The bill
Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2025
S. 1133, 119th Congress — read as touching Print & Broadcast Media.
Sponsored by
Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]
ID: G000386
Follow the money
The bill
S. 1133, 119th Congress — read as touching Print & Broadcast Media.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
23 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Communications Commission" section, p. 891-894 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Calendar No. 444.
June 22, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
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5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Sunshine in the Courtroom Act of 2025: A Prescription for Judicial Voyeurism** *Diagnosis: Terminal Naiveté with Complications of Power Tripping*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The bill’s stated goal—“to provide for media coverage of Federal court proceedings”—is about as honest as a politician claiming they’re in it for public service. Ostensibly, it aims to increase transparency by allowing cameras in federal appellate and district courts. But let’s be real: this isn’t about sunshine; it’s about turning the judiciary into a 24/7 true-crime spectacle for ratings-hungry networks and armchair lawyers who think *Law & Order* is a documentary. The real objective? To feed the public’s appetite for judicial drama while letting grandstanding judges play director in their own courtroom telenovela.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** This bill overhauls the federal judiciary’s long-standing aversion to cameras—a stance rooted in the sober understanding that justice isn’t served when a defendant’s fate hinges on whether their sweat looks guilty on HD.
- **Appellate Courts (including SCOTUS):** Presiding judges gain unilateral discretion to allow filming, recording, or broadcasting—unless they (or a majority of judges in multi-judge panels) determine it violates due process. Translation: *Your fate could be livestreamed based on one judge’s mood that morning.* - **District Courts:** Judges may permit media coverage—but with performative safeguards: - Witnesses (non-parties) can request their face/voice be obscured (a nod to victim protection, though likely ignored when ratings spike). - Jurors? Absolutely off-limits—because even Congress realizes showing jurors’ faces might lead to intimidation, or worse, *public accountability*. - Judges can obscure individuals for “good cause” (safety, security, ongoing ops, or “interest of justice”—a phrase so elastic it could cover a judge’s bad hair day). - **Sunset Clause:** District court authority expires in 3 years—because nothing says “permanent reform” like a built-in expiration date tied to the next election cycle. - **Judicial Conference:** Must issue mandatory guidelines for obscuring vulnerable witnesses within 6 months—because apparently, the judiciary needs Congress to tell it not to traumatize crime victims on live TV. - **No Interlocutory Appeals:** You can’t challenge a judge’s decision to allow or deny filming mid-trial. So if your trial becomes *Dateline: Federal Edition*, tough luck.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Judges:** Newfound power to bask in the spotlight—or avoid it, if they’re not narcissists. Most will likely err on the side of caution… until a high-profile case offers a chance at judicial celebrity. - **Parties & Witnesses:** Defendants face the terror of being judged not just by law, but by Twitter. Victims get a hollow promise of obscurity—easily overridden if the judge thinks their tears will boost viewership. - **Media:** Wins big. Finally, a chance to replace gavel-to-gavel coverage of Supreme Court confirmation hearings with actual trials—where the drama is real and the consequences are someone else’s life. - **Public:** Gets to play armchair juror, mistaking sensational clips for justice. Spoiler: outrage ≠ understanding. - **Jurors:** Protected—for now. But give it a year, and someone will argue “transparency” demands we see who’s deciding your fate. Spoiler alert: they’ll be wrong.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill doesn’t bring sunshine—it brings a glare. - **Short-term:** Expect a surge in televised trials, turning federal courts into entertainment venues. High-profile cases (terrorism, corruption, celebrity defendants) will become must-watch TV, incentivizing prosecutors to seek the dramatic over the just. - **Long-term:** Erosion of judicial dignity. Judges will self-censor or
Sen. Grassley, Chuck [R-IA]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 5 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: K000367
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ID: D000563
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ID: B001277
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2(b) allows presiding judges to permit media coverage of court proceedings, which could increase demand for broadcast media services, citing subsection (1)(A)
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on allowing media coverage of federal court proceedings to increase judicial transparency, while the Project 2025 FCC section addresses communications policy such as spectrum auctions, Section 230, and broadband expansion. Both involve media and public access, but they operate in distinct policy domains with little direct overlap."
