Chip Security Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/3447
Last Updated: September 14, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

ID: H001058

Follow the money

The bill

Chip Security Act

HR. 3447, 119th Congress — read as touching Semiconductors & Hardware.

The sponsor

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$323,650 raised

28 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Commerce" section, p. 702-704 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 42 - 0.

March 25, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The Chip Security Act, because what's more secure than slapping a few buzzwords together and calling it a day? Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

The bill creates new regulations for chip security mechanisms on integrated circuit products, because apparently, our national security depends on it. The Secretary of Commerce will issue standards, because who better to dictate tech policy than a bureaucrat? The affected industries include tech, manufacturing, and export, because who doesn't love a good game of regulatory whack-a-mole?

Compliance requirements are, of course, vague and open-ended, because that's how you ensure maximum confusion and opportunity for creative interpretation. The Secretary has 180 days to require location verification on covered products, and then another year to assess additional mechanisms, because who needs clear timelines or deadlines? The notification requirement is a joke, as it relies on self-reporting by license holders, because we all know how honest and forthcoming corporations are.

Enforcement mechanisms? Ha! The bill relies on the Under Secretary of Industry and Security to receive reports of non-compliance, which will undoubtedly be thoroughly investigated and acted upon with all due haste (i.e., never). Penalties? What penalties? Oh, right, the usual slap-on-the-wrist fines and "other measures" that will have zero impact on actual behavior.

The economic and operational impacts will be delightful. Companies will spend millions complying with these new regulations, only to find out they're not actually secure. The export industry will thrive on the uncertainty and confusion, as companies try to navigate the ever-shifting landscape of regulatory requirements. And, of course, the national security benefits will be negligible, since any determined adversary will simply find ways to circumvent these half-baked measures.

In conclusion, the Chip Security Act is a textbook example of legislative malpractice: a mess of vague language, unrealistic timelines, and unenforceable provisions, all designed to create the illusion of action while accomplishing nothing. It's a disease, really – a symptom of a deeper illness that afflicts our political system: the inability to address real problems with meaningful solutions. But hey, at least it sounds good on paper, right?

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$323,650
24 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$8,550
Committees
$0
Individuals
$315,100

No PAC contributions found

1
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
1 transaction
$3,300
2
THALOP LLC
2 transactions
$2,000
3
BARREL DOG, LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
4
NOAH HOMES LLC
1 transaction
$1,000
5
B&B DAIRY
2 transactions
$1,000
6
STRAIGHT LINE RED ANGUS
1 transaction
$250

No committee contributions found

1
VAN ANDEL, AMY
1 transaction
$75,000
2
VAN ANDEL, STEPHEN
1 transaction
$75,000
3
HAWORTH, RICHARD G
1 transaction
$47,900
4
SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE H.
1 transaction
$11,600
5
SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN A
1 transaction
$11,600
6
HAWORTH, MATT R
1 transaction
$11,600
7
QUINTILIAN, JOSEPH
1 transaction
$11,600
8
HIBMA, DANIEL
2 transactions
$11,600
9
SHINELDECKER, SHAR
2 transactions
$10,200
10
KLINSKY, STEVEN B.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
DIPRISCO, GREGORY
1 transaction
$6,600
12
PAYNE, ROBERT
1 transaction
$5,800
13
BAKER, JEFFREY
1 transaction
$5,000
14
CARMICHAEL, CATHRYN B
1 transaction
$5,000
15
PETERS, JAMES
1 transaction
$5,000
16
LANTING, ARLYN
1 transaction
$5,000
17
LANTING, MARCIA
1 transaction
$5,000
18
WORKMAN, JOHN
1 transaction
$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Foster, Bill [D-IL-11]

ID: F000454

Top Contributors

24

1
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
2
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$3,300
May 24, 2023
3
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
May 24, 2023
4
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$3,300
May 24, 2023
5
SIVANANTHAN, SIVALINGAM
SIVANANTHAN LABORATORIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualNAPERVILLE, IL
$3,300
Nov 4, 2024
6
TULLMAN, GLEN
TRANSCARENT • CEO
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
7
MCINTOSH, WILLIAM A.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualKENILWORTH, IL
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
8
STOWELL, MARY
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWINNETKA, IL
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
9
KHOSLA, NEERU
CK-12 FOUNDATION • EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
IndividualPORTOLA VALLEY, CA
$3,300
Oct 21, 2024
10
MORRISON, KATE B.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

