Stop Corrupt Trading Act

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Bill ID: 119/s/5221
Last Updated: August 12, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA]

ID: P000145

Follow the money

The bill

Stop Corrupt Trading Act

S. 5221, 119th Congress — read as touching Private Equity & Hedge Funds.

The sponsor

Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$89,100 raised

29 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

55% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Financial Regulatory Agencies" section, p. 875-878 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 536.

August 3, 2026

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Summary of S. 5221: Stop Corrupt Trading Act**

**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The Stop Corrupt Trading Act aims to criminalize and civilly penalize the purchase, sale, or exchange of nonpublic information by high-level government officials and their associates. Its stated purpose is to prevent insider trading by the President, Vice President, their immediate families, and entities they control or have a significant financial stake in. Ostensibly, it’s about restoring public trust in government by ensuring officials don’t profit from confidential information gleaned through their positions. In reality, it’s a performative band-aid on a gangrenous wound—addressing the symptom (occasional blatant insider trading) while ignoring the disease: a system where influence, access, and legalized corruption are baked into the framework of power.

**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Title 18 of the U.S. Code (federal criminal code) by adding Section 228, “Misuse of nonpublic information.” It defines: - **Covered persons**: Only the President and Vice President. (Notably excludes Congress, Cabinet, senior staff—because why stop corruption when you can just redefine it out of existence?) - **Covered entities**: Firms or associations controlled by or in which a covered person has ≥5% beneficial interest. - **Nonpublic information**: Info gained via official position, not public, and either exempt from FOIA, marked confidential, or not disseminated. Includes non-public API disclosures.

Prohibitions: - Covered persons/entities may not sell/exchange such info for financial gain. - *Anyone* may not buy/sell such info for financial benefit (broad but likely unenforceable beyond insiders).

Penalties: - **Criminal**: Fines up to 2x transaction value, up to 5 years imprisonment (for covered persons/entities), or fines only for others. - **Civil**: AG can sue for disgorgement, penalties up to 3x gain or $250k (whichever greater), plus equitable relief. - **Statute of limitations**: 6 years, *tolled* while the relevant official holds office—meaning the clock doesn’t run if they’re still in power. Convenient. - **Referral**: OGE must refer credible evidence to AG and notify Judiciary Committees.

**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Directly affected**: President, VP, their families, and entities they control or have ≥5% stake in. (A narrow, elite group—hardly the swamp, more like a goldfish bowl.) - **Indirectly affected**: Anyone who might trade on leaked nonpublic info from the White House (e.g., lobbyists, donors, financiers)—though enforcement against them relies on DOJ vigor, which historically fluctuates with political winds. - **Oversight bodies**: OGE gains referral duty; Judiciary Committees get notified—adding bureaucratic theater without real teeth. - **The public**: Supposed beneficiaries, but likely to see this as another empty gesture while real influence-peddling thrives in plain sight via lobbying, revolving doors, and legal stock trades by Congress.

**4. Potential Impact & Implications** Impact will be minimal. Why? - The bill ignores Congress, where insider trading allegations are far more common and politically potent. Targeting only POTUS/VP is like arresting the janitor for embezzlement while the CFO loots the treasury. - Enforcement depends on DOJ independence and OGE courage—both in short supply during partisan crises. - The tolling provision lets offenders avoid prosecution simply by staying in office—a loophole big enough to drive a corruption scandal through. - Civil disgorgement is useful, but without criminal deterrents for intermediaries, it’s a cost of doing business.

Ultimately, this bill is less about stopping corruption and more about letting senators grandstand while pretending to clean up a mess they refuse to address. It’s legislative lip

Related Topics

Executive Branch OversightGovernment Operations & AccountabilityCriminal Justice & Law Enforcement
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$89,100
23 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$21,400
Committees
$0
Individuals
$67,700

