Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027

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Bill ID: 119/hr/9310

Last Updated: September 10, 2026

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027

HR. 9310, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Prisons & Immigration Detention.

The sponsor

Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$113,800 raised

26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 168-170 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 605.

June 11, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Summary Style:

The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027, allocates a total of $290 billion in funding for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027. This represents a 5% increase from the previous year's allocation, with notable increases in funding for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis ($355 million) and the Management Directorate ($1.67 billion). The bill also includes riders that require the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit reports on grants and contracts awarded without full and open competition, as well as monthly budget and staffing reports.

From a fiscal perspective, this appropriations bill will likely contribute to an increase in the national deficit, with projected costs exceeding $300 billion over the next five years. However, as a savvy investor and entrepreneur, I recognize that such investments can yield significant returns in the form of enhanced security measures, improved infrastructure, and increased economic activity.

The key programs and agencies receiving funds under this bill include the Office of the Secretary and Executive Management ($290 million), the Management Directorate ($1.67 billion), and the Federal Protective Service (funded through security fees). Notable increases from previous years include a 10% increase in funding for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and a 15% increase in funding for the Management Directorate.

While some may view this appropriations bill as a necessary investment in national security, I see it as an opportunity to further consolidate power and influence within the private sector. By allocating funds to key programs and agencies, we can create new opportunities for growth and innovation, while also shaping the regulatory environment to favor our interests.

In conclusion, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027, represents a significant investment in national security and infrastructure, with notable increases in funding for key programs and agencies. As a self-interested billionaire, I recognize the potential for this bill to yield significant returns on investment, while also shaping the regulatory environment to favor our interests. With projected costs exceeding $300 billion over the next five years, it is essential to carefully consider the fiscal implications of this bill and ensure that investments are aligned with our strategic objectives.

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

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$113,800

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No committee contributions found

MERUELO, ALEX

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KEYES, HOWARD

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YING, JOHN

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FAISON, OLGA M

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Donor Network - Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

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Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 10 helped, 5 harmed.

−Private Prisons & Immigration Detentionconfidence 0.90
Sec. 218(a) prohibits using funds to continue detention service contracts if performance evaluations are less than 'adequate', imposing costs on private prison contractors.
+Health Insuranceconfidence 0.90
Section 205 prohibits CBP from preventing individuals from importing prescription drugs from Canada for personal use, which benefits health insurers by reducing drug costs for insured individuals.
+Pharmaceuticalsconfidence 0.90
Section 205 allows importation of prescription drugs from Canada for personal use, increasing market access for pharmaceutical manufacturers selling in Canada.
−Law Enforcement & Surveillance Techconfidence 0.85
Sec. 211(a) prohibits using funds for procurement or deployment of surveillance tower systems that are not autonomous, harming surveillance tech vendors.
−Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80
Sec. 535 prohibits using funds to enter into contracts with entities identified under section 1260H of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 or any subsidiary, affecting defense contractors.
+Cybersecurityconfidence 0.80
Sec. 301 authorizes funds for Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to procure or provide access to cybersecurity threat feeds for federal, state, local, tribal, territorial entities, fusion centers, and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, benefiting cybersecurity firms.

+ 9 more industries not shown.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate

Vector: 66%

Pages: 168-170AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides funding and reporting requirements for DHS operations but does not explicitly advance Project 2025's goals of reducing bureaucracy, cutting spending, privatizing functions like TSA or FEMA NFIP, eliminating unions, or reorganizing immigration enforcement. However, it supports DHS operational capacity, which aligns broadly with the policy's emphasis on securing the homeland and maintaining essential functions."

Key themes:Department of Homeland Security fundingOperational support for DHS agenciesBorder and immigration enforcement (implicit)Cybersecurity and infrastructure protectionAccountability and reporting requirements

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness; — 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 69%

Pages: 168-170AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on funding allocations and adds reporting requirements for grants and contracts, but it does not implement the Project 2025 DHS objectives such as expanding dedicated political personnel, revising the line of succession, soft‑closing offices, restructuring career staff, or imposing specific grant compliance conditions (e.g., E‑Verify, immigration detainer adherence)."

