Taxpayer Funds Oversight and Accountability Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1558
Last Updated: April 29, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11]

ID: C001078

Follow the money

The bill

Taxpayer Funds Oversight and Accountability Act

HR. 1558, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.

The sponsor

Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$69,150 raised

22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 869-871 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

ASSUMING FIRST SPONSORSHIP - Mr. Min asked unanimous consent that he may hereafter be considered as the first sponsor of H.R. 1558, a bill originally introduced by Representative Connolly, for the purpose of adding cosponsors and requesting reprintings pursuant to clause 7 of rule XII. Agreed to without objection.

September 14, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another bill from the esteemed members of Congress, because what could possibly go wrong with more bureaucratic meddling? Let's dissect this mess.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Taxpayer Funds Oversight and Accountability Act (HR 1558) claims to aim at improving governmentwide financial management by modifying existing laws. The real purpose is likely to create the illusion of accountability while maintaining the status quo of inefficiency and corruption.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:**

* Expands the role of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in overseeing agency finances, because clearly, they haven't been doing their job well enough. * Introduces new requirements for internal controls, financial reporting, and performance metrics. Because who doesn't love more paperwork and bureaucratic red tape? * Mandates agencies to submit plans to implement the 4-year financial management plan prepared by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Translation: more opportunities for OMB to exert control over agency finances.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:**

* Agencies with CFOs, who will now have even more hoops to jump through. * The OMB, which gains more power in overseeing agency finances. * Taxpayers, who will likely see no tangible benefits from this bill but might experience increased frustration with the government's inefficiencies.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

* More bureaucratic overhead and costs associated with implementing new requirements. * Potential for agencies to focus on compliance rather than actual financial management improvements. * Increased power concentration in the OMB, which could lead to more centralized control over agency finances. * The illusion of accountability will be maintained, while the underlying issues of inefficiency and corruption remain unaddressed.

In conclusion, this bill is a classic case of "treating the symptoms rather than the disease." It's a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. Congress is trying to appear concerned about financial management without actually addressing the root causes of the problems. The real disease here is bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, but that would require actual reform, not just more legislation.

Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this farce unfold. Next patient, please!

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsGovernment Operations & AccountabilityExecutive Branch Oversight
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$69,150
18 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$2,900
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

1
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP
1 transaction
$2,900

No committee contributions found

1
PUNARO, ARNOLD
2 transactions
$6,600
2
PUNARO, JULIA
2 transactions
$6,600
3
HALE, KAREN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
PHILLIPS, STERLING
2 transactions
$6,600
5
HERSHMAN, MICHAEL J.
1 transaction
$3,300
6
TRONE, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
7
MISENER, PAUL E
1 transaction
$3,300
8
RABAUT, TOM W
1 transaction
$3,300
9
WALKER, KENT
1 transaction
$3,300
10
CARLSON, TERESA
1 transaction
$3,300
11
GURU, RAM
1 transaction
$3,300
12
HALL SR, DON
1 transaction
$3,300
13
HALL, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
14
ABOD, CARAH
1 transaction
$3,300
15
ABOD, KIM
1 transaction
$3,300
16
BERBERIAN, ANNETTE
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Del. Norton, Eleanor Holmes [D-DC-At Large]

ID: N000147

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Rep. Lynch, Stephen F. [D-MA-8]

ID: L000562

Top Contributors

10

1
CRONIN, JON P.
CRONIN DEVELOPMENT • PRINCIPAL
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
2
CRONIN, NICOLE M.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
3
KENNEDY, LEE M. JR.
LEE KENNEDY CO. INC • SELF EMPLOYED
IndividualDUXBURY, MA
$3,300
Oct 25, 2023
4
KEOHANE, KIARA L.
SELF • HOMEMAKER
IndividualWAKEFIELD, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
5
KEOHANE, PATRICK J.
SELF • PROPERTY MANAGER
IndividualWAKEFIELD, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
6
KINEAVY, MICHAEL J.
THE CRONIN GROUP • COO
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
7
MORIARTY, JOHN J III
JOHN MORIARTY & ASSOCIATES INC • CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
IndividualCONCORD, MA
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
8
MORIARTY, JOHN J.
JOHN MORIARTY & ASSOCIATES • BUILDER
IndividualWINCHESTER, MA
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
9
MORIARTY, JOHN J.
JOHN MORIARTY & ASSOCIATES • BUILDER
IndividualWINCHESTER, MA
$3,300
Dec 4, 2023
10
MURPHY, DENIS
REBEL RESTAURANT • SELF
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023

