The bill
Advanced Transmission Technology to Reduce Rates Act
HR. 9335, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Goldman, Craig A. [R-TX-12]
ID: G000601
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9335, 119th Congress — read as touching Electric Utilities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 449-451 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported by the Yeas and Nays: 39 - 10.
July 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9335: Advanced Transmission Technology to Reduce Rates Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 9335 is to reduce electricity rates by accelerating the deployment of advanced transmission technologies through a federal clearinghouse, technical assistance, and streamlined regulatory processes. Ostensibly, it aims to modernize the grid, alleviate congestion, improve reliability, and mitigate wildfire risks—all while lowering costs for ratepayers. In reality, this bill is less about consumer savings and more about handing utilities and transmission operators a taxpayer-funded playbook to justify rate hikes under the guise of "innovation." The true objective? To create the *appearance* of progress while shielding politically connected energy interests from accountability, all wrapped in the tired rhetoric of "grid modernization."
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends two existing statutes: - **Energy Policy Act of 2005**: Directs the Secretary of Energy to create a publicly accessible clearinghouse within one year, compiling DOE-funded advanced transmission projects, available financial assistance, and analyses on grid efficiency, congestion reduction, infrastructure optimization, grid visibility, automation, cost-benefit impacts on utilities and ratepayers, and geographic/weather effects on deployment. It also authorizes technical assistance for utilities, transmission organizations, and state regulators upon request. Crucially, it includes a "savings clause" explicitly stating that *nothing* in the bill authorizes DOE or FERC to mandate the use of any technology—a transparent attempt to appease anti-regulation factions while rendering the clearinghouse purely advisory (i.e., ignorable). - **Energy Policy and Conservation Act**: Adds advanced transmission technology deployment as an allowable activity within state energy conservation plans. - **NEPA Exemption**: Perhaps the most consequential change, this provision exempts *any* federal funding (grants or loans) for advanced transmission technology from National Environmental Policy Act review. In other words, if the DOE hands money to a utility to install fancy wires or sensors, no environmental impact statement is required—regardless of whether the project crosses wetlands, habitats, or communities. This is not streamlining; it’s deregulation by stealth. - **Wildfire Mitigation Best Practices**: Requires DOE, within one year, to develop voluntary best practices for utilities to reduce wildfire ignition risks from transmission lines, focusing on vegetation management, engineering improvements, and operational safety. A sensible idea, but rendered hollow by the lack of enforcement mechanisms or funding.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Electric Utilities & Transmission Organizations**: Primary beneficiaries. Gain access to federally curated technical data, financial assistance roadmaps, and voluntary best practices—all while avoiding NEPA scrutiny when spending public funds. They get to modernize infrastructure (potentially passing costs to ratepayers) with reduced regulatory friction. - **State Regulatory Authorities**: Offered technical help to draft regulations and conduct cost-benefit analyses—useful, but likely underutilized due to political or resource constraints. - **Ratepayers**: Supposed beneficiaries of lower rates, but more likely to see indirect benefits (if any) drowned out by utility profit-seeking and the absence of rate-regulation teeth in the bill. - **Environmental Communities & Tribal Nations**: Adversely impacted by the NEPA exemption, which removes a critical tool for reviewing potential harms to ecosystems, cultural sites, and disadvantaged communities. - **Taxpayers**: Fund the clearinghouse, technical assistance, and grants/loans—without guaranteed returns in the form of lower bills or environmental protection.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill is a classic case of regulatory theater: busywork disguised as reform. The clearinghouse will likely become a underused digital archive of DOE reports that utilities ignore unless they align with profit motives. The NEPA exemption, however, is dangerous—it removes a vital check on environmentally reckless projects, privileging speed and convenience over due diligence. While wildfire guidance is welcome, its voluntary nature ensures patchy adoption, especially in states hostile to federal oversight. Ultimately, H.R. 9335 does little to constrain
Rep. Goldman, Craig A. [R-TX-12]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: E000300
Top Contributors
20
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
22
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 25 nodes and 32 connections
Total contributions: $32
Showing top 13 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 2(a) establishes a clearinghouse for advanced transmission technology, which may provide technical assistance and financial assistance to electric utilities, potentially reducing their costs and improving their operations.
