The bill
SEED Act of 2025
HR. 4171, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
Sponsored by
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
ID: G000597
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 4171, 119th Congress — read as touching Investment Banking & Securities.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 872-874 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 492.
March 24, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the intellectually bankrupt inhabitants of Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The SEED Act of 2025 is a blatant attempt to further deregulate the securities market, under the guise of "empowering small entrepreneurs." Because, you know, what could possibly go wrong when you reduce transparency and oversight in financial transactions? It's not like we've seen this movie before, with disastrous consequences. The real purpose, of course, is to line the pockets of lobbyists and their corporate masters.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a "micro-offering exemption" for small issuers, allowing them to raise up to $500,000 without mandated disclosures or offering filings. Because who needs transparency when dealing with investors' hard-earned cash? The exemption is subject to antifraud provisions, but let's be real, those are about as effective as a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The bill also adjusts the dollar amount every five years for inflation, because the politicians want to make sure they can keep up with the ever-increasing cost of their own corruption.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Small issuers, investors, and the usual suspects: lobbyists, corporate interests, and the politicians who serve them. Oh, and let's not forget the SEC, which will have to deal with the fallout when this house of cards inevitably collapses.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a recipe for disaster, a ticking time bomb of financial instability. By reducing oversight and transparency, it invites fraud, abuse, and reckless behavior. Investors will be left holding the bag, while the politicians and their corporate friends reap the benefits. It's a classic case of "privatize profits, socialize risks." The potential impact? A mini-Enron, or perhaps a full-blown financial crisis. But hey, who needs regulation when you have campaign contributions and lobbying dollars?
In conclusion, the SEED Act of 2025 is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money in politics, coupled with the staggering incompetence of our elected officials. It's a bill that should be titled "The Get Rich Quick Scheme for Corporate Interests and Their Politician Pawns." Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this train wreck unfold.
Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 53 nodes and 22 connections (58 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $68,000
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
Section 2(f) creates a micro-offering exemption for securities offerings up to $500,000, reducing regulatory burden and facilitating capital raising for small issuers, which benefits investment banks and securities firms that underwrite such offerings.
The exemption allows private placements and small offerings without mandated disclosures, which could increase deal flow for private equity and hedge funds investing in early-stage or small companies.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The SEED Act directly creates a micro-offering exemption for small issuers, which aligns with Project 2025's focus on reforming securities disclosure to improve entrepreneurs' access to capital and foster economic growth."
— 840 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 5480, Securities Act of 1933, Public Law No. 73-22, 73rd Congress, May 27, 1933, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg74.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 2. H.R. 9323, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Public Law No. 73-291, 73rd Congress, June 6, 1934, https:// govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/48/STATUTE-48-Pg881a.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 3. Mark T. Uyeda, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation,” November 17, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/uyeda-remarks- cato-summit-financial-regulation-111722 (accessed February 20, 2023); Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute,” December 7, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-remarks-american-enterprise-institute-120722 (accessed February 20, 2023); comment letter from David R. Burton to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, “Re: The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors [File No. S7-10-2; Release No. 33-11042; RIN 3235-AM87],” June 17, 2022, https://www. sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131980-302443.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 4. Size would probably be measured best by public float or the number of beneficial owners. 5. See David R. Burton, “Securities Disclosure Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3178, February 13, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3178.pdf; David R. Burton, “Offering and Disclosure Reform,” Chapter 11 in Reframing Financial Regulation: Enhancing Stability and Protecting Consumers, ed. Hester Peirce and Benjamin Klutsey (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016), pp. 277–315, https://www.mercatus.org/research/books/reframing-financial-regulation (accessed February 20, 2023); Andrew N. Vollmer, “Investor-Friendly Securities Reform to Increase Economic Growth,” Securities Regulation & Law Report, Bloomberg BNA, Vol. 49, June 5, 2017. 6. See, for example, David R. Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3378, January 30, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-01/ BG3378.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Testimony on Workforce Management Disclosures and Other SEC Issues,” submitted to the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, December 6, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/ meeting/house/115227/witnesses/HHRG-117-BA16-Wstate-VollmerA-20221208.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Reforming FINRA,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3181, February 1, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3181.pdf; Hester Peirce, “The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority: Not Self-Regulation After All,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, January 2015, https://www.mercatus.org/research/working-papers/financial-industry-regulatory- authority-not-self-regulation-after-all (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Transparency and Accountability at the SEC and at FINRA,” Chapter 11 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, ed. Norbert J. Michel, (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2017) https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2017-02/11_ProsperityUnleashed_Chapter11.pdf. 7. