The bill
Common Cents Act
S. 1525, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Sen. Lummis, Cynthia M. [R-WY]
ID: L000571
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1525, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "24" section, p. 764-766 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Held at the desk.
August 9, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of S. 1525: The Common Cents Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The Common Cents Act aims to eliminate the production of the one-cent coin (penny) and mandate cash transaction rounding to the nearest five cents. Its stated purpose is to reduce government waste by ending the minting of a coin that costs more to produce than its face value—a long-standing fiscal absurdity. The bill frames this as a pragmatic, cost-saving measure, though its timing and selective focus raise eyebrows: why target pennies while ignoring far costlier boondoggles like defense overruns or agricultural subsidies? The real objective appears to be performative fiscal responsibility—a symbolic gesture to appease taxpayer outrage over trivial inefficiencies while ignoring systemic waste.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** - **Section 2** amends Title 31 of the U.S. Code to halt production of pennies for general circulation, allowing only numismatic (collector) versions. It also tweaks specifications for 5-cent coins, permitting a zinc-nickel composition to reduce costs and vending machine disruption—because heaven forbid we inconvenience a snack machine. - **Section 3** permits (but does not require) rounding cash transactions to the nearest 5 cents: down for amounts ending in 1, 2, 6, or 7 cents; up for 3, 4, 8, or 9 cents. Special provisions favor customers in employer payments and allow rounding in their direction during cash exchanges. Crucially, rounding is voluntary and excludes electronic payments—presumably to avoid disrupting the credit card industry’s stranglehold on modern commerce. - **Section 4** shields businesses from state or federal liability for following these rounding rules, effectively greenlighting the practice without mandating it—a classic legislative dodge: “Do it if you want, but we won’t make you, and you won’t get sued if you do.”
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Losers:** Penny enthusiasts, Coinstar machines, and anyone who enjoys the existential dread of counting exact change. Also, zinc producers (pennies are 97.5% zinc) and small businesses that rely on cash transactions may face minor pricing adjustments or customer confusion. - **Winners:** The Treasury (saves ~$85 million annually), nickel and zinc lobbyists (who shaped the new 5-cent coin specs), and corporations that benefit from rounding up (statistically, rounding favors sellers slightly over time). - **Bystanders:** Consumers using cards or apps—unaffected, as usual. The poor, who use cash disproportionately, may absorb tiny, cumulative rounding costs—though the bill claims neutrality. - **Politicians:** Get to claim they “cut waste” without touching entitlements, defense, or tax loopholes—pure, low-risk theater.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** The penny’s demise is long overdue—it costs 3.7 cents to make, a fiscal joke only Congress could sustain for decades. Savings are real but trivial in the $6 trillion federal budget. Rounding could nudge prices upward over time, though studies (e.g., from Canada, which killed its penny in 2013) show minimal consumer impact. The bill’s voluntary nature limits disruption but also its effectiveness—businesses won’t round unless it benefits them. Ultimately, this is less about reform and more about alleviating congressional guilt: a bandaid on a bullet wound, letting lawmakers pretend they’re responsible while ignoring the real diseases—corruption, inertia, and the addiction to spending other people’s money. The Common Cents Act isn’t about cents; it’s about the common *nonsense* of pretending trivial fixes solve profound problems.
Sen. Lummis, Cynthia M. [R-WY]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
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This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000555
Top Contributors
25
ID: L000575
Top Contributors
22
ID: W000779
Top Contributors
30
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 43 nodes and 47 connections
Total contributions: $47
Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on eliminating the penny and implementing voluntary cash rounding to reduce costs and modernize currency, while Project 2025's Section 24 critiques the Federal Reserve's expanded mandate and calls for limiting it to stable money to preserve independence and combat inflation. Though both address monetary policy, the bill does not engage with the Fed's dual mandate, regulatory overreach, or structural reforms advocated in Project 2025."