Section 2(a) and Section 3 promote the development and deployment of advanced transmission technology, which may benefit companies involved in energy infrastructure, such as transmission organizations and pipeline operators.
Section 2(b) amends the Energy Policy and Conservation Act to include programs that facilitate the deployment of advanced transmission technology, which may help integrate renewable energy sources into the grid.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Goldman, Craig A. [R-TX-12])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's focus on modernizing the electric grid through advanced transmission technologies, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and streamlining deployment—particularly via DOE-led initiatives and reduced regulatory barriers like NEPA exemptions for federally funded projects."
— 416 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 119. During the deregulation-induced 230,000 MW combined cycle plant boom of 1999 to 2003 and beyond, developers were able to move ahead only with projects that were supported by adequate available gas transmission and near existing localized transmission hubs. Delinking transmission responsibility from power generation, coupled with the heavy incentivization of renewable over gas projects, has promoted the construction of a large class of partially usable and often partially stranded generation-only assets. 120. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Grid Deployment Office Launches Transmission Siting and Economic Development Grants Program with $760M Inflation Reduction Act Investment,” January 13, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/gdo/articles/grid-deployment-office-launches-transmission-siting-and- economic-development-grants (accessed March 13, 2023). 121. H.R. 6586, Natural Gas Act, Public Law No. 75-688, § 7. 122. Ibid., §§ 4 and 5. 123. Ibid., § 7(c). 124. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf (accessed March 2, 2022). 125. H.R. 6586, Natural Gas Act, Public Law No. 75-688, § 3. 126. U.S. Department of Energy U.S.-based operating export LNG terminals are located in Louisiana (3); Texas (2); Alaska (1); Georgia (1); and Maryland (1). Map, “North American LNG Export Terminals: Existing,” in U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “North American LNG Export Terminals— Existing, Approved not Yet Built, and Proposed,” February 8, 2023, https://www.ferc.gov/natural-gas/lng (accessed February 14, 2023). 127. Niina H. Farah, Miranda Wilson, and Carlos Anchondo, “Jordan Cove Project Dies. What It Means for FERC, Gas,” Energywire, December 2, 2021, https://www.eenews.net/articles/jordan-cove-project-dies-what-it- means-for-ferc-gas/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 128. Carlos Anchondo, “Biden Admin Backs Contested Alaska LNG Project,” Energywire, October 25, 2022, https:// www.eenews.net/articles/biden-admin-backs-contested-alaska-lng-project/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 129. As discussed in the section on the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, infra, these automatic approvals should be extended to allies of the United States, not just to those with free trade agreements. 130. H.R. 11510, Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-438, 93rd Congress, October 11, 1974, https:// www.congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1233.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 131. H.R. 9757, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Public Law No. 83-703, 83rd Congress, August 30, 1954, §§ 21–28, https://www.congress.gov/83/statute/STATUTE-68/STATUTE-68-Pg919.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 132. S. 512, Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act, Public Law No. 115-439, January 14, 2019, § 103, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ439/PLAW-115publ439.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 133. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Congressional Budget Justification Fiscal Year 2022, June 2021, p. xii, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v37/index.html (accessed March 2, 2023). — 417 — 13 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Mandy M. Gunasekara MISSION STATEMENT Creating a better environmental tomorrow with clean air, safe water, healthy soil, and thriving communities. A conservative U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will take a more supportive role toward local and state efforts, building them up so that they may lead in a meaningful fashion. This will include the sharing of federal resources and agency expertise. Creating environmental standards from the ground up is con- sistent with the concept of cooperative federalism embedded within many of the agency’s authorizing statutes and will create earnest relationships among local offi- cials and regulated stakeholders. This in turn will promote a culture of compliance. A conservative EPA will track success by measured progress as opposed to the current perpetual process and will convey this progress to the public in clear, con- cise terms. True transparency will be a defining characteristic of a conservative EPA. This will be reflected in all agency work, including the establishment of open- source science, to build not only transparency and awareness among the public, but also trust. The challenge of creating a conservative EPA will be to balance justified skep- ticism toward an agency that has long been amenable to being coopted by the Left for political ends against the need to implement the agency’s true function: pro- tecting public health and the environment in cooperation with states. Further, the EPA needs to be realigned away from attempts to make it an all-powerful energy and land use policymaker and returned to its congressionally sanctioned role as environmental regulator.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on modernizing the electric grid, enhancing grid security and resilience, and streamlining deployment of advanced transmission technologies through DOE-led initiatives like the Grid Deployment Office and clearinghouse models. It supports key objectives such as improving grid efficiency, reducing consumer costs, and mitigating wildfire risks to the bulk-power system, all of which are consistent with the policy's emphasis on grid reliability and D"
