Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023). — 234 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 36. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 37. “Independent IC Analytic Ombudsman’s [Report] on Politicization of Intelligence,” attached to January 6, 2021, Zulauf letter. 38. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” December 29, 2009, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 2 (January 5, 2010), pp. 707–731, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-2010-01-05/pdf/E9-31418.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 39. President Barack Obama, Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Classified Information,” November 4, 2010, in Federal Register, Vol. 75, No. 216 (November 9, 2010), pp. 68675–68677, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2010-11-09/pdf/2010-28360.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 40. Agathe Demarais, “How the U.S.–Chinese Technology War Is Changing the World,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/19/demarais-backfire-sanctions-us-china-technology-war- semiconductors-export-controls-biden/ (accessed February 28, 2023). 41. Scott Stewart, “The Risk to Undercover Operatives in the Digital Age,” Stratfor Worldview, October 29, 2015, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/risk-undercover-operatives-digital-age (accessed February 24, 2023). 42. Lauren Pitruzzello, “Human Intelligence: Former CIA Officer Talks About Espionage in the Digital Age, University of Delaware UDaily, March 22, 2012, https://www1.udel.edu/udaily/2012/mar/global-agenda- grenier-032212.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 43. Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/shattered-inside- the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-age-100029026.html (accessed February 24, 2023). 44. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, “U.S.–Safe Harbor Framework,” https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/ privacy-security/us-eu-safe-harbor-framework (accessed March 11, 2023). 45. “Fact Sheet: Overview of the EU–U.S. Privacy Shield Network,” U.S. Department of Commerce, https://2014-2017.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/media/files/2016/eu-us_privacy_shield_fact_ sheet.pdf (accessed March 11, 2023). 46. “Fact Sheet: United States and European Commission Announce Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework,” The White House, March 25, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/25/ fact-sheet-united-states-and-european-commission-announce-trans-atlantic-data-privacy-framework/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 47. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14086, “Enhancing Safeguards for United States Signals Intelligence Activities,” October 7, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 198 (October 14, 2022), pp. 62283– 62297, (accessed March 7, 2023). 48. Warren P. Strobel, “Release of Ukraine Intelligence Represents New Front in U.S. Information War with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, updated April 4, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/release-of-secrets-represents- new-front-in-u-s-information-war-with-russia-11649070001 (accessed February 24, 2023). 49. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., “National Security Memorandum on Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/national-security- memorandum-on-promoting-united-states-leadership-in-quantum-computing-while-mitigating-risks- to-vulnerable-cryptographic-systems/#:~:text=To%20mitigate%20this%20risk%2C%20the%20United%20 States%20must,the%20quantum%20risk%20as%20is%20feasible%20by%202035 (accessed March 12, 2023). See also President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14073, “Enhancing the National Quantum Initiative Advisory Committee,” May 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 89 (May 9, 2022), pp. 27909–27911, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05-09/pdf/2022-10076.pdf (accessed March 12, 2023); and “Fact Sheet: President Biden Announces Two Presidential Directives Advancing Quantum Technologies,” The White House, May 4, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/04/fact- sheet-president-biden-announces-two-presidential-directives-advancing-quantum-technologies/ (accessed March 12, 2023).