The bill
Ratepayer Protection Act
HR. 9340, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]
ID: E000300
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9340, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 443-445 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
At the conclusion of debate, the Yeas and Nays were demanded and ordered. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 8, rule XX, the Chair announced that further proceedings on the motion would be postponed.
September 14, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The full House will vote on whether to pass the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
HR 9340, the "Ratepayer Protection Act," is a masterclass in legislative misdirection—like naming a tapeworm a "digestive aid." It amends PURPA to force utilities to make data centers and other 100+ MW "large-load customers" (read: crypto mines, AI farms, and Amazon’s wet dreams) pay *upfront* for grid upgrades they demand, including financial assurances to cover costs if they bail mid-contract. The bill’s true purpose? Shifting the burden of speculative infrastructure gambles from ratepayers to the deep-pocketed leeches sucking up megawatts like it’s free air.
**New Regulations:** Section 2 creates a federal standard requiring utilities to: - Recover *full, incremental costs* of generation/transmission/distribution upgrades *only* from the large-load customer benefiting (not spread across all ratepayers). - Mandate *pre-upgrade financial assurances* (bonds, letters of credit, cash) from the customer to cover upgrade costs. - Define "large-load customer" as non-residential users (primarily IT/data/compute facilities) with ≥100 MW peak demand at a single site—effectively targeting data centers, hydrogen plants, and energy-intensive manufacturing. - Apply these rules even if the customer terminates service early (clawback provisions via financial assurances).
**Affected Industries:** - **Utilities:** Must restructure interconnection agreements, demand financial collateral, and absorb administrative costs of vetting assurances. - **Large-Load Customers:** Data centers (AWS, Google, Meta), crypto miners, AI training hubs, and industrial electrolysis projects face higher upfront costs and contractual rigidity. - **State Regulators:** Forced to implement or justify exemptions within 1–2 years (per Section 2(b)(1)), triggering costly proceedings unless they already have comparable rules. - **Ratepayers:** Theoretically shielded from subsidizing speculative loads—but only if utilities enforce the rule (spoiler: they’ll lobby to weaken it).
**Compliance & Timelines:** - States must *begin* consideration of the standard within 1 year of enactment; *complete* determination within 2 years. - Utilities must immediately require financial assurances for *new* large-load service requests post-enactment. - No grandfathering: applies to contracts entered into *on or after* enactment date. - "Prior State Actions" clause (2(b)(1)(C)) lets states opt out if they’ve already voted on, considered, or implemented similar rules—a loophole big enough to drive a coal train through.
**Enforcement:** - Embedded in PURPA’s existing framework: state public utility commissions (PUCs) enforce via rate case approvals. Noncompliance = utility cannot recover upgrade costs from *anyone*, creating a strong incentive to comply. - Financial assurances are held by the utility; if customer defaults, utility draws on them to cover sunk costs. No explicit federal penalties—enforcement is contractual and ratemaking-driven. - Section 2(b)(2) hints at handling prior/pending proceedings but is cut off—likely allowing utilities to pause existing interconnection studies until the new standard is set.
**Economic & Operational Impacts:** - **Short-Term:** Slows interconnection queues as utilities scramble to draft assurance requirements; large-load customers face higher capex and negotiation delays. - **Long-Term:** Reduces ratepayer risk from "stranded grid" investments when fickle tech tenants vacate (see: Northern Virginia data center busts). May deter marginal projects but encourage serious players to commit. - **Reality Check:** This isn’t consumer protection—it’s utility armor. Ratepayers win only if utilities actually enforce it. Given lobbying power of Big Tech and utilities’ love of rate-base padding, expect watered-down state implementations and creative loopholes (e.g., splitting 101 MW loads across two sites). The bill’s name is a lie; its function is a sensible, if overdue, risk transfer. But in Congress? That counts as revolutionary.
Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001066
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ID: J000302
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 39 nodes and 47 connections
Total contributions: $47
Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(a) establishes a federal standard allowing electric utilities to recover the full, incremental costs of upgrades for large-load customers, which could increase revenue for utilities.
Section 2(a) implies that energy infrastructure upgrades may be necessary to serve large-load customers, which could benefit energy infrastructure companies.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 9340 aligns with Project 2025's focus on grid reliability, cost allocation fairness, and reducing undue burdens on consumers by ensuring large-load customers like data centers pay for infrastructure upgrades they necessitate, thus supporting grid resilience and preventing cross-subsidization."
— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.
AI Analysis:
"HR 9340 aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on reducing taxpayer risk and promoting cost responsibility in energy infrastructure by ensuring large-load customers bear upgrade costs rather than shifting them to ratepayers, which indirectly protects public funds. However, the bill does not directly address DOE loan programs, ARPA-E, or FEMP reforms specified in the Project 2025 policy."
