The bill
SAFEGUARDS Act of 2026
HR. 8770, 119th Congress — read as touching Airlines.
Sponsored by
Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]
ID: S001220
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The bill
HR. 8770, 119th Congress — read as touching Airlines.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Transportation" section, p. 673-675 of the Mandate for Leadership.
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Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
July 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 8770 – SAFEGUARDS Act of 2026**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The SAFEGUARDS Act of 2026 is a performative exercise in legislative theater designed to convince the public that Congress is finally taking seriously the *original intent* of the post-9/11 aviation security fee—a fee passengers have been paying since 2002 under the pretense it would fund actual security upgrades. In reality, this bill is less about safeguarding skies and more about papering over years of fiscal bait-and-switch, where Congress treated the 9/11 Security Fee like a slush fund for unrelated budget holes. Its stated goal? To end the diversion of aviation security fees to non-security purposes by 2027—because, apparently, it took nearly two decades for lawmakers to notice that money labeled “for security” was being spent on, say, agricultural subsidies or naval shipbuilding. The objective is simple: restore public trust by doing what they should have done all along—spend the money on what it was promised for. How novel.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Title 49 of the U.S. Code to redirect and earmark revenue from the 9/11 Security Fee (currently $5.60 per one-way trip, capped at $11.20 per round trip) into two newly rigidified funds: - **Aviation Security Capital Fund**: First $500 million annually (starting FY 2028) to be deposited here for general aviation security upgrades. - **Aviation Security Checkpoint Technology Fund (ASCT Fund)**: Next $250 million annually to fund screening tech—think better X-rays, CT scanners, and explosive detection systems—so we’re not still using equipment that can’t distinguish a bottle of water from a semtex brick. It also amends the fee collection mandate to require the TSA Administrator to *actually collect* these amounts, treating the fee not as a ceiling but a floor—because, shockingly, Congress previously allowed the fee to be under-collected and the excess funneled into the general fund. A conforming amendment updates cross-references to reflect the new dual-fund structure. All this, of course, assumes the fee won’t be diverted again the moment a new crisis (or election) demands fiscal creativity.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Airline Passengers**: The true financiers of this scheme. They’ll continue paying the fee, now with the hollow reassurance that it’s *maybe* going toward not dying in a terrorist attack. Their trust, already eroded by years of feeling like ATMs with boarding passes, gets another placebo dose. - **Transportation Security Administration (TSA)**: Finally gets a predictable, dedicated revenue stream for long-overdue tech upgrades—though they’ll still be blamed when lines are long or machines fail. - **Aviation Industry & Lobbyists**: Airlines may breathe easier knowing security funding is less likely to be raided for unrelated pork, reducing the risk of sudden, unfunded mandates. But don’t expect them to complain if the fee ever gets raised—after all, it’s “for security.” - **Congress**: The real beneficiaries. They get to look tough on terrorism and responsible stewards of public funds without actually raising taxes or cutting elsewhere. A win-win for incumbents seeking reelection on the backs of anxious flyers. - **Taxpayers at Large**: Indirectly affected, as the bill prevents the fee revenue from offsetting general fund expenditures—meaning other programs may lose this hidden subsidy. Cue the outrage from whoever’s pet project just lost its stealth aviation security earmark.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** If implemented as written, the SAFEGUARDS Act could finally align aviation security spending with its stated purpose—leading to modernized screening tech, reduced checkpoint bottlenecks, and marginally improved threat detection. The earmarking of $750 million annually (starting FY 2028) represents a real, if long-overdue,
Rep. Strong, Dale W. [R-AL-5]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000402
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22
ID: G000597
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ID: G000591
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ID: E000300
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ID: M001230
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ID: V000139
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
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Total contributions: $57
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 2 implies that the 9/11 Security Fee, which is paid by airline passengers, will be used exclusively for aviation security purposes, potentially increasing costs for airlines. Section 3(a) and (b) further establish funds for aviation security investments, which may lead to additional costs or regulatory burdens for airlines.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening transportation security through dedicated funding mechanisms and reducing diversion of user fees to non-security purposes, reflecting shared goals of accountability and targeted investment in aviation security infrastructure."
