The bill
Nuclear Advisory Committee Reform Act
HR. 9613, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
Sponsored by
Rep. Harshbarger, Diana [R-TN-1]
ID: H001086
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9613, 119th Congress — read as touching Nuclear Power.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Energy and Related Commissions" section, p. 440-442 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Forwarded by Subcommittee to Full Committee by Voice Vote.
July 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill moves to the floor for full chamber debate and voting.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**Summary of H.R. 9613: Nuclear Advisory Committee Reform Act**
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated purpose of H.R. 9613 is to "update the role" of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in nuclear reactor licensing and oversight. In reality, this bill is a bureaucratic face-lift for an advisory body that has long operated in the shadows of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Its true objective appears to be streamlining the ACRS’s input into licensing decisions—making it faster, more pliable, and less likely to delay or complicate approvals for new or amended reactor licenses. The bill frames this as "efficiency," but given the nuclear industry’s persistent push to expand operations despite aging infrastructure and public skepticism, the real goal is likely to reduce regulatory friction for applicants—i.e., make it easier to get reactors approved, whether they’re novel designs or creaky old plants seeking life extensions.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 29 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to restructure the ACRS: - Membership is capped at 15 (down from no explicit prior limit), appointed by the NRC, with a focus on "diverse technical expertise"—a vague phrase that could mean anything from genuine interdisciplinary rigor to box-ticking for political or industry appeasement. - Term limits are introduced: max two 4-year terms, *unless* the NRC finds a "compelling need" for longer service—a loophole large enough to drive a spent fuel cask through. This lets the Commission retain loyalists or industry-friendly experts indefinitely under the guise of necessity. - The ACRS’s duties are narrowed to reviewing license applications *only when specifically requested* by the NRC, and its advice is limited to reactor design hazards and safety standard adequacy. Crucially, the Committee must now focus on issues that are "directly related to reactor design," "safety significant," "novel," and "not previously acted on"—a filter designed to exclude routine or redundant concerns, effectively muzzling persistent critics. - The Committee may only act if the NRC *requests* it to—turning an advisory body into a reactive tool rather than an independent check. - Per diem and travel compensation are formalized, though this is minor compared to the structural shifts. - Conforming amendments tweak related sections (e.g., Section 163 on advisory committees, Section 192a on temporary licenses) to align with the new ACRS framework, mostly adjusting cross-references and conditional language.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC):** Gains tighter control over when and how the ACRS weighs in, reducing potential delays or dissent in licensing. - **Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS):** Transformed from an independent advisory voice into a conditional, NRC-directed subcontractor. Its ability to raise broad or recurring safety concerns is curtailed. - **Nuclear Industry (vendors, utilities, applicants):** Benefits from faster, more predictable reviews with fewer opportunities for advisory pushback—especially for novel reactor designs (SMRs, advanced reactors) where the ACRS’s novelty filter could ironically limit scrutiny of unproven tech. - **Public & Environmental Groups:** Lose a layer of independent technical oversight. The ACRS’s reduced autonomy and narrowed mandate make it less likely to flag systemic or recurring safety issues. - **Congress:** Appears to be "modernizing" nuclear regulation while actually weakening a check on industry influence—classic legislative theater.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill risks turning the ACRS into a rubber-stamp corps that only speaks when told to—and only about what it’s told to discuss. By tying its activity to NRC requests and emphasizing "novelty" and "design focus," it discourages the Committee from addressing systemic problems (e.g., aging components, common-cause failures, or regulatory capture) unless they’re new and flashy. The "
Rep. Harshbarger, Diana [R-TN-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: G000601
Top Contributors
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Showing 45 nodes and 51 connections
Total contributions: $51
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Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.
Section 2 updates the role of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, which could lead to more efficient licensing and oversight of nuclear reactor facilities, potentially benefiting the nuclear power industry.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's goal of reforming the NRC to streamline nuclear licensing, enhance efficiency, and support advanced reactor deployment by modernizing the ACRS to focus on safety-significant and novel designs, improve transparency, and reduce regulatory delays."
