Law Enforcement Support and Counter Transnational Repression Act

Download PDF
Bill ID: 119/hr/2116
Last Updated: July 8, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Follow the money

The bill

Law Enforcement Support and Counter Transnational Repression Act

HR. 2116, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.

The sponsor

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$93,473 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

63% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 254-256 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Ordered to be Reported by Voice Vote.

April 8, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose its true nature.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The bill's title, "Law Enforcement Support and Counter Transnational Repression Act," sounds like a noble endeavor to combat foreign governments' attempts to silence dissidents on American soil. However, upon closer inspection, it's clear that the primary objective is to create a public service announcement campaign – because, you know, what every oppressed individual needs is a catchy slogan and a hotline number.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding a new section (890E) that authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct a public service announcement campaign. This campaign will educate the public on transnational repression, terrorism threats related to it, and how to report suspected acts to the FBI – anonymously, of course, because who needs accountability?

The bill also mandates research and development of technologies to enhance support for law enforcement agencies in countering transnational repression. Because what's a little surveillance state expansion without some shiny new gadgets?

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved:

* The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) gets to expand its reach and justify more funding. * Law enforcement agencies will receive additional resources, which they'll undoubtedly use to further erode civil liberties. * Foreign governments will be "warned" about the consequences of transnational repression – as if a strongly worded public service announcement would deter them. * The American people get to enjoy another round of fear-mongering and propaganda.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of action while doing little to address the root causes of transnational repression. Instead, it:

* Expands the surveillance state under the guise of national security. * Fosters a culture of fear and mistrust among immigrant communities. * Provides a convenient excuse for law enforcement agencies to further infringe upon civil liberties.

In short, this bill is a masterclass in legislative misdirection. It's a cynical attempt to create the appearance of action while serving the interests of those who benefit from a perpetual state of fear and surveillance. Bravo, Congress. You've managed to make a mockery of the very concept of "law enforcement support."

Related Topics

National Security & IntelligenceGovernment Operations & AccountabilityCybersecurity & Data Privacy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$93,473
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$93,473

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WRIGHT, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$6,600
2
WOODWARD, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
3
BERGSTROM, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
4
ERICKSON, GARY
1 transaction
$6,600
5
HASELDEN, BYRON
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HASELDEN, EDDIE
1 transaction
$6,600
7
HASELDEN, MIKE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WAGNER, BRUCE
1 transaction
$5,000
9
DUKE, D. A.
1 transaction
$5,000
10
MCDONALD, BRUCE
1 transaction
$3,868
11
MULVIHILL, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,570
12
TERRY, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,435
13
ANGELO JR, ERNEST
1 transaction
$3,300
14
CADER, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
15
CRANBERG, CATHY
1 transaction
$3,300
16
FROST, EDWIN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HAUDENSCHILD, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
18
LEVENSTAM, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
19
MASSEY, JON G.
1 transaction
$3,300
20
NOVIK, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Pfluger, August [R-TX-11]

ID: P000048

Top Contributors

10

1
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Apr 18, 2024
2
SYCUAN BAND OF THE KUMEYAAY NATION
OrganizationEL CAJON, CA
$3,300
Jun 30, 2023
3
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
OrganizationLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Sep 27, 2024
4
DIMEMMO, COLETTE
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualFORT MYERS, FL
$6,600
Oct 24, 2024
5
PUDWILL, JAMES
IndividualNIPOMO, CA
$6,600
Sep 16, 2024
6
GELBMAN, JOEL
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Sep 16, 2024
7
GELBMAN, JOEL
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualNAPLES, FL
$6,600
Aug 26, 2024
8
PUDWILL, JAMES
RETIREDRETIRED
IndividualNIPOMO, CA
$6,600
Aug 3, 2024
9
WILSON, CELIA R
OIL AND GASSELF-EMPLOYED
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$5,800
Mar 31, 2024
10
WILSON, CELIA R
SELFOIL AND GAS
IndividualMIDLAND, TX
$5,800
Apr 9, 2024

Rep. Magaziner, Seth [D-RI-2]

ID: M001223

Top Contributors

10

1
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
2
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$3,300
May 11, 2023
3
FOREST COUNTY POTAWATOMI COMMUNITY
OrganizationCRANDON, WI
$2,500
Dec 14, 2023
4
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Jun 9, 2023
5
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,650
Apr 30, 2024
6
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 6, 2023
7
POARCH BANK OF CREEK INDIANS
OrganizationATMORE, AL
$1,000
Mar 21, 2024
8
SIPPRELLE, SUSAN M.
SELF-EMPLOYEDFILMMAKER
IndividualMIDDLETOWN, RI
$3,300
Nov 19, 2023
9
LAVINE, JONATHAN
BAIN CAPITALINVESTOR
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023
10
LAVINE, JONATHAN
BAIN CAPITALINVESTOR
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$3,300
Dec 20, 2023

Rep. Gillen, Laura [D-NY-4]

ID: G000602

Top Contributors

10

1
RALLYE MOTORS
OrganizationROSLYN, NY
$6,000
Jul 18, 2023
2
RALLYE MOTORS
OrganizationROSLYN, NY
$6,000
Jun 5, 2023
3
FEDERATED INDIANS OF GRATON RANCHERIA
OrganizationROHNERT PARK, CA
$1,000
Aug 1, 2024
4
STONE, JAMES M
PLYMOUTH ROCK COMPANY, INC.EXECUTIVE
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$5,000
Oct 16, 2024
5
FAIVUS, HARRY E
SELF-EMPLOYEDOPHTHALMOLOGIST
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$5,000
Nov 1, 2024
6
STONE, JAMES M
PLYMOUTH ROCK COMPANY, INC.EXECUTIVE
IndividualBOSTON, MA
$5,000
Oct 16, 2024
7
HELFER, RICKI
N/ANOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$4,000
Sep 10, 2024
8
ANDEER, KYLE
APPLE INCATTORNEY
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Mar 27, 2024
9
BINDER, CHARLES
SELF-EMPLOYEDATTORNEY
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Mar 21, 2024
10
BURNSTEIN, CLIFFORD
Q PRIMEMANAGER
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Mar 28, 2024

