The bill
EBSA Investigations Transparency Act
HR. 2869, 119th Congress — read as touching Health Insurance.
Sponsored by
Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
ID: M001136
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2869, 119th Congress — read as touching Health Insurance.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
26 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Small Business Administration" section, p. 792-794 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 418.
February 9, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The EBSA Investigations Transparency Act (HR 2869) claims to promote transparency by requiring the Employee Benefit Security Administration (EBSA) to submit an annual report to Congress on its investigations. How noble. In reality, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound, designed to create the illusion of accountability while maintaining the status quo.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends Section 504 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 by adding a new subsection (f), which mandates an annual report on EBSA's investigations. The report must include information on active cases, investigations that are "in enforcement status," and those where the Secretary asserted investigative authority or engaged in targeted compliance monitoring.
Oh, wow. This is going to revolutionize transparency. Not. The report will exclude any information identifying private parties involved in the investigation, because God forbid we actually hold anyone accountable. And, of course, the report will only be submitted annually, giving EBSA plenty of time to sweep its dirty laundry under the rug.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are affected: plan sponsors, fiduciaries, service providers, employees, and participants. But let's not forget the real stakeholders – the politicians who sponsored this bill (Mrs. McClain, Mr. Walberg, and Mr. Owens) and their donors. This bill is a love letter to the financial industry, which will continue to reap benefits from lax oversight.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact of this bill will be negligible. It's a paper tiger designed to placate voters while maintaining business as usual. The real implications are:
1. Continued lack of accountability: EBSA will still have the freedom to drag its feet on investigations, and the annual report will only provide a snapshot of cases in progress. 2. Increased bureaucratic red tape: This bill creates more paperwork for EBSA, which will likely lead to increased costs and inefficiencies. 3. More opportunities for corruption: By excluding private party information from the report, this bill provides a convenient loophole for corrupt actors to hide behind.
In conclusion, HR 2869 is a classic case of legislative malpractice. It's a shallow attempt to address transparency concerns while maintaining the underlying disease – a corrupt system that prioritizes special interests over accountability and justice.
Rep. McClain, Lisa C. [R-MI-9]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 3 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: W000798
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Total contributions: $121,800
Showing top 22 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2 of the bill amends the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to require the Employee Benefit Security Administration to make an annual report on investigations, which may increase regulatory scrutiny and compliance costs for health insurance companies that offer employee benefits.
The bill's requirement for annual reports on investigations may also affect private equity and hedge funds that manage or invest in employee benefit plans, potentially increasing their regulatory burden and compliance costs.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill seeks to increase transparency and accountability in EBSA investigations, which shares a general theme of oversight and fraud prevention with the Project 2025 SBA section, but it does not address SBA programs, duplicative functions, or resource reallocation."
