Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/2659
Last Updated: July 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

ID: O000175

Follow the money

The bill

Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act

HR. 2659, 119th Congress — read as touching Cybersecurity.

The sponsor

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$129,458 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 152-154 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

November 17, 2025

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

Passed House

Senate Review

📍 Current Status

Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of our esteemed Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Strengthening Cyber Resilience Against State-Sponsored Threats Act (HR 2659) claims to address the threat posed by state-sponsored cyber actors, specifically those from China. Its primary objective is to establish an interagency task force to detect, analyze, and respond to these threats. How quaint.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill creates a joint interagency task force, led by the Director of CISA, to facilitate collaboration among various agencies. It also requires the task force to submit reports on sector-specific risks, trends, and tactics used by state-sponsored cyber actors. Oh, and it includes a classified assessment of the potential destruction, compromise, or disruption to US critical infrastructure in the event of a major crisis or conflict with China.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects are involved: the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Sector Risk Management Agencies, and critical infrastructure owners and operators. You know, the same folks who've been asleep at the wheel while our cyber infrastructure has been compromised time and again.

**Potential Impact & Implications:**

* This bill is a classic case of "security theater." It creates the illusion of action without addressing the underlying issues. * The task force will likely become another bureaucratic quagmire, bogged down by interagency turf wars and petty squabbles. * The classified assessments will probably be watered down to avoid offending China or revealing our own vulnerabilities. * Critical infrastructure owners and operators might receive some lip service about improving detection and mitigation, but don't expect any meaningful changes.

In short, this bill is a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It's a feel-good measure designed to placate the public and give politicians something to crow about during election season. Meanwhile, our cyber infrastructure remains vulnerable, and China (and other adversaries) will continue to exploit these weaknesses with impunity.

Diagnosis: This bill suffers from a severe case of "Legislative Inertia," where Congress prioritizes appearances over actual progress. The underlying disease is a lack of genuine commitment to addressing the complex issues surrounding cybersecurity. Treatment? A healthy dose of skepticism and a willingness to call out this legislative charade for what it is – a waste of time and resources.

Related Topics

Cybersecurity & Data PrivacyNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$129,458
17 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$129,458

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WINTERSTEEN, JAMES
1 transaction
$13,200
2
BEAMAN, LEE MR.
2 transactions
$12,850
3
DAVIS, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$12,540
4
BURNS, DONALD
2 transactions
$8,898
5
FISHER, KENNETH L.
1 transaction
$6,600
6
FISHER, SHERRILYN
1 transaction
$6,600
7
RAMSEY, DAVE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
MOSING, GREG
1 transaction
$6,600
9
SHOCKLEY, QIANG
1 transaction
$6,600
10
GUO, MING
1 transaction
$6,600
11
KENNINGER, STEVEN
1 transaction
$6,600
12
JAQUISH, GAIL
1 transaction
$6,600
13
ELAM, LULU ROGERS
1 transaction
$6,270
14
ROGERS, JESSICA
1 transaction
$6,000
15
ALLEN, JARED
1 transaction
$5,800
16
GIDEON, CECILE
1 transaction
$5,600
17
RICE, THOMAS A
1 transaction
$5,500

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 4 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7]

ID: G000590

Top Contributors

10

1
HAND, J.R.
HAND FAMILY COMPANIES • CEO
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
May 20, 2024
2
SCARLETT, DOROTHY
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Jun 11, 2024
3
CRABBE, JENNELL
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
4
CRABBE, JOHN
SELF • CONSTRUCTION
IndividualCLARKSVILLE, TN
$6,600
Feb 9, 2023
5
EVANS, BARBARA
HOMEMAKER • HOMEMAKER
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
6
EVANS, JOHN
PRESIDENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualHENDERSONVILLE, TN
$6,600
Mar 10, 2023
7
KEMMERER, KAREN
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualJACKSON, WY
$6,600
May 16, 2023
8
GONTOWNIK, YONI
GIC • VICE PRESIDENT
IndividualENGLEWOOD, NJ
$6,600
Aug 1, 2024
9
SCARLETT, JOE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNASHVILLE, TN
$6,600
Sep 9, 2024
10
UIHLEIN, RICHARD
ULINE • CHAIRMAN
IndividualLAKE FOREST, IL
$5,800
Jan 26, 2023

Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]