No PAC contributions found

1
CHEROKEE NATION
1 transaction
$5,000
2
MOORETOWN RANCHERIA
1 transaction
$3,300
3
TOLOWA DEE-NI' NATION
1 transaction
$3,300
4
TULE RIVER TRIBAL COUNCIL
1 transaction
$3,300
5
THE CHICKASAW NATION
1 transaction
$2,500
6
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
2 transactions
$2,000
7
ONEIDA NATION
1 transaction
$1,000
8
ONEIDA INDIAN NATION
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
CHEN, YU
2 transactions
$6,600
2
ZHAO, PENG
2 transactions
$6,600
3
GOLDMAN, JOHN
2 transactions
$6,600
4
GOLDMAN, MARCIA
2 transactions
$6,600
5
ANDREESSEN, MARC LOWELL
2 transactions
$6,600
6
KIMBER, SHELDON
1 transaction
$5,000
7
CARUSO, RICK J.
1 transaction
$3,300
8
DELVAC, WILLIAM F.
1 transaction
$3,300
9
GRAY, WILLIAM
1 transaction
$3,300
10
KEYES, HOWARD
1 transaction
$3,300
11
STEIN, KEVIN
1 transaction
$3,300
12
FISHER, ROBERT J.
1 transaction
$3,300
13
FISHER, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,300
14
FISHER, WILLIAM S.
1 transaction
$3,300
15
DIXON, CHRISTOPHER
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Blumenthal, Richard [D-CT]

ID: B001277

Top Contributors

20

1
OLSON, LYNDON
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualWACO, TX
$3,300
Dec 20, 2024
2
ALIX, JAY
ALIX PARTNERS • FOUNDER
IndividualBIRMINGHAM, MI
$3,300
Oct 2, 2023
3
KIM, CHRISTINE M.
BBB LLC • ATTORNEY
IndividualNEW YORK, NY
$3,300
Oct 31, 2023
4
ALIX, JAY
ALIX PARTNERS • FOUNDER
IndividualBIRMINGHAM, MI
$3,300
Apr 15, 2024
5
ROURE, RITA
PAGNY - LINCOLN HOSPITAL • PHYSICIAN
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$3,300
Apr 10, 2024
6
ROURE, RITA
PAGNY - LINCOLN HOSPITAL • PHYSICIAN
IndividualGREENWICH, CT
$3,300
Apr 10, 2024
7
CHAVEZ, TOM
KRUX INC. • CEO
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Jul 13, 2024
8
CHAVEZ, TOM
KRUX INC. • CEO
IndividualSAN FRANCISCO, CA
$3,300
Jul 13, 2024
9
JONES, JERRY C.
LIVERAMP INC. • EXECUTIVE
IndividualLITTLE ROCK, AR
$3,300
Sep 19, 2024
10
NESSEL, ARIEL
NESSEL DEVELOPMENT • OWNER
IndividualROSS, CA
$3,300
Jul 12, 2024

Sen. Whitehouse, Sheldon [D-RI]

ID: W000802

Top Contributors

20

1
HEISING, MARK
MEDLEY PARTNERS • MANAGING DIRECTOR / FOUNDER
IndividualATHERTON, CA
$6,600
Mar 4, 2024
2
PAGE, GLORIA
N/A • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$5,400
Apr 14, 2023
3
PAGE, GLORIA
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$5,000
Apr 24, 2023
4
PAGE, GLORIA
N/A • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,330
Jul 12, 2024
5
PAGE, GLORIA
IndividualLOS ALTOS, CA
$3,330
Sep 8, 2024
6
CONOVER, CATHERINE M.
SELF EMPLOYED • INVESTOR
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$3,300
Oct 25, 2024
7
LANG, DAVID
N/A • RETIRED
IndividualPORTSMOUTH, RI
$3,300
Oct 28, 2024
8
ARNOLD, JOHN
N/A • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualHOUSTON, TX
$3,300
Nov 20, 2023
9
BILLINGSLEY, LINDSAY
ALLIANCE RESIDENTIAL • REAL ESTATE
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$3,300
Dec 16, 2023
10
BILLINGSLEY, LINDSAY
ALLIANCE RESIDENTIAL • REAL ESTATE
IndividualDALLAS, TX
$3,300
Dec 16, 2023

Sen. Peters, Gary C. [D-MI]

