Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025

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Bill ID: 119/hr/1789
Last Updated: May 20, 2026

Sponsored by

Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]

ID: F000478

Follow the money

The bill

Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025

HR. 1789, 119th Congress.

The sponsor

Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$87,215 raised

24 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

60% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Introduction" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

Track this bill's progress through the legislative process

Latest Action

Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 18.

March 20, 2025

Introduced

📍 Current Status

Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.

🏛️

Committee Review

🗳️

Floor Action

Passed House

🏛️

Senate Review

🎉

Passed Congress

🖊️

Presidential Action

⚖️

Became Law

📚 How does a bill become a law?

1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.

2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.

7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!

Bill Summary

(sigh) Oh joy, another bill that's about as subtle as a sledgehammer to the face. Let me put on my surgical gloves and dissect this monstrosity.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Promptly Ending Political Prosecutions and Executive Retaliation Act of 2025 (HR 1789) is a laughable attempt to shield current and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, and other senior Executive officials from accountability. Its primary objective is to create a firewall between these individuals and the justice system, ensuring they can't be held liable for their actions while in office.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill amends Title 28 of the United States Code to:

1. Expand the scope of removal jurisdiction, allowing federal officials to transfer cases from state courts to federal courts, where they're more likely to receive favorable treatment. 2. Introduce a presumption of immunity for federal officials, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove wrongdoing. 3. Limit the admissibility of evidence in cases involving federal officials, effectively gagging whistleblowers and witnesses. 4. Grant the Attorney General authority to represent or compensate private counsel for federal officials accused of wrongdoing.

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

1. Current and former Presidents, Vice Presidents, and senior Executive officials who want to avoid accountability. 2. The Department of Justice, which will now have more power to shield its cronies from prosecution. 3. Lobbyists and special interest groups that donate heavily to politicians and expect favors in return.

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a cancer on the body politic. If passed, it will:

1. Erode trust in government by creating a culture of impunity among high-ranking officials. 2. Undermine the rule of law by allowing federal officials to operate above the law. 3. Embolden corruption and abuse of power, as officials will feel protected from consequences.

In short, HR 1789 is a brazen attempt to codify corruption and ensure that those in power remain unaccountable. It's a slap in the face to the American people, who deserve better than to be governed by a class of untouchables. (muttering to himself) And I'm sure it's just a coincidence that this bill was introduced by a politician with a history of... (rolls eyes)

Related Topics

Executive Branch OversightJudiciary & Legal ReformCongressional Rules & Procedures
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$87,215
23 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$10,100
Committees
$0
Individuals
$77,115

No PAC contributions found

1
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS
2 transactions
$6,600
2
RMS LLC
1 transaction
$2,500
3
ROBERT S GUYTON PC
1 transaction
$1,000

No committee contributions found

1
GAMBLE, KATHRYN
1 transaction
$6,600
2
AUSTIN, ROBERT
1 transaction
$6,600
3
MOORE, KEVIN
1 transaction
$6,600
4
LOWELL, RANDY
1 transaction
$3,435
5
GRUBBS, WESLEY
1 transaction
$3,435
6
WOOTEN, GAIL
1 transaction
$3,435
7
WELLS, MICHAEL
1 transaction
$3,435
8
JOHNSON, CYNDI
1 transaction
$3,435
9
JOHNSON, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,435
10
AVENT, BARRY
1 transaction
$3,435
11
CASSELMAN, JOHN
1 transaction
$3,435
12
MARINO, PATRICK
1 transaction
$3,435
13
VALLARINO, MANUEL
1 transaction
$3,300
14
PLYLER, JUSTIN
1 transaction
$3,300
15
STOREY, JOAN
1 transaction
$3,300
16
PETERS, BP
1 transaction
$3,300
17
BELL, MENDEL J
1 transaction
$3,300
18
WISE, WYMAN
1 transaction
$3,300
19
SHY, STACEY
1 transaction
$3,300
20
PAYNE, FRANK K
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]

PACs
Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 42 nodes and 24 connections (51 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $87,215

Top Donors - Rep. Fry, Russell [R-SC-7]

Showing top 23 donors by contribution amount

3 Orgs20 Individuals

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.

Introduction

Moderate60.1%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide

Introduction

Moderate60.1%
Pages: 898-900

— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.

About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text. A score of 60% or higher indicates meaningful thematic overlap. This does not imply direct causation or intent, but highlights areas where legislation aligns with Project 2025 policy objectives.

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