Rep. Krishnamoorthi, Raja [D-IL-8]

ID: K000391

Top Contributors

10

1
HONOR AGING LLC
OrganizationEAST BRUNSWICK, NJ
$3,300
Jul 16, 2024
2
PINNACLE HOSPITAL
OrganizationCROWN POINT, IN
$2,500
Mar 3, 2023
3
HOME BEE LLC
OrganizationWEST BLOOMFIELD, MI
$1,000
Sep 18, 2024
4
SAKA, SAMUEL
SELF EMPLOYED • ENTREPRENEUR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
5
SAKA, SAMUEL
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$6,600
Jun 2, 2023
6
GAITONDE, SUJATA
UIC • PROFESSOR
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,700
Feb 6, 2024
7
GAITONDE, SUNIL
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,700
Feb 6, 2024
8
KALSI, RAHUL S
NICOR GAS • EXECUTIVE
IndividualOAK BROOK, IL
$3,700
Sep 22, 2023
9
KOZAKIEWICZ, BEATA
STERLING GROUP INC. • PRINCIPAL
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
10
JAIN, RAJ
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualORLAND PARK, IL
$3,300
Nov 3, 2024

Rep. Khanna, Ro [D-CA-17]

ID: K000389

Top Contributors

10

1
1850 WILLIAMS INVESTORS LLC
OrganizationALAMO, CA
$3,300
Mar 5, 2024
2
SIRHAN, MOTASIM
ELIXIR • EXECUTIVE
IndividualMILPITAS, CA
$13,200
Jan 3, 2024
3
PAPIER, SUSAN
WERBA RUBIN PAPIER WEALTH MANAGEMENT • EXECUTIVE
IndividualSAN JOSE, CA
$13,200
Mar 29, 2024
4
CLEMENS, NICOLE
PARAMOUNT GLOBAL • EXECUTIVE
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$13,200
Mar 30, 2024
5
PAPIER, JASON
WERBA RUBIN PAPIER WEALTH MANAGEMENT • EXECUTIVE
IndividualSAN JOSE, CA
$13,200
Mar 29, 2024
6
COGEN, JACK
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$13,200
May 15, 2024
7
CLEMENS, NICOLE
IndividualPACIFIC PALISADES, CA
$12,200
Mar 31, 2024
8
YOUNIS, QASAR
APPLIED INTUITION • EXECUTIVE
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$9,900
Mar 31, 2024
9
PAPIER, SUSAN
IndividualSAN JOSE, CA
$9,900
Mar 31, 2024
10
PAPIER, JASON
IndividualSAN JOSE, CA
$9,900
Mar 31, 2024

Rep. Mfume, Kweisi [D-MD-7]

