The bill
AI PLAN Act
HR. 2152, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
ID: N000193
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2152, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "22" section, p. 727-729 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 615.
June 23, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the geniuses in Congress. The AI PLAN Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let's dissect this farce and uncover the real disease beneath the symptoms.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill claims to address the "significant risk" posed by artificial intelligence in financial crimes, because apparently, our lawmakers just discovered that AI exists. The main objective is to create a strategy to defend against these risks, which will undoubtedly involve more bureaucratic red tape and pointless reports.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretaries of Treasury, Homeland Security, and Commerce to submit annual reports on their plans to combat AI-driven financial crimes. These reports will include descriptions of interagency policies, public-private partnerships, and resources needed to fight these crimes. Oh, and they'll also provide recommendations for legislative changes, because Congress clearly needs more excuses to do nothing.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects: government agencies, private businesses, and the occasional innocent bystander who will be caught in the crossfire of bureaucratic incompetence. The bill mentions a laundry list of officials who will be involved in this farce, from the Attorney General to the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. It's a veritable who's who of people who will pretend to care about AI-driven financial crimes until the next election cycle.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The impact will be negligible, as this bill is merely a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real implication is that Congress will continue to waste time and resources on feel-good legislation while the actual problems persist. This bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the inability of our lawmakers to address complex issues in a meaningful way. It's a classic case of "legislative placebo effect," where they pretend to take action, but ultimately do nothing to cure the underlying illness.
In conclusion, the AI PLAN Act is a masterclass in political theater, designed to make it seem like Congress is doing something about AI-driven financial crimes without actually doing anything. It's a waste of time, resources, and oxygen. But hey, at least they tried, right? Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this train wreck unfold.
Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: H001047
Top Contributors
21
ID: B001323
Top Contributors
20
ID: M001224
Top Contributors
20
ID: V000138
Top Contributors
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ID: G000583
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ID: G000602
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24
ID: M001237
Top Contributors
26
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 55 nodes and 57 connections
Total contributions: $57
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 2(b)(1)(B) and (C) require identification of hardware, software, technologies, and budgetary estimates to combat AI-enabled financial crimes, which would benefit AI and cloud infrastructure providers through increased demand for their products and services.
Section 2(b)(1)(B) and (C) call for itemized lists of readily available resources, hardware, software, and technologies to combat AI-enabled financial crimes, which would benefit cybersecurity firms by driving demand for their defensive tools and services.
Section 2(b)(2)(A)-(F) identifies risks like deepfakes, voice cloning, and synthetic identities that are often disseminated via big tech platforms, implying potential regulatory scrutiny or compliance burdens on these companies to mitigate AI-generated misinformation and fraud.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Nunn, Zachary [R-IA-3])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The AI PLAN Act aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) by targeting AI-driven financial crimes, promoting interagency coordination, and enhancing defenses against illicit financial use—core TFI missions including money laundering, fraud, and sanctions enforcement."
— 694 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) was created in 2004 as part of the larger reorganization of the U.S. government to promote homeland security following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. TFI is charged with the mission of disrupting international financial support for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and other national security threats. It is also responsible for implementing and enforcing economic sanctions programs and supporting the wider law enforcement commu- nity in investigating financial crimes. It is led by the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. International Affairs protects and supports U.S. economic prosperity and national security by working to foster the most favorable external environment for sustained employment and economic growth in the United States. The most crucial functions of the Office of International Affairs relate to managing the U.S.–China Strategic Dialogue; representing U.S. interests in the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral development banks; and overseeing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS). It is led by the Under Secretary for International Affairs. Tax Policy formulates and develops tax policies and programs and works with Congress to get them passed into law. It reviews and issues regulations drafted by attorneys from the IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel to administer the Internal Reve- nue Code, negotiates tax information exchange agreements with the tax authorities of foreign governments, participates in international tax organizations, and pro- vides economic and legal policy analysis for domestic and international tax policy decisions. This office also provides revenue estimates for the President’s budget. It is led by the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Economic Policy reports on current and prospective economic developments and assists in the determination of appropriate economic policies. This office is responsible for the review and analysis of domestic economic issues and develop- ments in financial markets. The Treasurer of the United States is a statutory office that has been assigned varying duties in recent Administrations. In addition to performing public out- reach, treasurers have at times headed Treasury’s financial education program and overseen the U.S. Mint and Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Four Inspectors General provide independent audits, investigations, and over- sight of Treasury and its programs: The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Treasury; Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration; Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program; and the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery. Treasury Bureaus. Seven Treasury Department bureaus comprise 98 percent of the Treasury work force and are responsible for carrying out specific operations assigned to the department. — 695 — Department of the Treasury The Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau collects federal excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and ammunition, and is responsible for enforcing and administering laws covering the production, use, and distribution of alco- hol products. The Internal Revenue Service is the largest of the department’s bureaus, account- ing for about 85 percent of Treasury’s personnel and about four-fifths of its appropriated budget. It administers and enforces U.S. tax laws. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing develops and produces U.S. currency notes. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is designed to protect the financial system from illicit use. It also administers the beneficial ownership reporting regime mandated by the Corporate Transparency Act.12 The Bureau of the Fiscal Service provides central payment services to federal program agencies, operates the U.S. government’s collections and deposit systems, provides government-wide accounting and reporting services, manages the collec- tion of delinquent debt owed to the U.S. government, borrows the money needed to operate the government through the sale of U.S. Treasury securities (including the state and local government series), and accounts for and services the public debt. The United States Mint designs and mints U.S. circulating and bullion coins. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) charters, regulates, and supervises national banks and federal savings associations (thrifts) to ensure that they operate in a safe and sound manner, provide fair access to financial services, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. The OCC also supervises fed- eral branches and agencies of foreign banks and has rulemaking authority for all savings associations. TAX POLICY Tax policy has a powerful impact on the economy. The Treasury Department should develop and promote tax reform legislation that will promote prosperity. To accomplish this, tax reform should improve incentives to work, save, and invest. This, in turn, is accomplished primarily by reducing marginal tax rates,13 reducing the cost of capital14 and broadening the tax base to eliminate tax-induced economic distortions by eliminating special-interest tax credits, deductions, and exclusions. Tax compliance costs will decline precipitously if the tax system is substantially simplified.15 The Treasury Department should also promote tax competition rather than supporting an international tax cartel. Principles of Good Tax Policy. These are the principles governing good tax policy. l First, the tax system should raise the revenue necessary to fund a limited government for constitutionally appropriate activities. It should raise this revenue such that it: (a) applies the least economically destructive forms of
AI Analysis:
"The AI PLAN Act focuses on combating AI-driven financial crimes through interagency coordination and reporting, which aligns with Project 2025 Treasury's emphasis on financial security and fraud prevention, though it does not directly address the specific reforms like reducing information reporting burdens or withdrawing from international financial institutions outlined in the policy."