— 731 — 24 FEDERAL RESERVE Paul Winfree Money is the essential unit of measure for the voluntary exchanges that constitute the market economy. Stable money allows people to work freely, helps businesses grow, facilitates investment, supports saving for retirement, and ultimately provides for economic growth. The federal govern- ment has long made policy regarding the nation’s money on behalf of the people through their elected representatives in Congress.1 Over time, however, Congress has delegated that responsibility first to the Department of the Treasury and now to the quasi-public Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve was created by Congress in 1913 when most Americans lived in rural areas and the largest industry was agriculture. The impetus was a series of financial crises caused both by irresponsible banks and other financial institutions that overextended credit and by poor regulations. The architects of the Federal Reserve believed that a quasi-public clearinghouse acting as lender of last resort would reduce financial instability and end severe recessions. However, the Great Depression of the 1930s was needlessly prolonged in part because of the Federal Reserve’s inept manage- ment of the money supply. More recessions followed in the post–World War II years. In the decades since the Federal Reserve was created, there has been a down- turn roughly every five years. This monetary dysfunction is related in part to the impossibility of fine-tuning the money supply in real time, as well as to the moral hazard inherent in a political system that has demonstrated a history of bailing out private firms when they engage in excess speculation. Public control of money creation through the Federal Reserve System has another major problem: Government can abuse this authority for its own advantage — 732 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise by printing money to finance its operations. This necessitated the original Federal Reserve’s decentralization and political independence. Not long after the central bank’s creation, however, monetary decision-making power was transferred away from regional member banks and consolidated in the Board of Governors. The Federal Reserve’s independence is presumably supported by its mandate to maintain stable prices. Yet central bank independence is challenged in two addi- tional ways. First, like any other public institution, the Federal Reserve responds to the potential for political oversight when faced with challenges.2 Consequently, its independence in conducting monetary policy is more assured when the economy is experiencing sustained growth and when there is low unemployment and price stabil- ity—but less so in a crisis.3 Additionally, political pressure has led the Federal Reserve to use its power to regulate banks as a way to promote politically favorable initiatives including those aligned with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives.4 Even formal grants of power by Congress have not markedly improved Federal Reserve actions. Congress gave the Federal Reserve greater regulatory authority over banks after the stock market crash of 1929. During the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve was given the power to set reserve requirements on banks and to regulate loans for the purchase of securities. During the stagflation of the 1970s, Congress expanded the Federal Reserve’s mandate to include “maximum employ- ment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.”5 In the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s banking and financial regulatory authorities were broadened even further. The Great Recession also led to innova- tions by the central bank such as additional large-scale asset purchases. Together, these expansions have created significant risks associated with “too big to fail” financial institutions and have facilitated government debt creation.6 Collec- tively, such developments have eroded the Federal Reserve’s economic neutrality. In essence, because of its vastly expanded discretionary powers with respect to monetary and regulatory policy, the Fed lacks both operational effectiveness and political independence. To protect the Federal Reserve’s independence and to improve monetary policy outcomes, Congress should limit its mandate to the sole objective of stable money. This chapter provides a number of options aimed at achieving these goals along with the costs and benefits of each policy recommendation. These recommended reforms are divided into two parts: broad institutional changes and changes involv- ing the Federal Reserve’s management of the money supply. BROAD RECOMMENDATIONS l Eliminate the “dual mandate.” The Federal Reserve was originally created to “furnish an elastic currency” and rediscount commercial paper so that the supply of credit could increase along with the demand for money
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on eliminating the penny and introducing voluntary cash rounding to reduce costs and modernize currency, while the Project 2025 Federal Reserve section advocates for free banking, commodity-backed money, and ending central bank bailout functions—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond a shared interest in monetary reform."
— 737 — Federal Reserve by ensuring that cash earns a positive (inflation-adjusted) rate of return, it can pre- vent households and businesses from holding inefficiently small money balances. Further benefits of free banking include dramatic reduction of economic cycles, an end to indirect financing of federal spending, removal of the “lender of last resort” permanent bailout function of central banks, and promotion of currency competition.26 This allows Americans many more ways to protect their savings. Because free banking implies that financial services and banking would be gov- erned by general business laws against, for example, fraud or misrepresentation, crony regulatory burdens that hurt customers would be dramatically eased, and innovation would be encouraged. Potential downsides of free banking stem from its greatest benefit: It has mas- sive political hurdles to clear. Economic theory predicts and economic history confirms that free banking is both stable and productive, but it is radically different from the system we have now. Transitioning to free banking would require polit- ical authorities, including Congress and the President, to coordinate on multiple reforms simultaneously. Getting any of them wrong could imbalance an otherwise functional system. Ironically, it is the very strength of a true free banking system that makes transitioning to one so difficult. Commodity-Backed Money. For most of U.S. history, the dollar was defined in terms of both gold and silver. The problem was that when the legal price differed from the market price, the artificially undervalued currency would disappear from circulation. There were times, for instance, when this mechanism put the U.S. on a de facto silver standard. However, as a result, inflation was limited. Given this track record, restoring a gold standard retains some appeal among monetary reformers who do not wish to go so far as abolishing the Federal Reserve. Both the 2012 and 2016 GOP platforms urged the establishment of a commis- sion to consider the feasibility of a return to the gold standard,27 and in October 2022, Representative Alexander Mooney (R–WV) introduced a bill to restore the gold standard.28 In economic effect, commodity-backing the dollar differs from free banking in that the government (via the Fed) maintains both regulatory and bailout functions. However, manipulation of money and credit is limited because new dollars are not costless to the federal government: They must be backed by some hard asset like gold. Compared to free banking, then, the benefits of commodity-backed money are reduced, but transition disruptions are also smaller. The process of commodity backing is very straightforward: Treasury could set the price of a dollar at today’s market price of $2,000 per ounce of gold. This means that each Federal Reserve note could be redeemed at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for 1/2000 ounce of gold—about $80, for example, for a gold coin the weight of a dime. Private bank liabilities would be redeemable upon their issuers. Banks could send those traded-in dollars to the Treasury for gold to replenish their
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on eliminating the penny and implementing voluntary cash rounding to reduce costs and modernize currency, while the Project 2025 Federal Reserve section advocates for free banking, commodity-backed money (e.g., gold standard), or a K-Percent Rule to limit inflation and central bank discretion. There is no direct overlap in mechanisms or objectives, though both touch on currency reform and skepticism of current monetary policy."