— 759 — Small Business Administration ineffective programs, consolidate duplicative functions, and reallocate resources to more effective programs (such as the Office of Advocacy) or consider reducing the SBA budget. Personnel Challenges The SBA continues to expand programs and initiatives without first document- ing the effectiveness of existing programs or whether they involve areas in which the agency lacks staff expertise. For example, the SBA wants to expand the number of licensed Small Business Lending Companies (SBLCs), implement a new “Mis- sion-Based SBLC,” and remove a requirement for loan authorization within the 7(a) and 504 Loan programs and rely solely on a lender’s documents. Various IG reports have noted that the lack of skilled employees within the SBA has fueled fraud and mismanagement in COVID-19 lending programs, and congressional leaders have expressed alarm about these “changes that haphazardly overextend the SBA’s responsibilities at a time when they are devastated by fraud and underperforming on their core mission of serving the nation’s 33 million small businesses.”74 A conservative Administration should rein in these idealistic and impractical efforts, get current programs under control and properly staffed with people who can manage and perform competently, and outsource efforts where private-sector expertise is appropriate and more efficient. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but David Burton and Caleb Orr deserve special mention. The author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual. — 760 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. H.R. 7953, Small Business Act, Public Law 85-536, 85th Congress, July 18, 1958, § 2, https://uscode.ecfr.io/ statutes/pl/85/536.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), amended by H.R. 4877, One Stop Shop for Small Business Compliance Act of 2021, Public Law 117-188, 117th Congress, October 20, 2022, https://www.congress. gov/117/plaws/publ188/PLAW-117publ188.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 2. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: Mission,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 3. Michael Faulkender, Robert Jackman, and Stephen I. Miran, “The Job-Preservation Effects of Paycheck Protection Program Loans,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, Working Paper No. 2020-01, December 2020, p. 9, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/226/Job-Preservation-Effects- Paycheck-Protection-Program-Loans.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 4. Kate Rogers, Scott Zamost, Karina Hernandez, and Jennifer Schlesinger, “As Pandemic Aid Was Rushed to Main Street, Criminals Seized on Covid Relief Programs,” CNBC, April 15, 2021, https://www.cnbc. com/2021/04/15/as-pandemic-aid-was-rushed-to-main-street-criminals-seized-on-ppp-eidl-.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 5. Kevin Brewer, “Bills Extend Statute of Limitation for Prosecuting PPP, EIDL Fraud,” Journal of Accountancy, August 10, 2022, https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2022/aug/bills-extend-statute-limitation- prosecuting-ppp-eidl-fraud.html (accessed February 16, 2023). 6. Sacha Pfeiffer, “Virtually All PPP Loans Have Been Forgiven with Limited Scrutiny,” NPR, October 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/10/12/1128207464/ppp-loans-loan-forgiveness-small-business#:~:text=As%20 COVID-19%20shutdowns%20threatened,early%20days%20of%20the%20pandemic (accessed February 16, 2023). 7. U.S. Small Business Administration, “About SBA: Organization: SBA History,” https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/ organization (accessed February 19, 2023). 8. President Richard Nixon, Executive Order 11518, “Providing for the Increased Representation of the Interests of Small Business Concerns Before Departments and Agencies of the United States Government,” March 20, 1970, in Federal Register, Vol. 35, No. 56 (March 21, 1970), pp. 4939–4940, https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/ service/ll/fedreg/fr035/fr035056/fr035056.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 9. S. 3331, Small Business Amendments of 1974, Public Law 93-386, 93rd Congress, August 23, 1974, https://www. congress.gov/93/statute/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg742.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 10. S. 299, Regulatory Flexibility Act, Public Law No. 96-354, 96th Congress, September 19, 1980, https://www. congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-94/STATUTE-94-Pg1164.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 11. Maeve P. Carey, “The Regulatory Flex Act: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11900, August 16, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11900 (accessed February 18, 2023). 12. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “The Regulatory Flexibility Act,” https://advocacy.sba. gov/resources/the-regulatory-flexibility-act/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 13. H.R. 644, Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Public Law No. 114-125, 114th Congress, February 24, 2026, https://www.congress.gov/114/statute/STATUTE-130/STATUTE-130-Pg122.pdf (accessed March 21, 2023). 14. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy, “Advocacy Releases Trade Report,” December 21, 2018, https://advocacy.sba.gov/2018/12/21/advocacy-releases-trade-report/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 15. Associated Press, “Reagan Offers $994-Billion ‘Hard-Choices’ 1987 Budget,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1986, http://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-02-05-mn-4369-story.html (accessed February 18, 2023). 16. Testimony of Hon. Hector V. Barreto, Administrator, Small Business Administration, in hearing, The President’s FY 2006 Budget Request for the Small Business Administration, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, February 17, 2005, p. 8, https://books.google.com/ books?id=UwD-2ICa8k8C&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 18, 2023). See also Report No. 109-49, Summary of Legislative and Oversight Activities During the 108th Congress, Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, U.S. Senate, 109th Congress, 1st Session, March 30, 2005, p. 21, https://www.congress.gov/109/crpt/srpt49/CRPT-109srpt49.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 SBA section emphasize federal agency oversight and transparency, but they address different agencies (EBSA vs. SBA) and distinct policy areas (employee benefit plan investigations vs. small business lending and innovation programs)."