— 411 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 19. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” May 1, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 86 (May 4, 2020), pp. 26595–26599, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2020-05-04/pdf/2020-09695.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 20. 18 U.S. Code § 824a(c), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824a (accessed February 27, 2023). 21. Report No. 117-98, Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2022, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 117th Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 2021, p. 6, https:// www.congress.gov/117/crpt/hrpt98/CRPT-117hrpt98.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 22. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 11-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, Division J, Title III. 23. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 7. 24. Timothy Gardner, “White House Asks Congress for $500 mln to Modernize Oil Reserve,” Reuters, November 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-oil-spr-idAFL1N32C36I (accessed February 13, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Our History,” https://www.energy.gov/oe/about-us/our- history (accessed February 13, 2023). 26. Press release, “Secretary of Energy Signs Order to Mitigate Security Risks to the Nation’s Electric Grid,” U.S. Department of Energy, December 17, 2021, https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-energy-signs-order- mitigate-security-risks-nations-electric-grid (accessed February 13, 2023). 27. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity, “Revocation of Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 76 (April 22, 2021), pp. 21308–21309, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2021-04-22/pdf/2021-08483.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 28. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19 and 61. 29. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/ne/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 30. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, 97th Congress, January 7, 1983, https:// www.congress.gov/97/statute/STATUTE-96/STATUTE-96-Pg2201.pdf (accessed February 24, 2023). 31. The Heritage Foundation, “Budget Blueprint for Fiscal Year 2023: Reduce the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget/pages/recommendations/1.270.127.html. 32. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 58. 33. 42 USC § 16291, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/16291 (accessed February 27, 2023). 34. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management, “About Us: Mission,” https:// www.energy.gov/fecm/mission (accessed February 13, 2023). 35. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111, December2021, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22- 105111.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 36. International Energy Agency, The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions, World Energy Outlook Special Report, revised March 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ffd2a83b-8c30-4e9d-980a- 52b6d9a86fdc/TheRoleofCriticalMineralsinCleanEnergyTransitions.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 37. See 42 U.S. Code § 16291. 38. 42 U.S. Code Ch. 55, §§ 4321–4347, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-55 (accessed February 27, 2023). 39. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for Comment, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 87 (May 7, 2021), pp. 24514–24516, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-05-07/pdf/2021-09675.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Categorical Exclusions from Environmental Review,” Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Reopening of Comment Period, Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 160 (August 23, 2021), pp. 47032–47033, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-08-23/pdf/2021-18058.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 21, 23, and 52. — 412 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 41. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 3, 6, 12, 19, 21, and 23. 42. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1975, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 43. H.R. 6, Energy Policy Act of 2005, Public Law No. 109-58, 109th Congress, August 8, 2005, https://www. congress.gov/109/plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf (accessed February 27, 2023). 44. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “About the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy,” https://www.energy.gov/eere/about-office-energy-efficiency-and- renewable-energy (accessed February 28, 2023). 45. Ibid. 46. See note 41, supra. 47. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 19, 23, 43, and 49. 48. See U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “About Us,” https://www.energy.gov/gdo/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 49. U.S. Department of Energy, Grid Deployment Office, “Building a Better Grid Initiative,” https://www.energy. gov/gdo/building-better-grid-initiative (accessed February 13, 2023). 