ID: M000687

Top Contributors

10

1
TABORN, TYRONE D.
IndividualREISTERSTOWN, MD
$5,000
Jul 31, 2024
2
BRONFEIN, MICHAEL
CURIO WELLNESS • CEO
IndividualOWINGS MILLS, MD
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
3
SEIBEL, MICHAEL
Y COMBINATOR • INVESTOR
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Oct 17, 2024
4
JOHNSON, ROBERT
THE RLJ COMPANIES • EXECUTIVE
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
5
JOSEPH, MARK K.
N/A • RETIRED
IndividualBALTIMORE, MD
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
6
JOHNSON, ROBERT
THE RLJ COMPANIES • EXECUTIVE
IndividualBETHESDA, MD
$3,300
Nov 9, 2023
7
TABORN, TYRONE D.
CAREER COMMUNICATIONS GROUP • METAVERSE CREATOR
IndividualREISTERSTOWN, MD
$3,300
Oct 31, 2023
8
FISCHER, SOLOMON
FISCHER ROOFING • ROOFER
IndividualLAKEWOOD, NJ
$3,000
Oct 7, 2024
9
TABORN, TYRONE D.
CAREER COMMUNICATIONS GROUP • METAVERSE CREATOR
IndividualREISTERSTOWN, MD
$3,000
Jul 27, 2024
10
BEREANO, BRUCE C.
SELF-EMPLOYED • GOVERNMENT RELATIONS CONSULTANT
IndividualANNAPOLIS, MD
$2,500
Oct 23, 2024

Rep. Brown, Shontel M. [D-OH-11]

ID: B001313

Top Contributors

10

1
MORRIS-SINGER, ANDREW
SELF-EMPLOYED • MANAGEMENT
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$6,600
Jan 24, 2024
2
MORRIS-SINGER, COREY
SELF-EMPLOYED • RESEARCH
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$6,600
Jan 24, 2024
3
STEIN, KEVIN M
TRANSDIGM • CEO
IndividualCHAGRIN FALLS, OH
$3,300
Feb 15, 2023
4
MOSS, KAREN
NICOLAS GUDBRANSON & COOPER • ATTORNEY
IndividualCLEVELAND, OH
$3,300
Feb 24, 2023
5
SUMMERS, MICHAEL P.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLAKEWOOD, OH
$3,300
Feb 28, 2023
6
JOHNSON, ALEX B
TRI-C • COLLEGE PRESIDENT
IndividualBEACHWOOD, OH
$3,300
Mar 7, 2023
7
SINITO, FRANK T
MILLENIA HOUSING COMPANIES • PRESIDENT
IndividualCLEVELAND, OH
$3,300
Mar 13, 2023
8
EMERSON, WILLIAM
ROCK HOLDINGS • VICE CHAIRMAN
IndividualBLOOMFIELD HILLS, MI
$3,300
Apr 14, 2023
9
JURVETSON, KARLA
SELF • PHYSICIAN
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
10
RATNER, ALBERT B.
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLYNDHURST, OH
$3,300
Jun 13, 2023

Rep. Stansbury, Melanie A. [D-NM-1]

ID: S001218

Top Contributors

10

1
PUYALLUP TRIBE OF INDIANS
OrganizationTACOMA, WA
$3,700
Jun 10, 2024
2
PUEBLO OF ISLETA
OrganizationISLETA, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
3
PUEBLO OF SANDIA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
4
PECHANGA BAND OF LUISENO INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Dec 6, 2023
5
PUEBLO OF SANTA ANA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023
6
PUEBLO OF SANDIA
OrganizationBERNALILLO, NM
$3,300
Nov 27, 2023
7
PASCUA YAQUI TRIBE
OrganizationTUCSON, AZ
$3,300
Dec 30, 2023
8
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023
9
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$3,300
Mar 29, 2023
10
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRANTON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
Mar 25, 2024

Rep. Garcia, Robert [D-CA-42]

ID: G000598

Top Contributors

10

1
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 25, 2023
2
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 25, 2023
3
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,500
Jun 28, 2024
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Dec 22, 2023
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Dec 31, 2023
6
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$1,000
Jun 28, 2024
7
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$1,000
Sep 27, 2024
8
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$500
Dec 18, 2023
9
SALAS, RALPH
HARBOR BREEZE • PRESIDENT / CEO
IndividualRANCHO PALOS VERDES, CA
$6,600
Feb 20, 2024
10
ABDUL-WAHAB, ANDREW
SHANGRI-LA INDUSTRIES • CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
IndividualLONG BEACH, CA
$6,600
Jun 30, 2023

Rep. Frost, Maxwell [D-FL-10]

