pages: 205-207AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on strengthening public diplomacy structures and authorities within the State Department, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes political appointee placement, leadership control, and bureaucratic reform to align the State Department with the President’s agenda. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address appointment processes, political loyalty, or administrative overhaul central to the Project 2025 directive."

Key themes:State Departmentleadershippolicy implementation

— 173 — Department of State service and civil service personnel who share the President’s vision and policy agendas—to run the department. This can be done by taking these steps at the outset of the next Administration. Exert Leverage During the Confirmation Process. Notwithstanding the challenges and slowness of the modern U.S. Senate confirmation process, the next President can exert leverage on the Senate if he or she is willing to place State Department appointees directly into those roles, pending confirmation. Doing so would both ensure that the department has immediate senior political leadership and would force the Senate to act on nominees’ appointments instead of being allowed to engage in dilatory tactics that cripple the State Department’s function- ality for weeks, months, or even years. Assert Leadership in the Appointment Process. The next Administration should assert leadership over, and guidance to, the State Department by placing political appointees in positions that do not require Senate confirmation, including senior advisors, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and Deputy Assistant Sec- retaries. Given the department’s size, the next Administration should also increase the number of political appointees to manage it. To the extent possible, all non-confirmed senior appointees should be selected by the President-elect’s transition team or the new President’s Office of Presiden- tial Personnel (depending on the timing of selection) and be in place the first day of the Administration. No one in a leadership position on the morning of January 20 should hold that position at the end of the day. These recommendations do not imply that foreign service and civil service officials should be excluded from key roles: It is hard to imagine a scenario in which they are not immediately relevant to the transition of power. The main suggestion here is that as many political appoin- tees as possible should be in place at the start of a new Administration. Support and Train Political Appointees. The Secretary of State should use his or her office and its resources to ensure regular coordination among all political appointees, which should take the form of strategy meetings, trainings, and other events. The secretary should also take reasonable steps to ensure that the State Department’s political appointees are connected to other departments’ political appointees, which is critical for cross-agency effectiveness and morale. The sec- retary should capitalize on the more experienced political appointees by using them as the foundation for a mentorship program for less experienced political appointees. The interaction of political appointees must be routine and operational rather than incidental or occasional, and it must be treated as a crucial dimension for the next Administration’s success. Maximize the Value of Career Officials. Career foreign service and civil service personnel can and must be leveraged for their expertise and commit- ment to the President’s mission. Indeed, the State Department has thousands of employees with unparalleled linguistic, cultural, policy, and administrative skills, — 174 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and large numbers of them have been an enormous resource to the Secretaries of State under which they have served. The secretary must find a way to make clear to career officials that despite prior history and modes of operation, they need not be adversaries of a conservative President, Secretary of State, or the team of political appointees. Reboot Ambassadors Worldwide. All ambassadors are required to submit letters of resignation at the start of a new Administration. Previous Republican Administrations have accepted the resignations of only the political ambassadors and allowed the foreign service ambassadors to retain their posts, sometimes for months or years into a new Administration.5 The next Administration must go further: It should both accept the resignations of all political ambassadors and quickly review and reassess all career ambassadors. This review should commence well before the new Administration’s first day. Ambassadors in countries where U.S. policy or posture would substantially change under the new Administration, as well as any who have evinced hostility toward the incoming Administration or its agenda, should be recalled immediately. The priority should be to put in place new ambassadors who support the Presi- dent’s agenda among political appointees, foreign service officers, and civil service personnel, with no predetermined percentage among these categories. Political ambassadors with strong personal relationships with the President should be pri- oritized for key strategic posts such as Australia, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). RIGHTING THE SHIP Ensuring the State Department is accountable for serving American citi- zens first will require—at a minimum—that the following steps be implemented immediately: Review Retroactively. Before inauguration, the President-elect’s department transition team should assess every aspect of State Department negotiations and funding commitments. Upon inauguration, the Secretary of State should order an immediate freeze on all efforts to implement unratified treaties and international agreements, allocation of resources, foreign assistance disbursements, domestic and international contracts and payments, hiring and recruiting decisions, etc., pending a political appointee-driven review to ensure that such efforts comport with the new Administration’s policies. The quality of this review is more import- ant than speed. The posture of the department during this review should be an unwavering desire to prioritize the American people—including a recognition that the federal government must be a diligent steward of taxpayer dollars. Implement Repair. The State Department must change its handling of international agreements to restore constitutional governance. Under prior Administrations, unnecessary institutional factors in the department caused

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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To provide for the public diplomacy authorities of the Department of State, and for other purposes.