ID: L000597

Top Contributors

10

1
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTERS POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (NABPAC)
PACWASHINGTON, DC
$1,000
Oct 29, 2024
2
DREAM FINDERS HOMES
OrganizationJACKSONVILLE, FL
$6,600
Mar 27, 2024
3
DREAM FINDERS HOMES
OrganizationJACKSONVILLE, FL
$6,600
Mar 27, 2024
4
DREAM FINDERS HOMES
OrganizationJACKSONVILLE, FL
$3,300
Mar 27, 2024
5
MICCOSUKEE TRIBE
OrganizationMIAMI, FL
$3,000
May 13, 2024
6
RANNEY, TIM
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualSAINT PETERSBURG, FL
$6,600
Dec 10, 2023
7
BARNETT, HOYT R
PUBLIX • EXECUTIVE
IndividualLAKELAND, FL
$6,600
Feb 21, 2024
8
BOWDEN, VIRGINIA
STAR VIEW ADVISORS • MANAGING PARTNER
IndividualCLEARWATER, FL
$6,600
Mar 28, 2024
9
HOSSEINI, FOROUGH B
ICI HOMES • CEO
IndividualDAYTONA, FL
$6,600
Mar 29, 2024
10
HOSSEINI, MORTEZA
ICI HOMES • CHAIRMAN & CEO
IndividualDAYTONA BEACH, FL
$6,600
Mar 29, 2024

Rep. Moolenaar, John R. [R-MI-2]

ID: M001194

Top Contributors

10

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationSHELBYVILLE, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
2
PECHANGA BAND OF INDIANS
OrganizationTEMECULA, CA
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
3
POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationDOWAGIAC, MI
$3,300
Aug 30, 2023
4
SAGINAW CHIPPEWA INDIAN TRIBE TRIBAL OPERATIONS
OrganizationMOUNT PLEASANT, MI
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
5
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$3,300
Sep 30, 2023
6
NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF THE POTAWATOMI
OrganizationFULTON, MI
$3,300
Mar 12, 2024
7
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$3,300
Jun 20, 2024
8
SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE CHIPPEWA INDIANS
OrganizationSAULT SAINTE MARIE, MI
$2,900
Dec 19, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,500
Mar 4, 2024
10
SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS
OrganizationSHINGLE SPRINGS, CA
$2,500
Sep 30, 2024

Rep. Garbarino, Andrew R. [R-NY-2]

ID: G000597

Top Contributors

10

1
MS BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationPEARL, MS
$1,000
Nov 5, 2024
2
THE CHICKASAW NATION
OrganizationADA, OK
$1,000
Jun 20, 2023
3
DUIT, JAMES
CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER
IndividualEDMOND, OK
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
4
DUIT, PAMELA
CONCEPTION LLC • PARTNER
IndividualEDMOND, OK
$3,300
Nov 5, 2024
5
ROCKEFELLER, LISENNE
WINROCK ENT • PRESIDENT
IndividualLITTLE ROCK, AR
$3,300
Oct 29, 2024
6
RICKETTS, MARLENE
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualOMAHA, NE
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
7
LEACH, HOWARD
SELF EMPLOYED • PRIVATE INVESTOR
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
8
FEINSTEIN, LEONARD
BED BATH AND BEYOND • CHAIRMAN
IndividualJERICHO, NY
$3,300
Oct 31, 2024
9
BANKE, BARBARA R.
JACKSON FAMILY WINES • OWNER
IndividualGEYSERVILLE, CA
$3,300
Nov 15, 2023
10
SMITH, HOLLY
SHOOK HARDY BACON LLP • ATTORNEY
IndividualSAINT LOUIS, MO
$3,300
Dec 22, 2023

Donor Network - Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 62 nodes and 32 connections (52 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $178,658

Top Donors - Rep. Ogles, Andrew [R-TN-5]

Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount

17 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.

  • +Cybersecurityconfidence 0.90

    Section 2 establishes an interagency task force to detect, analyze, and respond to cybersecurity threats from state-sponsored actors, including Volt Typhoon, and requires reports and briefings on threats to critical infrastructure. This creates demand for cybersecurity services, threat intelligence, and related technologies, benefiting cybersecurity firms.

  • +Defense Contractorsconfidence 0.80

    Section 2(f)(3)(E) requires a classified assessment of the ability of state-sponsored cyber actors to disrupt U.S. Armed Forces operations by hindering mobility across critical infrastructure such as rail, aviation, and ports. This focus on defense-related cyber threats likely leads to increased contracts for defense contractors specializing in cyber defense and critical infrastructure protection.

  • +Electric Utilitiesconfidence 0.70

    Electric utilities are explicitly part of critical infrastructure (energy sector). Section 2(f)(3)(A) requires assessment of sector-specific risks, and Section 2(f)(3)(E) mentions hindering mobility across critical infrastructure including rail, aviation, and ports—energy infrastructure is vital for these. The task force's work will likely drive cybersecurity investments in the electric utilities sector.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 69%
Pages: 152-154AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's DoD objectives by enhancing cyber resilience, expanding defensive cyber operations, and improving coordination across agencies to counter state-sponsored threats—particularly from China—mirroring the policy's focus on integrating cyber and electronic warfare, protecting critical military networks, and increasing enterprise-wide cyber incident visibility."