— 858 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. 47 U.S.C. § 151, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/151 (accessed January 23, 2023). 2. 47 U.S.C. § 154, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/154 (accessed January 23, 2023). 3. Ibid. 4. 47 U.S.C. § 154(c). 5. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5). 6. 47 U.S.C. § 155(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/155 (accessed January 23, 2023). 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. There are no limits on the President’s authority to designate a different Chairperson from among the existing Commissioners. Further, though it is an open question, it is generally believed that the judiciary would impose limits on the power of the President to remove a Commissioner during his or her five-year term. The question is not settled because Congress did not include an express “for cause” or similar protection against removal in the Communications Act itself. Scholars assume this is because Congress passed the Communications Act in the years between the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), when it was not entirely clear that Congress could impose a limit on the President’s removal power. However, the Communications Act was significantly amended in 1996, and Congress did not add “just cause” or other protections from removal at that time. Considering the high-profile contemporary debates about the appointment and removal of independent counsels under the Independent Counsel Act, one could reasonably assume that Congress was aware of removal powers and protections for presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. 9. Chart, “FTEs—Historical and Estimated, Fiscal Years 1986–2023,” in U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, March 2022, p. 17, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-381693A1. pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 10. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2023 Budget Estimates to Congress, p. 7. 11. Roslyn Layton, “Spectrum Auctions Have Raised $230 Billion; The FCC’s Authority to Conduct Them Will Lapse Soon If Congress Doesn’t Act,” Forbes, April 29, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ roslynlayton/2022/04/29/spectrum-auctions-have-raised-230-billion-the-fccs-authority-to-conduct-them- will-lapse-soon-if-congress-doesnt-act/?sh=4d32066908eb (accessed January 23, 2023). 12. For a full listing of the FCC’s Bureaus and Offices, along with their functions and an organization chart, see U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “Organizational Charts of the FCC,” https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/ organizational-charts-fcc (accessed January 23, 2023). 13. 47 U.S.C. § 230, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/47/230 (accessed January 23, 2023). 14. Thomas M. Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230- communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 15. This chapter does not purport to set forth a comprehensive agenda for the FCC. Rather, it focuses on a selected handful of issue areas that may quickly rise to the attention of a new Administration. Similarly, not every contributor to this chapter agrees with every policy idea included here; this document attempts to reflect a range of views and perspectives. 16. Johnson, “The FCC’s Authority to Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act.” 17. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, “NTIA Petition for Rulemaking to Clarify Provisions of Section 230 of the Communications Act,” July 27, 2020, https:// ntia.gov/fcc-filing/ntia-petition-rulemaking-clarify-provisions-section-230-communications-act (accessed January 23, 2023). 18. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1284_869d.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 19. See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also Ray Baum’s Act of 2018, Division P, Title IV, § 401 (codifying the Consolidated Reporting Act), in H.R. 1625, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Public Law No. 115-141, 115th Congress, March 23, 2018, https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ141/PLAW-115publ141.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 20. NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 49 F.4th 439 (5th Cir. 2022), https://fingfx.thomsonreuters.com/gfx/legaldocs/ gdpzqyobyvw/alisonn%201.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). — 859 — Federal Communications Commission 21. Hal J. Singer and Ted Tatos, Subsidizing Universal Broadband Through a Digital Advertising Services Fee: An Alignment of Incentives, Econ One, September 2021, p. 1 (“[T]he current USF mechanism is unsustainable and will fail to meet the needs of its target consumer base within the next five years.”), https://www.econone.com/ wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Digital-Divide-HSinger-TTatos-2.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 22. FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in video of hearing, Worldwide Threats to the Homeland, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, November 15, 2022, at 02:27, https://democrats- homeland.house.gov/activities/hearings/11/04/2022/worldwide-threats-to-the-homeland (accessed January 23, 2023); John D. McKinnon, Arunav Viswanatha, and Stu Woo, “TikTok National-Security Deal Faces More Delays as Worry Grows Over Risks,” The Wall Street Journal, updated December 6, 2022, https://www.wsj. com/articles/tiktok-national-security-deal-faces-more-delays-as-worry-grows-over-risks-11670342800 (accessed January 23, 2023). 23. U.S. Federal Communications Commission, “List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act,” updated September 20, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (accessed January 23, 2023). 24. H.R. 820, Foreign Adversary Communications Transparency Act, 118th Congress, introduced February 2, 2023, https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr820/BILLS-118hr820ih.pdf (accessed March 6, 2023). 25. U.S. Department of State, “The Clean Network,” https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (accessed January 23, 2023). 26. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Broadband: National Strategy Needed to Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Digital Divide, GAO-22-104611, May 2022, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-104611.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 27. Document No. 144, “Federal Communications Commission: Message from the President of the United States Recommending that Congress Create a New Agency to be Known as the Federal Communications Commission,” U.S. Senate, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., February 26, 1934, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/ DOC-298207A1.pdf (accessed January 23, 2023). 28. 47 U.S.C, Chapter 5, §§ 151 et seq., (accessed March 6, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on media access to federal court proceedings to increase judicial transparency, while the Project 2025 excerpt concerns DOJ jurisdiction over voter fraud investigations and election crime prosecutions. Both touch on accountability and the rule of law, but their substantive objectives and policy domains are largely unrelated."
