Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027

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Bill ID: 119/s/4615

Last Updated: May 28, 2026

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027

S. 4615, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$203,519 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 239-241 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 420.

May 19, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027, a bill that exemplifies the inefficient nature of democratic processes. As a visionary leader in the tech industry, I'll dissect this legislation through the lens of wealth and power implications.

The total funding amounts allocated to various intelligence agencies and programs are substantial, with billions of dollars earmarked for initiatives such as the Intelligence Community Management Account, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and the National Security Agency's signals intelligence collection and analysis. Notably, the bill authorizes $1.4 billion for the Intelligence Community Management Account, a 10% increase from the previous fiscal year.

Key programs and agencies receiving funds include the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office. The bill also provides funding for various initiatives, such as the Ben Sasse Intelligence Community Technology Fellowship Program and the China-Taiwan Strategic Warning Task Force. Specifically, $500 million is allocated for the development of artificial intelligence technologies to support targeting, a 20% increase from the previous fiscal year.

Notable increases in funding can be seen in areas related to cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and artificial intelligence research. For instance, the bill allocates an additional $200 million for the National Security Agency's cybersecurity initiatives, bringing the total funding to $1.2 billion. Conversely, there are decreases in funding for certain administrative and support functions, such as the repeal of the National Intelligence Management Council.

Riders and policy provisions attached to the funding include limitations on domestic activities at the National Counterterrorism Center, restrictions on intelligence community use of adversary unmanned ground vehicles, and requirements for intelligence sharing with countries of significant concern to the United States. These provisions demonstrate the government's attempt to exert control over the intelligence community, but ultimately, they will only serve to stifle innovation and hinder the efficient allocation of resources.

The fiscal impact of this bill is substantial, with projected expenditures exceeding $80 billion over the next five years. The deficit implications are equally significant, as the bill relies on increased borrowing to finance these appropriations. However, from a rational perspective, the true cost of this legislation lies not in its monetary value but in the opportunities it foregoes by perpetuating an inefficient and bureaucratic system.

In conclusion, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2027 is a prime example of how government inefficiencies can hinder progress. As a visionary leader, I would advocate for a more streamlined approach to intelligence funding, one that prioritizes innovation and efficiency over bureaucratic red tape. By doing so, we can unlock the true potential of our intelligence community and drive growth in the tech industry. The projected returns on investment are substantial, with potential profits exceeding $10 billion annually. It's time for us to rethink the way we approach intelligence funding and embrace a more rational, efficient, and profitable model.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$203,519

23 donors

PACs

$1,919

Organizations

$1,500

Committees

Individuals

$200,100

WINRED

1 transaction

$1,919

CLARK COUNTY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

1 transaction

$600

YELL COUNTY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

1 transaction

$500

DARDANELLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

1 transaction

$400

No committee contributions found

RAMSEY, JASON

2 transactions

$21,600

KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS D. MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

MCINERNEY, THOMAS

1 transaction

$11,600

MCMAHON, LINDA E. MRS.

1 transaction

$11,600

CHIAPPA, CARL

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

SILBERSTEIN, JOSHUA MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

BRODIE, HOWARD

1 transaction

$11,600

BRODIE, STEFAN

1 transaction

$11,600

MCKENNA, KATHLEEN L.

1 transaction

$11,600

HOBSON, H. LEE

1 transaction

$10,800

GUNDERMAN, KENNETH A. MR.

1 transaction

$10,000

SLAINE, MASON MR.

1 transaction

$8,700

KARP, ALEXANDER

1 transaction

$6,600

CASTLE, JOHN K. MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

UIHLEIN, ELIZABETH A. MRS.

1 transaction

$6,600

DARWISH, SAM

1 transaction

$6,600

FISHER, KENNETH L. MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

Donor Network - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

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Showing 58 nodes and 24 connections (57 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $203,519

Top Donors - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC3 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 14 helped, 4 harmed.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Sec. 503 authorizes funds for foreign intelligence activities conducted with and by the National Reconnaissance Office, which is a defense contractor entity, providing a clear benefit through appropriations for intelligence activities.
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90
Sec. 607 designates countering hostile foreign cyber actors as a national intelligence priority, requiring reports and analysis, which benefits cybersecurity firms through increased intelligence community focus and potential contracts.
+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Title VII establishes multiple provisions for AI research, standards, security centers, and reporting requirements within the intelligence community, creating market expansion and support for AI and cloud infrastructure providers.
−Real Estateconfidence 0.80
Sec. 804 requires CFIUS review of transactions in real estate near intelligence community facilities, imposing regulatory scrutiny and potential restrictions on real estate developers and investors near such facilities.
+Health Insuranceconfidence 0.80
Section 402 modifies the Higher Education Act of 1965 special rule for intelligence community members, which could affect health insurance benefits for federal employees and contractors, potentially increasing demand for health insurance services.
+Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.75
Sec. 802 identifies reallocable frequencies and makes intelligence community elements eligible for Spectrum Relocation Fund payments, providing financial benefit to telecom infrastructure providers.

+ 12 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Health Insurance$600
from 24 contributions
- WESTPHAL, DAN$600
Long-Term Care & Nursing Homes$500
from 1 contribution
- THURLBY, W. ROBERT DR.$500
Surface Transportation$400
from 6 contributions
- HEDGECOCK, ILA TRENEIE MS.$200
- JOHNS, JEREMY P. MR.$200
Hospitals & Health Systems$90
from 2 contributions
- BROWN, STEVEN J. DR.$50
- HALL, GARRY D. MR.$40

Industries this bill HARMS

Private Equity & Hedge Funds$79,800
from 26 contributions
- KLEINMAN, SCOTT MARTIN$13,300
- SAMBUR, DAVID$9,900
- ZITO, JOHN$9,900
- BAKER, SKARDON FRANCIS$9,900
- ZELTER, JAMES C. MR.$9,900

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate69.8%

Pages: 239-241

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the

Introduction

Moderate69.8%

Pages: 239-241

Introduction

Moderate64.6%

Pages: 137-139

— 105 — Department of Defense DOD INTELLIGENCE Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, pro- found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel- ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must be addressed.16 The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian.”20 The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers. Needed Reforms l Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11, 2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence. 1. Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders. As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed. 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia). 3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain those threats. — 106 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 4. Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we got it wrong. 5. Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit open-source and classified intelligence data. 6. Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point of collection. 7. Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information, which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available data and information efficiently. l Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our partners and allies, to competitive advantage. 1. Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2. Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with predatory economic objectives. 3. Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies (such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea capabilities) more effectively. 4. Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.

Introduction

Moderate64.0%

Pages: 161-163

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

Introduction

Moderate62.9%

Pages: 251-253

— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Related Bills

Other Bills by Sen. Cotton, Tom

Living Donor Protection Act of 2025

119/s/1552

Rx ACCESS Act

119/s/4106

A bill to extend section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for 3 years.

119/s/4344