Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025
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Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
ID: N000193
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Bill Summary
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the real disease beneath.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Financial Technology Protection Act of 2025 is a masterclass in Orwellian doublespeak. The bill claims to establish an Independent Financial Technology Working Group to combat terrorism and illicit financing, but its true purpose is to further entrench government control over emerging technologies like blockchain and digital assets.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a working group comprising various government agencies, financial institutions, and "experts" from the private sector. This group will conduct research on terrorist use of digital assets (because that's not already being done) and develop legislative proposals to improve anti-money laundering efforts. Oh, and they'll also get to define what constitutes "digital assets" and other related emerging technologies.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: government agencies, financial institutions, and a few token representatives from the private sector. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the ones who will be affected by this bill's overreach: individual citizens, small businesses, and anyone who dares to use digital assets without permission.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Trojan horse for increased government surveillance and control over emerging technologies. By establishing a working group with broad powers, Congress is essentially creating a regulatory body that can stifle innovation and impose draconian measures on the financial sector.
The real disease here is the government's insatiable hunger for power and control. This bill is just another symptom of a larger problem – the erosion of individual liberties and the concentration of power in the hands of a few unelected bureaucrats.
Diagnosis: **Acute Regulatory Fever**, characterized by an excessive desire to regulate emerging technologies, coupled with a severe lack of understanding about their underlying mechanics.
Treatment: **Dose of Reality**. Congress needs to take a step back, acknowledge its own ignorance, and let the market dictate the development of digital assets and related technologies. Anything less is just a recipe for disaster – or at least another example of legislative malpractice.
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Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023). — 861 — 29 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Hans A. von Spakovsky MISSION/OVERVIEW The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent federal agency that began operations in 1975 to enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) passed by Congress in 1971 and amended in 1974.1 FECA governs the raising and spending of funds in all federal campaigns for Congress and the presidency. The FEC has no authority over the administration of federal elections, which is per- formed by state governments. While the FEC has exclusive civil enforcement authority over FECA,2 the U.S. Justice Department has criminal enforcement authority, which is defined as a knowing and willful violation of the law.3 Because the FEC is an independent agency and not a division or office directly within the executive branch, the author- ity of the President over the actions of the FEC is extremely limited. As former FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith has said, the FEC’s “[r]egulation of campaign finance deeply implicates First Amendment principles of free speech and association.”4 The FEC regulates in one of the most sensitive areas of the Bill of Rights: political speech and political activity by citizens, candidates, political par- ties, and the voluntary membership organizations that represent Americans who share common views on a huge range of important and vital public policy issues. NEEDED REFORMS Nomination Authority. The President’s most significant power is the appoint- ment of the six commissioners who govern the FEC, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Commissioners may only serve a single term of six years but
Introduction
— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50
Introduction
— 273 — Agency for International Development of the agency’s non-health, nonhumanitarian funding as well as almost all of its sectoral appropriations directives, including those that reflect the pet projects of individual Members of Congress. The Bureau is the policy and financial nexus at USAID for most of the Biden Administration’s radical priorities in foreign assis- tance, including gender, climate change, and the promotion of identity-based politics. On the positive side, DDI is also the Bureau in charge of areas that will be crucial to a reorientation of USAID, including trade, economic growth, inno- vation, partnerships with the private sector, and the agency’s relationship with communities of faith. The next conservative Administration should make the rapid staffing of key DDI positions a high priority. Besides the Senate-confirmed Assistant Administrator, the Directors of each of the Centers and Hubs in the Bureau will need political leadership. Almost every one of the agencywide policies that cover DDI’s areas of responsibility will need to be edited or rewritten entirely as soon as possible. The next conservative Administration should harvest DDI’s central appropriations to fund new priorities, especially working with ethnic and religious minorities and faith-based organizations and joint ventures with the private sector in education and energy. All DDI programs should issue funding opportunities restricted to new and underutilized partners modeled on the NPI. REGIONS Asia. Asia is the most populous continent and ground zero in the battle against Communist China’s efforts to exploit the development needs of poor countries for geopolitical gain. America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy should guide USAID’s approaches to disbursing foreign aid in the region. USAID should intensify its bilateral relationships with pro–free market Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India so that they can jointly advance private-sector solutions to secure financing for power generation, infrastructure, digital con- nectivity, investment and trade expansion, and other economic activities. USAID enjoys a strong in-country presence in India, buttressed by recent coordination on the global response to COVID-19 as India is a global leader in vaccine produc- tion. Those ties should be expanded. So too should development cooperation with Taiwan, which boasts effective pandemic response capacity that should be shared with developing countries. China’s island-hopping efforts to capture vulnerable Pacific states is a direct strategic threat to U.S. maritime supremacy and homeland security, and USAID and its allied donors should neutralize these efforts through the deployment of targeted assistance such as helping countries combat the effects of China’s ille- gal fishing. While China outpaces the ability of the democratic alliance to deploy state-backed financing to developing countries, it is unable to compete with our collective private-sector capacity to deploy trillions of dollars of capital.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.