— 408 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FERC is considering policy statements that would consider GHG emissions as part of its NEPA review and its NGA determination as to whether approval of an LNG export facility is consistent with the public interest. New Policies Since Congress through the NGA has already determined that LNG exports to countries with free trade agreements are in the public interest,129 and because LNG exports help to ensure America’s ability to support our friends and allies around the world while also supporting domestic natural gas production, FERC: l Should not use environmental issues like climate change as a reason to stop LNG projects. l Should ensure that the natural gas pipelines that are needed deliver more of the product to market, both for domestic use and export, and are reviewed, developed and constructed in a timely manner. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mission/Overview The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974130 created the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC). Before then, the commercial nuclear industry was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.131 Importantly, the AEC was responsible for encouraging and regulat- ing commercial nuclear power. Broad criticism of this dual function was a major factor in the establishment of the NRC, which held regulatory authority while the newly established Department of Energy held the advocacy function. Today, the NRC is responsible for a broad range of regulatory activities, including reactor safety, oversight of nuclear materials, and protection against radiation as well as permitting new reactors, certifying new reactor designs, and regulating nuclear waste management activities. Needed Reforms In 1989, the NRC established alternative licensing processes that were meant to provide a more predictable and efficient regulatory pathway for new Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by combining construction and operating nuclear power plant licenses, allowing for Early Site Permits, and establishing a framework for pre- approval of reactor designs. More recently, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act directed the NRC to establish a technology-neutral licensing process for new, advanced reactor technologies.132 Despite these efforts, the NRC remains a significant cost and regulatory barrier to new nuclear power. Especially — 409 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions frustrating is that these costs to a large extent are due to the agencies being overly prescriptive rather than outcomes-focused and fall on well-known and understood LWR reactor technologies. New Policies While refocusing its regulatory efforts on new reactor technologies, the NRC should also continue to ensure the security of radiological sources and mitigate cybersecurity risks across the industry. Applications for Combined Operating Licenses (COLs) and design certifications that rely on light-water technology should generally be completed within two years. Early Site Permits should gener- ally be issued within one year for construction on or adjacent to an existing reactor site. Additionally, the NRC should: l Expedite the review and approval of license extensions of existing reactors, which will require the NRC to streamline and focus its NEPA review process. l Set clear radiation exposure and protection standards by eliminating ALARA (“as low as reasonably achievable”) as a regulatory principle and setting clear standards according to radiological risk and dose rather than arbitrary objectives. l Work with Congress to reform its funding approach so that licensee fees are generally required for activities that are specific to a regulated entity, with other agency costs being provided through normal appropriations. Budget In FY 2022, the NRC was required to recover approximately 85 percent of its $887.7 million budget through licensee fees.133 The Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act requires the NRC to recover nearly all of its costs through fees. These reforms would likely not cost additional money but could rebalance the fee-versus-appropriations calculation. AUTHOR’S NOTE: The preparation of this chapter was the work of many individuals. All contributors to this chapter are listed at the front of this volume, but I wish to give special thanks to Brent Bennett, Willis Bixby, Travis Fisher, Ben Lieberman, Brian McCormack, Tom Pyle, Mark Robeck, Daniel Simmons, Jack Spencer, Katie Tubb, and David Walsh. Though informed by many, the author alone assumes responsibility for the content of this chapter, and no views expressed herein should be attributed to any particular individual.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's goal of modernizing the NRC to support advanced nuclear technologies by streamlining advisory processes, enhancing transparency, and focusing on safety-significant and novel reactor designs—key to reducing regulatory barriers for new nuclear power."
— 407 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions New Policies FERC should: l Recommit itself to the NGA’s purpose of providing the American people with access to affordable and reliable natural gas. l Limit its NGA decision-making on natural gas pipeline certificates to the question of whether there is a need for the natural gas. l Limit its NEPA analysis to the impacts of the actual pipeline itself, not indirect upstream and downstream effects. In addition, Congress, the states, and FERC should consider how better to pro- tect and compensate property owners whose property is taken for the benefit of the public. FERC also needs to be mindful that natural gas pipelines and projects are important for domestic access to natural gas, including local natural gas utilities, natural gas–fired electric generation, and manufacturing, as well as for exports of liquefied natural gas. FERC: LNG EXPORT FACILITIES Mission/Overview FERC permits, sites, and authorizes the construction and operation of LNG export facilities.125 It does not authorize the export of natural gas; DOE exercises that authority. LNG export facilities are important for delivering natural gas to markets around the world and have become an important policy tool in limiting the ability of Russia and Middle Eastern countries to use energy as a tool in for- eign affairs. Needed Reforms LNG exports are opposed by climate activists. In addition, some domestic man- ufacturers argue that LNG exports decrease available U.S. supplies of natural gas and increase the domestic price, thereby harming the competitive advantages of U.S. manufacturers in world markets. Currently, most LNG export facilities are along the Gulf of Mexico in Texas and Louisiana.126 Attempts to build facilities on the west coast (Jordan Cove LNG127) and the east coast have not moved forward for a variety of reasons; delays and costs of litigation can cause developers to cancel projects. An Alaska facility was approved by FERC in 2020, and the Biden Administration has indicated its sup- port.128 An east coast facility in Pennsylvania (or nearby) would unlock Marcellus shale natural gas for export. — 408 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise FERC is considering policy statements that would consider GHG emissions as part of its NEPA review and its NGA determination as to whether approval of an LNG export facility is consistent with the public interest. New Policies Since Congress through the NGA has already determined that LNG exports to countries with free trade agreements are in the public interest,129 and because LNG exports help to ensure America’s ability to support our friends and allies around the world while also supporting domestic natural gas production, FERC: l Should not use environmental issues like climate change as a reason to stop LNG projects. l Should ensure that the natural gas pipelines that are needed deliver more of the product to market, both for domestic use and export, and are reviewed, developed and constructed in a timely manner. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Mission/Overview The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974130 created the Nuclear Regulatory Com- mission (NRC). Before then, the commercial nuclear industry was regulated by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was established by the 1954 Atomic Energy Act.131 Importantly, the AEC was responsible for encouraging and regulat- ing commercial nuclear power. Broad criticism of this dual function was a major factor in the establishment of the NRC, which held regulatory authority while the newly established Department of Energy held the advocacy function. Today, the NRC is responsible for a broad range of regulatory activities, including reactor safety, oversight of nuclear materials, and protection against radiation as well as permitting new reactors, certifying new reactor designs, and regulating nuclear waste management activities. Needed Reforms In 1989, the NRC established alternative licensing processes that were meant to provide a more predictable and efficient regulatory pathway for new Light Water Reactors (LWRs) by combining construction and operating nuclear power plant licenses, allowing for Early Site Permits, and establishing a framework for pre- approval of reactor designs. More recently, the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act directed the NRC to establish a technology-neutral licensing process for new, advanced reactor technologies.132 Despite these efforts, the NRC remains a significant cost and regulatory barrier to new nuclear power. Especially
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on reforming the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to improve efficiency and transparency in nuclear reactor licensing, which aligns with Project 2025's goal of reducing regulatory obstacles and enabling deployment of advanced nuclear reactors like SMRs. However, the bill does not directly address limiting the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) or shifting commercialization responsibilities to the private sector as emphasized in the policy."
— 375 — Department of Energy and Related Commissions OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (NE) Mission/Overview The Office of Nuclear Energy’s “mission is to advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” It has five stated goals: “Enable continued operation of existing U.S. nuclear reactors,” “Enable deployment of advanced nuclear reactors,” “Develop advanced nuclear fuel cycles,” “Maintain U.S. leadership in nuclear energy technology,” and “Enable a high-performing organization.”29 Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,30 the Office of Nuclear Energy “has also been responsible for the DOE’s statutory requirements to collect and dispose of spent nuclear fuel…since the Obama Administration’s dissolution of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.”31 Needed Reforms NE is too influential in driving the business decisions of commercial nuclear energy firms. Instead of focusing on a limited set of basic research and devel- opment activities that solve foundational technical issues that apply broadly to energy production, NE intervenes in nearly all aspects of the commercial nuclear energy industry. Absent wholesale reforms that restructure the federal energy and science bureaucracy to eliminate such functional energy offices, the next Admin- istration should: l Substantially limit NE’s size and scope. l Adopt broader regulatory and energy policy reforms that reduce regulatory obstacles, allow all energy sources to compete fairly in the marketplace, and establish a predictable policy environment. This will avoid unfair bias against the nuclear industry. New Policies NE should transition to a more limited scope of responsibilities that focuses on basic research, solving broadly applicable technology challenges, and solving the nuclear waste management issue as it relates to the development and deployment of advanced next-generation reactors, which can include small modular reactors (SMR). While respecting existing contractual obligations, NE should not initi- ate any new civilian reactor demonstration and commercialization projects. NE also should: l Focus on overcoming technical barriers that are preventing commercial reactor demonstration projects from moving forward. Any activities in support of existing nuclear plants and any other projects — 376 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise directed toward commercialization, including licensing support, should be shouldered by the private sector. l Reorganize its remaining activities into three basic lines of responsibility: nuclear fuels across the fuel cycle, reactor technology, and civilian radioactive waste. Budget The above reforms would cost substantially less than the $1,675,060,000 requested for FY 2023.32 Legislation such as the IIJA placed additional funding for new reactor demonstration projects outside of NE. These responsibilities and their associated funds should be moved to NE as appropriate. NE should not simply add or subtract programs, as some programs may help to support NE’s new priorities. The better approach would be to build a new budget and program strategy that accounts for related DOE programs and submit a new budget request reflecting NE’s new priorities. OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY AND CARBON MANAGEMENT (FECM) Mission/Overview DOE is authorized by law to increase the conversion efficiency of all forms of fossil energy, reduce costs, improve environmental performance, and increase the energy security of the United States.33 In recent years, the Office of Fossil Energy (FE) has been transformed from its statutory role of improving fossil energy pro- duction to one that is focused primarily on reducing the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel extraction, transport, and combustion. This change is reflected in the office’s new name, the Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management (FECM), effective as of July 2021, and FECM’s mission: “to minimize the environmental impacts of fossil fuels while working towards net-zero emissions.”34 Needed Reforms l Eliminate carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) programs. Despite the recent expansion of the 45Q tax credit for carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) to $87 per ton, most carbon capture technology remains economically unviable, although private-sector innovations are on the horizon. CCUS programs should be left to the private sector to develop.35 If the office continues any CCUS research, that research should be focused more on innovative utilization. l Pursue the processing of critical minerals. Development of domestic critical material sources is important for national security, as the vast
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.