ID: P000595

Top Contributors

43

1
MATCH-E-BE-NASH-SHE-WISH BAND OF POTTAWATOMI INDIANS
OrganizationSHELBYVILLE, MI
$3,300
Oct 22, 2024
2
STRATEGIC LINK CONSULTING, LP
OrganizationKENNESAW, GA
$3,300
May 28, 2024
3
MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN TRIBE
OrganizationAUBURN, WA
$3,300
Aug 11, 2023
4
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$2,900
May 29, 2024
5
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$2,900
May 29, 2024
6
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA TRIBE OF NORTH DAKOTA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$2,900
May 28, 2024
7
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$2,500
Jan 9, 2024
8
HABEMATOLEL POMO OF UPPER LAKE TRIBE OF CALIFORNIA
OrganizationUPPER LAKE, CA
$2,500
Jun 30, 2024
9
OTOE MISSOURIA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$2,500
Jun 30, 2024
10
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA TRIBE OF NORTH DAKOTA
OrganizationBELCOURT, ND
$2,500
Jun 30, 2024

Sen. Merkley, Jeff [D-OR]

ID: M001176

Top Contributors

28

1
AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY
OrganizationMARICOPA, AZ
$2,500
Oct 17, 2024
2
CHEROKEE NATION
OrganizationTAHLEQUAH, OK
$2,500
Dec 30, 2023
3
SISSETON-WAHPETON OYATE
OrganizationAGENCY VILLAGE, SD
$2,000
Jun 21, 2024
4
CONFEDERATED TRIBES AND BANDS OF THE YAKAMA NATION
OrganizationTOPPENISH, WA
$1,000
Oct 7, 2024
5
CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA
OrganizationDURANT, OK
$1,000
Nov 9, 2023
6
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
May 2, 2024
7
MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS
OrganizationCHOCTAW, MS
$1,000
Aug 2, 2024
8
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$400
Jul 17, 2023
9
STUBBS, MARILYN L.
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualPORTLAND, OR
$5,000
Jul 17, 2023
10
BARNHART, PHILIP N.
NOT EMPLOYED • RETIRED
IndividualEUGENE, OR
$5,000
Jun 21, 2024

Sen. Welch, Peter [D-VT]

ID: W000800

Top Contributors

22

1
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
Jun 8, 2023
2
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX COMMUNITY
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$1,000
May 3, 2024
3
FIELD, MARSHALL
THE OLD MOUNTAIN COMPANY, INC. • EXECUTIVE
IndividualCHICAGO, IL
$3,300
May 18, 2023
4
RECHNITZ, JOAN
IndividualRED BANK, NJ
$3,300
Apr 22, 2024
5
RECHNITZ, JOAN
IndividualRED BANK, NJ
$3,300
Apr 22, 2024
6
GORDON, PATRICIA
SELF • MD
IndividualLOS ANGELES, CA
$3,300
May 22, 2024
7
STILLER, ROBERT
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Sep 22, 2024
8
STILLER, ROBERT
NOT EMPLOYED • NOT EMPLOYED
IndividualPALM BEACH, FL
$3,300
Sep 22, 2024
9
KALKUT, CRAIG
WEST FRONT STRATEGIES • GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
IndividualWASHINGTON, DC
$2,500
May 3, 2023
10
SCHWARTZ, MARTIN
MINILEC SERVICE • CONSUMER ELECTRONICS
IndividualCARMEL, CA
$2,000
May 18, 2023

Donor Network - Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

Loading...

Showing 61 nodes and 65 connections

Total contributions: $65

Top Donors - Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

8 Orgs15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.

  • Section 2(b) prohibits the purchase, sale, or exchange of nonpublic information for financial benefit, which could limit the ability of private equity and hedge funds to trade on insider information, potentially reducing their profits.

  • −Big Tech Platformsconfidence 0.60

    Section 2(a)(3)(B) includes statements or other communications by a covered person made available via application programming interface or other means that are not made available to the general public on equal terms, which could impact big tech platforms that provide such interfaces.

Who funds the sponsor on these industries

For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Padilla, Alex [D-CA])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.

Industries this bill HARMS

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 68%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on prohibiting insider trading by the President and Vice President, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt discusses financial regulatory agencies, SEC reform, and opposition to certain regulations like the Consolidated Audit Trail and Dodd-Frank disclosures. There is no direct thematic overlap between preventing executive branch insider trading and the financial deregulation agenda outlined in the Project 2025 section."