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, U.S. Code Title 5—Appendix, Reorganization Plans, http://uscode.house. gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title5a-node84-leaf114&num=0&edition=prelim (accessed February 20, 2023). 8. The board or commission should evaluate the regulatory functions of the National Securities Exchanges, Registered Securities Future Product Exchanges, Registered Clearing Agencies (such as the Depository Trust Company (DTC), the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) and the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC)), the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Futures Association (NFA). This board or commission should have a broad composition and permit minority reports. 9. Boyden Gray & Associates, Comments Submitted on Behalf of Alliance for Fair Board Recruitment Concerning the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Adopt Listing Rules Related to Board Diversity, Amendment No. 1, File No. SR-NASDAQ-2020-081, April 6, 2021 https://www.sec.gov/ comments/sr-nasdaq-2020-081/srnasdaq2020081-8639478-230941.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Nasdaq’s Proposed Board-Diversity Rule Is Immoral and Has No Basis in Economics,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3591, March 9, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-03/BG3591_0.pdf. The SEC is contemplating at least two rules that can be expected to require differential treatment based on race, sex, ethnicity, and so on. See Executive Office of the President, Office — 841 — Financial Regulatory Agencies of Management and Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Fall 2022 Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions: Active Regulatory Actions Listed by Agency,” https://www.reginfo.gov/ public/do/eAgendaMain (accessed February 20, 2023); “Human Capital Management Disclosure,” RIN: 3235- AM88, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AM88 (accessed February 20, 2023); “Corporate Board Diversity,” RIN: 3235-AL91, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/ eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AL91 (accessed February 20, 2023). 10. 15 U.S. Code § 77z–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77z-3 (accessed February 20, 2023); 15 U.S. Code § 78mm, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78mm (accessed February 20, 2023). 11. S. ___, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2022, discussion draft, 117th Congress, 2nd Session, https:// www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0discussiondraft.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Entrepreneurial Capital Formation,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 5, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/testimony/entrepreneurial- capital-formation; “Removing Barriers to Small Business Capital Formation and Expanding Investor Opportunities,” Section 6 in Nicholas Anthony, Norbert J. Michel, Jennifer J. Schulp, George Selgin, and Jack Solowey, “Sound Financial Policy: Principled Recommendations for the 118th Congress,” ed. Norbert J. Michel and Ann Rulon, Cato Institute, 2022, pp. 22–27, https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-10/sound- financial-policy-118th-congress.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton and Norbert J. Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, Submission to Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, March 18, 2021, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David%20 Burton%20and%20Norbert%20Michel%20-%202021-3-18.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3182, February 14, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3182.pdf. 12. The small issues exemptive authority has been in the Securities Act since its initial enactment. 13. The crowdfunding exemption was created by Title III of the 2012 JOBS Act. See H.R. 3606, Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Public Law No. 112-106, 112th Congress, April 5, 2021, Title III, § 302, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-112publ106/pdf/PLAW-112publ106.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 14. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws,” Chapter 6 in Prosperity Unleashed: Smarter Financial Regulation, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/06_ProsperityUnleashed_ Chapter06.pdf. 15. Andrew N. Vollmer, “Abandon the Concept of Accredited Investors in Private Securities Offerings,” Securities Regulation Law Journal, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Spring 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3719280 (accessed February 20, 2023); Thaya Brook Knight, “Your Money’s No Good Here: How Restrictions on Private Securities Offerings Harm Investors,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 833, February 9, 2018, https:// www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa833.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David R. Burton, “Congress Should Increase Access to Private Securities Offerings,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4899, August 29, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IB4899.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Evidence on the Use of Disclosure Documents in Private Securities Offerings to Accredited Investors,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Working Paper, October 22, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/publications/financial-regulation/ evidence-use-disclosure-documents-private-securities-offerings-0 (accessed February 20, 2023). 16. For a detailed discussion, see “Micro-Offerings,” Section IId in Burton and Michel, Proposals to Foster Economic Growth and Capital Formation, pp. 15–17. 17. David R. Burton, “Let Entrepreneurs Raise Capital Using Finders and Private Placement Brokers,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3328, July 10, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-07/ BG3328.pdf; Andrew N. Vollmer, “Make It Easy for Startups to Sell Stock,” Mercatus Center at George Mason University Discourse, September 21, 2020, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/make-it-easy- startups-sell-stock (accessed February 20, 2023). 18. See H.R. 531, S-Corp Access to Crowdfunding Act, 115th Congress, introduced January 13, 2017, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-115hr531ih/pdf/BILLS-115hr531ih.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023); David Burton, “The Tax Law Makes It Almost Impossible for ‘S Corporations’ to Use Equity Crowdfunding,” The Daily Signal, April 19, 2016, https://www.dailysignal.com/2016/04/19/the-tax-law-makes-it-almost-impossible-for- s-corporations-to-use-equity-crowdfunding/.
AI Analysis:
"The SEED Act directly creates a micro-offering exemption for small issuers, which mirrors Project 2025’s explicit call to exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements and to reduce regulatory impediments to entrepreneurial capital formation."
