The bill
Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025
HR. 1789, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]
ID: F000478
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 1789, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Executive Office of the President of the United States" section, p. 96-98 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 18.
March 20, 2025
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
(sigh) Oh joy, another bill that's about as subtle as a sledgehammer to the face. Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this monstrosity.
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025 (HR 1789) is a laughable attempt to shield current and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, and other senior Executive officials from accountability. Its primary objective is to create a firewall between these individuals and the justice system, ensuring they can't be held liable for their actions while in office.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill amends Title 28 of the United States Code to:
1. Expand the scope of removal jurisdiction, allowing federal officials to transfer cases from state courts to federal courts, where they're more likely to receive favorable treatment. 2. Introduce a presumption of immunity for federal officials, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove wrongdoing. 3. Limit the admissibility of evidence in cases involving federal officials, effectively gagging whistleblowers and witnesses. 4. Grant the Attorney General authority to represent or compensate private counsel for federal officials accused of wrongdoing.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:
1. Current and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, and senior Executive officials who want to avoid accountability. 2. The Department of Justice, which will now have more power to shield its cronies from prosecution. 3. Lobbyists and special interest groups that donate heavily to politicians and expect favors in return.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a cancer on the body politic. If passed, it will:
1. Erode trust in government by creating a culture of impunity among high-ranking officials. 2. Undermine the rule of law by allowing federal officials to operate above the law. 3. Embolden corruption and abuse of power, as officials will feel protected from consequences.
In short, HR 1789 is a brazen attempt to codify corruption and ensure that those in power remain unaccountable. It's a slap in the face to the American people, who deserve better than to be governed by a class of untouchables. (muttering to himself) And I'm sure it's just a coincidence that this bill was introduced by a politician with a history of... (rolls eyes)
Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 42 nodes and 24 connections (51 secondary connections hidden)
Total contributions: $87,215
Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill’s effort to shield senior executive officials from state prosecutions and move cases to federal court aligns with Project 2025’s goal of strengthening the Executive Office and insulating the presidency from external interference that could hinder its agenda."
— 64 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise Senate, often serves as a presidential emissary to the Senate and thus can be espe- cially helpful in securing passage of the President’s legislative agenda. To the extent that he or she desires, a Vice President can have a direct role in shaping Administration policy. A Vice President who regularly attends meetings and disperses staff across the interagency and policy councils is a Vice President whose voice will be heard. AUTHOR’S NOTE: Special thanks to those who contributed to this chapter: Stephen Billy, Scott Pace, Casey Mulligan, Edie Heipel, Mike Duffey, Vance Ginn, Iain Murray, Laura Cunliffe, Mario Loyola, Anthony Campau, Paige Agostin, Molly Sikes, Paul Ray, Kenneth A. Klukowski, Michael Anton, Robert Greenway, Valerie Huber, James Rockas, Paul Winfree, Aaron Hedlund, Brian McCormack, David Legates, Art Kleinschmidt, Paul Larkin, Kayla Tonnessen, Jeffrey B. Clark, Jonathan Wolfson, and Bob Burkett. — 65 — Executive Office of the President of the United States ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii#section1 (accessed January 30, 2023). 2. James Madison, The Federalist Papers No. 47, January 30, 1788, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Madison/01-10-02-0266 (accessed January 30, 2023). 3. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A) and 1341(a)(1)(B), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1341 (accessed January 30, 2023); § 1342, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1342 (accessed January 30, 2023); and § 1517(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/1517(a) (accessed January 30, 2023). 4. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12866, “Regulatory Planning and Review,” September 30, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 190 (October 4, 1993), pp. 51735–51744, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/ FR-1993-10-04/pdf/FR-1993-10-04.pdf (accessed March 9, 2023). 5. Brent J. McIntosh, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Neomi Rao, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum of Agreement, “The Department of the Treasury and the Office of Management and Budget Review of Tax Regulations Under Executive Order 12866,” April 11, 2018, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 6. See Steven A. Engel, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, “Extending Regulatory Review Under Executive Order 12866 to Independent Regulatory Agencies,” 43 Op. O.L.C. __ (Oct. 8, 2019), https:// www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/attachments/2020/12/30/2019-10-08-extend-reg-review.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 7. Office of Management and Budget, Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis,” September 17, 2003, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/legacy_drupal_files/omb/circulars/A4/a-4.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 8. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13891, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Improved Agency Guidance Documents,” October 9, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55235– 55238, https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/04-11%20Signed%20Treasury%20OIRA%20MOA. