The bill
FEC Administrative Improvements Act
HR. 8738, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
Sponsored by
Rep. Morelle, Joseph D. [D-NY-25]
ID: M001206
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8738, 119th Congress — read as touching Commercial Banks.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
July 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 8738: FEC Administrative Improvements Act** *Or: How to Pretend You’re Fixing Democracy While Letting the Grifters Go Digital*
**1. New Regulations Being Created or Modified** This bill amends two obscure sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) with the subtlety of a tax auditor at a brothel. - **Section 2** expands the definition of “expenditures” requiring electronic filing to now include persons who make *electioneering communications*. Translation: If you run a shady ad saying “Vote for Candidate X because Candidate Y eats babies,” you now have to file it online instead of mailing a crayon drawing to the FEC. - **Section 3** strikes the archaic requirement that political committees disburse funds *only by check*. Now they can use wire transfers, ACH, Venmo, or presumably carrier pigeon with a Bitcoin wallet attached. The check mandate was apparently deemed too 1992, even though it served the useful purpose of creating a paper trail slow enough to embarrass corrupt actors before they laundered the cash.
**2. Affected Industries and Sectors** - **Political consultants**: Now forced to upgrade from fax machines to encrypted email for filing electioneering comms. Tragic. - **Dark money groups**: Finally able to move funds without the indignity of writing a check to “Shell Corporation LLC” for “strategic consulting.” Efficiency gains: estimated at 17% more laundering per hour. - **Check printers and postal workers**: Minor economic dislocation expected. Try retraining as compliance officers or cynics. - **FEC staff**: Slightly increased workload processing electronic filings, though they’ll likely spend most of it begging for budget increases while ignoring violations.
**3. Compliance Requirements and Timelines** - Electronic filing for electioneering communications: Effective immediately upon enactment. Because nothing says “urgent reform” like making grifters use Outlook. - Alternative disbursement methods: Also immediate. No grace period. The check is dead. Long live the Zelle transfer. - No new reporting thresholds, no new disclosure rules—just a change in *how* you file the same useless, delayed, often inaccurate data you were already (supposedly) filing.
**4. Enforcement Mechanisms and Penalties** None introduced. The bill assumes the FEC will magically start enforcing existing rules now that filings are electronic and checks are optional. Spoiler: They won’t. The FEC remains a bipartisan corpse held together by mutual fear of actually doing its job. Penalties for late or false filings remain the same—meaningless fines that are budgeted as campaign expenses.
**5. Economic and Operational Impacts** - **Operational**: Marginally faster processing for those who comply. For everyone else: business as usual. - **Economic**: Negligible. The real cost is the continued erosion of public trust, which this bill does nothing to address—indeed, by making corruption slightly more efficient, it may accelerate it. - **Net effect**: A placebo reform. It looks like progress if you don’t read the fine print or remember that the FEC hasn’t enforced a meaningful rule since dial-up was cutting-edge.
**Diagnosis**: This bill treats the symptom (archaic filing methods) while ignoring the disease: a campaign finance system designed to be unenforceable, a regulator neutered by design, and a political class that views transparency as an occupational hazard. It’s not an improvement—it’s capitulation with a spreadsheet. *Prognosis*: Terminal. But at least the checks will clear faster.
Rep. Morelle, Joseph D. [D-NY-25]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: L000597
Top Contributors
25
ID: S001213
Top Contributors
32
ID: S001185
Top Contributors
27
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 51 nodes and 58 connections
Total contributions: $58
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 harmed.
Section 3 permits political committees to make disbursements by methods other than check, potentially reducing the need for traditional banking services
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 8738 aligns with Project 2025's focus on modernizing the Federal Election Commission by enhancing transparency and efficiency in campaign finance through electronic reporting and flexible disbursement methods, directly supporting the agency's operational effectiveness as outlined in the policy document."
— 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023). — 861 — 29 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Hans A. von Spakovsky MISSION/OVERVIEW The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent federal agency that began operations in 1975 to enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) passed by Congress in 1971 and amended in 1974.1 FECA governs the raising and spending of funds in all federal campaigns for Congress and the presidency. The FEC has no authority over the administration of federal elections, which is per- formed by state governments. While the FEC has exclusive civil enforcement authority over FECA,2 the U.S. Justice Department has criminal enforcement authority, which is defined as a knowing and willful violation of the law.3 Because the FEC is an independent agency and not a division or office directly within the executive branch, the author- ity of the President over the actions of the FEC is extremely limited. As former FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith has said, the FEC’s “[r]egulation of campaign finance deeply implicates First Amendment principles of free speech and association.”4 The FEC regulates in one of the most sensitive areas of the Bill of Rights: political speech and political activity by citizens, candidates, political par- ties, and the voluntary membership organizations that represent Americans who share common views on a huge range of important and vital public policy issues. NEEDED REFORMS Nomination Authority. The President’s most significant power is the appoint- ment of the six commissioners who govern the FEC, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Commissioners may only serve a single term of six years but
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on modernizing FEC administrative processes through electronic filing and flexible disbursement methods, while Project 2025 emphasizes structural reforms like removing the FEC's litigating authority, addressing commissioner term overstays, and raising contribution limits. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address litigation authority, commissioner tenure, or contribution limits."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
AI Analysis:
"HR 8738 focuses on modernizing FEC reporting and disbursement processes, which touches on administrative efficiency but does not address the Project 2025 priorities of removing the FEC's independent litigating authority, resolving voided provisions via DOJ guidance, or limiting commissioner overstays and term limits."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
Providing for consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 18) disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to "Overdraft Lending: Very Large Financial Institutions''; providing for consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 28) disapproving the rule submitted by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection relating to ''Defining Larger Participants of a Market for General-Use Digital Consumer Payment Applications''; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 1526) to amend title 28, United States Code, to limit the authority of district courts to provide injunctive relief, and for other purposes; providing for consideration of the bill (H.R. 22) to amend the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 to require proof of United States citizenship to register an individual to vote in elections for Federal office, and for other purposes; and for other purposes.
Taxpayer Funds Oversight and Accountability Act
To track taxpayer dollars sent to adversarial countries and foreign entities of concern, and for other purposes.