ID: M001194

Top Contributors

36

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationSHELBYVILLE, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
2
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
3
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
4
SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE TRIBAL OPERATIONS
OrganizationMOUNT PLEASANT, MI
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
5
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
6
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
OrganizationFULTON, MI
$3,300
Mar 12, 2024
7
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Jun 20, 2024
8
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE CHIPPEWA INDIANS
OrganizationSAULT SAINTE MARIE, MI
$2,900
Dec 19, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,500
Mar 4, 2024
10
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$2,500
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]

ID: K000391

Top Contributors

23

1
HONOR AGING LLC
OrganizationEAST BRUNSWICK, NJ
$3,300
Jul 16, 2024
2
PINNACLE HOSPITAL
OrganizationCROWN POINT, IN
$2,500
Mar 3, 2023
3
HOME BEE LLC
OrganizationWEST BLOOMFIELD, MI
$1,000
Sep 18, 2024
4
SAKA, SAMUEL
SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
5
SAKA, SAMUEL
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
6
GAITONDE, SUJATA
UIC • PROFESSOR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,700
Feb 6, 2024
7
GAITONDE, SUNIL
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,700
Feb 6, 2024
8
KALSI, RAHUL S
NICOR GAS • EXECUTIVE
IndividualOAK BROOK, IL
$3,700
Sep 22, 2023
9
KOZAKIEWICZ, BEATA
STERLING GROUP INC. • PRINCIPAL
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
10
JAIN, RAJ
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualORLAND PARK, IL
$3,300
Nov 3, 2024

Rep. Crawford, Eric A. "Rick" [R-AR-1]

ID: C001087

Top Contributors

20

1
KAMPETER, MICHAEL MR.
SNK REAL PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC • PARTNER
IndividualMETA, MO
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
2
KAMPETER, MICHAEL MR.
SNK REAL PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC • PARTNER
IndividualMETA, MO
$3,300
Dec 14, 2023
3
SILBEY, ALEXANDER MR.
ATS COMMUNICATIONS • CONSULTANT
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Jan 24, 2023
4
WALTON, ROB MR.
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualBENTONVILLE, AR
$3,300
Jun 30, 2023
5
HEDGE, BETTY MRS.
HEDGES INC. • OWNER
IndividualPARAGOULD, AR
$3,300
Jun 4, 2024
6
HEDGE, RANDY MR.
HEDGES INC • OWNER
IndividualPARAGOULD, AR
$3,300
Jun 4, 2024
7
DILLARD, DENNIS ALEXANDER MR.
DILLARD'S INC • PRESIDENT
IndividualLITTLE ROCK, AR
$3,300
Sep 17, 2024
8
LAMBERT, RYAN MR.
SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualMCLEAN, VA
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
9
COOPER, JOHN A. MR. III
COOPER COMMUNITIES INC. • PRESIDENT
IndividualROGERS, AR
$3,300
Nov 1, 2024
10
STEPHENS, WARREN A. MR.
STEPHENS INC • PRESIDENT & CEO
IndividualLITTLE ROCK, AR
$3,300
Jul 31, 2023

Rep. Lieu, Ted [D-CA-36]

ID: L000582

Top Contributors

31

1
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Sep 24, 2024
2
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS
OrganizationPALM SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Dec 19, 2023
3
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Jun 4, 2024
4
DEMOCRACY ENGINE
CONDUIT TOTAL LISTED IN AGG. FIELD
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,000
May 19, 2024
5
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,000
Jun 21, 2024
6
ONEIDA NATION
OrganizationONEIDA, WI
$1,000
Oct 8, 2024
7
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Sep 28, 2024
8
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$1,000
Aug 20, 2024
9
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Dec 27, 2023
10
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Oct 3, 2023

Rep. LaHood, Darin [R-IL-16]

ID: L000585

Top Contributors

34

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
2
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$3,300
Jun 14, 2024
3
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
May 15, 2024
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Jun 16, 2023
5
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 28, 2024
6
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Feb 8, 2023
7
ONEIDA NATION
OrganizationONEIDA, WI
$1,000
Mar 30, 2023
8
SALT RIVER PIMA MARICOPA INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationSCOTTSDALE, AZ
$1,000
Mar 31, 2023
9
D CONSTRUCTION, INC.
OrganizationCOAL CITY, IL
$1,000
Mar 29, 2024
10
ONEIDA NATION
OrganizationONEIDA, WI
$1,000
Jun 30, 2024

Rep. Gottheimer, Josh [D-NJ-5]

