National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program Reassignment and Funding Reform Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/hr/7764
Last Updated: July 17, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

ID: E000300

Follow the money

The bill

National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program Reassignment and Funding Reform Act of 2026

HR. 7764, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.

The sponsor

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$93,473 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

70% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 186-188 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.

May 13, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, courtesy of the 119th Congress. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?

The National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program Reassignment and Funding Reform Act of 2026 (HR 7764) is a bill that reeks of bureaucratic shell games and fiscal sleight of hand. The total funding amount for this program? Conveniently omitted, because who needs transparency when you're playing with other people's money?

The key programs and agencies receiving funds are the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) and the National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program (NTER). Because, of course, we need to funnel more cash into the Department of Homeland Security's black hole of inefficiency. Notable increases or decreases from previous years? Don't bother looking; it's all just a smokescreen.

The real fun begins with the riders and policy provisions attached to funding. Section 3(c) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit reports on the program's progress, because Congress loves to micromanage and pretend they're doing something useful. And let's not forget the prohibition on using National Intelligence Program funds for the NTER Program (Section 3(b)). A clever trick to make it seem like they're being fiscally responsible, while actually just shuffling money around.

Fiscal impact and deficit implications? Ha! Don't make me laugh. This bill is a drop in the ocean of our national debt, but it's a perfect example of how Congress loves to play accounting games with our money. They'll just magic up some new funding sources, or maybe just borrow more from China. Who cares about the long-term consequences when you can get reelected on empty promises?

In conclusion, HR 7764 is a symptom of a deeper disease: the chronic incompetence and corruption that plagues our government. It's a bill that serves only to further entrench bureaucratic inefficiency and waste, while pretending to address a pressing national issue. Congratulations, Congress, you've managed to create another masterpiece of legislative obfuscation. Now, if you'll excuse me, I have better things to do than watch this train wreck unfold.

Related Topics

Federal Budget & AppropriationsDefense Spending & ProcurementNational Security & Intelligence
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$93,473
20 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$93,473

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
WRIGHT, ELIZABETH
1 transaction
$6,600
2
WOODWARD, JOHN
1 transaction
$6,600
3
BERGSTROM, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
4
ERICKSON, GARY
1 transaction
$6,600
5
HASELDEN, BYRON
1 transaction
$6,600
6
HASELDEN, EDDIE
1 transaction
$6,600
7
HASELDEN, MIKE
1 transaction
$6,600
8
WAGNER, BRUCE
1 transaction
$5,000
9
DUKE, D. A.
1 transaction
$5,000
10
MCDONALD, BRUCE
1 transaction
$3,868
11
MULVIHILL, JAMES
1 transaction
$3,570
12
TERRY, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,435
13
ANGELO JR, ERNEST
1 transaction
$3,300
14
CADER, ANDREW
1 transaction
$3,300
15
CRANBERG, CATHY
1 transaction
$3,300
16
FROST, EDWIN
1 transaction
$3,300
17
HAUDENSCHILD, CHRIS
1 transaction
$3,300
18
LEVENSTAM, DAVID
1 transaction
$3,300
19
MASSEY, JON G.
1 transaction
$3,300
20
NOVIK, JAY
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Rep. Van Epps, Matt [R-TN-7]

ID: V000139

Top Contributors

0

No contribution data available

Rep. Pou, Nellie [D-NJ-9]

ID: P000621

Top Contributors

10

1
MATSIKOUDIS & FANCIULLO, LLC
OrganizationJERSEY CITY, NJ
$500
Oct 15, 2024
2
COOK, HAROLD P. III
RETIRED • RETIRED
IndividualNORTH HALEDON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
3
MUKHERJI, RAJ
STATE OF NEW JERSEY • SENATOR
IndividualJERSEY CITY, NJ
$3,300
Oct 27, 2024
4
KRAMER, LAWRENCE
V. PAULIUS & ASSOCIATES • ATTORNEY
IndividualGLEN ROCK, NJ
$3,300
Nov 8, 2024
5
CURITOMAI, NORBERTO
SPANISH TRANSPORTATION SVC • CEO
IndividualCLIFTON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
6
KIPIANI, CARLA TURCO
CARLA DEVELOPMENT GROUP • COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
IndividualLYNDHURST, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
7
CRISOSTOMO, YAMILKY
YNC TAX • CEO
IndividualCLIFTON, NJ
$3,300
Oct 20, 2024
8
AVILA, RENE A.
GI AUTO SALVAGE • PRESIDENT
IndividualPINE BROOK, NJ
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
9
COLGAN, BILL
GP MANAGEMENT, LLC • PARTNER
IndividualBLOOMFIELD, NJ
$3,300
Oct 24, 2024
10
KIPIANI, PAUL
CARLA DEVELOPMENT GROUP • COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE
IndividualFRANKLIN LAKES, NJ
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024

Donor Network - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 45 nodes and 23 connections (47 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $100,573

