The bill
Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act
HR. 5061, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
ID: G000597
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5061, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 201-204 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 60 - 0.
September 2, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity and reveal the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act (HR 5061) claims to reauthorize and reform counter-unmanned aircraft system authorities, improve transparency, security, safety, and accountability. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a Frankenstein's monster of bureaucratic overreach, designed to expand the government's surveillance powers under the guise of "national security."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 3 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, granting the Secretary and Attorney General sweeping authority to seize or confiscate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) deemed a threat to national security. The bill also establishes a Counter-UAS Mitigation Law Enforcement Pilot Program, because what could possibly go wrong with giving law enforcement more power to surveil citizens?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and various congressional committees. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the defense contractors, surveillance technology companies, and lobbyists who will reap the benefits of this legislation.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the insatiable appetite for power and control that afflicts our government. By expanding surveillance powers and creating new authorities, HR 5061 erodes civil liberties and sets a precedent for further encroachment on individual freedoms.
The "transparency" and "accountability" provisions are nothing more than window dressing, designed to placate the naive and the ignorant. In reality, this bill will lead to increased secrecy, as government agencies and law enforcement exploit their newfound powers to surveil and control citizens.
In conclusion, HR 5061 is a legislative abomination that should be euthanized before it causes any more harm. But hey, what do I know? I'm just a cynical political analyst with a penchant for dark humor.
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: T000193
Top Contributors
20
ID: G000546
Top Contributors
28
ID: L000560
Top Contributors
36
ID: R000606
Top Contributors
23
ID: G000605
Top Contributors
32
ID: V000133
Top Contributors
27
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 52 nodes and 58 connections
Total contributions: $58
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 10 helped, 2 harmed.
The bill authorizes counter-UAS detection and mitigation systems, equipment, and technology for use by federal agencies, law enforcement, and covered entities, which will likely increase demand for defense contractors that produce such systems (e.g., Raytheon, Lockheed Martin). Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 detail authorities for deployment, testing, training, and procurement of counter-UAS systems, creating market opportunities for defense contractors.
Section 7(b)(1)(A) requires deployment of approved counter-UAS detection systems at large hub airports, which benefits commercial aerospace manufacturers (e.g., Boeing, GE Aerospace) that supply airport infrastructure and air traffic management systems.
The bill involves detection, identification, monitoring, tracking, and mitigation of unmanned aircraft systems, which includes electronic signal interception and cybersecurity measures. Sections 3(b)(4)(C), 4(a)(2)(A), 4(a)(2)(D), 4(b)(2), 4(e)(2)(C), 4(f), 4(g), 4(h), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 reference communications interception, spectrum impact, and electronic systems, indicating growth in cybersecurity needs for counter-UAS technology.
Section 3(b)(2)(D) requires coordination with the Federal Communications Commission to ensure counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, which benefits surface transportation logistics firms (e.g., Union Pacific, UPS) that rely on uninterrupted communications and GPS for freight rail and trucking operations.
The bill requires consultation with the FCC or NTIA to ensure counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, communications spectrum, internet technology, or radio communications networks (Section 3(b)(4)(C)). This implies potential restrictions or compliance burdens on telecommunications companies if their systems are deemed to cause interference, representing a regulatory cost.
The bill mandates development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of counter-UAS detection and mitigation systems, equipment, and technology (Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). This will likely increase demand for semiconductors and hardware components used in radar, RF sensors, electronic warfare, and computing systems, benefiting semiconductor manufacturers.
+ 6 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"HR 5061 directly expands and reauthorizes DHS's counter-UAS authorities to protect critical infrastructure and coordinate with other agencies, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening DHS capabilities to defend the homeland against emerging threats."