ID: F000476

Top Contributors

10

1
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationBANNING, CA
$1,000
Jun 28, 2024
2
MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$500
Sep 26, 2023
3
HULL, MEGAN
SELF EMPLOYED • ACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 17, 2024
4
HARRIS, WILLIAM
PERKINS + WILL • ARCHITECT
IndividualCAMBRIDGE, MA
$3,300
Oct 29, 2023
5
BOYLAND, DORIAN
BOYLAND AUTO ORLANDO • BUSINESS OWNER
IndividualWINDERMERE, FL
$3,300
Oct 13, 2023
6
TILLMAN, BRIAN
WINDOW WORLD • OWNER
IndividualORLANDO, FL
$3,300
Oct 20, 2023
7
PISCITELLI, JUNE
SMARTHINKING • INSTRUCTOR
IndividualFORT LAUDERDALE, FL
$3,300
Oct 6, 2023
8
WILLIAMS, TERESA
SELF EMPLOYED • MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT
IndividualWINTER PARK, FL
$3,300
Dec 2, 2023
9
HARRIS, WILLIAM
PERKINS + WILL • ARCHITECT
IndividualCAMBRIDGE, MA
$3,300
Oct 29, 2023
10
PISCITELLI, JUNE
SMARTHINKING • INSTRUCTOR
IndividualFORT LAUDERDALE, FL
$3,300
Oct 6, 2023

Rep. Lee, Summer L. [D-PA-12]

ID: L000602

Top Contributors

10

1
FRIENDS OF SARA INNAMORATO
OrganizationPITTSBURGH, PA
$3,300
Mar 19, 2024
2
FRIENDS OF SARA INNAMORATO
OrganizationPITTSBURGH, PA
$2,300
Mar 19, 2024
3
JORDAN, WAYNE
JREI • SELF-EMPLOYED
IndividualOAKLAND, CA
$6,600
Jan 26, 2024
4
TROTTER, ANDREW
N/A • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualREDWOOD CITY, CA
$3,600
Mar 21, 2024
5
COOK ZUHLKE, RONNIE
N/A • RETIRED
IndividualPITTSBURGH, PA
$3,420
Mar 27, 2024
6
KALIYUR, SATHVIK
NWF STRATEGIES • CONSULTANT
IndividualSARATOGA, CA
$3,300
Dec 26, 2024
7
ABDALLAH, HANI
EVERGREEN • PHARMACIST
IndividualHOMER GLEN, IL
$3,300
Dec 30, 2023
8
AKHRAS, RAMI
RAMI AKHRAS • SELF-EMPLOYED
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
Nov 16, 2023
9
ALI, NADIA
MPI • BUSINESSWOMAN
IndividualORLAND PARK, IL
$3,300
Dec 30, 2023
10
ALI, NADIR
INPIXON • CEO
IndividualPALO ALTO, CA
$3,300
Dec 9, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 54 nodes and 34 connections (41 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $127,150

Top Donors - Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11]

Showing top 18 donors by contribution amount

1 Org1 Committee16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 harmed.

  • Section 3512(a)(2)(B)(ix) includes comprehensive financial management performance-based metrics, which may lead to increased scrutiny and regulation of private equity and hedge funds, potentially increasing their costs.

  • −Commercial Banksconfidence 0.70

    Section 3512(e)(1) requires agencies to identify key financial management information, including agency spending data, which may lead to increased transparency and oversight of commercial banks' interactions with government agencies.

  • Section 3512(a)(2)(B)(viii) mentions the identification of opportunities for agencies to share systems and services, which may lead to increased competition and reduced profits for insurance companies providing services to government agencies.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Connolly, Gerald E. [D-VA-11])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 869-871AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"HR 1558 enhances transparency, accountability, and congressional oversight of federal agency financial management, which directly supports the Project 2025 goal of increasing oversight and reporting requirements for financial regulatory agencies such as the SEC, CFTC, and CFPB."