Key themes:cyber resiliencedefensive cyber operationsstate-sponsored threatsinteragency coordinationcritical infrastructure protection

— 120 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Expand defensive cyber-effects operations authorized by President Trump's classified National Security Presidential Memorandum 13, “United States Cyber Operations Policy.”36 4. End USCYBERCOM’s participation in federal efforts to “fortify” U.S. elections to eliminate the perception that DOD is engaging in partisan politics. l Increase USCYBERCOM’s effectiveness. 1. Accelerate the integration of cyber and electronic warfare (EW) doctrine and capabilities, abiding by the time-tested norms of combined-arms warfare. 2. Mandate that development teams will include both coders and soldiers, aircrew, and sailors with kinetic experience at the platoon level. 3. Break the paradigm of cyber authorities held at the strategic level. 4. Increase cyber resilience by, for example, protecting the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Network and the Air Force’s Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapons Systems (CROWS). 5. Expand coordination of joint operations with allies. 6. Implement the Government Accountability Office’s recommendation that the DOD Chief Information Officer, Commander of USCYBERCOM, and Commander of Joint Force Headquarters–DOD Information Network “align policy and system requirements to enable DOD to have enterprise-wide visibility of cyber incident reporting to support tactical, strategic, and military strategies for response.”37 l Rationalize strategy and doctrine. 1. Update the October 2022 National Security Strategy to define DOD roles and responsibilities beyond existing platitudes. 2. Apply traditional deterrence strategies and principles for using cyber/ EW in retaliation for foreign cyberattacks and/or EW actions against U.S. infrastructure and citizens. — 121 — Department of Defense SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES Even though America’s conventional war in Afghanistan was a failure, Special Operations Forces of the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) executed an extremely effective counterterrorism campaign: There has not been another major attack on the homeland, global terrorist threats are reduced and managed, collaboration with international partners is effective, and units under USSOCOM are the most capable and experienced warfighters in two generations. There is a movement to reduce the scope and scale of USSOCOM’s mission in favor of other service priorities in great-power competition. This would be a mis- take because USSOCOM can be employed effectively in great-power competition. It makes sense to capitalize on USSOCOM’s experience and repurpose its mis- sion to include irregular warfare within the context of great-power competition, thereby providing a robust organization that is capable of achieving strategic effects that are critical both to our national defense and to the defense of our allies and partners around the globe. Irregular warfare should be used proactively to prevent state and nonstate actors from negatively affecting U.S. policies and objectives while simultaneously strengthening our regional partnerships. If we maintain irregular warfare’s traditional focus on nonstate actors, we limit ourselves to addressing only the symptoms (nonstate actors), not the problems themselves (China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran). Needed Reforms l Make irregular warfare a cornerstone of security strategy. The U.S. can project strength through unified action with our Interagency,38 allies, and partners by utilizing irregular warfare capabilities synchronized with elements of national power. Broadly redefining irregular warfare to address current state and nonstate actors is critical to countering irregular threats that range from the Chinese use of economic warfare to Russian disinformation and Islamist terrorism. A broad definition of irregular warfare in the National Security Strategy would allow for a whole-of- government approach, thereby providing resources and capabilities to counter threats and ultimately serve as credible deterrence at the strategic and tactical levels. 1. Define irregular warfare as “a means by which the United States uses all elements of national power to project influence abroad to counter state adversaries, defeat hostile nonstate actors, deter wider conflict, and maintain peace in great-power competition.” 2. Characterize the state and nonstate irregular threats facing the U.S. by region in the National Security Strategy.

Intelligence Community

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 251-253AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly addresses the Project 2025 priority of countering state-sponsored cyber threats, particularly from China, by creating an FBI-led interagency task force to improve detection, reporting, and resource allocation—core elements of the recommended counterintelligence enhancements."

Key themes:state-sponsored cyber threatsChina threatFBI empowermentinteragency coordinationcritical infrastructure protection

— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts.

Intelligence Community

Strong
Vector: 68%
Pages: 254-256AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening intelligence sharing, improving cyber threat detection, and enhancing coordination to counter state-sponsored threats—particularly from China—by establishing an interagency task force and mandating timely reporting and assessments."

Key themes:cyber threat intelligence sharingcountering state-sponsored cyber threatsinteragency coordinationcritical infrastructure protectionChina-focused threat analysis

— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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