Rep. Vindman, Eugene Simon [D-VA-7]

ID: V000138

Top Contributors

10

1
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 29, 2024
2
LUX FOR VIRGINIA
OrganizationLADYSMITH, VA
$500
Mar 31, 2024
3
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
Apr 20, 2024
4
FORSTER-BURKE, DIANE
IndividualCOTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UT
$4,000
May 5, 2024
5
VON STEIN, THOMSON
IndividualROCKVILLE, MD
$3,500
Aug 7, 2024
6
HULL, MEGAN
SELFACTIVIST
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Nov 2, 2024
7
KAISER, GEORGE
GBK CORPORATIONEXECUTIVE
IndividualTULSA, OK
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
8
PARSONS, KATHLEEN
NOT EMPLOYEDNOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPOTOMAC, MD
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
9
STAPLE, HARISE
SELFMD
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,300
Oct 18, 2024
10
HOLMES, LAURA
SELFREAL ESTATE INVESTOR
IndividualBOCA RATON, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 51 nodes and 32 connections (47 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $128,173

Top Donors - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • Section 2(a)(1) directs the Secretary to conduct a public service announcement campaign educating the public and international allies on transnational repression and resources for victims, including contacting the FBI to report suspected acts. This supports law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors by increasing awareness and reporting mechanisms, potentially expanding their market.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate62.7%
Pages: 254-256

— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.

Introduction

Moderate62.2%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness;

Introduction

Moderate62.2%
Pages: 168-170

— 135 — Department of Homeland Security Unfortunately for our nation, the federal government’s newest department became like every other federal agency: bloated, bureaucratic, and expensive. It also lost sight of its mission priorities. DHS has also suffered from the Left’s wokeness and weaponization against Americans whom the Left perceives as its political opponents. To truly secure the homeland, a conservative Administration needs to return the department to the right mission, the right size, and the right budget. This would include reorganizing the department and shifting significant resources away from several supporting components to the essential operational components. Prior- itizing border security and immigration enforcement, including detention and deportation, is critical if we are to regain control of the border, repair the historic damage done by the Biden Administration, return to a lawful and orderly immi- gration system, and protect the homeland from terrorism and public safety threats. This also includes consolidating the pieces of the fragmented immigration system into one agency to fulfill the mission more efficiently. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is a DHS com- ponent that the Left has weaponized to censor speech and affect elections at the expense of securing the cyber domain and critical infrastructure, which are threat- ened daily.2 A conservative Administration should return CISA to its statutory and important but narrow mission. The bloated DHS bureaucracy and budget, along with the wrong priorities, provide real opportunities for a conservative Administration to cut billions in spending and limit government’s role in Americans’ lives. These opportunities include privatizing TSA screening and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program, reforming FEMA emergency spending to shift the majority of preparedness and response costs to states and localities instead of the federal government, eliminating most of DHS’s grant pro- grams, and removing all unions in the department for national security purposes. A successful DHS would: l Secure and control the border; l Thoroughly enforce immigration laws; l Correctly and efficiently adjudicate immigration benefit applications while rejecting fraudulent claims; l Secure the cyber domain and collaborate with critical infrastructure sectors to maintain their security; l Provide states and localities with a limited federal emergency response and preparedness; — 136 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Secure our coasts and economic zones; l Protect political leaders, their families, and visiting heads of state or government; and l Oversee transportation security. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SEC) In the next Administration, the Office of the Secretary should take on the fol- lowing key issues and challenges to ensure the effective operation of DHS. Expansion of Dedicated Political Personnel. The Secretary of Homeland Security is a presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed political appointee, but for budgetary reasons, he or she has historically been unable to fund a dedi- cated team of political appointees. A key first step for the Secretary to improve front-office functions is to have his or her own dedicated team of political appoin- tees selected and vetted by the Office of Presidential Personnel, which is not reliant on detailees from other parts of the department, to help ensure the completion of the next President’s agenda. An Aggressive Approach to Senate-Confirmed Leadership Positions. While Senate confirmation is a constitutionally necessary requirement for appointing agency leadership, the next Administration may need to take a novel approach to the confirmations process to ensure an adequate and rapid transition. For example, the next Administration arguably should place its nominees for key positions into similar positions as “actings” (for example, putting in a person to serve as the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP while that person is going through the confirmation process to direct ICE or become the Secretary). This approach would both guarantee implementation of the Day One agenda and equip the department for potential emergency situations while still honoring the confirmation requirement. The department should also look to remove lower-level but nevertheless important positions that currently require Senate confirmation from the confirmation requirement, although this effort would require legislation (and might also be mooted in the event of legisla- tion that closes portions of the department that currently have Senate-confirmed leadership). Clearer, More Durable, and Political-Only Line of Succession. Based on previous experience, the department needs legislation to establish a more durable but politically oriented line of succession for agency decision-making purposes. The ideal sequence for line of succession is certainly debatable, except that in cir- cumstances where a career employee holds a leadership position in the department, that position should be deemed vacant for line-of-succession purposes and the next eligible political appointee in the sequence should assume acting authority. Further,

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

Full Policy Text

Related Bills