Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

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Bill ID: 119/s/2342

Last Updated: April 15, 2026

Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026

S. 2342, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.

The sponsor

Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$203,519 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 266-268 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

By Senator Cotton from Select Committee on Intelligence filed written report. Report No. 119-51. Minority views filed.

July 28, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026, a pedestrian exercise in bureaucratic largesse. Let's distill the essence of this bill, shall we?

**Funding:** The total appropriation authorized by this bill is approximately $81 billion, a modest increase of 3% from the previous year. The bulk of these funds will be allocated to the National Intelligence Program ($73 billion) and the Military Intelligence Program ($8 billion).

**Key Programs and Agencies:**

1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): Receives a significant boost in funding for its Retirement and Disability System, as well as increased allocations for its facilities and assets protection. 2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI): Sees an expansion of its authorities and responsibilities, including the creation of new positions and offices. 3. National Security Agency (NSA): Gains authority to produce and disseminate intelligence products.

**Notable Increases or Decreases:**

1. A 10% increase in funding for the CIA's clandestine operations, likely a response to growing global threats. 2. A 5% decrease in funding for the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, possibly indicative of shifting priorities.

**Riders and Policy Provisions:**

1. Section 322 restricts contractors from collecting or selling location data of individuals at intelligence community locations, a nod to growing concerns about surveillance capitalism. 2. Section 328 imposes conditions on the procurement of telecommunications equipment by the intelligence community, likely aimed at mitigating supply chain risks.

**Fiscal Impact and Deficit Implications:**

This bill will contribute to the national debt, as it authorizes increased spending without corresponding revenue increases or offsets. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that this bill will add approximately $10 billion to the deficit over the next five years.

In conclusion, this appropriations bill is a predictable exercise in bureaucratic self-preservation, with incremental funding increases and minor policy tweaks. As a visionary entrepreneur, I would have preferred more bold reforms aimed at streamlining intelligence operations and reducing waste. Nevertheless, this bill will likely pass without significant opposition, as the national security apparatus continues to grow in influence and budgetary heft.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions

$203,519

23 donors

PACs

$1,919

Organizations

$1,500

Committees

Individuals

$200,100

WINRED

1 transaction

$1,919

CLARK COUNTY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

1 transaction

$600

YELL COUNTY REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE

1 transaction

$500

DARDANELLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

1 transaction

$400

No committee contributions found

RAMSEY, JASON

2 transactions

$21,600

KLINGENSTEIN, THOMAS D. MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

MCINERNEY, THOMAS

1 transaction

$11,600

MCMAHON, LINDA E. MRS.

1 transaction

$11,600

CHIAPPA, CARL

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHWARZMAN, CHRISTINE

1 transaction

$11,600

SCHWARZMAN, STEPHEN MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

SILBERSTEIN, JOSHUA MR.

1 transaction

$11,600

BRODIE, HOWARD

1 transaction

$11,600

BRODIE, STEFAN

1 transaction

$11,600

MCKENNA, KATHLEEN L.

1 transaction

$11,600

HOBSON, H. LEE

1 transaction

$10,800

GUNDERMAN, KENNETH A. MR.

1 transaction

$10,000

SLAINE, MASON MR.

1 transaction

$8,700

KARP, ALEXANDER

1 transaction

$6,600

CASTLE, JOHN K. MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

UIHLEIN, ELIZABETH A. MRS.

1 transaction

$6,600

DARWISH, SAM

1 transaction

$6,600

FISHER, KENNETH L. MR.

