Accelerating Broadband Permits Act of 2026

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Bill ID: 119/s/4448
Last Updated: September 7, 2026

Sponsored by

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

ID: T000250

Follow the money

The bill

Accelerating Broadband Permits Act of 2026

S. 4448, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.

The sponsor

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$102,900 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

85% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 888-890 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Ordered to be reported with an amendment in the nature of a substitute favorably.

July 21, 2026

Introduced

Committee Review

Floor Action

📍 Current Status

Next: The full Senate will vote on whether to pass the bill.

✅

Passed Senate

🏛️

House Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

**Accelerating Broadband Permits Act of 2026 (S. 4448): A Regulatory Colonoscopy**

Ah, another noble effort to “accelerate” broadband deployment by… adding more paperwork. How *innovative*. Let’s dissect this legislative placebo, shall we?

**1. New Regulations Created/Modified:** This bill amends three existing statutes like a drunk intern editing a wiki: - **BEAD Program (IIJA §60102):** Forces the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information (a title longer than most senators’ attention spans) to build a public “progress dashboard” tracking grant recipients’ spending and broadband deployment milestones. Because nothing says “efficiency” like mandating yet another federal website nobody will use. - Adds a “permit tracking tool” to help states and subgrantees navigate federal permitting labyrinths—presumably so they can blame the feds when they still miss deadlines. - **Communications Use Applications (Middle Class Tax Relief Act §6409):** Requires the same Assistant Secretary to develop data controls, delay-factor analyses, and alert systems for executive agencies processing telecom siting applications (think: cell tower permits). Agencies must now track, analyze, report on, and get nagged about delays—all while presumably still missing the 270-day statutory deadline. - **FAST Act §41001:** Tweaks the definition of “major federal action” to include broadband infrastructure projects over $5M that trigger NEPA review. Thrilling.

**2. Affected Industries/Sectors:** - **Broadband providers** (especially rural subsidy recipients): Now get to play data-entry clerks for federal dashboards. - **State and local broadband offices (eligible entities):** Must use new tracking tools and submit to federal oversight—because states clearly can’t manage grants without Uncle Sam looking over their shoulder. - **Telecom infrastructure firms:** Face slightly altered NEPA thresholds, though the real bottleneck remains local zoning and NIMBYism, not federal forms. - **Federal agencies** (FBI, DOT, BLM, etc.): Stuck processing tower permits while now being monitored for compliance—like putting a speed camera on a snail.

**3. Compliance Requirements & Timelines:** - Within **90 days of enactment**, the Assistant Secretary must: - Build data accuracy controls for agency tracking. - Create an alert system for “at-risk” applications (i.e., those likely to miss the 270-day deadline). - Dashboards and permit tools presumably follow soon after—timelines unspecified, because why rush perfection? - Annual delay-factor reports to four congressional committees (because redundancy is the soul of governance).

**4. Enforcement Mechanisms & Penalties:** Ah, here’s the kicker: **there aren’t any**. This bill is pure oversight theater. It mandates tracking, reporting, and analysis—but attaches zero consequences for failure. Miss the 270-day deadline? You’ll get a strongly worded annual report. Fail to update the dashboard? The website might show a sad loading spinner. No fines, no fund suspensions, no accountability. It’s like diagnosing hypertension and prescribing a pamphlet.

**5. Economic & Operational Impacts:** - **Short-term:** More compliance burden on already-strapped state broadband offices and federal agencies. Expect consultants to thrive as states scramble to build dashboard integrations. - **Long-term:** Negligible. The real barriers to broadband deployment are local permitting delays, pole attachment disputes, workforce shortages, and the fact that BEAD money is moving slower than a glacier in July. This bill addresses none of that. It’s a solution in search of a problem—or more charitably, a way for senators to claim they’re “doing something” while avoiding the hard work of reforming permitting or holding contractors accountable. - **Net effect:** Slightly increased administrative costs, zero meaningful acceleration in deployment, and a fresh layer of bureaucratic theater to mask the fact that we’re still throwing billions at a problem we refuse to fix at the root.

