DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program and Law Enforcement Support Act
Download PDFSponsored by
Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
ID: M001230
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Invalid Date
Introduced
đź“Ť Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
đź“š How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who thought the TSA was a good idea. Let's dissect this mess.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of HR 2212 is to create a new program that sounds impressive but accomplishes nothing. The "DHS Intelligence Rotational Assignment Program" is just a fancy name for a bureaucratic merry-go-round, where intelligence personnel will be rotated through various assignments, because, you know, the current system isn't inefficient enough.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new subsection that requires DHS components to participate in the ODNI Intelligence Community Civilian Joint Duty Program. Wow, I bet the authors spent hours crafting this sentence to sound as exciting as possible. In reality, it's just a minor tweak to an existing program, designed to make it seem like they're doing something.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties are the usual suspects: DHS personnel, intelligence agencies, and the Director of National Intelligence. But let's be real, the only stakeholders who matter are the lobbyists and contractors who will profit from this new "program." The rest are just pawns in a game of bureaucratic musical chairs.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact is zero, zilch, nada. This bill won't improve national security, nor will it make our intelligence agencies more efficient. It's just a placebo, designed to make the public feel like something is being done. But hey, at least it'll create some new job titles and opportunities for bureaucrats to pad their resumes.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a bad case of "Legislative Attention Deficit Disorder" (LADD). The symptoms are clear: a lack of focus, an inability to address real problems, and a desperate attempt to seem relevant. Treatment involves a healthy dose of skepticism, a strong stomach for bureaucratic nonsense, and a willingness to call out the obvious lies.
In short, HR 2212 is a waste of time, money, and oxygen. But hey, at least it'll keep the politicians busy while they pretend to care about national security.
Related Topics
đź’° Campaign Finance Network
Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
Donor Network - Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 30 connections
Total contributions: $51,954
Top Donors - Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
Showing top 25 donors by contribution amount
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 162 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments. The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coor- dination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) Needed Reforms OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations, policies, and programs. Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters Gen- eral Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equiv- alent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head. The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS. OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making. OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressio- nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses. — 163 — Department of Homeland Security The old practice of relying on Executive Secretary taskings to pull documents for congressional requests does not work: It is slow, the metrics for what documents are gathered and how are unclear, and the components do not gather responsive material in an efficient manner. Document gathering should come from the Office of the Chief Information Officer or a relevant technological element within the department that can pull responsive communications quickly. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (OLA); OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (OPA); AND OFFICE OF PARTNERSHIP AND ENGAGEMENT (OPE) DHS’s external communications function should be consolidated and reformed so that the President’s agenda can be implemented more effectively. The Office of Partnership and Engagement should be merged into the Office of Public Affairs. In many Cabinet agencies, outreach to companies and partner organizations is similarly performed by the Office of Public Affairs. This would also accomplish a needed DHS organizational and management reform to decrease the number of direct reports to the Secretary. Both public and legislative affairs staff in the components should report directly to their respective headquarters equivalent. This would help to avoid a failure by the department to speak with one voice. It would also allow the component staff to perform more efficiently, overseen by expert managers in their trade. This would also allow DHS to respond to crises effectively by shifting staff as needed to the most pressing issues and better use underutilized staff at less active components. Only political appointees in OLA should interact directly with congressional staff on all inquiries, including budget and appropriations matters. To prevent congres- sional staff from answer shopping among HQ OLA, the DHS OCFO, and components, DHS legislative affairs appropriations staff should be moved from MGMT OCFO into OLA. Regarding components, budget/appropriations staff should move from component budget offices into component legislative affairs offices. Because dozens of congressional committees and subcommittees either have or claim to have jurisdiction over some DHS function, DHS staff from the Secretary on down spend so much time responding to congressional hearing and briefing requests, letters, and questions for the record that they are left with little time to do their assigned job of protecting the homeland. The next President should reach an agreement with congressional leadership to limit committee jurisdiction to one authorizing committee and one appropriations committee in each cham- ber. If congressional leadership will not limit their committees’ jurisdiction over DHS, DHS should identify one authorizing and appropriations committee in each chamber and answer only to it. To focus more precisely on the DHS mission, OLA staff should also identify outdated and needless congressional reporting requirements and notify Congress