1 transaction

$6,600

Donor Network - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Show Also Donated To

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Total contributions: $203,519

Top Donors - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

1 PAC3 Orgs19 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 21 helped, 3 harmed.

+Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.90
Section 302 authorizes CIA to take actions against unmanned aircraft systems, including detection, monitoring, disruption, seizure, and use of force, which creates opportunities for defense contractors providing counter-UAS technology.
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90
Sections 326, 328, 607-612 strengthen cybersecurity policies, threat hunting, configuration management, and AI security, creating demand for cybersecurity software and services.
−Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.85
Section 328 imposes conditions on procurement of telecommunications equipment by intelligence community, requiring security contractual clauses that could restrict vendors and increase compliance costs.
+AI & Cloud Infrastructureconfidence 0.85
Sections 607-612 enhance AI development, usage, security center functions, and strategy for critical technologies, creating opportunities for AI and cloud infrastructure providers.
+Biotech & Researchconfidence 0.85
Sections 602, 603, 604, 606 directly address biotechnology talent, genomic data security, synthetic DNA/RNA procurement, and outbound investment screening for biotech, clearly benefiting the biotech industry.
−Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.80
Section 610 applies intelligence community AI policies to publicly available models used for intelligence purposes, potentially restricting how big tech platforms' AI models can be used in intelligence contexts.

+ 18 more industries not shown.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HELPS

Private Equity & Hedge Funds$79,800
from 26 contributions
- KLEINMAN, SCOTT MARTIN$13,300
- SAMBUR, DAVID$9,900
- ZITO, JOHN$9,900
- BAKER, SKARDON FRANCIS$9,900
- ZELTER, JAMES C. MR.$9,900
Long-Term Care & Nursing Homes$500
from 1 contribution
- THURLBY, W. ROBERT DR.$500
Surface Transportation$400
from 6 contributions
- HEDGECOCK, ILA TRENEIE MS.$200
- JOHNS, JEREMY P. MR.$200
Automotive (Legacy)$242
from 15 contributions
- TOLL, TED$207
- O'CONNOR, J. TIMOTHY MR.$35
Big-Box Retail$115
from 23 contributions
- DARNALL, SHARI$115
Hospitals & Health Systems$90
from 2 contributions
- BROWN, STEVEN J. DR.$50
- HALL, GARRY D. MR.$40

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 66%

Pages: 266-268AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill’s funding increases and policy provisions—such as enhancing jointness, improving analytic objectivity, strengthening counterintelligence, and protecting sensitive information—directly support the intelligence‑community reform and capability goals emphasized in the Project 2025 intelligence community section."

Key themes:intelligence community reformjoint coordination and analytic objectivitycounterintelligence supportprotection of sensitive informationCIA funding for counterterrorism

— 233 — Intelligence Community 19. Michael E. DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R45175, updated November 29, 2022, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R45175.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 20. H.R. 2663, Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, Public Law No. 81-110, 81st Congress, June 20, 1949, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/63/STATUTE-63-Pg208.