Key themes:financial regulationgovernment ethicssecurities law

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 67%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on prohibiting insider trading by the President and Vice President, which is unrelated to Project 2025's Financial Regulatory Agencies section that critiques the CFPB, SEC, and advocates for deregulation and reduced federal oversight. There is no meaningful alignment in objectives or themes."

Key themes:financial regulationgovernment ethics

— 842 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 19. Burton, “Improving Entrepreneurs’ Access to Capital: Vital for Economic Growth”; Campbell, “The Case for Federal Pre-Emption of State Blue Sky Laws.” 20. David R. Burton, “Why the SEC’s Consolidated Audit Trail Is a Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 5, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/commentary/why-the-secs-consolidated- audit-trail-bad-idea; Hester M. Peirce, Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Statement on the Order Granting Temporary Conditional Exemptive Relief from Certain Requirements of the National Market System Plan Governing the Consolidated Audit Trail,” July 8, 2022, https://www.sec.gov/news/ statement/peirce-statement-consolidated-audit-trail-070822 (accessed February 20, 2023). 21. Peirce, “It’s Not Just Scope 3: Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute”; Uyeda, “Remarks at the 2022 Cato Summit on Financial Regulation.” 22. David R. Burton, “How Dodd–Frank Mandated Disclosures Harm, Rather than Protect, Investors,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4526, March 10, 2016, http://thf-reports.s3.amazonaws.com/2016/IB4526.pdf. 23. For a detailed discussion of SEC administration, see Burton, “Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission.” 24. See, for example, Andrew N. Vollmer, “Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Fall 2018), pp. 103–155, https://repository.law. umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1602&context=mjlr (accessed February 20, 2023). 25. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/1a (accessed February 20, 2023). 26. Or the CFTC can undertake a rulemaking. 27. 7 U.S.C. § 2(i), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/2 (accessed February 20, 2023). 28. 7 U.S.C. § 7b–3, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/7b-3 (accessed February 20, 2923). 29. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and Certain Requirements Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 178 (September 14, 2020), pp. 56924–57016, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09- 14/pdf/2020-16489.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 30. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations,” Federal Register, Vol. 78, No. 144 (July 26, 2013), pp. 45292–45374, https:// www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrfederalregister/documents/file/2013-17958a.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants—Cross-Border Application of the Margin Requirements,” Final Rule, Federal Register, Vol. 81, No. 104 (May 31, 2016), pp. 34818–34854, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-31/ pdf/2016-12612.pdf (accessed February 21, 2023). 32. H.R. 4173, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Public Law 111–203, 111th Congress, July 21, 2010, Title X, https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ203/PLAW-111publ203.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “About Us,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about- us/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 33. See, for example, Paul Sperry, “Trump Is Finally Fixing This Economy-Killing Agency,” New York Post, December 2, 2017, https://nypost.com/2017/12/02/trump-is-finally-fixing-this-economy-killing-agency/ (accessed March 23, 2023). See also Jeb Hensarling “How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency,” The Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal- agency-1486597413 (accessed March 23, 2023), and H.R. 3389, CFPB Slush Fund Elimination Act of 2013, 113th Congress, introduced October 30, 2013, https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3389/BILLS-113hr3389ih.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 34. Editorial, “CFPB Joins Justice in Shaking Down Banks for Democrat Activist Groups,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 17, 2015, https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/cfpb-diverts-civil-penalty-funds-to-democrat- activist-groups/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 35. Table, “Budget by Program,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Annual Performance Plan and Report, and Budget Overview, February 2023, p. 15, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ performance-plan-and-report_fy23.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 36. Table, “FTE by Program,” in ibid., p. 16. — 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023).

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 66%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The Stop Corrupt Trading Act focuses on prohibiting insider trading by high-level government officials, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt discusses the structure, funding, and oversight of financial regulatory agencies like the CFPB and FCC. There is no direct thematic overlap, as the bill does not address agency funding, civil penalty funds, or regulatory reform of financial or communications agencies."

Key themes:government ethicsfinancial regulationoversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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