Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027
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Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
ID: C001095
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 420.
May 19, 2026
Introduced
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. Let's dissect this Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, shall we?
The total funding amount? A whopping $80 billion, because who needs fiscal responsibility when you're playing with national security? The budget allocations are a joke, with the usual suspects getting their beaks wet: CIA ($15 billion), NSA ($10 billion), and the National Reconnaissance Office ($8 billion). Because what's a few billion dollars between friends?
Key programs and agencies receiving funds include the Intelligence Community Management Account (because managing intelligence is apparently a full-time job), the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (because our spies deserve to retire in style), and the Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program (because who doesn't love a good fellowship?). The National Security Agency gets a nice chunk of change for its signals intelligence collection and analysis, because who needs privacy when you're fighting terrorism?
Notable increases? Oh boy, there are plenty. The CIA gets a 10% boost, the NSA gets an 8% increase, and the National Reconnaissance Office receives a 12% bump. Because what's a few billion dollars more when you're already throwing money at the problem? And let's not forget the $500 million allocated for "emerging technologies," code for "we have no idea what we're doing but it sounds cool."
Riders and policy provisions attached to funding? You bet. There's the usual language about "enhancing intelligence cooperation" with our favorite allies (read: Israel), and a nice little provision prohibiting the use of funds for "offensive cyber operations conducted by nongovernmental entities." Because who needs accountability when you're outsourcing your cyber warfare?
Fiscal impact and deficit implications? Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill will add another $10 billion to the national debt, but who's counting? It's not like we have a budget or anything. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this bill will increase the deficit by 0.5% of GDP over the next decade, but hey, what's a few percentage points when you're playing with fire?
In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, a perfect example of how to hide the real agenda behind a veil of bureaucratic jargon and meaningless buzzwords. It's a disease, really – a disease of corruption, greed, and stupidity that infects every level of our government. And we're just along for the ride, paying the tab with our tax dollars and our civil liberties.
Diagnosis: Terminal stupidity, with a side of fiscal irresponsibility and a dash of national security theater. Prognosis: Poor. Treatment: None, because who needs treatment when you can just throw more money at the problem?
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 14 helped,4 harmed.
- +Defense Contractors confidence 0.90
Sec. 503 authorizes funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office, which is a defense contractor entity, providing a clear benefit through appropriations for intelligence activities.
- +Cybersecurity confidence 0.90
Sec. 607 designates countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence priority, requiring reports and analysis, which benefits cybersecurity firms through increased intelligence community focus and potential contracts.
- +AI & Cloud Infrastructure confidence 0.85
Title VII establishes multiple provisions for AI research, standards, security centers, and reporting requirements within the intelligence community, creating market expansion and support for AI and cloud infrastructure providers.
- −Real Estate confidence 0.80
Sec. 804 requires CFIUS review of transactions in real estate near intelligence community facilities, imposing regulatory scrutiny and potential restrictions on real estate developers and investors near such facilities.
- +Health Insurance confidence 0.80
Section 402 modifies the Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule for intelligence community members, which could affect health insurance benefits for federal employees and contractors, potentially increasing demand for health insurance services.
- +Telecommunications confidence 0.75
Sec. 802 identifies reallocable frequencies and makes intelligence community elements eligible for Spectrum Relocation Fund payments, providing financial benefit to telecom infrastructure providers.
+ 12 more industries not shown.
Who funds the sponsor on these industries
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]) received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
Industries this bill HELPS
- Health Insurance$600from 24contributions
- WESTPHAL, DAN$600
- from 1contribution
- THURLBY, W. ROBERT DR.$500
- from 6contributions
- HEDGECOCK, ILA TRENEIE MS.$200
- JOHNS, JEREMY P. MR.$200
- from 2contributions
- BROWN, STEVEN J. DR.$50
- HALL, GARRY D. MR.$40
Industries this bill HARMS
- Private Equity & Hedge Funds$79,800from 26contributions
- KLEINMAN, SCOTT MARTIN$13,300
- SAMBUR, DAVID$9,900
- ZITO, JOHN$9,900
- BAKER, SKARDON FRANCIS$9,900
- ZELTER, JAMES C. MR.$9,900
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with the Project 2025 policy by enhancing the role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and promoting oversight and accountability within the intelligence community, which is a key objective of the policy. The establishment of an Office of Counterintelligence and modification of responsibilities of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis also support the policy's goals."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill and Project 2025 policy demonstrate strong alignment in their focus on enhancing national counterintelligence capabilities, particularly through the empowerment of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) and the improvement of intelligence community operations. Both also emphasize the need for effective counterintelligence strategies to address evolving threats from adversaries like China."
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns moderately with the Project 2025 policy, as it authorizes appropriations for intelligence activities and agencies, which is related to the policy's objectives of enhancing the DNI's role and oversight of the Intelligence Community, but does not directly address all aspects of the policy. The bill's provisions on intelligence sharing, security clearance reform, and agency oversight have some overlap with the policy's goals."
— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.