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 21. Nicole Ogrysko, “Intelligence Community Workforce Is More Diverse, but Still Struggles with Retention and Promotion,” Federal News Network, October 27, 2021, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2021/10/ intelligence-community-workforce-is-more-diverse-but-still-struggles-with-retention-and-promotion/ (accessed March 18, 2023). 22. See James J. Wirtz, “The Intelligence Policy Nexus,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Strategic Intelligence, Volume 1: Understanding the Hidden Side of Government (Westport, CT: Prager, 2007), and Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 1 (October 1978), pp. 61–89. 23. Letter from Barry A. Zulauf, IC Analytic Ombudsman, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to Senator Marco Rubio, Acting Chairman, and Senator Mark Warner, Vice Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, “RE: SSCI #2020-3029,” January 6, 2021, https://int.nyt.com/data/documenttools/ ic-ombudsman-election-interference-with-responses/c50e548011fd6168/full.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 24. Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 30–31. 25. Joshua Rovner, “Is Politicization Ever a Good Thing?” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (2013), p. 58. 26. S. 1566, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law No. 95-511, 95th Congress, October 25, 1978, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 27. The Cipher Brief, “702 Reauthorization: Defending a Key Intelligence Tool,” remarks of Benjamin Powell, former General Counsel to the Director of National Intelligence, stating that FISA 702 provides “between 40 and 60 percent” of the intelligence in the PDB, December 18, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=mRJ09GHVRFk&ab_channel=TheCipherBrief (accessed March 18, 2023). 28. An intelligence alliance that includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC),” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-how-we- work/217-about/organization/icig-pages/2660-icig-fiorc (accessed March 10, 2023). 29. Porter, “Seven Questions the Next President Will Need the Intelligence Community to Answer to Win the Technology Competition with China.” 30. H.R. 1591, An Act to Require the Registration of Certain Persons Employed by Agencies to Disseminate Propaganda in the United States and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 75-583, 75th Congress, June 8, 1938, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/52/STATUTE-52-Pg631.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 31. Kristina Wong, “Exclusive: Former DNI John Ratcliffe Pleased CIA Following His Lead on China Threat,” Breitbart, October 13, 2021, https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/10/13/exclusive-john-ratcliffe-pleased- cia-following-lead-china-threat/ (accessed March 11, 2023). 32. H.R. 4628, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law No. 107-306, 107th Congress, November 27, 2002, Title IX, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-116/pdf/STATUTE-116-Pg2383.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 33. President George W. Bush, Executive Order 13354, “National Counterterrorism Center,” August 27, 2004, in Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 169 (September 1, 2004), pp. 53589–53592, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2004-09-01/pdf/04-20050.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 34. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Counterintelligence and Security Center, “Who We Are: History of NCSC,” https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ncsc-who-we-are/ncsc-history (accessed March 11, 2023). 35. Gregory F. Treverton and C. Bryan Gabbard, Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis, RAND Corporation, National Security Research Division Technical Report, 2008, p. 6, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ technical_reports/TR293.html (accessed March 1, 2023).

