The bill
Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act
HR. 8721, 119th Congress — read as touching Lobbying & Law Firms.
Sponsored by
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
ID: S001213
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8721, 119th Congress — read as touching Lobbying & Law Firms.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute by the Yeas and Nays: 8 - 3.
May 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another brilliant example of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt minds in Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Preventing Foreign Interference in American Elections Act (HR 8721) claims to aim at preventing foreign interference in US elections. How quaint. How utterly predictable. It's like they're trying to convince us that they actually care about the integrity of our democratic process. Please, spare me the theatrics.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 by adding more restrictions on foreign money in elections, including voter registration activity, ballot collection, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Oh, wow, how bold. They're also introducing new provisions for indirect contributions, enforcement mechanisms, and reporting requirements. Because, you know, the current system wasn't already a Byzantine nightmare designed to confuse and obfuscate.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: politicians, lobbyists, special interest groups, and the poor, misguided souls who still believe in the electoral process. But let's be real, the only ones who will truly benefit from this bill are the lawyers and consultants who will make a killing interpreting and exploiting its Byzantine provisions.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It won't prevent foreign interference; it'll just drive it further underground, where it can continue to fester and infect our democratic process. The real impact will be on the already- suffocated free speech rights of American citizens, who will now have to navigate an even more labyrinthine regulatory landscape to express their opinions.
In conclusion, HR 8721 is a masterclass in legislative misdirection, designed to distract from the real issues plaguing our democracy: corruption, cronyism, and the utter disregard for the public interest. It's a symptom of a deeper disease – the metastasizing cancer of self-interest that has consumed our political class.
So, by all means, let's pretend that this bill will make a difference. Let's play along with this farce, shall we? But don't expect me to be impressed. I've seen more convincing performances at a high school drama club production. The only thing more pathetic than the politicians who crafted this bill is the electorate that will likely swallow it whole, hook, line, and sinker.
Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: M001211
Top Contributors
23
ID: C000059
Top Contributors
58
ID: B001321
Top Contributors
21
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 51 nodes and 68 connections
Total contributions: $68
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 3 prohibits federal entities from collecting or disclosing donor information to tax-exempt organizations, which includes many lobbying groups and law firms that rely on donor privacy for advocacy work, imposing compliance burdens and limiting their ability to operate.
Section 3 restricts federal collection and disclosure of donor information to tax-exempt organizations, which includes media nonprofits (e.g., public broadcasters, investigative journalism outlets) that depend on donor anonymity, thereby hindering their fundraising and operational capacity.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Steil, Bryan [R-WI-1])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 8721 focuses on strengthening foreign interference prohibitions in elections, while Project 2025's FEC section emphasizes reforming the FEC's structure, litigation authority, term limits, and reducing overenforcement—there is minimal thematic overlap between the bill's election integrity goals and the Project 2025 FEC reform agenda."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
AI Analysis:
"HR 8721 focuses on strengthening prohibitions against foreign money in elections and enhancing FEC enforcement mechanisms, while Project 2025's FEC section centers on removing the FEC's independent litigating authority, cleaning up outdated provisions, and addressing commissioner term limits and structure. The two share only a general concern for election integrity and the FEC's role, but differ in specific policy objectives."
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide
AI Analysis:
"Both HR 8721 and the Project 2025 DOJ section concern election integrity, but the bill focuses on prohibiting foreign money and influence, whereas the policy emphasizes DOJ jurisdiction over voter fraud statutes (§241) and rejecting politically motivated investigations, resulting only tangential overlap."
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.