Key themes:transparencyaccountabilitycongressional oversightfinancial reportingagency oversight

— 837 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Require the SEC and the CFTC to publish a detailed annual report on SRO supervision. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but Paul Atkins, C. Wallace DeWitt, Christopher Iacovella, Brian Knight, Chelsea Pizzola, and Andrew Vollmer deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU Robert Bowes The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was authorized in 2010 by the Dodd–Frank Act.32 Since the Bureau’s inception, its status as an “inde- pendent” agency with no congressional oversight has been questioned in multiple court cases, and the agency has been assailed by critics33 as a shakedown mecha- nism to provide unaccountable funding to leftist nonprofits politically aligned with those who spearheaded its creation. In 2015, for example, Investor’s Business Daily accused the CFPB of “diverting potentially millions of dollars in settlement payments for alleged victims of lending bias to a slush fund for poverty groups tied to the Democratic Party” and plan- ning “to create a so-called Civil Penalty Fund from its own shakedown operations targeting financial institutions” that would use “ramped-up (and trumped-up) anti-discrimination lawsuits and investigations” to “bankroll some 60 liberal non- profits, many of whom are radical Acorn-style pressure groups.”34 The CFPB has a fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget of $653.2 million35 and 1,635 full- time equivalent (FTE) employees.36 From FY 2012 through FY 2020, it imposed approximately $1.25 billion in civil money penalties;37 in FY 2022, it imposed approximately $172.5 million in civil money penalties.38 These penalties are imposed by the CFPB Civil Penalty Fund, described as “a victims relief fund, into which the CFPB deposits civil penalties it collects in judicial and administrative actions under Federal consumer financial laws.”39 The CFPB is headed by a single Director who is appointed by the President to a five-year term.40 Its organizational structure includes five divisions: Operations; Consumer Education and External Affairs; Legal; Supervision, Enforcement and Fair Lending; and Research, Monitoring and Regulations.41 Each of these divisions reports to the Office of the Director, except for the Operations Division, which reports to the Deputy Director. Passage of Title X of Dodd–Frank was a bid to placate concern over a series of regulatory failures identified in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. The law imported a new superstructure of federal regulation over consumer finance and — 838 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise mortgage lending and servicing industries traditionally regulated by state bank- ing regulators. Consumer protection responsibilities previously handled by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, National Credit Union Admin- istration, and Federal Trade Commission were transferred to and consolidated in the CFPB, which issues rules, orders, and guidance to implement federal consumer financial law. The CFPB collects fines from the private sector that are put into the Civil Pen- alty Fund.42 The fund serves two ostensible purposes: to compensate the victims whom the CFPB perceives to be harmed and to underwrite “consumer education” and “financial literacy” programs.43 How the Civil Penalty Fund is spent is at the discretion of the CFPB Director. The CFPB has been unclear as to how it decides what “consumer education” or “financial literacy programs” to fund.44 As noted, critics have charged that money from the Civil Penalty Fund has ended up in the pockets of leftist activist organizations. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,45 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual remov- able only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violated constitutional separation of powers requirements because “[t]he Constitution requires that such officials remain dependent on the President, who in turn is accountable to the people.”46 The CFPB Director is thus subject to removal by the President. The CFPB is not subject to congressional oversight, and its funding is not determined by elected lawmakers in Congress as part of the typical congressional appropriations process. It receives its funding from the Federal Reserve, which is itself funded outside the appropriations process through bank assessments. CFPB funding represents 12 percent of the total operating expenses of the Fed- eral Reserve and is disbursed by the unelected Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.47 This is not the case with respect to any other federal agency. On October 19, 2022, in Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the CFPB’s “perpetual insulation from Congress’s appropriations power, including the express exemption from congressional review of its funding, renders the Bureau ‘no longer dependent and, as a result, no longer accountable’ to Congress and, ultimately, to the people”48 and that “[b]y abandoning its ‘most complete and effectual’ check on ‘the overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government’—indeed, by enabling them in the Bureau’s case—Congress ran afoul of the separation of powers embodied in the Appropriations Clause.”49 The Court further remarked that the CFPB’s “capacious portfolio of authority acts ‘as a mini legislature, prosecutor, and court, responsible for creating substantive rules for a wide swath of industries, prosecuting violations, and levying knee-buckling penalties against private citizens.’”50

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 68%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section emphasize strengthening oversight, transparency, and accountability of financial operations, though HR 1558 applies governmentwide while Project 2025 targets specific financial regulatory agencies."

