The bill
Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act
HR. 5061, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
Sponsored by
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
ID: G000597
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 5061, 119th Congress — read as touching Defense Contractors.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 171-173 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 60 - 0.
September 2, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this monstrosity and reveal the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Counter-UAS Authority Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act (HR 5061) claims to reauthorize and reform counter-unmanned aircraft system authorities, improve transparency, security, safety, and accountability. How quaint. In reality, this bill is a Frankenstein's monster of bureaucratic overreach, designed to expand the government's surveillance powers under the guise of "national security."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Section 3 amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002, granting the Secretary and Attorney General sweeping authority to seize or confiscate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) deemed a threat to national security. The bill also establishes a Counter-UAS Mitigation Law Enforcement Pilot Program, because what could possibly go wrong with giving law enforcement more power to surveil citizens?
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and various congressional committees. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the defense contractors, surveillance technology companies, and lobbyists who will reap the benefits of this legislation.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the insatiable appetite for power and control that afflicts our government. By expanding surveillance powers and creating new authorities, HR 5061 erodes civil liberties and sets a precedent for further encroachment on individual freedoms.
The "transparency" and "accountability" provisions are nothing more than window dressing, designed to placate the naive and the ignorant. In reality, this bill will lead to increased secrecy, as government agencies and law enforcement exploit their newfound powers to surveil and control citizens.
In conclusion, HR 5061 is a legislative abomination that should be euthanized before it causes any more harm. But hey, what do I know? I'm just a cynical political analyst with a penchant for dark humor.
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 6 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: T000193
Top Contributors
10
ID: G000546
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000560
Top Contributors
10
ID: R000606
Top Contributors
10
ID: G000605
Top Contributors
10
ID: V000133
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 70 nodes and 37 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $103,850
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 10 helped, 2 harmed.
The bill authorizes counter-UAS detection and mitigation systems, equipment, and technology for use by federal agencies, law enforcement, and covered entities, which will likely increase demand for defense contractors that produce such systems (e.g., Raytheon, Lockheed Martin). Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 detail authorities for deployment, testing, training, and procurement of counter-UAS systems, creating market opportunities for defense contractors.
Section 7(b)(1)(A) requires deployment of approved counter-UAS detection systems at large hub airports, which benefits commercial aerospace manufacturers (e.g., Boeing, GE Aerospace) that supply airport infrastructure and air traffic management systems.
The bill involves detection, identification, monitoring, tracking, and mitigation of unmanned aircraft systems, which includes electronic signal interception and cybersecurity measures. Sections 3(b)(4)(C), 4(a)(2)(A), 4(a)(2)(D), 4(b)(2), 4(e)(2)(C), 4(f), 4(g), 4(h), 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 reference communications interception, spectrum impact, and electronic systems, indicating growth in cybersecurity needs for counter-UAS technology.
Section 3(b)(2)(D) requires coordination with the Federal Communications Commission to ensure counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, which benefits surface transportation logistics firms (e.g., Union Pacific, UPS) that rely on uninterrupted communications and GPS for freight rail and trucking operations.
The bill requires consultation with the FCC or NTIA to ensure counter-UAS systems do not adversely impact civilian telecommunications, communications spectrum, internet technology, or radio communications networks (Section 3(b)(4)(C)). This implies potential restrictions or compliance burdens on telecommunications companies if their systems are deemed to cause interference, representing a regulatory cost.
The bill mandates development, testing, evaluation, and deployment of counter-UAS detection and mitigation systems, equipment, and technology (Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7). This will likely increase demand for semiconductors and hardware components used in radar, RF sensors, electronic warfare, and computing systems, benefiting semiconductor manufacturers.
+ 6 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 139 — Department of Homeland Security also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel. The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community. A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval. The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time. Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments. CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP. The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000. — 140 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise OT’s function is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart. Combin- ing OT with OFO would achieve streamlined operations and increase OT’s capacity and capability by leveraging OFO’s expansive resources. CBP, ICE, and USCIS all have authority to issue Notices to Appear (NTA) to removable aliens in their presence, which begins removal proceedings. In most instances, CBP should turn illegal aliens over to ICE for detention, and ICE can then issue any needed NTA. CBP should issue NTAs only in limited situations for humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition, CBP should eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR) altogether. CBP’s established national standards of Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) have been widely interpreted and expanded by lower courts. This has resulted in unrealistic and differing detention standards for CBP facilities based on the jurisdiction within which they fall, negatively impacting operations. ICE has suffered similarly. A single nationwide detention standard should be codified that prevents individual states from mandating that federal government agencies adhere to widely expansive and ever-changing sets of standards. Such standards should allow the flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents. The annual costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary facil- ities to address the flow of illegal migration and associated care, transportation, and processing are prohibitive, and CBP’s budget is inadequate. CBP is forced to forgo critical mission-essential endeavors to fund the additional associated costs. Often, this requires the reprogramming of funding at the DHS level, which has a negative impact on other DHS components’ operations. This predictable cost that has to be paid from existing CBP and DHS funding levels reduces CBP’s operational readiness and ability to accomplish its diverse and critical missions to protect the American people. The next President should request a realistic budget that fully pays for these costs. Increased funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel, which would relieve uniformed BP agents from administrative duties associated with processing aliens and allow them to return to their national security mission. Congress should increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports of Entry (POEs), including expanding state-of-the-art technology such as Non-Intru- sive Inspection equipment. Today, the cartels exploit the aging facilities and lack of adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and more successfully through our nation’s POEs. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) Needed Reforms Since the formation of DHS, ICE has increasingly been tasked with auxiliary missions that have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.