— 737 — Federal Reserve by ensuring that cash earns a positive (inflation-adjusted) rate of return, it can pre- vent households and businesses from holding inefficiently small money balances. Further benefits of free banking include dramatic reduction of economic cycles, an end to indirect financing of federal spending, removal of the “lender of last resort” permanent bailout function of central banks, and promotion of currency competition.26 This allows Americans many more ways to protect their savings. Because free banking implies that financial services and banking would be gov- erned by general business laws against, for example, fraud or misrepresentation, crony regulatory burdens that hurt customers would be dramatically eased, and innovation would be encouraged. Potential downsides of free banking stem from its greatest benefit: It has mas- sive political hurdles to clear. Economic theory predicts and economic history confirms that free banking is both stable and productive, but it is radically different from the system we have now. Transitioning to free banking would require polit- ical authorities, including Congress and the President, to coordinate on multiple reforms simultaneously. Getting any of them wrong could imbalance an otherwise functional system. Ironically, it is the very strength of a true free banking system that makes transitioning to one so difficult. Commodity-Backed Money. For most of U.S. history, the dollar was defined in terms of both gold and silver. The problem was that when the legal price differed from the market price, the artificially undervalued currency would disappear from circulation. There were times, for instance, when this mechanism put the U.S. on a de facto silver standard. However, as a result, inflation was limited. Given this track record, restoring a gold standard retains some appeal among monetary reformers who do not wish to go so far as abolishing the Federal Reserve. Both the 2012 and 2016 GOP platforms urged the establishment of a commis- sion to consider the feasibility of a return to the gold standard,27 and in October 2022, Representative Alexander Mooney (R–WV) introduced a bill to restore the gold standard.28 In economic effect, commodity-backing the dollar differs from free banking in that the government (via the Fed) maintains both regulatory and bailout functions. However, manipulation of money and credit is limited because new dollars are not costless to the federal government: They must be backed by some hard asset like gold. Compared to free banking, then, the benefits of commodity-backed money are reduced, but transition disruptions are also smaller. The process of commodity backing is very straightforward: Treasury could set the price of a dollar at today’s market price of $2,000 per ounce of gold. This means that each Federal Reserve note could be redeemed at the Federal Reserve and exchanged for 1/2000 ounce of gold—about $80, for example, for a gold coin the weight of a dime. Private bank liabilities would be redeemable upon their issuers. Banks could send those traded-in dollars to the Treasury for gold to replenish their — 738 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise vaults. This creates a powerful self-policing mechanism: If the federal govern- ment creates dollars too quickly, more people will doubt the peg and turn in their gold to banks, which then will turn in their gold and drain the government’s gold. This forces governments to rein in spending and inflation lest their gold reserves become depleted. One concern raised against commodity backing is that there is not enough gold in the federal government for all the dollars in existence. This is solved by making sure that the initial peg on gold is correct. Also, in reality, a very small number of users trade for gold as long as they believe the government will stick to the price peg. The mere fact that people could exchange dollars for gold is what acts as the enforcer. After all, if one is confident that a dollar will still be worth 1/2000 ounce of gold in a year, it is much easier to walk about with paper dollars and use credit cards than it is to mail tiny $80 coins. People would redeem en masse only if they feared the government would not be able control itself, for which the only solution is for the government to control itself. Beyond full backing, alternate paths to gold backing might involve gold-con- vertible Treasury instruments29 or allowing a parallel gold standard to operate temporarily alongside the current fiat dollar.30 These could ease adoption while minimizing disruption, but they should be temporary so that we can quickly enjoy the benefits of gold’s ability to police government spending. In addition, Congress could simply allow individuals to use commodity-backed money without fully replacing the current system. Among downsides to a commodity standard, there is no guarantee that the gov- ernment will stick to the price peg. Also, allowing a commodity standard to operate along with a fiat dollar opens both up for a speculative attack. Another downside is that even under a commodity standard, the Federal Reserve can still influence the economy via interest rate or other interventions. Therefore, at best, a commodity standard is not a full solution to returning to free banking. We have good reasons to worry that central banks and the gold standard are fundamentally incompati- ble—as the disastrous experience of the Western nations on their “managed gold standards” between World War I and World War II showed. K-Percent Rule. Under this rule, proposed by Milton Friedman in 1960,31 the Federal Reserve would create money at a fixed rate—say 3 percent per year. By offering the inflation benefits of gold without the potential disruption to the finan- cial system, a K-Percent Rule could be a more politically viable alternative to gold. The principal flaw is that unlike commodities, a K-Percent Rule is not fixed by physical costs: It could change according to political pressures or random economic fluctuations. Importantly, financial innovation could destabilize the market’s demand for liquidity, as happened with changes in consumer credit pat- terns in the 1970s. When this happens, a given K-Percent Rule that previously delivered stability could become destabilizing. In addition, monetary policy when
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.