— 830 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Three basic categories of firm: private firms, an intermediate category of smaller firms,4 and public firms; l Reasonable, scaled disclosure requirements; and l Specified secondary markets for the securities of these firms.5 The SEC needs to be reformed to achieve its important core functions more effectively, to improve transparency and due process, and to reduce unnecessary regulatory impediments to capital formation.6 Under current law, the SEC Chair- man has the authority to make almost all of the necessary changes.7 Unfortunately, financial regulators, particularly the SEC and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), are poorly managed and organized. With regulatory authority delegated by the government, both the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and FINRA have proved to be ineffective, costly, opaque, and largely impervious to reform. To reduce costs and improve transparency, due process, congressional oversight, and responsiveness, PCAOB and FINRA should be abolished, and their regulatory functions should be merged into the SEC. Furthermore, Congress should establish an indepen- dent board or commission and charge it with producing a detailed report within 18 months that examines the degree to which the regulatory functions of the var- ious other so-called self-regulatory organizations (SROs), which are no longer self-regulatory in any meaningful sense, should be moved to the SEC.8 Discrimination based on immutable characteristics has no place in financial regulation. Offices at financial regulators that promote racist policies (usually in the name of “diversity, equity, and inclusion”) should be abolished, and regulations that require appointments on the basis of race, ethnicity, sex, or sexual orientation should be eliminated. Equal protection of the law, equal opportunity, and individ- ual merit should govern regulatory decisions.9 Congress has given the SEC broad “general exemptive authority,”10 but the SEC has used this authority only rarely. It should use this authority significantly more often to reduce the regulatory burden on issuers, particularly smaller entrepreneurs. ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPITAL FORMATION Financial regulators should remove regulatory impediments to entrepreneur- ial capital formation.11 In the absence of the fundamental reform outlined above, the SEC should: l Simplify and streamline Regulation A (the small issues exemption)12 and Regulation CF (crowdfunding)13 and preempt blue sky registration and quali- fication requirements for all primary and secondary Regulation A offerings.14 — 831 — Financial Regulatory Agencies l Either democratize access to private offerings by broadening the definition of accredited investor for purposes of Regulation D or eliminate the accredited investor restriction altogether.15 l Allow traditional self-certification of accredited investor status for all Regulation D Rule 506 offerings. l Exempt small micro-offerings from registration requirements.16 l Exempt small and intermittent finders from broker–dealer registration requirements and provide a simplified registration process for private placement brokers.17 l Exempt peer-to-peer lending from federal and state securities laws and reduce the regulatory burden on Regulation CF debt securities. l Make the Title I Emerging Growth Company (EGC) exemptions permanent for all EGCs. l Reduce the regulatory burden on small broker–dealers and exempt privately held, non-custodial broker–dealers from the requirements to use a PCAOB- registered firm for their audits. Congress should: l Amend the Internal Revenue Code to disregard crowdfunding and Regulation A shareholders for purposes of the 100-shareholder limit for Subchapter S corporations.18 BETTER CAPITAL MARKETS To improve capital markets, the SEC should: l Preempt blue sky registration, qualification, and continuing reporting requirements for securities traded on established securities markets (including a national securities exchange or an alternative trading system).19 l Terminate the Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT) program.20 l Abolish Rule 144 and other regulations that restrict securities resales and instead require a company that has sold securities to provide sufficient current informa- tion to the market to permit reasonable investment decisions and secondary sales.
AI Analysis:
"The SEED Act directly enacts the Project 2025 policy goal of reducing SEC-imposed impediments to capital formation by creating a simplified micro-offering exemption that lowers disclosure and filing costs for small issuers."
— 827 — Section 5: Independent Regulatory Agencies with government.” Under the Biden FTC, he writes, firms try “to get out of anti- trust liability by offering climate, diversity, or other forms of ESG-type offerings.” Candeub says that state AGs “are far more responsive to their constituents” than the federal government generally is, and he recommends that the FTC establish a position in the chairman’s office that is “focused on state AG cooperation and inviting state AGs to Washington, DC, to discuss enforcement policy in key sectors under the FTC’s jurisdiction: Big Tech, hospital mergers, supermarket mergers, and so forth.” — 829 — 27 FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND RELATED AGENCIES David R. Burton The primary purposes of the laws and regulations governing capital markets and of capital market regulators are to deter and punish fraud and other material misstatements to investors; foster reasonable, scaled disclosure of information that is material to investors’ financial outcomes and proxy voting decisions; and maintain fair, orderly, and efficient secondary capital markets. The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19342 reflect nearly nine decades of rushed and haphazard amendments. The securities laws are now extremely complex and do not constitute a coherent, rational regulatory regime. For example, the current SEC has proposed a climate change reporting rule that would quadruple the costs of being a public company.3 This would have a substantial adverse impact on existing companies. Over time, it would also sub- stantially reduce the number of public companies and therefore the number of investing options available to ordinary Americans. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should be reducing impediments to capital formation, not rad- ically increasing them. The SEC and Congress should fundamentally reform the securities laws gov- erning issuers, broker–dealers, exchanges, and other market participants. Among other things, they should establish a simplified and rationalized securities disclo- sure system with:
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.