In

Related Topics

Small Business & EntrepreneurshipTelecommunications & Broadband AccessResearch & Innovation Policy
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💰 Campaign Finance Network

Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$102,900
15 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$102,900

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
BELL, RICHARD R
2 transactions
$16,800
2
NESS, LARRY F
2 transactions
$11,700
3
HARMS, DUANE D
2 transactions
$9,700
4
EVANS, MICHAEL
2 transactions
$8,400
5
POWELL, JESSE
1 transaction
$6,600
6
DUHAMEL, KATHARINE B
1 transaction
$6,600
7
DUHAMEL, WILLIAM F JR.
1 transaction
$6,600
8
BARATTA, JOSEPH
2 transactions
$6,600
9
MCINERNEY, PAULA G
1 transaction
$5,000
10
MILKEN, LOWELL J
1 transaction
$5,000
11
WHITE, ALAN B
1 transaction
$5,000
12
HARMS, JEFFREY D
1 transaction
$5,000
13
MARQUIS, BENJAMIN L
1 transaction
$3,300
14
MARQUIS, DARRELL L
1 transaction
$3,300
15
MARQUIS, DUSTIN L
1 transaction
$3,300

Cosponsors & Their Campaign Finance

This bill has 2 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.

Sen. Luján, Ben Ray [D-NM]

ID: L000570

Top Contributors

45

1
LYTTON BAND OF POMO INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA ROSA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2023
2
OTOE-MISSOURIA TRIBE
OrganizationRED ROCK, OK
$3,300
Dec 7, 2023
3
LYTTON BAND OF POMO INDIANS
OrganizationSANTA ROSA, CA
$3,300
Dec 5, 2023
4
TAOS PUEBLO GOVERNOR'S OFFICE
OrganizationTAOS, NM
$3,300
Dec 2, 2024
5
OHKAY OWINGEH TRIBE
OrganizationOHKAY OWINGEH, NM
$3,300
Dec 2, 2024
6
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$3,300
Apr 18, 2023
7
BARONA BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationLAKESIDE, CA
$3,300
May 22, 2024
8
MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE
OrganizationMESCALERO, NM
$3,300
Sep 25, 2023
9
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
OrganizationWASHINGTON, DC
$2,500
Jun 25, 2024
10
SHAKOPEE MDEWAKANTON SIOUX
OrganizationPRIOR LAKE, MN
$2,000
Mar 21, 2024

Sen. Barrasso, John [R-WY]

ID: B001261

Top Contributors

32

1
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
COMATMORE, AL
$3,300
May 24, 2023
2
POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS
COMATMORE, AL
$3,300
Sep 20, 2024
3
SAN MANUEL BAND OF MISSION INDIANS
COMLOS ANGELES, CA
$2,500
Dec 31, 2024
4
ALABAMA-COUSHATTA TRIBE
COMLIVINGSTON, TX
$1,000
Jun 29, 2023
5
MUSCOGEE CREEK NATION
COMOKMULGEE, OK
$1,000
Oct 30, 2024
6
TO PROTECT OUR HERITAGE
OrganizationSKOKIE, IL
$5,000
Jun 26, 2024
7
TO PROTECT OUR HERITAGE
OrganizationSKOKIE, IL
$5,000
Jun 26, 2024
8
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Jun 11, 2024
9
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
OrganizationCHEROKEE, NC
$3,300
Jun 11, 2024
10
UTE INDIAN TRIBE
OrganizationFORT DUCHESNE, UT
$3,300
Nov 13, 2024

Donor Network - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 29 nodes and 36 connections

Total contributions: $36

Top Donors - Sen. Thune, John [R-SD]

Showing top 15 donors by contribution amount

15 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 helped.

  • +Telecommunicationsconfidence 0.80

    Section 3 improves processing times for communications use applications, which could benefit telecommunications companies by reducing delays in their projects.

  • Section 4 amends the minimum broadband project cost, which could lead to more construction projects for broadband infrastructure, benefiting construction and engineering companies.

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Federal Communications Commission

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 888-890AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's goals of improving accountability, reducing wasteful broadband spending, and streamlining federal permitting for broadband and wireless infrastructure. It enhances transparency, accelerates permitting timelines, and targets efficient use of federal funds—directly supporting the policy's emphasis on oversight, coordination, and ending the digital divide without overbuilding."