— 168 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law No. 107-296, 107th Congress, November 25, 2002, § 101(b)(1), https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ296/PLAW-107publ296.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 2. See, for example, “Elon Musk Slams CISA Censorship Network as ‘Propaganda Platform,’” Kanekoa News, December 28, 2022, https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/elon-musk-slams-cisa-censorship-network (accessed March 14, 2023). 3. H.R. 2680, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act, and for Other Purposes, Public Law No. 89-236, 89th Congress, October 3, 1965, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-79/pdf/STATUTE-79- Pg911.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 4. Added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. See H.R. 3610, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Public Law No. 104-208, 104th Congress, September 30, 1996, Division C, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ208/ PLAW-104publ208.pdf (accessed March 14, 2023). 5. 8 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8 (accessed March 14, 2023). 6. 18 U.S. Code, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18 (accessed March 14, 2023). 7. 5 U.S. Code §§ 551–559, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5/subchapter-II (accessed March 14, 2023). 8. Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Budget Comparison and Adjustments Appropriation and PPA Summary,” in U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. CIS-4, https://www.uscis.gov/ sites/default/files/document/reports/U.S._Citizenship_and_Immigration_Services%E2%80%99_Budget_ Overview_Document_for%20Fiscal_Year_2023.pdf#:~:text=The%20FY%202023%20Budget%20includes%20 %24913.6M%2C%204%2C001%20positions%3B,of%20%24444.1M%20above%20the%20FY%202022%20 President%E2%80%99s%20Budget (accessed March 14, 2023), and Table, “United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Comparison of Budget Authority and Request,” in ibid., p. CIS-5. 9. H.R. 7311, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Public Law No. 110-457, 110th Congress, December 23, 2008, § 235, https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ457/PLAW- 110publ457.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 10. Matter of A-B-, Respondent, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/ download (accessed January 18, 2023). 11. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/567/387/ (accessed January 18, 2023). 12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [Public Law 93–288; Approved May 22, 1974] [As Amended Through P.L. 117–328, Enacted December 29, 2022], https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ COMPS-2977/pdf/COMPS-2977.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 13. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2023 Congressional Justification, p. FEMA-24, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/Federal%20Emergency%20 Management%20Agency_Remediated.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 14. Report, United States Secret Service: An Agency in Crisis, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 114th Congress, December 9, 2015, https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Oversight-USSS-Report.pdf (accessed January 18, 2023). 15. 5 U.S. Code § 7103, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7103 (accessed March 15, 2023). 16. S. 3418, Privacy Act of 1974, Public Law No. 93-579, 93rd Congress, December 31, 1974, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1896.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 17. H.R. 1428, Judicial Redress Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-126, 114th Congress, February 24, 2016, https://www. congress.gov/114/plaws/publ126/PLAW-114publ126.pdf (accessed March 15, 2023). 18. H.R. 1158, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Public Law No. 116-93, 116th Congress, December 20, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1158 (accessed January 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt aim to strengthen Department of Homeland Security security operations and improve interagency coordination, but the bill focuses specifically on counter‑UAS authorities while Project 2025 centers on USSS mission realignment and TSA reform, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."
— 157 — Department of Homeland Security to such returnees. These two steps could be foundational for any improvements in the recruiting process. U.S. SECRET SERVICE (USSS) Needed Reforms The U.S. Secret Service must be the world’s best protective agency. Currently, the agency is distracted by its dual mission of protection and financial investigations. The result has been a long series of high-profile embarrassments and security fail- ures, perhaps most notably its allowing of then-Vice President-elect Kamala Harris to be inside the Democratic National Committee office on January 6, 2021, while a pipe bomb was outside. Despite the great size and scope of the January 6 inves- tigation, this high-profile incident of danger to a protectee remains unresolved. The failures of the USSS protective mission are too numerous to list here. A December 2015 bipartisan report from the House Oversight Committee listed dozens of such incidents as well as needed recommendations for reform.14 This chapter adopts those findings and recommendations in whole, especially the finding that USSS’s dual-mission structure detracts from the agency’s protective capabilities. At the time of that report, USSS agents spent only one-third of their work hours on protection-related activities as opposed to investigative activities. USSS was established initially to investigate counterfeit currency, but its mission has evolved over the decades to prioritize electronic financial crimes. For example, as this chap- ter was being written, all 15 of the USSS’s most wanted individuals were wanted for financial crimes, many of them international in nature. Notably, the last head of the agency left not for a protection-related job, but to be the Chief Security Officer of social media company SnapChat. This is a pattern that has developed over the years, with agents seeking to burnish their online financial crimes credentials to secure corporate security jobs. Coupled with some of the lowest morale in the federal government, the agency has completely lost sight of the primacy of its protective mission. New Policies USSS should transfer to the Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury all investigations that are not related to its protective function. It should begin the logistical operation of closing all field offices throughout the country and internationally to the extent they are not taken over by Treasury or Justice. USSS agents stationed outside of