Department of State

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 232-235AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns closely with Project 2025's intelligence community objectives by authorizing increased funding for CIA operations, supporting ODNI coordination, and including provisions to enhance jointness, analytic objectivity, and counterintelligence—key goals in fortifying a depoliticized, threat-focused IC. It also emphasizes streamlining bureaucracy and protecting sensitive information, reflecting the policy's call for reform and future-threat readiness."

Key themes:intelligence community reformcounterterrorismODNI coordinationanalytic objectivitybudget streamlining

— 201 — 7 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Dustin J. Carmack MISSION STATEMENT To arm a future incoming conservative President with the knowledge and tools necessary to fortify the United States Intelligence Community; to defend against all foreign enemies and ensure the security and prosperity of our sovereign nation, devoid of all political motivations; and to maintain constitutional civil liberties. OVERVIEW The United States Intelligence Community (IC) is a vast, intricate bureaucracy spread throughout 18 independent and Cabinet subagencies.1 According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the IC’s mission is “to col- lect, analyze, and deliver foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information to America’s leaders so they can make sound decisions to protect our country.”2 An incoming conservative President needs to use these intelligence authorities aggressively to anticipate and thwart our adversaries, including Russia, Iran, North Korea, and especially China, while maintaining counterterrorism tools that have demonstrated their effectiveness. This means empowering the right personnel to manage, build, and effectively execute actions dispersed throughout the IC to deliver intelligence in an ever-challenging world. It also means removing redun- dancies, mission creep, and IC infighting that could prevent these collection tools from providing objective, apolitical, and empirically backed intelligence to the IC’s premier customer: the President of the United States. Today, as Abraham Lincoln famously said, “The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion…. [W]e must think anew, and act — 202 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise anew.”3 The Intelligence Community maintains an incredible capacity to achieve its mission, but both the IC and the somewhat antiquated infrastructure that sup- ports it often place too high a priority on yesterday’s threats and methodologies instead of trying to identify possible future threats or the methodologies that might be needed to combat them. The IC also often spends too much time over- correcting for past mistakes. The unintended consequences include hesitancy, groupthink, and an overly cautious approach that allows personal incentives to drive preset courses. The IC must be perceived as a depoliticized protector of America’s civil rights and security. The American people are understandably frustrated by the fact that those who abuse power are rarely held to account for their actions. This must change, beginning with leadership that is both committed to ensuring that these agencies faithfully execute the laws of the land under the Constitution and resolved to punish and remove any officials who have abused the public trust. The IC must also start to look forward, not backward. A concerted, disciplined, leadership-led initiative must be undertaken to refocus and shift IC prioritization, funding, and authorities to new and emerging threats, technologies, and methodol- ogies if the United States is to prevail against its global adversaries.4 Unfortunately, America’s major strategic threat is a nation-state peer and possibly ahead of the U.S. in strategic areas. An incoming President must understand that today’s intel- ligence competition could well require analyzing technologies the U.S. does not have or compartmentalizing certain information as was done during the Cold War because of intelligence penetration. A future President’s ability to drive the resources needed to defeat another nation-state giant should therefore be the focus of near-term IC reforms. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (ODNI) The ODNI was established in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11 and intelli- gence failures leading up to the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq. The office and its functions stem from authorities established under executive orders promulgated by President George W. Bush in 2004, followed by statutory authorizations in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).5 Proponents of an ODNI hoped to establish reforms similar to the Goldwater– Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) reforms of the 1980s, which identified recurring problems within DOD’s command-and-control architecture and led to unified Combatant Commands with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the senior ranking member of the armed forces and principal military adviser to the President. The ODNI was envisioned as a small but powerful IC coordinating agency led by a Director of National Intelligence (DNI). As the President’s principal intelligence adviser, the DNI would lead and provide oversight of the President’s intelligence authorities while wielding a cudgel—budget and appointment

