Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act
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Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]
ID: O000175
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Bill Summary
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act (HR 2659) claims to address the threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, specifically those from China. Its primary objective is to establish an interagency task force to detect, analyze, and respond to these threats. How quaint.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a joint interagency task force, led by the Director of CISA, to facilitate collaboration among various agencies. It also requires the task force to submit reports on sector-specific risks, trends, and tactics used by state-sponsored cyber actors. Oh, and it includes a classified assessment of the potential destruction, compromise, or disruption to US critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with China.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sector Risk Management Agencies, and critical infrastructure owners and operators. You know, the same folks who've been asleep at the wheel while our cyber infrastructure has been compromised time and again.
**Potential Impact & Implications:**
* This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of action without addressing the underlying issues. * The task force will likely become another bureaucratic quagmire, bogged down by interagency turf wars and petty squabbles. * The classified assessments will probably be watered down to avoid offending China or revealing our own vulnerabilities. * Critical infrastructure owners and operators might receive some lip service about improving detection and mitigation, but don't expect any meaningful changes.
In short, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a feel-good measure designed to placate the public and give politicians something to crow about during election season. Meanwhile, our cyber infrastructure remains vulnerable, and China (and other adversaries) will continue to exploit these weaknesses with impunity.
Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Inertia," where Congress prioritizes appearances over actual progress. The underlying disease is a lack of genuine commitment to addressing the complex issues surrounding cybersecurity. Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism and a willingness to call out this legislative charade for what it is – a waste of time and resources.
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Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. Higher similarity scores indicate stronger thematic connections.
Introduction
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy. — 197 — Department of State The ideas and recommendations herein are premised on the belief that a rigorous adherence to the national interest is the most enduring foundation for U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Thanks to the entire State Department chapter team, the leaders and staff of the 2025 Presidential Transition Project, and my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation’s Davis Center. In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following colleagues: Russell Berman, Sarah Calvis, James Carafano, Spencer Chretien, Wesley Coopersmith, Paul Dans, Steven Groves, Simon Hankinson, Joseph Humire, Michael Pillsbury, Max Primorac, Reed Rubenstein, Brett Schaefer, Jeff Smith, Hillary Tanoff, Erin Walsh, and John Zadrozny.
Introduction
— 196 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Simultaneously, Russia, China, and lesser adversaries exploit the more open networks of countries like the U.S. to undermine democracy through disinformation and propaganda. They have attempted to influence U.S. elections; enabled or encouraged actors to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to commit theft of real or intellectual property; and have challenged U.S. governmental, military, and critical infrastructure networks with targeted malware. In short, the cyberspace era has gradually evolved from one of exploration, innovation, and cooperation to one that retains these features but is also marked by aggressive competition and persistent threats. To meet this reality, the State Department must move beyond its traditional model of attempting to establish non-binding, informal world standards of acceptable cyberspace behavior. The State Department should work with allies to establish a clear framework of enforceable norms for actions in cyberspace, moving beyond the voluntary norms of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts.26 The State Department should also assist the Department of Defense to go “on offence” against adversaries. “Deterrence as a strategic approach has not stemmed the onslaught of cyber aggression below the level of armed conflict.”27 The traditional U.S. defensive approach based on deterrence followed by reaction to crossed “red lines” is no longer effective. Adversaries can evade this strategy through multiple tactical lines of action below the level of armed conflict, and such actions have a cumulative strategic effect. The State Department’s role should be to work with allies and engage with adversaries when necessary to draw clear lines of unacceptable conduct. Global financial infrastructure, nuclear controls, and public health are particularly important areas in which consensus may even be found across ideological lines. These mission-essential institutional initiatives should be joined with others to establish a presidentially directed and durable U.S. foreign policy. CONCLUSION The next conservative President has the opportunity and the duty to restructure the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy so that it is focused on his or her vision for the nation's role in the world. The policy ideas and reform recommen- dations outlined in this chapter provide guidance about how the State Department can contribute to this objective. In the main, this chapter refocuses attention away from the special interests and social experiments that are used in some quarters to capture U.S. foreign policy.
Introduction
— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing
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Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.