ID: G000583

Top Contributors

29

1
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$22,941
Apr 12, 2024
2
AMERICAN EXPRESS
OrganizationNEWARK, NJ
$10,621
May 10, 2024
3
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
May 15, 2024
4
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 15, 2024
5
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$6,337
Apr 30, 2024
6
PAYROLL DATA PROCESSING
OrganizationTAMPA, FL
$5,751
Apr 1, 2024
7
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
SEKAS LAW GROUP LLC
OrganizationENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, NJ
$1,500
Apr 12, 2024
9
SANDOR F. GENET & ASSOCIATES, P.A.
OrganizationNORTH MIAMI BEACH, FL
$250
Apr 12, 2024
10
FIRESTONE MILKEN, SARAH
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Jul 2, 2024

Rep. Lawler, Michael [R-NY-17]

ID: L000599

Top Contributors

21

1
MURTAGH, COSSU, VENDITTI & CASTRO-BLANCO, LLP
OrganizationWHITE PLAINS, NY
$1,000
Feb 24, 2024
2
BATMASIAN, JAMES
INVESTMENTS LIMITED • OWNER
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 27, 2023
3
BATMASIAN, JAMES
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$6,600
Sep 29, 2023
4
AUSTIN, ROBERT
UNAKA CO., INC. • BUSINESSMAN
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$6,600
Jul 18, 2024
5
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 15, 2024
6
SILVERMAN, JEFFREY
IndividualSURFSIDE, FL
$6,534
Feb 22, 2024
7
SCALA, MARY ELLEN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualPORT CHESTER, NY
$5,300
Aug 27, 2023
8
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
SELF • PRESIDENT
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 24, 2024
9
DEUTSCH, SHMULEY
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,900
Jun 25, 2024
10
PERLMUTTER, RAFUEL
GOLDEN TASTE • CEO
IndividualSPRING VALLEY, NY
$3,400
Jun 24, 2024

Rep. Sherman, Brad [D-CA-32]

ID: S000344

Top Contributors

26

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$2,000
Oct 30, 2023
2
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$2,000
Oct 5, 2023
3
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$2,000
Sep 30, 2024
4
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$1,300
Oct 21, 2024
5
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$1,000
Oct 28, 2024
6
SANTA YNEZ BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA YNEZ, CA
$700
Oct 21, 2024
7
AHMED, TAIMOOR
MARKHOR LOGISTICS • CEO
IndividualSACRAMENTO, CA
$3,300
Mar 30, 2023
8
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
9
GARHWAL, HARI
GARHWAL, CHAN & WILLIAMS • CPA
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 23, 2023
10
GARHWAL, SANJEEV
WWMG • PHYSICIAN
IndividualSEATTLE, WA
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023

Rep. Shreve, Jefferson [R-IN-6]

ID: S001229

Top Contributors

20

1
SASSO, APRIL
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$6,600
Oct 30, 2024
2
PONDER, JACQUELINE
BOWMAN FAMILY HOLDINGS • LAWYER
IndividualGREENWOOD, IN
$3,437
Oct 29, 2024
3
KING, CHRISTOPHER M.
RUNNEBOHM CONSTRUCTION, INC. • OWNER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Jun 7, 2024
4
CALDWELL, JORDAN
CALDWELL'S INC. • EXECUTIVE
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
5
DOPPELT, BRIAN
BAINBRIDGE COMPANIES • EXECUTIVE
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
6
KING, KYLIE A.
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualSHELBYVILLE, IN
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
7
SASSO, RICK C.
INDIANA SPINE GROUP • PHYSICIAN
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
8
SCHUMACHER, AMY MAE
THE HERITAGE GROUP • CEO
IndividualCARMEL, IN
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
9
MCALLISTER, CHRIS
TARBERT PROPERTIES LP • PARTNER
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
10
ZINK, JAMES C.
ZINK DISTRIBUTING • CHAIRMAN / CEO
IndividualINDIANAPOLIS, IN
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 45 nodes and 47 connections

Total contributions: $47

Top Donors - Rep. Huizenga, Bill [R-MI-4]

Showing top 24 donors by contribution amount

6 Orgs18 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • Section 4(a)(1) requires covered integrated circuit products to be outfitted with chip security mechanisms before export, reexport, or in-country transfer, which imposes a cost on semiconductor manufacturers but also creates a market for security technologies; net benefit likely as it enables continued exports under enhanced security, supporting industry competitiveness.