— 563 — Department of Justice Voter fraud includes unlawful practices concerning voter registration and ballot correction. When state legislatures are silent as to procedures for absentee ballot curing or provide specific rules governing that curing, neither counties nor courts may create a cure right where one does not exist, may not modify the law on curing, and certainly cannot engage in creating consent orders with the force of law that are inconsistent with the orders of other similarly situated counties. The DOJ has ceded substantial discretion concerning voter suppression to the Civil Rights Division. Since the Bush Administration, DOJ leadership has determined that using the Election Crimes Branch to prosecute fraudulent voter registration, including mail-in ballot fraud, was too politically costly.78 The Crim- inal Division’s Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses handbook advised that schemes that violated equal protection constituted “voter suppression” prosecut- able under 18 U.S. Code § 241 as part of the guidelines for which the department’s criminal prosecutors were trained.79 State-based investigations of election crimes are supposed to be referred to the Public Integrity Section for review. Historically, 18 U.S. Code § 241 (conspiracy against rights) was used as a basis for investigating state officials whose statements or orders violated the equal protection rights of voters or deliberately misinformed voters concerning the eligibility of their ballots. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice has formalized the Civil Rights Divi- sion’s (as opposed to the Criminal Division’s) jurisdiction over 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions. The Criminal Division is no longer involved in consultation or review of 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations.80 The Criminal Division has accordingly advised states that “[i]n the case of a crime of violence or intimida- tion,” they should “call 911 immediately and before contacting federal authorities” because “[s]tate and local police have primary jurisdiction over polling places,”81 despite clearly applicable federal law. This is a mistake. With respect to the 2020 presidential election, there were no DOJ investigations of the appropriateness or lawfulness of state election guidance. Consider the state of Pennsylvania. The Secretary of State sent guidance to the counties stating that: This revised guidance addresses the issuance, voting and examination of provisional ballots under the Election Code. Provisional ballots were originally mandated by section 302 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 77 of 2019 went into effect for the 2020 Primary election. Provisional ballot amendments included in Act 12 of 2020 go into effect for the first time on November 3, 2020.82 HAVA, however, mandates provisional ballots only for eligible voters who were not on a state’s voter registration list.83 It does not apply to those who registered for mail-in voting but whose ballots were rejected due to some form of spoliation. — 564 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Pennsylvania Act 12 (amended in 2020) does not authorize curing by providing provisional ballots for mail-in voters whose ballots were rejected. Act 12 requires, as part of the mail-in application process, an affidavit that: [The elector] shall not be eligible to vote at a polling place on election day unless the elector brings the elector’s mail-in ballot to the elector’s polling place, remits the ballot and the envelope containing the declaration of the elector to the judge of elections to be spoiled and signs a statement subject to the penalties under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities) to the same effect.84 The law in Pennsylvania clearly states that no county may affirmatively provide provisional ballots: The mail-in voter must vote in person and sign a new affidavit. In the 2020 election, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that “the Election Code contains no requirement that voters whose ballots are deemed inadequately verified be apprised of this fact. Thus, unlike in-person voters, mail-in or absentee voters are not provided any opportunity to cure perceived defects in a timely man- ner.”85 Given the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s use of guidance to circumvent state law, the Pennsylvania Secretary of State should have been (and still should be) investigated and prosecuted for potential violations of 18 U.S. Code § 241. Investigations and prosecutions under 18 U.S. Code § 241 are currently within the jurisdictional oversight of the Civil Rights Division, not the Criminal Division.86 Only by moving authority for 18 U.S. Code § 241 investigations and prosecutions back to the Criminal Division will the rule of law be appropriately enforced. Rejecting Third-Party Requests for Politically Motivated Investigations or Prosecutions. The DOJ should reject demands from third-party groups that ask it to threaten politically motivated investigation or prosecution of those engag- ing in lawful and, in many cases, constitutionally protected activity. By acceding to such demands, the department risks diminishing its credibility with the American public. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that communications between govern- ment officials and third-party groups are generally unprotected by privilege and subject to disclosure, whether via subpoena to the third-party group or via request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. These communications can even be made public voluntarily by the third-party group. A recent example illustrates the risks posed by such activity. On October 4, 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland issued a memorandum to the Director of the FBI, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, and the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, calling on the FBI to work with each U.S. Attorney to “con- vene meetings with federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial leaders” to discuss strategies for addressing “threats against school administrators, board members, teachers, and staff.”87 Subsequent reporting and investigation revealed that the
AI Analysis:
"The bill promotes transparency in federal court proceedings, which tangentially supports the broader Project 2025 goal of restoring the rule of law and public trust, but it does not address the DOJ-specific reforms, politicization, consent decrees, or investigative priorities emphasized in the policy."