Introduction
— 162 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise components as well: CBP, TSA, etc. all have their own intelligence operations and are better situated with their subject-matter experts to make their own assessments. The National Operations Center (NOC) within the Office of Operations Coor- dination (OPS) should absorb those select I&A functions and tactically proficient personnel that need to be maintained (for example, technical support to the National Vetting Center). The remainder of I&A should be eliminated. The OPS entity should maintain IC status, and the only intelligence mission set should be to provide situational awareness and the dissemination of operational information or raw intelligence (no analysis or products) at classified and unclassified levels to executive leadership across the department, not outside of DHS. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) Needed Reforms OGC should advise principals as to how DHS can execute its missions within the law instead of advising principals as to why they cannot execute regulations, policies, and programs. Instead of each component’s chief counsel reporting to the Headquarters Gen- eral Counsel (with a solid line) and indirectly to his or her component head (with a dotted line), the accountability should be reversed. Due to the different missions throughout the department, the components can better manage the legal issues of their specific mission than headquarters can. Thus, the chief counsel (or equiv- alent) of each component should report directly to the component head, report indirectly to the DHS General Counsel, and be accountable to the component head. The report to the General Counsel is to ensure consistency of advice across DHS. OGC should hire significantly more Schedule C/political appointees who in turn supervise career staff and manage their output. DHS’s mission is politically charged, and the legal function cannot be allowed to thwart the Administration’s agenda by providing stilted or erroneous legal positions and decision-making. OGC should serve as the center of the response to the legal challenges facing the department to ensure a streamlined, consistent response to a litany of issues facing the department. It is important to ensure consistency across all potential legal positions taken by the department, including those arising in litigation, congressio- nal oversight, and inquiries received from the Inspector General, U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Congressional Research Service and pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. OGC should invest in e-discovery software and contract with a vendor to manage the department’s e-discovery. This would be beneficial both in litigation and in responding to congressional oversight. Removing delays in e-discovery processing would also reduce the issuance of subpoenas to the department and the generation of negative press for the Administration that comes from delayed responses.
Introduction
— 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the — 208 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise threat from China and thereby counter it more effectively. They can also aid the development of export control mechanisms and potential outbound investment screening where necessary. Brief, specific governance language should be considered that would apply counterterrorist authority models to the broader functions of the U.S. government insofar as they are needed to counter 21st century nation-state threats. The success of any DNI rests with support from the President. Any revised Executive Order 12333 must serve to express unequivocal support for the DNI in executing the mandates that an amended order would provide. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) The CIA is a foreign intelligence collection service tasked with collecting human intelligence (HUMINT), providing all-source intelligence analysis and report- ing, and conducting covert action when required to do so by the President. The CIA has its roots in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which the United States established during World War II as a paramilitary and intelligence collection orga- nization. After World War II, President Harry Truman disbanded the OSS, and the CIA was established in law by the National Security Act of 1947. As with every agency in government, the President's election sets a new agenda for the country. Public servants must be mindful that they are required to help the President implement that agenda while remaining apolitical, upholding the Constitution and laws of the United States, and earning the public trust. The Pres- ident requires a CIA that provides unbiased and apolitical foreign intelligence information and, when necessary, can act capably and effectively on any covert action findings. Executing the Mission. The CIA’s success depends on firm direction from the President and solid internal CIA Director–appointed leadership. Decisive senior leaders must commit to carrying out the President’s agenda and be willing to take calculated risks. Therefore: l The next President-Elect and incoming Presidential Personnel Office should identify a Director nominee who can foster a mission-driven culture by making necessary personnel and structural changes. l The President-Elect should choose a Deputy Director who, without needing Senate confirmation, can immediately begin to implement the President’s agenda. This includes halting all current hiring to prevent the “burrowing in” of outgoing political personnel. Additional appointees should be placed within the agency as needed to assist the Director in supervising its functioning.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.