Washington, D.C., should be transferred to work in Immigration and Customs Enforcement field offices where they would continue to be the “boots on the ground” to follow up on threat reports throughout the country and liaise with local law enforcement for visits by protectees. — 158 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise The only investigations not related to USSS’s protective function that agents should pursue would be directed by HSI and relate to tracking the financial crimes associated with illegal immigration. This should include tracing remittances, any funds that are used to pay coyotes or the cartels, and payments by businesses to illegal aliens and all other crimes associated with illegal immigration. USSS should keep visitor logs for all facilities where the President works or resides. The Biden Administration has evaded such transparency with President Biden spending a historic amount of time for a President at his Delaware residence. This has left the American people in the dark as to who is influencing the highest levels of their own government. Budget The suggested reforms would result in a significant USSS budget reduction, primarily because the agency would relinquish dozens of physical offices through- out the U.S. and internationally. Some amount of savings should be used to fix the personnel problems and for recruitment initiatives aimed at individuals who are inclined to join a protection-focused agency. Personnel As documented extensively in the above-referenced 2015 bipartisan congressio- nal report, low morale and high turnover are key drivers of USSS problems. With their mission focused on protection, agents would no longer spend the bulk of their time developing unrelated skillsets. Instead, USSS agents could hone their protection skills and pursue a protection career path in the agency rather than quickly leaving USSS for high-paying corporate security jobs. The Uniform Division (UD) of USSS requires a significant staffing increase. As documented in the bipartisan report, understaffing results in unpredictable and long hours, which in turn result in high turnover, which only compounds the problem. Another key issue is that UD officers lack the ability to enforce criminal laws outside the immediate vicinity of the White House. As the District of Columbia is a federal jurisdiction and currently is beholden to the trend of progressive pro- crime policies, UD officers should enforce all applicable laws. The result would be to allow UD officers to gain more law enforcement experience—an attractive credential that would improve morale. TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (TSA) The TSA model is costly and unwisely makes TSA both the regulator and the regulated organization responsible for screening operations. As part of an effort to shrink federal bureaucracies and bring private-sector know-how to govern- ment programs, TSA is ripe for reform. The U.S. should look to the Canadian and
AI Analysis:
"The bill addresses counter‑UAS authority and facility protection, while the Project 2025 DHS section focuses on immigration enforcement, work authorization, and border policies; they share only the agency involvement but have divergent policy objectives."
— 151 — Department of Homeland Security l Employment authorization. Along with the legislative proposal, take regulatory action to limit the classes of aliens eligible for work authorization. Executive Orders l Pathways for border crossers 1. Direct the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security to reinstate Asylum Cooperative Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries immediately. 2. Recommence negotiations with Mexico to fully implement the Remain in Mexico Protocols. 3. Reinstate, to the extent possible, expedited pathways with full credible fear/immigration court process (PACR and HARP). 4. Prohibit the use of Notices to Report, the use of any funds for travel into the interior of the United States, and government flights or transportation for aliens. 5. Mandate that ICE use all detention space in full compliance with Section 235 of the INA, issue weekly reports on detention capacity, and provide authority for low-level temporary capacity (for example, tents) once permanent space is full. 6. Eliminate the use of ATD for border crossers except in rare cases and only with the explicit authority of the Secretary. 7. Prohibit the use of parole except in matters that are certified by the Secretary of Homeland Security as requiring action for humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons, and prohibit the use of parole in any categorical circumstance. l Enforcement 1. Restrict prosecutorial discretion to eliminate it as a “catch-all” excuse for limiting immigration enforcement. 2. Mandate the use of E-Verify for anyone doing business with the government. — 152 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Designate USCIS as Intelligence Community–adjacent, ensuring that it has access to national security and law enforcement databases. 4. Rescind all memoranda limiting enforcement of immigration laws including those identifying sensitive zones. 5. End ICE’s widespread use of termination and administrative closure of cases in immigration court. l Averting or curtailing a mass migration event 1. Provide that whenever the Secretary of Homeland Security determines that an actual or anticipated mass migration of aliens en route to or arriving off the coast of the U.S. presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate federal response, the Secretary may make, subject to the approval of the President, rules and regulations prohibiting in whole or in part the introduction of persons from such countries or places as he or she shall designate in order to avert or curtail such mass migration and for such period of time as is deemed necessary, including through the expulsion of such aliens. Such rule and regulation making shall not be subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. 2. Provide that notwithstanding any other provision of law, when the Secretary makes such a determination and then promulgates, subject to the approval of the President, such rules and regulations, the Secretary shall have the authority to waive all legal requirements of Title 8 that the Secretary, in his or her sole discretion, determines are necessary to avert or curtail the mass migration. Subregulatory Matters l USCIS priorities/structural changes 1. Ensure that focus is returned to vetting, base eligibility of applicants, and fraud detection. 2. Realign the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) to ensure agencywide consistency on implementation of fraud detection and vetting policies. 3. Review and repeal any internal agency memo that is inconsistent with the priorities described in this chapter.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.