— 763 — Small Business Administration 40. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Inspector General, Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Small Business Administration in Fiscal Year 2023, p. iv. 41. H.R. 748, CARES (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security) Act, Public Law No. 116-136, 116th Congress, March 27, 2020, https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ136/PLAW-116publ136.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 42. Sarah McCammon, “Planned Parenthood Asked to Return Funds from Paycheck Protection Program,” NPR, May 21, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/21/859991359/planned-parenthood-asked-to-return-funds- from-paycheck-protection-program (accessed February 18, 2023). 43. Letter from William Manger, Associate Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration, to Laura Meyers, Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, “Re: Notice of Investigation and Request for Records,” May 19, 2020, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6922122/SBA-Letter-Planned-Parenthood-DC.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 44. Press release, “Lankford, HSGAC Republicans Demand Details on Illegal PPP Loans to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator James Lankford, April 28, 2022, https://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press- releases/lankford-hsgac-republicans-demand-details-on-illegal-ppp-loans-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates (accessed February 18, 2023). 45. Press release, “Romney, Colleagues Request Information from SBA Administrator Guzman on Illegal PPP Loans Given to Planned Parenthood Affiliates,” Office of U.S. Senator Mitt Romney, April 28, 2022, https:// www.romney.senate.gov/romney-colleagues-request-information-from-sba-administrator-guzman-on- illegal-ppp-loans-given-to-planned-parenthood-affiliates/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 46. 13 C.F.R. §§ 109.400(b)(11), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/109.400; 123.301(g), https://www.law. cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.301; 123.502(n), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.502; and 123.702(b)(6), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/123.702 (all accessed February 19, 2023). 47. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Religious Eligibility Worksheet for all 7(a) and 504 Loan Programs” SBA Form 1971, http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-11/sba-form-1971.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 48. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 49. See, for example, Carson v. Makin, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/21pdf/20-1088_dbfi.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 50. 28 U.S. Code § 530d, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/530D (accessed February 19, 2023). 51. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Ensuring Equal Treatment for Faith-Based Organizations in SBA’s Loan and Disaster Assistance Program.” 52. 13 CFR 120.110(k), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/13/120.110 (accessed February 19, 2023). 53. U.S. Small Business Administration, “Regulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504 Loan Programs to Reduce Regulatory Burden,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 125 (June 30, 2022), pp. 38900–38910, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/30/2022-13483/ regulatory-reform-initiative-streamlining-and-modernizing-the-7a-microloan-and-504-loan-programs-to (accessed February 18, 2023). 54. Ibid. 55. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel “Religious Restrictions on Capital Financing for Historically Black Colleges and Universities,” Memorandum Opinion for the Acting General Counsel, Department of Education, August 15, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/ attachments/2021/01/01/2019-08-15-hbcu-capfin-2.pdf. (accessed February 18, 2023). 56. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, p. 8, https://www.sbir.gov/sites/default/files/SBA_Final_FY19_SBIR_STTR_Annual_Report.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 57. S. 4900, SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022, Public Law No. 117–183, 117th Congress, September 30, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ183/PLAW-117publ183.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 58. U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Investment and Innovation, SBIR and STTR Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2019, pp. 6, 40, and 108. — 764 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 59. Peter L. Singer, “Federally Supported Innovations: 22 Examples of Major Technology Advances that Stem from Federal Support,” Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, February 2014, https://wrnjradio.com/ bipartisan-call-to-crack-down-on-covid-19-ppp-eidl-fraud-prosecute-fraudsters-to-the-fullest-extent-of-the- law/ (accessed March 21, 2023). 