— 701 — Department of the Treasury administers these reporting programs, most of this expense is mandated by Con- gress, not the IRS. One of the primary reasons that Congress mandates ever-increasing infor- mation reporting is that the Treasury Department and the Joint Committee on Taxation staff almost always overestimate how much revenue will be gained from still more burdensome information reporting, and they do not estimate or report private compliance costs. Congress and the Treasury Department must undertake a serious review of the information reporting regime and reduce the burden on the public—especially small businesses. Small businesses suffer disproportionately from complexity and administrative burdens. Costs do not increase linearly with size, so elevated administrative costs have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of small firms. Budget. The operating budget of the IRS should be held constant in real terms. The resources allocated to the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate should be increased by at least 20 percent (about $44 million). The Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion should be closed. Provided that IT management is changed; an effective, well-considered implementation plan is adopted; and serious oversight is put in place, additional resources dedicated solely to IT modernization may be warranted. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The Treasury Department should withdraw from Senate consideration the Protocol Amending the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters.48 The protocol will lead to substantially more transnational identity theft, crime, industrial espionage, financial fraud, and suppression of political oppo- nents and religious or ethnic minorities by authoritarian and corrupt governments, including China, Colombia, Nigeria, and Russia. Unlike the original multilateral convention, the amended convention is open to all governments—including many that are either hostile to the United States, have serious corruption problems, or have inadequate privacy protections. The new Administration should also oppose the multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information.49 International organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, and the Inter- national Monetary Fund espouse economic theories and policies that are inimical to American free market and limited government principles. The global elites who operate the IMF regularly advance higher taxes and big centralized government. The IMF has intervened in American policy debates—and has even recommended that the U.S. raise taxes. The IMF’s record of advancing global financial stability has been mixed at best. Its development assistance and lending programs in third- world countries have more often than not retarded growth rather than advancing it. The Treasury Department plays an important role in these international institutions and should force reforms and new policies. The U.S., however, should — 702 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise withdraw from both the World Bank and the IMF and terminate its financial con- tribution to both institutions. If the U.S. is to provide economic assistance or humanitarian aid to other nations, it should do so unilaterally—not through the pass-throughs of international aid orga- nizations, non-governmental organizations, or other nations. These organizations and countries simply create expensive middle-men, while U.S. funds are intercepted before being distributed to those in need. Also, these foreign entities have interests that do not coincide with American national security and economic interests. FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY Treasury should make balancing the federal budget a mission-critical objective. The federal budget absorbs enormous resources from the economy, both in money taken from taxpayers and in money borrowed. The budget should be balanced by driving down federal spending while maintaining a strong national defense and not raising taxes. To reduce interest payments on the debt, Treasury should lock in current rel- atively low interest rates by issuing longer duration bonds, and even consider creating a 50-year treasury bill. Most of the federal debt rolls over on average about every three to four years. But interest rates, even with the latest Federal Reserve rate increases, are still below the 5 percent historical average. Treasury would thus save taxpayers money during the next several decades by issuing fewer short-term notes that will probably have to be rolled over at higher rates in the future. To promote transparency of finances, each year Americans should receive a financial statement of the U.S. government alerting citizens of the revenues, expen- ditures, deficit, and debt for the preceding fiscal year. The statement should also include this individual family’s pro-rata share of the debt based on family size. INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS The Treasury must act more assertively in international financial institutions to protect and advance U.S. national interests—and oppose those that do not. It should employ a carrot-and-stick approach by increasing its activity and commitment to those financial institutions that are willing and able to adjust to this new approach and by zeroing out or potentially exiting those institutions that rely on U.S. capital while advancing agendas that run counter to U.S. interests. l A major emphasis of effecting this change must be the addition of a large new cadre of U.S. professionals and contractors at these international financial institutions. l The U.S. must insist on the hiring and support of this human capital as a condition to future funding.
AI Analysis:
"Both the AI PLAN Act and the Project 2025 Intelligence Community section emphasize interagency coordination, public‑private partnerships, and sharing threat information to defend national security, though the bill focuses on AI‑driven financial crimes while the policy focuses on broader intelligence reform and cyber threat sharing."
— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.