Campaign Finance Transparency Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/8720
Last Updated: August 19, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

ID: S001213

Follow the money

The bill

Campaign Finance Transparency Act

HR. 8720, 119th Congress — read as touching Big Tech Platforms.

The sponsor

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$154,506 raised

30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 651.

July 12, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

HR 8720: Campaign Finance Transparency Act Or: How to Pretend You’re Fighting Corruption While Making It Slightly More Annoying to Steal

Let’s be clear: this bill isn’t about transparency. It’s about *performance*. Like putting a Band-Aid on a shotgun wound and calling it surgery.

**New Regulations:** Sections 2 and 3 amend the Federal Election Campaign Act to force online political donors to cough up their CVV (that three-digit security code on the back of your card), billing ZIP, and—get this—proof of identity *just to give $25 to a candidate*. For recurring donations, you only get probed once. After that, the campaign can keep charging your card like a subscription to moral decay. Digital wallets? Magically exempt. Because apparently, Apple Pay is inherently virtuous.

**Affected Industries:** Political campaigns (all of them), payment processors, and the growing industry of “compliance theater consultants” who will now sell campaigns $500/hour guides on how to CVV-scan without triggering fraud alerts. Banks and card networks? They’ll love this—more data to mine, more liability to shift onto campaigns, and zero actual security gain.

**Compliance Requirements:** Campaigns must now: - Demand CVV + ZIP + ID for first-time online card donations - Store that data (securely, they promise) - Forward donor info to treasurers within 10 days - Refund non-compliant donations… *if* they notice - Pretend digital wallets don’t circumvent the whole thing

Timelines? Effective immediately. Because nothing says “urgent reform” like forcing a 72-year-old donor to fax a copy of their passport to a congressional candidate’s treasurer.

**Enforcement:** The FEC gets to audit. Treasurers who “show best efforts” get a pass—even if they took laundered crypto through a shell LLC and called it a “digital wallet contribution.” Penalties? Refund the money. Wow. A deterrent. It’s like fining a bank robber by making them return the cash… *if* they feel guilty.

**Economic & Operational Impact:** - **Campaigns:** Increased admin costs, more vendor contracts for ID verification tools, higher donation abandonment rates (good luck getting grandpa to upload his passport). - **Donors:** Privacy erosion, friction, and the creeping sense that participating in democracy now requires a background check. - **Fraudsters:** Unfazed. They’ll just use stolen cards, synthetic IDs, or exploit the digital wallet loophole—which, spoiler, is just Apple Pay with a fancy name. - **Voters:** Left with the illusion that something’s been fixed, while dark money flows untouched through 501(c)(4)s, LLCs, and offshore accounts—none of which this bill touches.

**Real Diagnosis:** This is legislative liposuction—removing surface fat while ignoring the visceral tumor. The sponsors (Steil, Miller, Barrett) know damn well CVV collection won’t stop foreign interference, straw donors, or corporate influence laundering. But it *does* let them grandstand about “election integrity” while taking PAC money from the same industries they’re pretending to regulate.

In short: HR 8720 is a placebo for a democracy dying of institutional sepsis. It won’t heal anything. It’ll just make the patient fill out more forms before they code.

Related Topics

Research & Innovation PolicyElections & Voting RightsCybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$154,506
21 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$26,600
Committees
$0
Individuals
$127,906

No PAC contributions found

1
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$6,600
2
HO CHUNK NATION
2 transactions
$6,200
3
ONEIDA NATION
3 transactions
$4,000
4
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
1 transaction
$3,300
5
MORONGO BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
2 transactions
$3,000
6
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$2,500
7
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
MAYER, SCOTT A.
3 transactions
$33,000
2
ADAMANY, KIMBERLY K.
2 transactions
$13,636
3
MAYER, SUSANNE
2 transactions
$13,200
4
G, DAVID
1 transaction
$6,870
5
WHITE, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
6
ADAMANY, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$6,600
7
BUHOLZER, GLENDA
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WILEY, LADD
1 transaction
$6,600
9
MOORE, NOEL G.
1 transaction
$6,600
10
BUSH, KATHLEEN M.
1 transaction
$6,600
11
BUSH, MARK F.
1 transaction
$6,600
12
MURESIANU, ANDREI
1 transaction
$5,000
13
BARRETT, BRAD
1 transaction
$5,000
14
SUZMAN, ANDREW
1 transaction
$5,000

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Miller, Mary E. [R-IL-15]

ID: M001211

Top Contributors

23

1
WINRED PAC
PACARLINGTON, VA
$13,010
Mar 31, 2023
2
ADAMS MEMORIALS
OrganizationCHARLESTON, IL
$1,000
Mar 23, 2023
3
VAHLING VINEYARDS
OrganizationSTEWARDSON, IL
$500
Jan 11, 2024
4
KASPAR, SCOTT
KASPAR LAW COMPANY • LAWYER
IndividualORLAND PARK, IL
$13,200
Mar 22, 2023
5
BISHOP, JACK L MR
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
IndividualLAKE BLUFF, IL
$10,000
Mar 30, 2023
6
BISHOP, JACK L MR
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
IndividualLAKE BLUFF, IL
$7,700
Mar 30, 2023
7
FORSYTHE, GERALD R MR
INDECK ENERGY SERVICES • CEO
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Nov 14, 2023
8
DAMAS, BETH A
SOUTHWEST ENDODONTICS • ENDODONTIST
IndividualORLAND PARK, IL
$6,600
Mar 22, 2023
9
FORSYTHE, GERALD R MR
INDECK ENERGY SERVICES • CEO
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Aug 15, 2023
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CEO
IndividualLAKE BLUFF, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Barrett, Tom [R-MI-7]