60. Wells King, “Uncle Sam’s Top-Performing Venture Fund,” American Compass Case Study, November 2022, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AC-Case-Study_SBIR_final2.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 61. Elisabeth B. Reynolds, Hiram M. Samel, and Joyce Lawrence, “Learning by Building: Complementary Assets and the Migration of Capabilities in U.S. Innovative Firms,” MIT Industrial Performance Center Working Paper No. MIT-IPC-13-001, March 2013, https://ipc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2019-01/13-001.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 62. American Compass, “Where’s The Growth? Assessing the Results of the Globalization Experiment,” March 2022, pp. 3–5, https://americancompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/AC-Atlas-Wheres-the-Growth.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 63. Sridhar Kota and Tom Mahoney, “Innovation Should Be Made in the U.S.A.,” The Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/innovation-should-be-made-in-the-u-s-a-11573833987 (accessed February 18, 2023). 64. S. ___, SBA Reauthorization and Improvement Act of 2019, 116th Congress, 1st Session, Title III, § 303, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/80533629-2905-433f-a588-7c4e032f7347/ C096ED9C1EBA68E041CFDA143E01C66C.mir19891.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 65. David Adler, “Financing Advanced Manufacturing: Why VCs Aren’t the Answer,” American Affairs, Vol. III, No. 2 (Summer 2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/05/financing-advanced-manufacturing-why-vcs- arent-the-answer/ (accessed February 18, 2023). 66. National Association of Manufacturers, “Overview of the Senate HEALS Act,” July 28, 2020, https://documents. nam.org/comm/HEALSActInfo.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). See also remarks by Senator Mitch McConnell, “HEALS Act,” Congressional Record, Vol. 166, No. 132 (July 27, 2020), pp. S4491–S4492, https:// www.congress.gov/116/crec/2020/07/27/CREC-2020-07-27-pt1-PgS4491-7.pdf (accessed February 20, 2023). 67. S. 1059, American Innovation and Manufacturing Act, 117th Congress, introduced March 25, 2021, https:// www.crfb.org/blogs/whats-11-trillion-heals-act https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/s1059/BILLS-117s1059is.pdf (accessed February 18, 2023). 68. H.R. 7628, IMPROVE (Improve Management, Programs, Resources, and Oversight for Vital Entrepreneurs) the SBA Act, 117th Congress, introduced April 28, 2022, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr7628/BILLS- 117hr7628ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 69. S. 1120, Small Business Regulatory Flexibility Improvements Act, 116th Congress, introduced April 10, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1120/BILLS-116s1120is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 70. H.R. 3136, Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-121, 104th Congress, March 29, 1996, Title II, https://www.congress.gov/104/plaws/publ121/PLAW-104publ121.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 71. S. 403, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www. congress.gov/117/bills/s403/BILLS-117s403is.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023), and H.R. 1284, Fair and Open Competition Act, 117th Congress, introduced February 24, 2021, https://www.congress.gov/117/bills/hr1284/ BILLS-117hr1284ih.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023. 72. President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Executive Order 14063, “Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal Construction Projects,” February 4, 2022, in Federal Register, Vol. 87, No. 27 (February 9, 2022), pp. 7363–7366, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2022-02-09/pdf/2022-02869.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 73. “The JOBS Act 4.0: Section-by-Section,” Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/the_jobs_act_4.0sectionbysection.pdf (accessed February 19, 2023). 74. Press release, “Luetkeymeyer: SBA Lacks Infrastructure and Expertise to Expand Number of Small Business Lending Companies,” Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, November 7, 2022, https:// smallbusiness.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=404376 (accessed February 18, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill addresses transparency of Employee Benefit Security Administration investigations, while the Project 2025 EPA section focuses on reforming EPA advisory bodies, science activities, hiring practices, and laboratory structure; there is no substantive policy overlap between the two."