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 9. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13771, “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,” January 30, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 22 (February 3, 20170, pp. 9339–9341, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 10. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13777, “Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,” February 24, 2017, in Federal Register, Vol. 82, No. 39 (March 1, 2017), pp. 12285–12287, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/ pkg/FR-2017-03-01/pdf/2017-04107.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 11. See note 8, supra. 12. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13892, “Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication,” in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 199 (October 15, 2019), pp. 55239–55243, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 13. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13893, “Increasing Government Accountability for Administrative Actions by Reinvigorating Administrative PAYGO,” October 10, 2019, in Federal Register, Vol. 84, No. 200 (October 16, 2019), pp. 55487–55488, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-16/pdf/2019-22749. pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 14. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13924, “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery,” May 19, 2020, in Federal Register, Vol. 85, No. 100 (May 22, 2020), pp. 31353–31356, esp. 31355, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-05-22/pdf/2020-11301.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 15. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13979, “Ensuring Democratic Accountability in Agency Rulemaking,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6813–6815, https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01644.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 16. President Donald J. Trump, Executive Order 13980, “Protecting Americans from Overcriminalization Through Regulatory Reform,” January 18, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 13 (January 22, 2021), pp. 6817–6820, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-22/pdf/2021-01645.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023).
AI Analysis:
"The bill seeks to shield the President and senior executive officials from state legal actions, thereby enhancing presidential authority and limiting external checks—core themes in Project 2025’s vision of a President who controls the executive branch and protects it from politicized or bureaucratic interference."
— 42 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise ENDNOTES 1. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 1, https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/article-2/ (accessed February 14, 2023). 2. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 3. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 3. 4. U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2. 5. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 6. H.R. 4328, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Public Law No. 105- 277, 105th Congress, October 21, 1998, Division C, Title I, § 151, https://www.congress.gov/105/plaws/publ277/ PLAW-105publ277.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 7. S. 1871, An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Public Law No. 76-252, 76th Congress, August 2, 1939, https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/53/STATUTE-53-Pg1147.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). 8. S. 758, National Security Act of 1947, Public Law No. 80-253, 80th Congress, July 26, 1947, https://govtrackus. s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/61/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). “The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (PL 235 – 61 Stat. 496; U.S.C. 402), amended by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 (63 Stat. 579; 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.). Later in 1949, as part of the Reorganization Plan, the Council was placed in the Executive Office of the President.” The White House, “National Security Council,” https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 9. See Chapter 2, “Executive Office of the President,” infra. 10. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 12835, “Establishment of the National Economic Council,” January 25, 1993, in Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 16 (January 27, 1993), pp. 6189–6190, https://www.govinfo. gov/content/pkg/FR-1993-01-27/pdf/FR-1993-01-27.pdf (accessed March 7, 2023). — 43 — 2 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Russ Vought In its opening words, Article II of the U.S. Constitution makes it abundantly clear that “[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”1 That enormous power is not vested in departments or agencies, in staff or administrative bodies, in nongovernmental organizations or other equities and interests close to the government. The President must set and enforce a plan for the executive branch. Sadly, however, a President today assumes office to find a sprawling federal bureaucracy that all too often is carrying out its own policy plans and preferences—or, worse yet, the policy plans and preferences of a radical, supposedly “woke” faction of the country. The modern conservative President’s task is to limit, control, and direct the executive branch on behalf of the American people. This challenge is created and exacerbated by factors like Congress’s decades-long tendency to delegate its lawmaking power to agency bureaucracies, the pervasive notion of expert “inde- pendence” that protects so-called expert authorities from scrutiny, the presumed inability to hold career civil servants accountable for their performance, and the increasing reality that many agencies are not only too big and powerful, but also increasingly weaponized against the public and a President who is elected by the people and empowered by the Constitution to govern. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison warned that “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”2 Regrettably, that wise and cautionary note describes to a significant degree the modern executive branch, which—whether controlled