— 640 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Department of Transportation, 2023 Budget Highlights, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot. gov/files/2022-03/Budget_Highlights_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 2. U.S. Department of Transportation, DEIA [Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility] Strategic Plan FY22– FY26, p. 2, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-09/DOT%20DEIA%20Strategic%20Plan. pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 3. 23 U.S. Code §§ 601–609, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/23 (accessed March 3, 2023). 4. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Administrative Rulemaking, Guidance, and Enforcement Procedures,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 248 (December 27, 2019), pp. 71714–71734, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/regulations/361831/fed-reg-published-final-admin- rule.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 5. U.S. Department of Transportation, Build America Bureau, “About the Build America Bureau,” last updated October 24, 2022, https://www.transportation.gov/buildamerica/about (accessed March 3, 2023). 6. S. 622, Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Public Law No. 94-163, 94th Congress, December 22, 1995, https:// www.congress.gov/94/statute/STATUTE-89/STATUTE-89-Pg871.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 7. 42 U.S. Code Chapter 85, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-85 (accessed March 3, 2023). 8. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, “Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2024–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 84 (May 2, 2022), pp. 25710–26092, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-05- 02/pdf/2022-07200.pdf (accessed March 10, 2023). 9. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Defining Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 235 (December 7, 2020), pp. 78707–78718, https://www.transportation.gov/ sites/dot.gov/files/2020-12/Defining%20Unfair%20or%20Deceptive%20Practices%20Final%20Rule%20-%20 85%20FR%2078707.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 10. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Secretary, “Procedures in Regulating Unfair or Deceptive Practices,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 22 (February 2, 2022), pp. 5655–5659, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-02/pdf/2022-01589.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 11. U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Budget Estimates Fiscal Year 2023, p. 1, https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/2022-04/FAA_Budget_Estimates_FY2023.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 12. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Organization and Innovation in Air Traffic Control, Hudson Institute Initiative on Future Innovation, November 2013, https://www.hudson.org/sites/default/files/researchattachments/ attachment/1199/poole_hi_res.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). Also published subsequently as Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 431, January 2014, https://reason.org/wp-content/uploads/files/air_traffic_ control_organization_innovation.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 13. H.R. 3684, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Public Law No. 117-58, 117th Congress, November 15, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ58/PLAW-117publ58.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 14. S. 6, Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 88th Congress, July 9, 1964, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-78/pdf/STATUTE-78-Pg302-2.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). 15. U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration, “About Us,” last updated March 23, 2022, https:// www.maritime.dot.gov/about-us (accessed March 4, 2023). 16. H.R. 10378, Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Public Law 66-261, 66th Congress, June 5, 1920, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/41/STATUTE-41-Pg988.pdf (accessed March 3, 2023). — 641 — 20 DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS Brooks D. Tucker MISSION STATEMENT The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is the primary provider of health care, benefits, and memorial affairs for America’s veterans and their families. The VA has the noble responsibility to render exceptional and timely support and services with respect, compassion, and competence. The veteran is at the forefront of every VA process and interaction. The VA must continually strive to be recognized as a “best in class,” “Veteran-centric”1 system with an organizational ethos inspired by and accountable to the needs and problems of veterans, not subservient to the parochial preferences of a bureaucracy. OVERVIEW At the end of the Obama Administration, the VA was held in low esteem both by the veterans it served and by the employees who served these former warriors. Eroding morale caused by the downstream effects of a health care access crisis in 2014 led to the resignation of Secretary Eric Shinseki and extensive oversight investigations by Congress from 2015–2016. By 2020, however, the VA had become one of the most respected U.S. agencies. This significant progress was due in part to the leadership of Secretary Robert Wilkie (2018–2021) and his team of political appointees and career senior executives, many of them veterans, who led the effort to ensure that the VA became “Veteran-centric” in its governance decisions and fostered a more positive work environment. This mindset translated into a department that was better attuned to employees’ and veterans’ needs and experiences in the daily operations of health care, benefits,
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act focuses on securing dedicated funding for aviation security through the 9/11 Security Fee, while the Project 2025 DOT section emphasizes regulatory reform, foreign investment screening, slot allocation, pilot training, Essential Air Service reform, and FAA modernization—none of which are addressed in the bill."
— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to have 1,500 flight hours. Today, facing a pilot shortage, larger and safer twin-engine planes with two pilots are being phased out of service at smaller airports and replaced by single-engine planes that have only one pilot. This trend could be reversed if copilots were required to have fewer flight hours or could count certified simulator training. Federal subsidies are also distorting the commercial market. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program subsidizes flights to 200 small airports that are not otherwise commercially viable. The program was established in the 1970s as a temporary measure to cushion deregulation. It has since been made permanent. Finally ending the program would free hundreds of pilots to serve larger markets with more passengers. A new Administration could reform regulations to encour- age airports in lower-served areas of the nation. International air travel is regulated and restricted by individual treaties between the United States and other countries. The new Administration should remain committed to the laudatory goal of “Open Skies.” However, many of the largest emerging markets are not fully open, and our aviation policies should reflect that reality and ensure that U.S. air carriers compete on a level playing field. Specifically, so long as U.S. carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. should not allow foreign carriers serving markets in East Asia and South Asia to enjoy a com- petitive advantage by continuing to allow them to fly to the U.S. China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. should — 632 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise not offer additional negotiations until the Chinese implement the agreements they have already signed. The current Administration’s policies in several areas that affect aviation and limit America’s future opportunities for growth are internally inconsistent. In addition to a New Entry Initiative, the new Administration should establish an interagency clearinghouse to drive consistent policies across the government on spectrum, drones, and advanced air mobility. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION With a budget of $18.6 billion requested for FY 202311 and an international regulatory footprint, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is DOT’s most visible mode. It needs reform. Air traffic control (ATC) operations account for two-thirds of FAA’s budget, and the Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is far behind its counterparts in Australia, Canada, and Western Europe in implementing 21st century technology. The FAA’s primary mission is ATC; its two smaller functions are distributing federal airport grants and regulating all aspects of aviation safety. The FAA was once considered the world’s best government aviation agency. Those days are long past. In the more than five decades since 1958 when the Federal Aviation Agency (precursor to the Federal Aviation Administration) was formed, there have been notable developments in air traffic control technology, aircraft avionics, and engine reliability, but despite many well-intentioned attempts, there have been few changes in the FAA’s funding structure. The FAA is still improperly organized and financed, and the management reforms provided in the late 1990s remain largely unused. The FAA is 10 years older than DOT. It provides two separate and functionally different services: the world’s largest and most complex Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and, at the same time, the world’s largest civil aviation regulatory and certificatory agency. The first is a 24/7/365 air traffic service provider. The second is an inherently governmental organization responsible for ensuring that aerospace operators, vehicles, airports, and ANSPs are properly certified and follow all FAA regulations. These two different organizations ought to run separately. The FAA is the only modern Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) in the world that does not assess fees for its services. Its funding structure, subject to the annual appropriations process, stifles efficiency and innovation—and the FAA does not innovate well. It spends too much time and money on research and development (R&D) and is not very good at either one. It should get out of the R&D business and focus on testing, evaluating, and certifying private-sector innovation much more quickly than it does today. The FAA workforce needs to modernize. The agency needs safety and certifi- cation experts, not professional airframe and powerplant mechanics (A&Ps). It
AI Analysis:
"The SAFEGUARDS Act of 2026 focuses on aviation security funding through the 9/11 Security Fee, while the Project 2025 DHS section emphasizes immigration enforcement, FEMA reform, and CISA cybersecurity priorities—there is no substantive thematic or policy overlap between the two."
— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.