The bill
SAFE Act
S. 4280, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
Sponsored by
Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
ID: L000577
Follow the money
The bill
S. 4280, 119th Congress — read as touching Telecommunications.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 248-250 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Read the second time. Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 371.
April 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Joy, another bill that's supposed to make us feel better about the government spying on us. The SAFE Act, because who doesn't love a good acronym? Let me put on my surprised face for a moment... *ahem*
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The main purpose of this bill is to reauthorize and reform certain authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. Because, you know, the last time they "reformed" it, it was a total success... said no one ever. The objectives are to provide greater transparency and oversight, which is just code for "we'll try to make it look like we're doing something while still spying on everyone."
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill introduces some new provisions, such as mandatory audits of US person queries conducted by the FBI (because who doesn't trust the FBI to police themselves?), restrictions on reverse targeting of US persons, and a prohibition on avoiding disclosure obligations through parallel construction. Oh, and let's not forget the enhanced reports by the Director of National Intelligence, because more paperwork always solves everything.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The affected parties include US persons whose communications are collected under Section 702 of FISA (i.e., pretty much everyone), intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, data brokers, and interactive computing services. You know, the usual suspects. The stakeholders are the politicians who get to pretend they're doing something about surveillance, the lobbyists who get paid to make sure nothing actually changes, and the voters who will inevitably be duped into thinking this bill makes a difference.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** The potential impact of this bill is minimal, as it's just another Band-Aid on a bullet wound. It might provide some temporary relief for those who think the government is actually going to start respecting their privacy (ha!), but in reality, it will just lead to more creative ways for intelligence agencies to spy on us. The implications are that we'll continue to have a surveillance state, and our politicians will keep pretending they're doing something about it while lining their pockets with lobbyist money.
In conclusion, the SAFE Act is just another example of legislative theater, designed to make us feel better about being spied on while doing nothing to actually address the problem. It's like putting a fresh coat of paint on a rotting house – it might look pretty for a moment, but the underlying disease remains. And we're all just pawns in their game of "let's pretend we care about your privacy." How quaint.
Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No organization contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: D000563
Top Contributors
10
ID: L000571
Top Contributors
10
ID: H001042
Top Contributors
10
ID: C001096
Top Contributors
10
ID: S000033
Top Contributors
10
ID: S001217
Top Contributors
0
No contribution data available
ID: B001288
Top Contributors
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ID: C001098
Top Contributors
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ID: M000133
Top Contributors
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ID: D000618
Top Contributors
10
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 53 nodes and 35 connections (53 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $238,600
Showing top 17 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 7 harmed.
Section 101(c)(3) prohibits warrantless access to communications content of US persons and persons located in the US, requiring probable cause warrants for law enforcement purposes, which imposes compliance costs and restrictions on telecommunications providers who may be compelled to assist with surveillance under FISA.
Section 205 prohibits parallel construction and requires policies/guidance for derived data, directly impacting cybersecurity firms that provide surveillance or data analysis tools to law enforcement; Section 502 limits law enforcement purchase of personal data from data brokers, affecting cybersecurity firms that rely on such data for threat intelligence.
Section 101(c)(3) restricts warrantless access to communications content acquired under FISA Section 702, which affects big tech platforms that may be compelled to provide data under FISA directives, increasing their compliance burden and limiting government access to user data.
Section 101(c)(3) limits warrantless access to communications content, which could affect AI and cloud providers that store or process data subject to FISA queries, requiring them to implement additional safeguards and compliance measures.
Section 502 restricts law enforcement acquisition of personal data from data brokers, which could reduce surveillance capabilities used in immigration enforcement and private prison contracts that depend on such data for detainee tracking.
Section 101(c)(3) restricts warrantless access to communications content, which may impact e-commerce and retail tech companies that handle user data and could be subject to FISA data requests, increasing their compliance obligations.
+ 4 more industries not shown.
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Sen. Lee, Mike [R-UT])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include: — 216 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise l Stiffer penalties and mandatory investigations when intelligence leaks are aimed at domestic political targets, l Tighter controls on otherwise lawful intercepts that also collect the communications of domestic political figures, l An express prohibition on politically motivated use of intelligence authorities, and l Reforms to improve the accountability of the Justice Department and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. To keep intelligence credentials from being used for partisan purposes, former high-ranking intelligence officials who retain a clearance should remain subject to the Hatch Act after they leave government to deter them from tying their political stands or activism to their continuing privilege of access to classified government information. The IC should be prohibited from monitoring so-called domestic disinformation. Such activity can easily slip into suppression of an opposition party’s speech, is corrosive of First Amendment protections, and raises questions about impartiality when the IC chooses not to act. CHINA-FOCUSED CHANGES, REFORMS, AND RESOURCES The term “whole of government” is all too frequently overused, but in responding to the generational threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party, that is exactly the approach that our national security apparatus should adopt. CIA Director William Burns has formally established a China Mission Center focused on these efforts, but it can be successful only if it is given the necessary personnel, cross-community collaboration, and resources. That is uncertain at this point, and just how seriously the organization is taking the staffing of the center is unclear. A critical strategic question for an incoming Administration and IC lead- ers will be: How, when, and with whom do we share our classified intelligence? Understanding when to pass things to liaisons and for what purpose will be vital to outmaneuvering China in the intelligence sphere. Questions for a President will include: l What is our overarching conception of the adversarial relationship and competition? l How does intelligence-sharing fit into that conception?
— 215 — Intelligence Community Hill who attempt to weaponize the use of selective intelligence to feed political narratives. l Political leaders should avoid “manipulation-by-appointment,” a practice by which intelligence leaders are selected for their policy views or political loyalties instead of their skilled expertise.24 Presidents should also avoid public rebukes and pressure from the intelligence profession, which can include intimidation and bullying, to shape IC analysis. This will be easier if IC leaders live by the norms of neutrality and thus are not seen as political actors, for whom political responses are deemed necessary. l Intelligence leaders and professionals should never “cook the books” for Presidents or change or shape their analysis to preserve access or status.25 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) A future President should understand the importance of FISA26 while also seek- ing reforms and accountability for any abuses of its authorities. When discussing FISA and what changes may need to be made, it is important to note and recognize that there are stark differences among the individual FISA authorities. Section 702 of FISA, for example, allows the IC to target foreign terrorists, spies, cyber hackers, and other bad actors (but only if they are non-U.S. persons) when their communications pass through the United States. While this authority may lapse if Congress does not resolve the issue by the end of 2023, Section 702 should be understood as an essential tool in the fight against terrorism, malicious cyber actors, and Chinese espionage. These are two major national security priorities for an incoming President, and it is imperative that the need to use properly main- tained and accountable authorities to counter these challenges be recognized. Section 702 is a vital program that often provides the lion’s share of intelligence used in the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).27 An independent review by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) found that it was not abused. Nev- ertheless, Congress should review the PCLOB’s upcoming 2023 report to help it determine whether any reforms or codification of recent administrative changes in FISA processes are needed. Other authorities in Title I and Title III, often referred to as “traditional” FISA, have elicited valid concerns about the politicization of intelligence collection authority in recent years. When seeking surveillance of Trump campaign adviser Carter Page, for example, the FBI and the Department of Justice concealed vital information from a specialized court and submitted applications that were riddled with errors. An incoming conservative President should consider reforms designed to prevent future partisan abuses of national security authority. A package of strong provisions to protect against such partisanship might include:
Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.