Key themes:financial oversighttransparencyaccountabilityinternal controlsreporting requirements

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Moderate
Vector: 67%
Pages: 866-868AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"Both the bill and the Project 2025 section aim to increase oversight, accountability, and efficiency in federal financial management, though the bill applies government-wide while Project 2025 focuses on specific reforms for the SEC and CFTC."

Key themes:oversightaccountabilityinternal controlsreporting requirementsreducing inefficiencies

— 833 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Eliminate all administrative proceedings (APs) within the SEC except for stop orders related to defective registration statements. The SEC enforcement system does not need to have both district court cases and APs. Alternatively, respondents should be allowed to elect whether an adjudication occurs in the SEC’s administrative law court or an ordinary Article III federal court.24 l End the practice of delegating the decision to initiate an enforcement case. The SEC Chairman—and possibly the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)—should study whether other Commission delegation of authority to staff should be narrowed and whether sunsetting of such delegation of authority should be required. Congress should: l Require an Inspector General’s (or possibly a GAO) report regarding SEC information technology spending and contracting. Spending appears to be much too high, and IT contracting is poorly managed. l Statutorily limit the time for an investigation to two years with no extensions. Long investigations harm private parties and the quality of justice. With adequate management processes, the SEC should not need more than two years even for complicated matters. The SEC Chairman should: l Dramatically reduce the number of direct reports to the SEC Chairman. l Merge SEC offices that are performing similar functions. l Reduce the number of managers per employee. CFTC ADMINISTRATION AND IMPROVED COMMODITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS Congress should: l Modernize the definition of commodity (which is now largely a laundry list of agricultural commodities)25 and clarify the treatment of digital assets. l Clarify through an express amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA)26 the circumstances that require a foreign swap trading platform to — 834 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) as a swap execution facility (SEF) under Sections 2(i)27 and 5h28 of the CEA. Currently, it is not clear whether having one or a small number of U.S. participants would require SEF registration under prior staff guidance, which has led foreign swap trading platforms to exclude all U.S. persons from their platforms or to go through the process of seeking an exemption from registration. l Amend Section 2 of the CEA to authorize the CFTC Chairman to remove the agency’s Executive Director without a Commission vote. l To augment Commissioners’ independence, establish funding amounts for the Commissioners’ offices by statute with adjustments for inflation, with no requirement for a Commissioner to obtain budget or expense approvals from the Chairman or the agency’s administrative staff. The CFTC should: l Allocate more resources to core agency functions rather than ancillary and support operations. l Replace the existing position limits rule, which reduces liquidity and makes markets more volatile, with further delegation of authority to the exchanges to set position limits and position accountability levels where appropriate for the relevant market. l Reduce overly prescriptive rules implementing the CFTC’s core principles. l Apply the definitions of “U.S. Person” and “Guarantee” in the CFTC’s 2020 rule on cross-border application of swaps regulations (2020 Cross-Border Rule)29 to the regulatory requirements that remain covered by the CFTC’s 2013 guidance on the subject (2013 Guidance).30 Currently, the definition of each of these foundational terms differs depending on whether the requirement in question is covered by the 2020 Cross-Border Rule or the 2013 Guidance. l Remove the regulatory categories of “affiliate conduit” and “foreign consolidated subsidiary” from the 2013 Guidance and the CFTC’s cross- border rule on margin for uncleared swaps,31 respectively. These categories were replaced by the concept of a “Significant Risk Subsidiary” for purposes of the 2020 Cross-Border Rule because of widespread market confusion and compliance difficulties arising from their broad and vague scope.

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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