Key themes:broadband accountabilitypermitting streamliningfederal fund oversightavoiding overbuildinginteragency coordination

— 855 — Federal Communications Commission so a new Administration should redouble efforts to require timely reviews and final actions by agencies with jurisdiction over federal lands, including the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. l Advance America’s space leadership. One of the most significant technological developments of the past few years has been the emergence of a new generation of low-earth orbit satellites like StarLink and Kuiper. This technology can beam a reliable, high-speed Internet signal to nearly any part of the globe at a fraction of the cost of other technologies. This has the potential to significantly accelerate efforts to end the digital divide and disrupt the federal regulatory and subsidy regime that applies to communications networks. The FCC should expedite its work to support this new technology by acting more quickly in its review and approval of applications to launch new satellites. Otherwise, the U.S. risks ceding space leadership to entities based in countries with more friendly regulatory environments. Holding Government Accountable. Federal technology and telecommunica- tions programs have been plagued by a troubling lack of accountability and good governance. They would benefit from stronger oversight and a fresh look at elim- inating outdated regulations that are doing more harm than good. l End wasteful broadband spending policies. Many of the broadband spending policies being pursued by the current Administration are poised to waste taxpayer money while leaving rural communities and unconnected Americans behind. At the same time, the dramatic recent increases in funding through the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act mean that the federal government has more than enough resources to meet its broadband connectivity goals. Congress should therefore hold the agencies accountable so that taxpayer money is used effectively to promote broadband connectivity across the nation. To that end, the next Administration should instruct the various departments and agencies that are administering broadband infrastructure funds to direct those resources to communities without adequate Internet infrastructure instead of to places that already enjoy broadband connectivity. Take, for example, the final rules that the Treasury Department adopted in 2022 that govern the expenditure of $350 billion in ARPA funds. Rather than directing those dollars to the rural and other communities that have no Internet infrastructure, the current — 856 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Administration gave the green light for recipients to spend those funds to overbuild existing high-speed networks in communities that already have multiple broadband providers. A new Administration should eliminate government-funded overbuilding of existing networks. l Adopt a national coordinating strategy. Hundreds of billions of infrastructure dollars have been appropriated by Congress or budgeted by agencies over the past couple of years that can be used to end the digital divide. Yet, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by a national strategy”; instead, “[f]ederal broadband efforts are fragmented and overlapping, with more than 100 programs administered by 15 agencies,” risking overbuilding as well as wasteful duplication.26 Many of these programs remain plagued by inefficiency, further contributing to waste of limited taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the federal government is failing to put appropriate guardrails in place to govern the expenditure of billions in broadband funds. This is the regulatory equivalent of turning the spigot on full blast and then walking away from the hose. There is a worrisome lack of adequate tracking, measurement, and accountability standards governing all of this broadband spending. As a result, we are likely to see headline levels of waste, fraud, and abuse. A new Administration needs to bring fresh oversight to this spending and put a national strategy in place to ensure that the federal government adopts a coordinated approach to its various broadband initiatives. Similarly, the next Administration should ask the FCC to launch a review of its existing broadband programs, including the different components of the USF, with the goal of avoiding duplication, improving efficiency of existing programs, and saving taxpayer money. l Correct the FCC’s regulatory trajectory and encourage competition to improve connectivity. The FCC is a New Deal–era agency. Its history of regulation tends to reflect the view that the federal government should impose heavy-handed regulation rather than relying on competition and market forces to produce optimal outcomes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended that Congress create the FCC in February 1934 for the purposes of establishing “a single Government agency charged with broad authority” over the field of communications.27 Congress subsequently established the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934. Congress has passed a number of additional statutes—some broad, some

Federal Communications Commission

Moderate
Vector: 66%
Pages: 888-890AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on improving transparency, coordination, and efficiency in broadband deployment through tracking tools and permitting reforms, which aligns with Project 2025's concern about fragmented federal broadband efforts and lack of accountability. However, it does not directly address eliminating government-funded overbuilding or reforming FCC regulations to promote competition, which are central to the Project 2025 policy."