ID: B001321

Top Contributors

21

1
MICHIGAN AGGREGATES ASSOCIATION PAC
OrganizationOKEMOS, MI
$300
Feb 27, 2024
2
DEMKOWICZ, BRIAN MR.
HURON CAPITAL • INVESTOR
IndividualGROSSE POINTE, MI
$13,200
Jan 8, 2024
3
STADLER, BRIAN
WOLGAST CORPORATION • MANAGER
IndividualSAGINAW, MI
$6,870
Sep 28, 2023
4
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$6,870
Sep 26, 2023
5
COURTNEY, JOHN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualOKEMOS, MI
$6,870
Dec 8, 2023
6
BAKER, JEFFREY
MUSKEGON CAR CREDIT • EXECUTIVE
IndividualGRAND RAPIDS, MI
$6,600
Jul 25, 2023
7
BANCROFT, NICHOLAS
AGROLIQUID • CEO
IndividualSAINT JOHNS, MI
$6,600
Sep 19, 2023
8
HAWORTH, MATTHEW
HAWORTH, INC. • CHAIRMAN
IndividualHOLLAND, MI
$6,600
Sep 18, 2023
9
HAWORTH, RICHARD
HAWORTH, INC. • CHAIRMAN EMERITUS
IndividualSAUGATUCK, MI
$6,600
Sep 18, 2023
10
O'NEIL, WILLIAM
W J O'NEIL COMPANY • EXECUTIVE
IndividualCOMMERCE TOWNSHIP, MI
$6,600
Sep 11, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 51 nodes and 68 connections

Total contributions: $68

Top Donors - Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]

Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount

7 Orgs14 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 5 harmed.

  • −Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(j)(1) requires political committees to collect CVV and ZIP code for online credit/debit card contributions, imposing additional compliance burdens on platforms that process such payments (e.g., ActBlue, WinRed) and potentially reducing ease of online donations.

  • −Crypto & Fintechconfidence 0.85

    Section 2(j)(5) treats digital wallet contributions as compliant, but the overall increased verification requirements (CVV, ZIP, name matching) may hinder frictionless crypto/fintech payment processing for political donations, imposing operational costs.

  • −Labor Unionsconfidence 0.80

    Sections 2-4 impose stricter contribution verification rules that could reduce the ease of small-dollar online donations, a key fundraising method for many labor unions and allied political committees.

  • −Teachers Unionsconfidence 0.80

    Same as labor unions: teachers unions rely on grassroots online donations; increased verification may suppress small-dollar contributions.

  • For-profit education entities and affiliated PACs often rely on online contributions; the added verification steps could hinder their fundraising efficiency.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Strong
Vector: 63%
Pages: 891-894AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on enhancing transparency and preventing illicit contributions directly supports the Federal Election Commission's mission to enforce campaign finance laws and regulate political spending, showing significant overlap in objectives."

Key themes:campaign finance regulationdisclosure requirementspreventing illicit contributionsFEC oversighttransparency in elections

— 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023). — 861 — 29 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Hans A. von Spakovsky MISSION/OVERVIEW The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is an independent federal agency that began operations in 1975 to enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) passed by Congress in 1971 and amended in 1974.1 FECA governs the raising and spending of funds in all federal campaigns for Congress and the presidency. The FEC has no authority over the administration of federal elections, which is per- formed by state governments. While the FEC has exclusive civil enforcement authority over FECA,2 the U.S. Justice Department has criminal enforcement authority, which is defined as a knowing and willful violation of the law.3 Because the FEC is an independent agency and not a division or office directly within the executive branch, the author- ity of the President over the actions of the FEC is extremely limited. As former FEC Commissioner Bradley Smith has said, the FEC’s “[r]egulation of campaign finance deeply implicates First Amendment principles of free speech and association.”4 The FEC regulates in one of the most sensitive areas of the Bill of Rights: political speech and political activity by citizens, candidates, political par- ties, and the voluntary membership organizations that represent Americans who share common views on a huge range of important and vital public policy issues. NEEDED REFORMS Nomination Authority. The President’s most significant power is the appoint- ment of the six commissioners who govern the FEC, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Commissioners may only serve a single term of six years but

Federal Election Commission

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 898-900AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on enhancing transparency in online campaign contributions through disclosure requirements, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes structural reforms to the FEC, such as removing its independent litigating authority and addressing commissioner term overstays. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address litigation authority, commissioner tenure, or DOJ guidance on invalidated regulations."

Key themes:Federal Election CommissionFECAcampaign finance

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 64%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on campaign finance disclosure for online contributions, while the Project 2025 section concerns reforms to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and related financial regulatory agencies; both share a theme of increasing transparency in financial transactions, but their substantive objectives and regulatory scopes differ significantly."

Key themes:transparencyfinancial transactionsdisclosure requirementsillicit activity preventionregulatory oversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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