— 384 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise DOE-backed loans and loan guarantees put taxpayers at undue risk, distort private-sector investment decisions, shift private money toward projects with political support, and create additional barriers to entry for companies that are outside of the government’s definition of “innovative” or for companies that choose not to participate. New Policies To the extent that DOE loan programs cannot be repealed, the new Adminis- tration should: l Strengthen due diligence and increase transparency in DOE loan programs. l Limit the use of new loan or loan guarantee authority to projects that will promote the reliability and resilience of the electric grid and other energy infrastructure and support national security objectives. l Establish clear mandatory qualifications requiring applicants to comply with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act58 and to certify that they are not financed with any other local, state, or federal taxpayer-backed loan, loan guarantee, or bond (such as a state “green bank”). ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY–ENERGY (ARPA–E) Mission/Overview ARPA–E was created in 2007 as part of the America Competes (Creating Oppor- tunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology Education) Act.59 Its statutory goals are “to enhance the economic and energy security of the United States through the development of energy technologies” that reduce “imports of energy from foreign sources;” reduce “energy-related emissions, including green- house gases;” improve “the energy efficiency of all economic sectors;” and “ensure that the United States maintains a technological lead in developing and deploying advanced energy technologies.”60 Some in Congress see ARPA–E as beneficial because the COMPETES Act pro- vides it with more bureaucratic flexibility than other federal programs are allowed. Its goals are essentially the same as those of DOE’s applied energy offices, but its structure is different, and it is focused around individual programs instead of around offices with longer-term agendas. — 385 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions Needed Reforms l Stop risking taxpayer dollars as venture capital for the private sector. ARPA–E tends to see its mission as bringing technology from idea to commercialization. Often called the investment trough, ARPA–E is effectively funding projects that the private sector is unwilling to fund. Taxpayers should not in effect be picking winners and losers—and having their dollars at risk but not gaining the economic rewards of success. l End duplicative efforts. Another problem is that ARPA–E’s mission is similar to the missions of DOE’s applied energy offices. If DOE’s applied energy offices are doing their jobs correctly, they will use Funding Opportunities Announcements, prizes, lab calls, and other funding mechanisms that are needed to accomplish a specific goal. In other words, ARPA–E is at best duplicating the work done by other DOE offices. New Policies l Eliminate ARPA-E. The next Administration should work with Congress to eliminate ARPA–E. The agency is unnecessary, risks taxpayer dollars, and interferes with risk-benefit decisions that should be made by the private sector. Budget Congress appropriated $427 million for ARPA–E in FY 2021, and slightly more than $700 million has been requested for FY 2023.61 FEDERAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (FEMP) Mission/Overview The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) describes its mission as working with “other federal agencies to meet energy-related goals, identify affordable solutions, facilitate public–private partnerships, and provide energy leadership to the country by identifying government best practices.”62 Congress has created a number of energy and energy efficiency requirements and guidelines for federal agencies,63 and FEMP works with those agencies to help them meet their congressionally mandated goals. Needed Reforms As the world’s largest single energy consumer, the federal government should use energy efficiently and cost-effectively—especially because the taxpayer is paying the energy bills. The Obama Administration required the federal govern- ment to set extrastatutory and aggressive goals regarding the use of renewable
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on utility cost allocation for large electricity consumers like data centers, while the Project 2025 EPA section addresses air quality, greenhouse gas regulations, and regulatory streamlining—there is minimal thematic overlap beyond indirect implications for energy use and emissions."
— 425 — Environmental Protection Agency are statutorily required, and remove any regulatory differences between attainment and maintenance that are not explicitly required by law. l Streamline the process for state and local governments to demonstrate that their federally funded highway projects will not interfere with NAAQS attainment. l Adopt policies to prevent abuse of EPA’s CAA “error correction” authority.20 EPA historically has used this to coerce states into adopting its favored policies on pain of imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). l Limit EPA’s reliance on CAA § 30121 general rulemaking authority to ensure that it is not abused to issue regulations for which EPA lacks substantive authority elsewhere in the statute. l If possible, return the standard-setting role to Congress. Climate Change l Remove the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) for any source category that is not currently being regulated. The overall reporting program imposes significant burdens on small businesses and companies that are not being regulated. This is either a pointless burden or a sword-of- Damocles threat of future regulation, neither of which is appropriate. l Establish a system, with an appropriate deadline, to update the 2009 endangerment finding. l Establish a significant emissions rate (SER) for greenhouse gasses (GHGs). Regulating Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Under the American Innovation and Manufacturing (AIM) Act22 l Repeal Biden Administration implementing regulations for the AIM Act that are unnecessarily stringent and costly. l Refrain from granting petitions from opportunistic manufacturers to add new restrictions that further skew the market toward costlier refrigerants and equipment.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
EXPERTS Act of 2025
Tradeable Energy Performance Standards Act
Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Department of Energy relating to "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Coolers and Walk-In Freezers".