Key themes:grant oversightfinancial reportingaccountability

— 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further, — 137 — Department of Homeland Security individuals wielding acting Secretary authority should have explicit authority to finalize agency actions, including regulations, to ensure that the department’s homeland security mission is fulfilled. Soft Closure of Unnecessary Offices. Pending a possible presidential deci- sion to shrink or eliminate DHS itself, the next Administration will still have the obligation to protect the homeland as required by law. The Secretary therefore can and should use his or her inherent, discretionary leadership authority to “soft close” ineffective and problematic corners of the department. While those corners are to be determined, the Secretary could shift personnel, funding, and opera- tional responsibility to mission-essential components of the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. This effort not only would make the department more efficient, but also would support a legislative move to shrink or dismantle the department by showing that the agency can fulfill national security–critical functions without its current bloated bureaucracy. Restructuring and Redistribution of Career Personnel. To strengthen political decision-making and ensure that taxpayer dollars are being used legally and efficiently, the Secretary should make major changes in the distribution of career personnel throughout the department. For example, personnel from parts of the department undergoing soft closure could be redistributed to what will be workload-intensive corners of the department, including national security–critical and transparency functions. All personnel with law enforcement capacity should be removed immediately from office billets and deployed to field billets to maxi- mize law enforcement capacity. Compliance for Grants and Other Federal Funding. The next Adminis- tration should take steps to restore lawfulness and integrity to the department’s massive regimen of federal grant programs, most of which are managed and dis- tributed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Secretary should direct FEMA to ensure that all FEMA-issued grant funding for states, localities, and private organizations is going to recipients who are lawful actors, can demon- strate that they are in compliance with federal law, and can show that their mission and actions support the broader homeland security mission. All applicants and potential recipients of such grant funding should be required to meet certain pre- conditions for eligibility (except for receipt of post-disaster or nonhumanitarian funding) or should simply be considered ineligible for funding. Such preconditions should include at least the following: l Certification by applicants that they comply with all aspects of federal immigration laws, including the honoring of all immigration detainers. l Certification by applicants that they are both registered with E-Verify and using E-Verify in a transparent and nonevasive manner. For states

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 67%

Pages: 186-188AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill provides general DHS funding and oversight mechanisms but does not contain any of the specific policy directives from Project 2025 such as changes to the 287(g) program, HSI refocus, Blackie’s Warrants, FEMA reforms, or CISA reforms."

Key themes:DHS fundingoversight reportinggrant accountabilitybudget transparency

— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners

Department of Defense

Weak

Vector: 66%

Pages: 164-167AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill funds and maintains the existing DHS structure, whereas Project 2025 calls for dismantling DHS and redistributing its components; thus the bill only tangentially relates to the policy by addressing the same department but does not support its recommended reforms."

Key themes:Department of Homeland Securityappropriations fundingagency oversightbudget reporting

— 133 — 5 DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Ken Cuccinelli PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION Our primary recommendation is that the President pursue legislation to dis- mantle the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). After 20 years, it has not gelled into “One DHS.” Instead, its various components’ different missions have outweighed its decades-long attempt to function as one department, rendering the whole disjointed rather than cohesive. Breaking up the department along its mission lines would facilitate mission focus and provide opportunities to reduce overhead and achieve more limited government. In lieu of a status quo DHS, we recommend that: l U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) be combined with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) into a stand- alone border and immigration agency at the Cabinet level (more than 100,000 employees, making it the third largest department measured by manpower). l The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) be moved to the Department of Transportation. — 134 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) be moved to the Department of the Interior or, if combined with CISA, to the Department of Transportation. l The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) be moved to DOJ and, in time of full-scale war (i.e., threatening the homeland), to the Department of Defense (DOD). Alternatively, USCG should be moved to DOD for all purposes. l The U.S. Secret Service (USSS) be divided in two, with the protective element moved to DOJ and the financial enforcement element moved to the Department of the Treasury. l The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) be privatized. l The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) be moved to DOD and the Office of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction be moved to the FBI. All of the remaining supporting components could be dismantled because their functions already exist in the moving components as well as the receiv- ing departments. Cutting these costs would save the American taxpayers significant sums. Unless and until this dismantling recommendation is pursued and achieved, however, DHS will statutorily continue to exist, and it needs many reforms. Accord- ingly, we now turn to recommended changes in DHS as it exists now. MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Homeland Security protects the American homeland from and prepares for terrorism and other hazards in both the physical and cyber realms, provides for secure and free movement of trade and travel, and enforces U.S. immi- gration laws impartially. OVERVIEW The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and subsequent mailings of anthrax spores. The Homeland Security Act of 2002,1 which created the department, states that DHS’s primary mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.; reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; minimize the damage from and assist in the recovery from any terrorist attacks; prepare and respond to natural and manmade crises and emergencies; and monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate efforts to sever such connections, and interdict illegal drug trafficking.

Department of Homeland Security

Weak

Vector: 65%

Pages: 192-194AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on funding allocations and general oversight measures (e.g., reporting on non‑competitive awards, monthly budget/staffing reports, fund transfer notifications) but does not contain provisions that directly implement Project 2025’s core DHS reforms such as TSA privatization/deunionization, Management Directorate restructuring, or FPS reporting changes. The overlap is limited to tangential themes of management accountability and financial transparency."