— 437 — Environmental Protection Agency l Suspend and review the activities of EPA advisory bodies, many of which have not been authorized by Congress or lack independence, balance, and geographic and viewpoint diversity. l Retract delegations for key science and risk-assessment decisions from Assistant Administrators, regional offices, and career officials. l Eliminate the use of Title 42 hiring authority that allows ORD to spend millions in taxpayer dollars for salaries of certain employees above the civil service scale. l Announce plans to streamline and reform EPA’s poorly coordinated and managed laboratory structure. Budget: Back-to-Basics Rejection of Unauthorized or Expired Science Activities A top priority should be the immediate and consistent rejection of all EPA ORD and science activities that have not been authorized by Congress. In FY 2022, according to EPA’s opaque budgeting efforts, science and technology activ- ities totaled nearly $730 million. EPA’s FY 2023 budget request for the Office of Research and Development seeks funds for more than 1,850 employees—a dramatic increase for what is already the largest EPA office with well above 10 percent of the agency’s workforce.44 ORD conducts a wide-ranging series of science and peer review activities, some in support of regulatory programs established by our envi- ronmental laws, but often lacks authority for these specific endeavors. Several ORD offices and programs, many of which constitute unaccountable efforts to use scientific determinations to drive regulatory, enforcement, and legal decisions, should be eliminated. The Integrated Risk Information System, for example, was ostensibly designed by EPA to evaluate hazard and dose-response for certain chemicals. Despite operating since the 1980s, the program has never been authorized by Congress and often sets “safe levels” based on questionable science and below background levels, resulting in billions in economic costs. The program has been criticized by a wide variety of stakeholders: states; Congress; the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM); and the U.S. Govern- ment Accountability Office (GAO), among others. EPA has failed to implement meaningful reforms, and this unaccountable program threatens key regulatory processes as well as the integrity of Clean Air Act and TSCA implementation. Needed EPA Advisory Body Reforms EPA currently operates 21 federal advisory committees.45 These committees often play an outsized role in determining agency scientific and regulatory policy, — 438 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and their membership has too often been handpicked to achieve certain politi- cal positions. In the Biden Administration, key EPA advisory committees were purged of balanced perspectives, geographic diversity, important regulatory and private-sector experience, and state, local, and tribal expertise. Contrary to con- gressional directives and recommendations from the GAO and intergovernmental associations, these moves eviscerated historic levels of participation on key com- mittees by state, local, and tribal members from 2017 to 2020. As a result, a variety of EPA regulations lack relevant scientific perspectives, increasing the risks of economic fallout and a failure of cooperative federalism. EPA also has repeatedly disregarded legal requirements regarding the role of these advisory committees and the scope of scientific advice on key regulations.46 Needed Science Policy Reforms Instead of allowing these efforts to be misused for scaremongering risk com- munications and enforcement activities, EPA should embrace so-called citizen science and deputize the public to subject the agency’s science to greater scrutiny, especially in areas of data analysis, identification of scientific flaws, and research misconduct. In addition, EPA should: l Shift responsibility for evaluating misconduct away from its Office of Scientific Integrity, which has been overseen by environmental activists, and toward an independent body. l Work (including with Congress) to provide incentives similar to those under the False Claims Act47 for the public to identify scientific flaws and research misconduct, thereby saving taxpayers from having to bear the costs involved in expending unnecessary resources. l Avoid proprietary, black box models for key regulations. Nearly all major EPA regulations are based on nontransparent models for which the public lacks access or for which significant costs prevent the public from understanding agency analysis. l Reject precautionary default models and uncertainty factors. In the face of uncertainty around associations between certain pollutants and health or welfare endpoints, EPA’s heavy reliance on default assumptions like its low-dose, linear non-threshold model bake orders of magnitude of risk into key regulatory inputs and drive flawed and opaque decisions. Given the disproportionate economic impacts of top-down solutions, EPA should implement an approach that defaults to less restrictive regulatory outcomes.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.