  • Section 2(1) and (5) state that chip security mechanisms will support AI ecosystem advancement and increase flexibility in export controls, allowing more international partners to receive advanced computing hardware, which benefits AI and cloud infrastructure providers that rely on exported chips.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2(3) and (4) emphasize national security and export control compliance, and Section 4(c) authorizes enforcement mechanisms for tracking exported chips, which benefits defense contractors who rely on secure supply chains for advanced integrated circuits used in military systems.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Commerce

Very Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 702-704AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Chip Security Act directly implements export control measures to secure U.S.-made semiconductors, preventing diversion and unauthorized use, which aligns with Project 2025's objectives of strategic decoupling from China, protecting critical supply chains, strengthening the defense industrial base, and safeguarding emerging technologies."

Key themes:semiconductor export controlstechnology transfer preventionsupply chain securitydefense industrial basestrategic decoupling from China

— 670 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Strategic decoupling from China; l Defense industrial base strength; l Critical supply chains (e.g., pharmaceuticals, medical devices, food); and l Emerging technologies (e.g., rare earth minerals, semiconductors, batteries, artificial intelligence, quantum computing). Global Markets and the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service. For more than a decade, strategic planning at Global Markets (GM) and the U.S. and For- eign Commercial Service (CS) has been consistently undermined by increased costs associated with overseas staff and flat or reduced budgets. The Trump Administration introduced crucial, long-overdue business practices such as the implementation of software to manage and track workflow, but a further strategic overhaul of resource allocation is needed to set GM and the CS on a firm footing. Currently, CS manages staff spread over 106 domestic offices in 77 countries around the world. Abroad, several “partner posts” utilize interagency staff and regionally located CS officials to offer services without a permanent physical in-country CS presence. Given the rapidly rising costs imposed by the State Depart- ment on CS posts overseas, a drastic expansion of this model is likely needed. CS resources should be distributed according to the following set of priorities: l Value in countering the malign influence of adversaries, particularly China; l Value in fostering U.S. innovation; l Value in maintaining access to critical supply chains and technology; l Difficulty for U.S. companies in gaining market access without CS involvement; and l Potential untapped export market size and likelihood of expansion. Ultimately, difficult decisions must be made about the value of CS posts and whether individual posts can be justified given current resources and the above criteria. If the State Department deems the diplomatic value of a permanent in-country CS post to be vital to the national interest, then State should bear more of the cost of maintaining that post. Global Markets should also consolidate and elevate the Advocacy Center and SelectUSA as relatively low-cost tools to drive large-scale export transactions — 671 — Department of Commerce and foreign direct investment (FDI). SelectUSA is a low-cost and effective tool in attracting FDI to the U.S. and to re-shore manufacturing and research and devel- opment. In a world in which corruption is rampant, these are among the most effective tools in leveling the playing field for U.S. communities and companies seeking to engage with governments and potential overseas investors. Given the value placed on senior-level engagement by many governments and companies, this consolidated Office of Trade and Investment Advocacy should be headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary. The new office should also seek congres- sional authorization to utilize its FDI-promotion tools to encourage reshoring by U.S. businesses. BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY During the past two decades, technology transfer from America and its allies has helped accelerate adversaries’ technological and weapons capabilities. This tech- nology transfer on a massive scale has occurred because of adversaries’ exploitation of the U.S.’s open economy and education system through both commercial trans- actions and university and government research programs. Examples include the People’s Republic of China’s dramatic leaps forward in semiconductor design and fabrication, battery energy storage, nuclear weapons capabilities, artificial intel- ligence, space and aerospace engineering, and hypersonic weapons deployment. At the same time, the U.S. has systematically failed to protect critical assets. Rather than promulgate policies to better prevent technology transfer, the U.S. government has either ignored the problem or, worse, from 2008 through 2016 instituted a government-wide “Export Control Reform” process to loosen the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) governing exports of dual-use items to facilitate technology transfer to adversaries, either directly or indirectly through third-country transfers. Those reforms still present in the Department of Commerce’s EAR must be reversed. The United States needs stronger rules to protect technology transfer to adversaries while promoting technology integration and interoperability with allies. Further, U.S. export control regulations should be utilized to prevent theft of personally identifiable information and to encourage U.S. companies to shift production out of China and further diversify their supply chains to better advance U.S. national security interests. For all the below recommendations, BIS needs to move unilaterally while it works with allies to implement complementary export control policies. Waiting to act until allies are ready to move in lockstep is not an option while America’s national security is at risk. Emerging and Foundational Technologies. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) gave BIS permanent statutory authority to regulate exports of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology). ECRA also mandated that BIS

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Chip Security Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's goal of strengthening export controls on emerging and foundational technologies, particularly through mandating security mechanisms like location verification to prevent diversion and unauthorized use—directly supporting tighter controls on technologies of national security concern."