50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 2, 19, 21, 23, and 84. “The FY 2023 Budget Request to Congress proposes to split the Electricity appropriation account into two accounts: Electricity and Grid Deployment Office (GDO). Had the proposed FY 2023 structure been in place in FY 2021 and FY 2022, the $7,000,000 shown under the Electricity account’s Transmission Permitting and Technical Assistance (TPTA) program would have appeared under Grid Technical Assistance in GDO and the $3,000,000 shown under Program Direction in the Electricity account represents the estimated share of Electricity PD funding associated with TPTA and would have appeared under Program Direction in GDO.” Ibid., p. 84, note. 51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Mission,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 13, 2023). 52. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 6. 53. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “About Us: Our Story,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/about-us (accessed February 28, 2023). 54. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, “OCED Project Portfolio,” https://www. energy.gov/oced/office-clean-energy-demonstrations (accessed February 28, 2023). 55. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 3, Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response, Federal Energy Management Program, Grid Deployment Office, Indian Energy Policy & Programs, Loan Programs, Manufacturing & Energy Supply Chains, Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations, Petroleum Reserves, Power Marketing Administrations, State and Community Energy Programs, April 2022, p. 104, https://www.energy. gov/sites/default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-3-v2.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 56. See, for example, ibid., pp. 104 and 107. 57. U.S. Department of Energy, Loan Program Office, “LPO Year in Review 2022: New Legislation,” January 5, 2023, https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpo-year-review-2022 (accessed February 28, 2023). Emphases in original. 58. H.R. 6256, To Ensure That Goods Made with Forced Labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China Do Not Enter the United States Market, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 117-78, 117th Congress, December 23, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ78/PLAW-117publ78.pdf (accessed February 28, 2023). 59. H.R. 2272, America COMPETES Act, Public Law 110–69, 110th Congress, August 9, 2007, § 5012, https://www. congress.gov/110/plaws/publ69/PLAW-110publ69.pdf (accessed February 13, 2023). 60. Ibid., § 5012(c)(1). 61. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, March 2022, p. 103.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's focus on modernizing the electric grid through advanced transmission technologies, improving reliability, reducing costs, and streamlining deployment—particularly via DOE-led initiatives and reduced regulatory barriers like NEPA exemptions for federally funded projects."
— 414 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 81. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Technology Transitions, “About Us: Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/ technologytransitions/mission-0 (accessed February 13, 2023). 82. Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR); Basic Energy Sciences (BES); Biological and Environmental Research (BER); Fusion Energy Sciences (FES); High-Energy Physics (HEP); Nuclear Physics (NP); Isotope R&D and Production (IRP); and Accelerator R&D and Production (ARDAP). U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, pp. 10–14, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-5- science-v2.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 83. For example, the CHIPS and Science Act authorizes $50 billion for the Office of Science. U.S. Department of Energy, “Statement by Secretary Granholm on Congressional Passage of the CHIPS and Science Act,” July 28, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/statement-secretary-granholm-congressional-passage-chips-and- science-act (accessed February 13, 2023). 84. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 5, Science, April 2022, p. 7, https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/doe- fy2023-budget-volume-5-science-v2.pdf (accessed March 2, 2023). 85. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Mission,” https://www.energy.gov/em/ mission (accessed March 1, 2023). 86. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, “Cleanup Sites,” https://www.energy.gov/ em/cleanup-sites (accessed March 1, 2023). 87. U.S. Government Accountability Office, “DOE’s Environmental Liability,” GAO-21-585R, June 2021, p. 2, https:// www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-585r.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 88. Chart, “EM’s Annual Spending and Estimated Environmental Liability (Fiscal Years 2011–2020),” in ibid., p. 1. 89. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Volume 6, Environmental Management, April 2022, p. 53, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2022-09/doe-fy2023-budget-volume-6-em-v3.pdf (accessed March 1, 2023). 90. Ibid. 91. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Waste: DOE Needs Greater Leadership Stability and Commitment to Accomplish Cleanup Mission, GAO-22-104805, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104805. pdf#:~:text=DOE%20Needs%20Greater%20Leadership%20Stability%20and%20Commitment%20to,May%20 2022%20GAO-22-104805%20United%20States%20Government%20Accountability%20Office May 2022, (accessed February 14, 2023). 92. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, pp. 23 and 93. 93. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title I, Subtitle B. 94. Ibid., Title III, § 304. 95. See, for example, Chapter 4, “The Need for Geologic Disposal,” in Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Report to the Secretary of Energy, January 2012, pp. 27–31, https://www.energy.gov/sites/ default/files/2013/04/f0/brc_finalreport_jan2012.