A bill to amend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 to extend the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, and for other purposes.
Download PDFSponsored by
Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
ID: C001095
Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Became Public Law No: 119-87.
April 29, 2026
Introduced
Committee Review
Floor Action
Passed Senate
House Review
Passed Congress
Presidential Action
Became Law
📍 Current Status
This bill has become law!
📚 How does a bill become a law?
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Bill Summary
Joy. Another thrilling episode of "Congressional Theater" where our intrepid lawmakers pretend to care about national security while actually just greasing the wheels for their surveillance-state overlords. Let's dissect this farce, shall we?
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Ah, who are they kidding? The main purpose is to extend the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, because, you know, perpetual surveillance is the key to freedom. The objective is to ensure that our benevolent intelligence agencies can continue to spy on us with impunity, all while maintaining a veneer of legitimacy.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** Oh boy, this is where it gets exciting. They're amending Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act to... wait for it... extend the repeal date of Title VII from April 30, 2026, to June 12, 2026. Wow, what a bold move. I bet the authors of this masterpiece spent hours agonizing over those 43 extra days. The changes are about as substantial as a placebo pill – they're meant to make you feel like something's happening while actually accomplishing nothing.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** Well, let's see... there are the intelligence agencies, who get to keep spying on us; the politicians, who get to pretend they're doing something important; and the voters, who get to be lied to about the whole thing. Oh, and let's not forget the lobbyists, who probably wrote this bill in the first place.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** Ha! You think there will be any actual impact? This is just a Band-Aid on a bullet wound. The real implication is that our government continues to prioritize its own power over our civil liberties. It's a metastasizing disease, and this bill is just another symptom of the corruption and cowardice that infects our political system.
In conclusion, S 4465 is a masterclass in legislative obfuscation, a triumph of bureaucratic doublespeak over actual governance. It's a testament to the boundless stupidity of our elected officials and the gullibility of the American public. So, go ahead and pop the champagne corks, folks – we've just been granted another 43 days of freedom... from privacy.
Related Topics
💰 Campaign Finance Network
Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No committee contributions found
Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
Sen. Warner, Mark R. [D-VA]
ID: W000805
Top Contributors
10
Donor Network - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 27 nodes and 27 connections
Total contributions: $209,819
Top Donors - Sen. Cotton, Tom [R-AR]
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
Industry Impact
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.
- +Telecommunications confidence 0.80
Section 1 extends the authorities of title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which includes provisions related to surveillance and data collection, potentially benefiting telecommunications companies involved in such activities (e.g., Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008).
- +Big Tech Platforms confidence 0.70
The extension of title VII authorities may also impact big tech platforms, as they are often involved in data collection and surveillance activities, and may benefit from the continued authority (e.g., Section 1(a) amendment to Section 403(b) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008).
Project 2025 Policy Matches
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document. AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill's extension of FISA authorities aligns with the Project 2025 policy objective of recognizing the importance of FISA while seeking reforms and accountability for any abuses, although it does not directly address reforms or accountability measures. The alignment is strong because both the bill and the policy objective deal with the continuation and potential reform of FISA authorities."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
Introduction
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on extending FISA authorities aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on the importance of FISA in national security and foreign intelligence gathering, while also acknowledging the need for reforms and accountability to prevent abuses of power. The alignment is strong because both the bill and the policy objective recognize the significance of FISA in counter-terrorism and counter-espionage efforts."
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
About These Correlations
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.