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 policy seek to curb what they view as overzealous or politically motivated prosecutions that could chill protected political activity, emphasizing deference to expert agency interpretations and limiting jurisdictional overreach. However, the bill focuses on removing state cases to federal court and expanding immunity for senior executive officials, while the Project 2025 text centers on DOJ prosecutorial discretion regarding FECA and defending the FEC, resultin"
— 863 — Federal Election Commission l The President assuming office in 2025 must ensure, if the three Republican commissioners do not wish to remain on the FEC past their terms, that nominees for these positions share the views of those commissioners. l Also, to the extent that the President has the ability to negotiate with the Democratic Party leader in the Senate, he should try to temper any choice of the opposition party to ensure that this individual does not have extreme views on aggressive overenforcement that would severely restrict political speech and protected party, campaign, and associational activities. U.S. Department of Justice/FEC-Related Activities. The President does have control of the Department of Justice (DOJ). Thus, he has authority as Presi- dent, primarily through his choice of attorney general and other political appointees, to direct the prosecutorial functions of the DOJ regarding criminal enforcement of FECA. Such investigations and prosecutions are carried out by the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division, with the assistance, coordination, and help of the Offices of U.S. Attorneys in whatever state an alleged violation occurs. l The President must ensure that the DOJ, just like the FEC, is directed to only prosecute clear violations of FECA. The department must not construe ambiguous provisions against the public instead of the government or apply FECA in a way that infringes on protected First Amendment activity. It should be but is not always obvious to overzealous government prosecutors that if a federal law is confusing, it would be unjust to prosecute individuals who are unable to determine if they are violating the law. l The President should direct the DOJ and the attorney general not to prosecute individuals under an interpretation of the law with which the FEC—the expert agency designated by Congress to enforce the law civilly and issue regulations establishing the standards under which the law is applied—does not agree. l In making prosecution decisions, DOJ should be instructed to consult and consider all official actions by the FEC that interpret the law including prior enforcement actions, regulatory pronouncements, and advisory opinions, just as private practitioners, the public, and political actors must do. — 864 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise It is fundamentally unfair for the DOJ to prosecute an individual for supposedly violating the law when the FEC has previously determined that a similarly situ- ated individual has not violated the law. Furthermore, this rule should apply even when there is a tied or three-to-three vote by the FEC commissioners whether in an enforcement action or an advisory opinion since under the statute, the FEC cannot take any action unless there are four affirmative votes. Again, it seems obvious that if the commissioners designated by Congress to interpret the law are unable to determine what the law requires, then it is unfair to prosecute a citizen for violating that law. The DOJ should not engage in crim- inal prosecutions that stretch legal theories and defy FEC interpretations and regulations. Another issue directly related to what has often been a contentious relationship between the FEC and the DOJ is the conduct of litigation. The vast majority of federal agencies are defended by the DOJ, which also represents them when the agency is pursuing litigation as a plaintiff. The FEC, however, is one of the few federal agencies with independent litigating authority.10 The FEC’s lawyers represent the agency in federal court up through the federal courts of appeal. If a case reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, then the Office of the Solicitor General of the Justice Department represents the FEC. In recent years, the FEC has failed to defend itself against litigation filed by political allies of certain Democrat commissioners. It takes four votes to authorize the general counsel of the FEC to defend a lawsuit filed against the agency, and those commissioners have refused to provide that fourth vote, so “the public was treated to the scandalous spectacle of the Commission—an independent agency of the United States government—defaulting in litigation before federal courts.”11 These cases involved enforcement matters in which the commissioners dis- agreed on whether a violation of the law had occurred. Accordingly, the final votes of the commissioners did not approve moving forward with enforcement because there were not four affirmative votes that a violation of the law occurred. When private plaintiffs then sued the FEC for failing to take action, Democrat commissioners refused to authorize the defense of the FEC in litigation as a way of circumventing the prior final action of the FEC and the FECA four-vote requirement to authorize an enforcement action. Such defaults in litigation are unacceptable. l The President should direct the attorney general to defend the FEC in all litigation when there is a failure of the commissioners to authorize the general counsel of the agency to defend it. No legislation would be needed to accomplish this; the DOJ has the general authority to defend the government and its agencies in all litigation.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.
To amend the National Child Protection Act of 1993 to ensure that businesses and organizations that work with vulnerable populations are able to request background checks for their contractors who work with those populations, as well as for individuals that the businesses or organizations license or certify to provide care for those populations.
119/hr/3100
American Enrichment Deployment Act
119/hr/9612
SHOWER Act
119/hr/4593