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 96. Press release, “DOE Announces $16 Million to Support Consent-Based Siting for Spent Nuclear Fuel,” U.S. Department of Energy, September 20, 2022, https://www.energy.gov/articles/doe-announces-16-million- support-consent-based-siting-spent-nuclear-fuel (accessed February 14, 2023). 97. U.S. Department of Energy, Agency Financial Report, Fiscal Year 2022, DOE/CF-0191, p. 58, https://www. energy.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/fy-2022-doe-agency-financial-report.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 98. H.R. 3809, Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law No. 97-425, Title III, § 302. 99. Ibid., p. 57. 100. Table, “Department of Energy Comparative Organization by Congressional Control, FY 2023,” p. 5, in U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, “FY 2023 Budget Justification: Summary Budget Documents,” https://www.energy.gov/cfo/articles/fy-2023-budget-justification (accessed March 13, 2023). 101. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Missions,” https://www.energy.gov/ nnsa/missions#:~:text=NNSA%20ensures%20the%20United%20States%20maintains%20a%20safe%2C,of%20 nuclear%20and%20radiological%20terrorism%20around%20the%20world (accessed March 2, 2023). — 415 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions 102. S. 1059, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Public Law 106-65, 106th Congress, October 5, 1999, §§ 3201–3299, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ65/PLAW-106publ65.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 103. See Geller, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons.” 104. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20, https://media.defense. gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF (accessed March 2, 2023). 105. U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, “Plutonium Pit Production,” https:// www.energy.gov/nnsa/plutonium-pit-production (accessed March 13, 2023). 106. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Chief Financial Officer, Department of Energy FY 2023 Congressional Budget Request, Budget in Brief, p. 27. 107. 16 U.S. Code § 824o, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824o (accessed March 2, 2023). 108. 16 U.S. Code § 824o-1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/824o-1 (accessed March 2, 2023). 109. For example, the California blackouts in August 2020 and the Texas blackouts and deaths in February 2021. 110. North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “Announcement: Extreme Weather Heightens Reliability Risks This Summer,” May 18, 2022, https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/May%2018%202022%20SRA%20 Announcement.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 111. Ethan Howland, “ISO-NE, ERCOT, MISO Face Possible Capacity Shortfalls in Extreme Winter Weather: FERC,” Utility Dive, October 21, 2022, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/FERC-iso-ne-ercot-miso-extreme-winter- weather-report/634682/ (accessed February 14, 2023), and North American Energy Reliability Corporation, “Announcement: NERC Warns Generation Resources Tight in Large Portion of North America This Winter,” November 17, 2022, https://www.nerc.com/news/Headlines%20DL/2022%20WRA%20Release%20final.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023). 112. Note that the challenges to the grid are coming mainly from subsidized renewable resources. Renewable resources have beneficial attributes, and the electric grid can benefit from embracing an all-of-the-above approach to power generation. 113. See U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Glossary: Reserve Margin,” https:// www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=reserve_margin (accessed February 14, 2023). 114. Dan Frosch and Ginger Adams Otis, “North Carolina Power Outage Leaves 33,000 Without Electricity After Substation Attack,” The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ attack-on-north-carolina-power-substations-leaves-45-000-without-electricity-11670200585 (accessed February 14, 2023). 115. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Power Sales and Markets: RTOs and ISOs,” last updated May 3, 2022, https://www.ferc.gov/power-sales-and-markets/rtos-and-isos (accessed February 14, 2023). 116. Such as the blackouts and shortages in California (August 2020, summer 2022) and Texas (February 2021, summer 2022). 117. See notes 110 and 111, supra; North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “2022 Summer Reliability Assessment,” May 2022, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC_ SRA_2022.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023); and North American Electric Reliability Corporation, “2022–2023 Winter Reliability Assessment,” November 2022, https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20 Assessments%20DL/NERC_WRA_2022.pdf (accessed March 13, 2023). 118. U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Building for the Future Through Electric Regional Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation and Generator Interconnection,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 86 (May 4, 2022), pp. 26504–26611, https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2022-05-04/pdf/2022-08973.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023), and U.S. Department of Energy, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Improvements to Generator Interconnection Procedures and Agreements,” Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 127 (July 5, 2022), pp. 39934–40032, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-07-05/pdf/2022-13470.pdf (accessed February 14, 2023).
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Tradeable Energy Performance Standards Act
Fire Safe Electrical Corridors Act of 2025
Providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Department of Energy relating to "Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Walk-In Coolers and Walk-In Freezers".