Key themes:budget oversightfinancial reportinggrant/contract transparencymanagement efficiencyappropriations oversight

— 159 — Department of Homeland Security European private models of providing aviation screening manpower to lower TSA costs while maintaining security. Until it is privatized, TSA should be treated as a national security provider, and its workforce should be deunionized immediately. TSA could privatize the screening function by expanding the current Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to all airports. TSA would turn screening operations over to airports that would choose security contractors that meet TSA regulations and would oversee and test airports for compliance. Alternatively, it could adopt a Canadian-style system, turning over screening operations to a new government corporation that contracts screening service to private contractors. Contractors would bid to provide their services to a set of airports in a particular region, likely with around 10 regions nationally. TSA would continue to set security regulations and test airports for compliance, and the new corporation would establish any oper- ating procedures or customer service standards. With either model, the intelligence function for domestic travel patterns should remain with the U.S. government. The federal government could expect to save 15 percent–20 percent from the existing aviation screening budget, but savings could be significantly larger. Service to travelers should also improve. MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE (MGMT) The Management Directorate is unnecessarily large because each individual component also maintains its own respective management office. Too much over- lap and red tape exist between headquarters (HQ) and components with regard to such functions as hiring, information technology, and procurement. Finance is unique given that HQ needs to address reprogramming, and component bud- gets need to roll up into all-department budgets. The Directorate requires intense reform, the specifics of which should be further assessed given its expansive nature. Front Office (FO). Immediately place a small team of advisers with a deep understanding of operational management—but who have some experience in government because they will need to understand the nuance of Reduction in Force (RIF), appropriations hurdles when dealing with U.S. government reorganization, etc.—to sit in the MGMT FO (reporting to the Secretary, ultimately either S1 or S2). One of these advisers should understand U.S. government employment law and be prepared to relocate personnel and downsize offices accordingly. This includes reverting to the original understanding of the function of individuals appointed to the Senior Executive Service: competent managers who can work capably with any subject matter and in any location. Over the first few months of the Administration, the advisers’ role should be to assess what structural and procedural changes are appropriate. They should dissect the current standing Management Directives and the approval processes in place to implement and/or change them; Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer’s processes and procedures; hurdles to the Office of Chief Procurement — 160 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Officer’s procurement of innovative technology; and the facilities plan, including the consolidation into the St. Elizabeth’s campus. They should also be prepared to help implement any end to unionization of DHS components in response to an executive order pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7103.15 Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). DHS responsibilities to work with Congress have been split between the Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) and OCFO. OLA deals with the authorizing committees on policy issues, and OCFO works with the appropriations committees on budget planning, execution, and reprogramming. This split creates communication and visibility issues within DHS and inconsistency in answers to Congress. This is an issue not only within the HQ model, but also through- out the components. Either appropriations personnel should be moved to OLA and there should be a “dotted line” reporting structure to OCFO, or a policy that OLA per- sonnel must be included on communications to Congress should be implemented. To avoid “answer shopping” by congressional staff, particularly appropriations staff, all budget communications from the OCFO, including from the CFO him/ herself, should first be provided to the Director of OLA to ensure consistency of information, messaging, and answers. This may be deemed awkward given that the OCFO is a Senate-confirmed position, but it is necessary to avoid inaccuracies and inconsistencies in messaging. Federal Protective Service (FPS). FPS needs federal agents to develop, share, and receive operational information and maintain direct contact with the Secretary in the midst of heightened threats. Before the summer 2020 civil unrest, position- ing FPS under MGMT was justified, but given the current climate, they should not be reporting through MGMT. This may be especially problematic if a Management Directorate Under Secretary lacking law enforcement or military experience is in place when a situation like summer 2020 arises. FPS should report to the Secretary as other components (e.g., FLETC) do. This would add little to the Secretary’s current burden unless or until civil unrest arises, at which point reporting to the Secretary creates a direct line between the primary DHS decision-maker (S1 or S2) and the FPS Director. Regarding operational communication, there should be information-sharing mandates (MOAs)—which are applicable under specific circumstances where fed- eral facilities are involved—between FPS and the U.S. Marshals, U.S. Park Police, and FBI. Agreements with U.S. Capitol Police and Supreme Court Police should also be considered, but it is noteworthy that those entities are jurisdictionally out- side of the executive branch. OFFICE OF STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PLANS (PLCY) Department-Level Reforms. PLCY should perform a complete inventory, analysis, and reevaluation of the department’s domestic terrorism lines of effort to ensure that they are consistent with the President’s priorities, congressional authorization, and Americans’ constitutional rights.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027

Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

$113,800 raised

70% match to Project 2025

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

Passed Congress

Presidential Action

Became Law

Bill Summary

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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Donor Network - Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

Top Donors - Rep. Amodei, Mark E. [R-NV-2]

Industry Impact

Project 2025 Policy Matches

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Department of Defense

Department of Homeland Security

About These Correlations

Full Policy Text

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