— 557 — Department of Justice such as increases in “sextortion,” ransomware, and the continued proliferation of child pornography. DEFENDING THE RULE OF LAW The DOJ’s actions over the course of the Biden Administration exhibit scorn for its stated mission: “to uphold the rule of law, to keep our country safe, and to pro- tect civil rights.”54 The Biden Administration’s unprecedented politicization and weaponization of the department therefore demand a comprehensive response from the next Administration. Restoration of the department’s values of independence, impartiality, honesty, integrity, respect, and excellence must serve as first principles for its efforts on all fronts. Concretely, the DOJ must identify and address all individuals, policies, and directives that have fueled the destruction of these core values and the American people’s loss of trust in the department and its officials. The next Administration will need to exert significant energy to dismantle the two-tiered system of justice currently in place at the department while simultaneously applying the rule of law evenly and with neutrality. Specific examples of department corruption, such as the Russia collusion hoax, will need to be tackled, exposed, and addressed head-on. This will require not just winning in a court of law, but also demonstrating culpability to the public and the media in a concrete and nonrefutable manner. These efforts will require commitment and willpower, but they will be essential to restoring the trust of the American people. Promptly and Properly Eliminating Lawless Policies, Investigations, and Cases, Including All Existing Consent Decrees. Few things undermine the DOJ’s credibility more than brazenly partisan and ideologically driven prosecution of an Administration’s perceived political enemies, yet the department has readily indulged in such misadventures during the Biden Administration. Before even entering the Robert F. Kennedy building on January 20, 2025, the next Adminis- tration should: l Conduct a thorough review of all publicly available policies, investigations, and cases. l In a manner consistent with applicable law, prepare a plan to end immediately any policies, investigations, or cases that run contrary to law or Administration policies. l Ensure that upon the next President’s inauguration, appointees at the department obtain information about anything that was not learned before taking office and conduct the same analysis. — 558 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise An egregious example of the need for such a review is provided by the depart- ment’s use of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act55 to harass pro-life demonstrators while not pursuing similar investigations of shocking acts of violence committed against pro-life pregnancy resource centers. On the morning of September 23, 2022, pro-life activist Mark Houck was arrested by more than 15 FBI agents at his home in Pennsylvania in front of his wife and small children. Agents came to his door with guns drawn to arrest the 48-year-old father of seven whose alleged crime involved a minor altercation with an activist who was harass- ing one of his children in front of an abortion clinic almost one year before Mr. Houck’s arrest by the FBI.56 Similarly, Paul Vaughn, a 55-year-old father of 11, was arrested at his home in Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, by armed FBI agents for allegedly participating in a peaceful protest at an abortion clinic one year earlier.57 These arrests stand in stark contrast to the department’s virtual silence on the wave of vandalism and violence directed at religiously affiliated institutions, includ- ing pregnancy resource centers, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization.58 The Catholic News Agency reported more than one hundred such incidents as of September 2022.59 By engaging in disparate and viewpoint-based enforcement of an already con- troversial law like the FACE Act against pro-life activists, the DOJ has needlessly undermined its credibility with law-abiding people of faith. The department should make every effort to uphold equal protection of the law and avoid politically moti- vated and viewpoint-based prosecutions. Specifically, it should: l Ensure that its review extends beyond ending the absurd double standards embodied in the ongoing campaign of FACE Act prosecutions and instead be a thorough and holistic review of all DOJ activities, including all consent degrees and settlement agreements currently in force. l Seek to terminate any unnecessary or outdated consent decree to which the United States is a party. l Consider pursuing intervention in other matters where consent decrees or settlement agreements continue to bind parties years or decades after the fact. l As its review concludes, and consistent with applicable law, take appropriate action in all cases, including those on appeal. l Enact policies and regulations that prohibit settlement payments to third parties.
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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.