Key themes:broadband accountabilityfederal coordinationreducing waste in broadband spendingtracking and oversightpermitting efficiency

— 856 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Administration gave the green light for recipients to spend those funds to overbuild existing high-speed networks in communities that already have multiple broadband providers. A new Administration should eliminate government-funded overbuilding of existing networks. l Adopt a national coordinating strategy. Hundreds of billions of infrastructure dollars have been appropriated by Congress or budgeted by agencies over the past couple of years that can be used to end the digital divide. Yet, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, “U.S. broadband efforts are not guided by a national strategy”; instead, “[f]ederal broadband efforts are fragmented and overlapping, with more than 100 programs administered by 15 agencies,” risking overbuilding as well as wasteful duplication.26 Many of these programs remain plagued by inefficiency, further contributing to waste of limited taxpayer dollars. Moreover, the federal government is failing to put appropriate guardrails in place to govern the expenditure of billions in broadband funds. This is the regulatory equivalent of turning the spigot on full blast and then walking away from the hose. There is a worrisome lack of adequate tracking, measurement, and accountability standards governing all of this broadband spending. As a result, we are likely to see headline levels of waste, fraud, and abuse. A new Administration needs to bring fresh oversight to this spending and put a national strategy in place to ensure that the federal government adopts a coordinated approach to its various broadband initiatives. Similarly, the next Administration should ask the FCC to launch a review of its existing broadband programs, including the different components of the USF, with the goal of avoiding duplication, improving efficiency of existing programs, and saving taxpayer money. l Correct the FCC’s regulatory trajectory and encourage competition to improve connectivity. The FCC is a New Deal–era agency. Its history of regulation tends to reflect the view that the federal government should impose heavy-handed regulation rather than relying on competition and market forces to produce optimal outcomes. President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended that Congress create the FCC in February 1934 for the purposes of establishing “a single Government agency charged with broad authority” over the field of communications.27 Congress subsequently established the FCC through the Communications Act of 1934. Congress has passed a number of additional statutes—some broad, some — 857 — Federal Communications Commission narrow—that pertain to the FCC’s authority, including most significantly the Telecommunications Act of 1996,28 which opened up markets for greater competition and largely deregulated industry segments. Technological change in the connectivity sector is occurring rapidly. We are now seeing an unprecedented level of convergence, innovation, and competition in the market for connectivity. On the one hand, traditional cable providers like Charter are now offering mobile wireless services to consumers in direct competition with traditional wireless companies like Verizon. On the other hand, a new generation of low-earth orbit satellite services like StarLink and Amazon’s Project Kuiper stand to offer high- speed home broadband in competition with legacy providers. Furthermore, broadcasters are offering high-speed downloads directly to consumers over spectrum that previously provided only TV service. These rapidly evolving market conditions counsel in favor of eliminating many of the heavy-handed FCC regulations that were adopted in an era when every technology operated in a silo. These include many of the FCC’s media ownership rules, which can have the effect of restricting investment and competition because those regulations assume a far more limited set of competitors for advertising dollars than exist today, as well as its universal service requirements. Ultimately, FCC reliance on competition and innovation is vital if the agency is to deliver optimal outcomes for the American public. The FCC should engage in a serious top-to-bottom review of its regulations and take steps to rescind any that are overly cumbersome or outdated. The Commission should focus its efforts on creating a market-friendly regulatory environment that fosters innovation and competition from a wide range of actors, including cable-based, broadband-based, and satellite- based Internet providers. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was a collective enterprise of individuals involved in the 2025 Presidential Transition Project. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume. While this chapter identifies certain issues on which the contributors did not all agree, the author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any other individual.

Financial Regulatory Agencies

Weak
Vector: 65%
Pages: 875-878AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill focuses on streamlining broadband deployment through permitting efficiency and transparency tools, while the Project 2025 excerpt discusses FCC mission, structure, and CFPB civil penalty fund mechanics—topics with minimal direct overlap. Any alignment is indirect, relating only to broader goals of regulatory efficiency and communications infrastructure."

Key themes:regulatory efficiencycommunications infrastructurefederal agency oversight

— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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