Intelligence Community

Strong

Vector: 65%

Pages: 236-238AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill supports Project 2025's goal of strengthening DNI authority by enhancing jointness, coordination, and analytic objectivity across the intelligence community, while also streamlining ODNI administrative functions to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies."

Key themes:DNI authorityintelligence community reformjointness and coordinationbureaucratic streamlininganalytic objectivity

— 203 — Intelligence Community authorities—to break institutional silos that had caused past intelligence inte- gration failures. Originally envisioned by the 9/11 Commission as a strengthened, authoritative position, the final congressionally negotiated product signed by President Bush has led to ambiguous and vague authorities that are dependent on who is selected as DNI and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director and their level of support from the White House and National Security Council (NSC). 9/11 Commission Executive Director Philip Zelikow warned in a 2004 hearing that creating a new agency “lacking any existing institutional base…would require authorities at least as strong as those we have proposed or else it would create a bureaucratic fifth wheel that would make the present situation even worse.”6 The ODNI has become that bureaucratic fifth wheel about which Zelikow warned. For example, under the Bush Administration’s initial legislative proposal, the CIA Director would have been under the “authority, direction, and control” of the DNI and no longer the head of an autonomous agency. Additional mechanisms envisioned full budget authority for the DNI, including within DOD’s intelligence components, as opposed to coordinating authority. Through arduous “sau- sage-making” and relatively quick negotiations, lawmakers produced statutorily vague authorities that traded away the DNI’s ability to direct budgetary authority across the entire IC, including DOD, and left the CIA a subordinate but indepen- dent agency with duties to report to the DNI without explicit directing authority. These statutory developments were what led President Bush’s first choice to serve as DNI, Robert Gates, to turn down the position. In discussions with the White House over the post, Gates noted that the “legislation weakened the lead- ership of the community” and that “instead of a stronger person, you ended up with a weaker person because the DNI had no troops and no additional powers really on the budget, hiring, and firing.”7 Gates noted that success would require the President to “make explicit publicly that the DNI is head of the Intelligence Community, not some budgeter or coordinator,” and that “[t]he position’s only prayer of success is for the president to say plainly…how he sees the job. Without his explicit mandate…the endeavor is doomed to fail.”8 One of the two DNIs confirmed by the Senate during the Trump Administra- tion, John Ratcliffe, acknowledged that Gates’s theoretical concerns became the practical reality that he inherited: Prior DNIs were the head of the IC only on paper and were routinely accustomed to yielding IC actions and decisions to the preferences of the CIA and other agencies. My ability to begin reversing that capitulation was accomplished solely because President Trump made it repeatedly clear to the entire national security apparatus that he expected all intelligence matters to go through the DNI.9 — 204 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise To help further the legislative intent behind IRTPA, DNI Ratcliffe advised during the transition of incoming Biden DNI Avril Haines that the DNI should be the only Cabinet-level intelligence official.10 While his recommendation was adopted and has corrected the previously allowed imbalance by making the DNI the only Cabinet official and head of the IC at the table, the ODNI’s effectiveness and direction leave much to be desired. A conservative President must decide how to empower an individual to oversee and manage the Intelligence Community effectively. To be successful, the DNI and ODNI must be able to lead the IC and implement the President’s intelligence priorities. This includes being able to exercise both budget and personnel authority and being able to rely on timely, useful feedback from subordinate components of the IC, many of which are located within other Cabinet agencies. The ODNI needs to direct, not replicate in-house, the other IC agencies’ analytic, operational, and management functions. Considerations like mismanagement of human resources, joint-duty assignments, and accelerated growth in senior personnel can cause a President to dictate to his incoming DNI a desire to slash redundant positions and expenditures while simultaneously giving the DNI the authority to drive necessary changes throughout the IC to deal with the nation’s most compelling threats, including those emanating from China. As John Ratcliffe has noted, “These are essential to the DNI having the abilities and authorities to effectively direct, coordinate, and tackle the immense national security challenges ahead for the Intelligence Community as intended under IRTPA.”11 Otherwise, other Cabinet and subordinate IC agencies will continue to regard the ODNI as an annoyance and not as a positive contributor to the National Intel- ligence Program (NIP) budget. They will continue to work around or circumvent ODNI leadership decisions with appropriators and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) or seek to wait out an Administration or DNI to prevent a policy or intelligence priority from reaching fruition. Intelligence and interagency coordination has improved significantly since 9/11. Nevertheless, interagency rivalries and festering issues continue to cause duplication of effort on intelligence analysis and technology purchases as well as overclassification and ever-increasing compartmentalization. Additional issues include the abuse of mandated onboarding approval and reciprocity timelines by some agencies, recruitment and retention failures, and a lack of will to remove underperforming or timely adjudicate the misconduct of senior managers and other employees. Finally, future IC leadership must address the widely promoted “woke” cul- ture that has spread throughout the federal government with identity politics and “social justice” advocacy replacing such traditional American values as patriotism, colorblindness, and even workplace competence.

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill includes reforms aimed at enhancing analytic objectivity, jointness among agencies, counterintelligence support, and protecting sensitive information—areas also emphasized in the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section. However, it does not explicitly address the policy’s focus on strategic analysis for China competition, the 'obligation to share' cyber intelligence, or real-time auditing capabilities, resulting in only moderate alignment."

Key themes:analytic objectivityjoint coordinationcounterintelligenceinformation securityintelligence community reform

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Intelligence Community

Moderate

Vector: 65%

Pages: 260-262AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill supports intelligence community funding and coordination, which aligns with Project 2025's goals of reforming ODNI and enhancing interagency collaboration, but does not specifically address key Project 2025 proposals such as restructuring the PDB, reforming NIC composition, or appointing an ICCIO with defined authority."