Key themes:export controlstechnology securitynational securityCommerce Department oversightpreventing technology diversion

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its — 673 — Department of Commerce Export Enforcement officers through improved and frequent training so they are able to detect export-control violations. EAR Revisions. The U.S. Government needs a new export control moderniza- tion effort to tighten the EAR policies governing licenses to countries of concern, including China and Russia (specifically, revise and/or reverse the 2008 through 2016 policies). When authoritarian governments explain what they plan to do, believe them unless hard evidence demonstrates otherwise. Case in point: China’s and Russia’s stated civil–military fusion policies demand central government command-and-control style systems in which every private entity serves the interests of the state and is forced to provide technology, services, capacity, and data to the central govern- ment and the military. Through this structure, commercial activities are routinely weaponized by authoritarian regimes that repeatedly identify the U.S. as an enemy. Accordingly, U.S. export control policies must be updated to reflect these realities and the associated threats to national security. Key priorities for EAR modernization for countries of concern should be: l Eliminating the “specially designed” licensing loophole; l Redesignating China and Russia to more highly prohibitive export licensing groups (country groups D or E); l Eliminating license exceptions; l Broadening foreign direct product rules; l Reducing the de minimis threshold from 25 percent to 10 percent—or 0 percent for critical technologies; l Tightening the deemed export rules to prevent technology transfer to foreign nationals from countries of concern; l Tightening the definition of “fundamental research” to address exploitation of the open U.S. university system by authoritarian governments through funding, students and researchers, and recruitment; l Eliminating license exceptions for sharing technology with controlled entities/countries through standards-setting “activities” and bodies; and l Improving regulations regarding published information for technology transfers.

Department of Commerce

Strong
Vector: 64%
Pages: 705-707AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Chip Security Act directly supports Project 2025's goal of regulating exports of emerging/foundational technologies by imposing security measures (e.g., location verification) and reporting requirements to prevent diversion and unauthorized use, thereby strengthening end-use checks and export control compliance."

Key themes:export controlssemiconductor securityend-use verificationpreventing diversiontechnology protection

— 672 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise regulate exports of emerging and foundational technologies. Although the scope of such technologies is vast, to date BIS has only controlled just over 40 of these technologies. This does not meet the clear statutory intent of Congress that ECRA be leveraged to ensure that the United States maintains a technological advantage in technologies bearing upon national security interests. Currently, BIS self-identifies technologies that merit control under the EAR with minimal input from other federal agencies. This mechanism should be improved. BIS should create an open, transparent rulemaking process by which any industry participant, private entity, or branch of the government may, at any time, submit nominations for emerging/foundational technologies for control. Then, on a quarterly basis, BIS should make public such recommendations (while holding the identity of the submitter confidential) for public input, followed by an explanation about its ultimate decision to control or not control the items, its reasons, the level of controls applied (stringent or permissive), and the relevant Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) under the Commerce Control List. Commerce should also institute a mechanism whereby its decisions can be challenged, including on a confidential basis. Licensing Procedures: Adjudication and Transparency. Currently, if the Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy disagree on an export license decision, the disagreement may be escalated to the Operating Commit- tee—and subsequently to the Advisory Committee on Export Policy led by BIS’s Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. The Assistant Secretary does not need to lead the dispute resolution, and this process should be revised by giving lead authority to BIS’s Under Secretary, who is better able to account for diverging views. Moreover, BIS’s authority to overrule other agency votes should be changed. Each agency should have one equal vote and, if a licensing dispute remains unre- solved, the final decision should be elevated to the National Security Advisor and the Secretaries of Defense, State, Commerce, and Energy. Additionally, to improve congressional oversight of BIS’s license adjudication process, BIS should provide specific congressional committees with data from the Automated Export System on a quarterly basis. Electronic files should contain U.S. exporter by name; product description (e.g., harmonized system code and ECCN/U. S. Munitions List designation); end user and destination country; and when a license was required, whether the license was granted or denied. BIS cur- rently denies just 1.2 percent of export licenses. These data reporting requirements can help Congress better determine whether BIS is adequately protecting national security through appropriate use of export controls or whether additional direction from Congress is required. Improve End-Use Checks. The integrity of the export control system may be validated only through adequate end-use checks. BIS must deny export licenses to countries that do not permit adequate end-use checks (e.g., China/Russia) by U.S. authorities. BIS should also strengthen the forensic audit capabilities of its

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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