Top Donors - Rep. Evans, Gabe [R-CO-8]

Showing top 20 donors by contribution amount

20 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • Section 3(a) transfers the National Threat Evaluation and Reporting Program to the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), which coordinates with state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement, thereby benefiting law enforcement and surveillance technology vendors by expanding their role in threat assessment and reporting.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Homeland Security

Moderate
Vector: 63%
Pages: 186-188AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill's focus on transferring the NTER Program to OSLLE and aligning funding with non-Federal stakeholders reflects a broader theme of strengthening state and local partnerships within DHS, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on federalism and empowering SLTT entities in preparedness and response. However, the bill does not directly address specific Project 2025 proposals such as FEMA reform, grant termination, or immigration enforcement priorities."

Key themes:state and local partnershipfederalismpreparedness grantsDHS reorganizationnon-Federal stakeholder engagement

— 153 — Department of Homeland Security l 287(g) program. Issue a memo prohibiting any jurisdiction that applies from being denied access to the program unless good cause is shown. l Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) priorities. Issue Department Management Directive (and ICE companion Directive) to refocus HSI on immigration offenses and criminal offenses typically associated with immigration (for example, human trafficking). All criminal investigative work without a clear nexus to the border or otherwise to Title 8 should be turned over to the appropriate federal agency. l Blackie’s Warrants. ICE OPLA, ERO, and HSI should issue a joint internal memo on operationalizing Blackie’s Warrants for immediate use on worksite enforcement and other appropriate investigations and operations. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) Needed Reforms FEMA is the lead federal agency in preparing for and responding to disasters, but it is overtasked, overcompensates for the lack of state and local preparedness and response, and is regularly in deep debt. After passage of the 1988 Stafford Act,12 the number of declared federal disasters rose dramatically as most disaster costs were shifted from states and local governments to the federal government. In addition, state-friendly FEMA regulations, such as a “per capita indicator,” failed to maintain the pace of inflation and made it easy to meet disaster declaration thresholds. This combination has left FEMA unprepared in both readiness and funding for the truly catastrophic disasters in which its services are most needed. Reform of FEMA requires a greater emphasis on federalism and state and local preparedness, leaving FEMA to focus on large, widespread disasters. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to adjust the per capita indi- cator for damages, which creates a threshold under which states and localities are not eligible for public assistance. FEMA should raise the threshold because the per capita indicator has not kept pace with inflation, and this over time has effectively lowered the threshold for public assistance and caused FEMA’s resources to be stretched perilously thin. Alternatively, applying a deductible could accomplish a similar outcome while also incentivizing states to take a more proactive role in their own preparedness and response capabilities. In addition, Congress should change the cost-share arrangement so that the federal government covers 25 per- cent of the costs for small disasters with the cost share reaching a maximum of 75 percent for truly catastrophic disasters. FEMA is also responsible for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), nearly all of which is issued by the federal government. Washington provides — 154 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise insurance at prices lower than the actuarially fair rate, thereby subsidizing flood insurance. Then, when flood costs exceed NFIP’s revenue, FEMA seeks taxpay- er-funded bailouts. Current NFIP debt is $20.5 billion, and in 2017, Congress canceled $16 billion in debt when FEMA reached its borrowing authority limit. These subsidies and bailouts only encourage more development in flood zones, increasing the potential losses to both NFIP and the taxpayer. The NFIP should be wound down and replaced with private insurance starting with the least risky areas currently identified by the program. Budget Issues FEMA manages all grants for DHS, and these grants have become pork for states, localities, and special-interest groups. Since 2002, DHS/FEMA have provided more than $56 billion in preparedness grants for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. For FY 2023, President Biden requested more than $3.5 billion for federal assistance grants.13 Funds provided under these programs do not provide measurable gains for preparedness or resiliency. Rather, more than any objective needs, political interests appear to direct the flow of nondisaster funds. The principles of federalism should be upheld; these indicate that states better understand their unique needs and should bear the costs of their particularized programs. FEMA employees in Washington, D.C., should not determine how bil- lions of federal tax dollars should be awarded to train local law enforcement officers in Texas, harden cybersecurity infrastructure in Utah, or supplement migrant shelters in Arizona. DHS should not be in the business of handing out federal tax dollars: These grants should be terminated. Accomplishing this, however, will require action by Members of Congress who repeatedly vote to fund grants for political reasons. The transition should focus on building resilience and return on investment in line with real threats. Personnel FEMA currently has four Senate-confirmed positions. Only the Administrator should be confirmed by the Senate; other political leadership need not be con- firmed by the Senate. Additionally, FEMA’s “springing Cabinet position” should be eliminated, as this creates significant unnecessary challenges to the functioning of the whole of DHS at points in time when coordinated responses are most needed. CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY (CISA) Needed Reforms CISA is supposed to have two key roles: (1) protection of the federal civilian government networks (.gov) while coordinating the execution of national cyber defense and sharing information with non-federal and private-sector partners

Intelligence Community

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 239-241AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on reorganizing and funding the NTER Program within DHS to better serve SLTT partners, while the Project 2025 policy emphasizes strengthening the DNI's authority over the National Intelligence Program budget and IC-wide coordination, particularly regarding OSINT and budget execution. There is minimal thematic overlap, as the bill does not address DNI authority, NIP budget oversight, or intelligence enterprise reform."