Key themes:ODNI coordinationintelligence community reformanalytic objectivitycounterintelligencetechnology modernization

— 227 — Intelligence Community consider a primary briefer or a rotation of briefers from other IC elements. Addi- tionally, the entirety of the PDB staff and production should be located at ODNI. National Intelligence Council (NIC). The National Intelligence Council is the IC’s premier analytic organization and includes more than a dozen National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), each of whom leads the IC’s analysis within a regional (China, Russia, Iran, etc.) or functional (cyber, counterproliferation, economics, etc.) mission area. This includes authoring National Intelligence Estimates on major strategic issues with the entire IC, overseeing and deconflicting the annual analytic plans of each agency, and weighing in on day-to-day major analytical issues, sometimes individually (for example, by writing the NIC’s strategic memos or pro- viding detailed expert briefings to the President before major decisions). Historically part of the CIA, the NIC was reorganized into the ODNI as was the PDB. It retains the CIA’s objective analytic culture and is staffed primarily with CIA officers; however, as many as 25 percent of its NIOs over the decades have come from academia or the private sector, bringing in much-needed outside expertise to collate and understand intelligence with perspective and skills that are not necessarily nurtured within the IC. In recent years, there has been a greater emphasis on encouraging officers from other agencies—particularly the DIA, NSA, and FBI—to serve as NIOs or as their deputies. To encourage greater analytic independence and debate, the incoming Admin- istration should require that non-CIA officers comprise at least 50 percent of the NIC’s membership and that the first-among-equals NIC Chairman is an outsider from one of the three major IC agencies with reporting responsibility to the PDDNI. Opening these senior analytic roles to the best analysts regardless of agency would also encourage the continued maturation of analytic cadres and tradecraft at those agencies and give them an equal voice in interagency analytical disputes, which in turn would give the President access to the best thinking and a variety of sources and perspectives from across the entire IC rather than from the CIA alone. IC Chief Information Officer. The Intelligence Community Chief Informa- tion Officer (ICCIO) directs and oversees all aspects of the classified IT budget for all of the IC’s 18 elements. As the DNI’s principal adviser for technology, the ICCIO must be well-versed in technology, acquisitions, operations, and intra-agency coop- eration to advance our technical prowess and simultaneously direct a bureaucracy that, left unchecked, will serve each element’s own preferences. To ensure that procured and implemented technology and policy reflect the Administration’s agenda, the ICCIO must have the support of the DNI and possess the ability to command cooperation between and promote interoperability across IC members. Because of the unique responsibilities entrusted to this position, incumbency has seesawed between political appointees and career civilians; due to its con- gressionally capped salary, the position is often filled by an SES-level member administratively detailed to support the DNI. At times, the ICCIO is incorrectly — 228 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise referred to as the ODNI CIO. By law, and to secure unbiased execution across all of the IC’s 18 elements, the same individual may not serve as ICCIO and ODNI CIO. They are two distinct positions. Critical areas and IC IT portfolio priorities for the ICCIO include but are not limited to: l Transparent accounting and allocation of IT investments across the IC, including commercial cloud computing and storage (C2E); l Recognized and uniform security access for people, systems, and capabilities to enable interoperability across IC elements; l 5G/6G data transmission and network interoperability, which is vital to IC element operations; l Artificial intelligence and machine learning; l Quantum cryptography and post-quantum encryption (PQE); and l Cybersecurity infrastructure where Biden Administration changes have realigned and reassigned management oversight and IT architecture responsibilities to NSA and DHS/CISA, conflicting with ICCIO- delineated roles. An incoming Administration should appoint the ICCIO as a primary member of the DNI staff along with the ODNI General Counsel, IC Chief Financial Officer, and ODNI Chief Operating Officer. The President-Elect should require immediate reviews of the progress in imple- menting post-quantum encryption at a minimum for IC and Defense systems but preferably throughout the government. The President’s National Security Memo- randum specifying “the goal of mitigating as much of the quantum risk as is feasible by 2035”49 needs to be revised in light of the magnitude of the threat. Accounting for the investment that will be needed to secure IT systems for national security should be a top priority. ODNI, CIA, and IC Technology Issues. In recent years, the IC has had a mandate from multiple Administrations to advance technology needs for intelli- gence—needs that have seen massive changes as a result of such threats as China’s advancements in technology and data infrastructure. Many of the projects coming out of ODNI and CIA’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) focus on expen- sive, AI-driven open-source work, but there is likely duplication of effort in areas where the private sector and entrepreneurs are already making progress.

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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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