Key themes:intelligence communitybudget alignmentinformation sharing

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort. — 207 — Intelligence Community l Prioritize security clearance reform. Security clearance reform has made significant progress under Trusted Workforce 2.0, a governmentwide background investigation reform that was implemented beginning in 2018 with the goal of creating one system with reciprocity across organizations. This included allowing movement from periodic reinvestigations toward a Continuous Vetting (CV) program with automated records checks, adjudication of flags, the “mitigat[ion of] personnel security situations before they become a larger problem,” or the suspension or revocation of clearances.15 However, human resources onboarding operations in major agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA remain to be resolved. As executive agent for security clearances, the DNI must require results from agencies that resist implementation, enforce the 48-hour reciprocity guidance, and target human resources operations that fail to attract and expediently onboard qualified personnel. Additional “carrots and sticks” from executive order reform language, including moving the Security Services Directorate from NCSC to ODNI with elevated status, may be necessary. It is unacceptable for agencies to hinder opportunities for cross- agency assignments, use public–private partnerships inefficiently because of constraints on the transferability of security clearances, and lose future talent because of extraordinary delays in backend operations. Proper vetting to speed the onboarding of personnel with much-needed expertise is vital to the IC’s future. l Ensure the DNI’s authority. The DNI’s authority should be similar to an orchestra conductor’s. An incoming conservative President will appoint whomever he chooses as DNI, but there should be agreement between the incoming DNI and President with advice and counsel from the Presidential Personnel Office on selecting positions overseen by the DNI throughout subordinate agencies, as well as concurrence by relevant Cabinet officials and the CIA. This exists by executive order, but many Presidents, PPOs, and Cabinet agency heads do not follow executive order guidance and necessary norms. The importance of trust, character, and the ability to work together to achieve a joint set of intelligence goals established by the President cannot be overstated: It is a mission that can be accomplished only with the conductor and his orchestra playing in sync. l Provide additional support for such economic and supply chain– focused agencies as the Department of Commerce. Information sharing and feedback can help subagencies like the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security to improve their understanding of the

Intelligence Community

Weak
Vector: 61%
Pages: 239-241AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill shifts the NTER Program away from National Intelligence Program funding and DNI oversight, which contrasts with Project 2025's goal of strengthening the DNI's authority over NIP budget execution and prioritization. Both texts, however, discuss aligning intelligence program funding with mission objectives and ensuring proper resource allocation."

Key themes:intelligence program fundingmission alignmentresource allocationoversightnon-Federal partners

— 206 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise local, and tribal elements. The order should consider stipulating what to do with DOD cyber agencies, most notably the NSA, in terms of strategic (for example, the President and the DNI) vs. tactical support (for example, support for the warfighter) in conjunction with ongoing congressionally mandated reviews of the future dual-hatted relationship. l Enhance the DNI’s role in overseeing execution of the National Intelligence Program budget under the President’s authority. This should be done in a manner that is consistent with Congress’s intent as embodied in IRTPA. Under the executive order as written today, the DNI “shall oversee and direct the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” In practice, the DNI’s authority to oversee execution of the IC’s budget remains constrained by an inability to address changing intelligence priorities and mandate the implementation of appropriated NIP funding to higher intelligence priorities. The DNI should have the President’s direction to address emerging but catastrophic threats such as those posed by bioweapons. Clarifying how much budget authority the DNI has in conjunction (within the limits of congressional appropriations) with OMB and IC-member Cabinet officials to move around money and personnel is crucial, but positions will not always be fungible. It will probably be necessary to hold IC leadership accountable at intransigent agencies and to restructure areas through executive orders in close conjunction with OMB, as needed. l Clarify the DNI’s role as leader of the IC as an enterprise in building the IC’s capabilities around its open-source collection and analytic missions. The exponential growth in open-source information, often called OSINT, is not disputed. In the IC, the use of publicly available information, notwithstanding the authorities within IRTPA for the DNI to manage OSINT, remains disaggregated. The explosion of private-sector intelligence products and expertise should signal to IC leadership that duplicative efforts are unnecessary and that limited resources should be focused on problematic collection tasks. The IC should avoid duplication of what is already being done well in the private sector and focus instead on complex questions that cannot be answered by conventional and frequently increasing numbers of commercial tools and capabilities. If necessary, for lack of results from the National Open Source Committee, the DNI should appoint the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) as chairman to prioritize and promote accountability for the IC’s 18 agencies toward this effort.

Showing 3 of 5 policy matches

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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