The bill
One-Stop Pilot Program Extension Act
HR. 9388, 119th Congress.
Sponsored by
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]
ID: G000593
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9388, 119th Congress.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Homeland Security" section, p. 171-173 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
July 13, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 9388: One-Stop Pilot Program Extension Act** *Or: How to Pretend We’re Making Air Travel Safer While Just Letting Bags Slide Through Because Screening Is Hard*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated goal of HR 9388 is to extend a pilot program that allows checked baggage arriving on certain international flights to bypass additional TSA screening when connecting to domestic U.S. flights—provided the bags were already screened overseas using approved explosives detection systems, remain inaccessible to passengers until final destination, and have been pre-vetted by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). In reality, this bill exists because someone in Congress got tired of explaining why we can’t just trust foreign airports that take our money to pretend they’re screening luggage to American standards. The objective? Extend the program from six to ten years—because if a flawed security workaround hasn’t caused a catastrophe yet, why not double down on hope and inertia?
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** The bill amends Section 7132 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2023 (yes, we’re still naming things after senators who deny climate change). Specifically: - It formalizes conditions under which TSA may waive re-screening of checked baggage: initial screening must use approved explosives detection tech, bags must remain inaccessible to passengers in transit, CBP must receive advance images and give clearance, and no flags must be raised. - Most critically, it strikes “six” and inserts “ten” in subsection (k), extending the program’s authorization period by 40%. No substantive changes to security protocols—just a longer lease on the same risky gamble. It’s less a reform, more a legislative extension cord: plugging the same outdated device into a socket we know is frayed, hoping it doesn’t spark this time.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **TSA & CBP:** Gain temporary relief from the logistical nightmare of re-screening millions of bags—at the cost of outsourcing trust to foreign screening regimes with variable oversight. - **Airlines & Airports:** Win big. Less congestion, faster connections, lower operational costs. Passenger satisfaction? Up. Actual security? Who’s measuring that anymore? - **Passengers:** Sold a fiction of seamless travel. They’ll never know if their bag was screened by a competent technician in Amsterdam or a guy named Lars who’s supposed to be watching the X-ray but is actually streaming soccer. - **Taxpayers:** Foot the bill for a system that assumes foreign partners are as diligent as we pretend to be—while ignoring the fact that the last major aviation terror plot involved explosives in *shoes*, not checked bags. Priorities, people.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill doesn’t make flying safer—it makes it *more convenient*, which is not the same thing. By extending the One-Stop Pilot Program, we’re institutionalizing a security model based on trust, paperwork, and the assumption that terrorists won’t exploit the weakest link in the chain: a foreign airport with lax oversight, corrupt officials, or outdated equipment. The real impact? A slow erosion of defense-in-depth security philosophy. We’re betting that pre-screening + CBP image review = adequate protection. It’s cheaper. It’s faster. And if something goes wrong? Well, we’ll just blame the foreign airport, tighten screws on passengers again, and pretend we didn’t see it coming. In short: HR 9388 is legislative wishful thinking dressed as policy—a placebo for a security system that’s afraid to admit it’s cutting corners. Extend it ten years? Sure. Just don’t act surprised when the lottery finally loses.
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
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This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: C001125
Top Contributors
31
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 44 nodes and 46 connections
Total contributions: $46
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns with Project 2025's goal of enhancing border security and travel efficiency by streamlining international-to-domestic passenger processing through pre-screening and CBP coordination, though it does not directly address broader DHS restructuring or data transparency mandates."
— 139 — Department of Homeland Security also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel. The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community. A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval. The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time. Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments. CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP. The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000. — 140 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise OT’s function is interwoven with that of its OFO operational counterpart. Combin- ing OT with OFO would achieve streamlined operations and increase OT’s capacity and capability by leveraging OFO’s expansive resources. CBP, ICE, and USCIS all have authority to issue Notices to Appear (NTA) to removable aliens in their presence, which begins removal proceedings. In most instances, CBP should turn illegal aliens over to ICE for detention, and ICE can then issue any needed NTA. CBP should issue NTAs only in limited situations for humanitarian reasons, such as medical emergencies. In addition, CBP should eliminate use of Notices to Report (NTR) altogether. CBP’s established national standards of Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) have been widely interpreted and expanded by lower courts. This has resulted in unrealistic and differing detention standards for CBP facilities based on the jurisdiction within which they fall, negatively impacting operations. ICE has suffered similarly. A single nationwide detention standard should be codified that prevents individual states from mandating that federal government agencies adhere to widely expansive and ever-changing sets of standards. Such standards should allow the flexibility to use large numbers of temporary facilities such as tents. The annual costs associated with establishing and maintaining temporary facil- ities to address the flow of illegal migration and associated care, transportation, and processing are prohibitive, and CBP’s budget is inadequate. CBP is forced to forgo critical mission-essential endeavors to fund the additional associated costs. Often, this requires the reprogramming of funding at the DHS level, which has a negative impact on other DHS components’ operations. This predictable cost that has to be paid from existing CBP and DHS funding levels reduces CBP’s operational readiness and ability to accomplish its diverse and critical missions to protect the American people. The next President should request a realistic budget that fully pays for these costs. Increased funding is needed for BP to hire additional support personnel, which would relieve uniformed BP agents from administrative duties associated with processing aliens and allow them to return to their national security mission. Congress should increase funding for facility upgrades at strategic land Ports of Entry (POEs), including expanding state-of-the-art technology such as Non-Intru- sive Inspection equipment. Today, the cartels exploit the aging facilities and lack of adequate technology to smuggle illicit drugs, contraband, and more successfully through our nation’s POEs. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE) Needed Reforms Since the formation of DHS, ICE has increasingly been tasked with auxiliary missions that have little or nothing to do with either immigration or customs
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on streamlining international-to-domestic air travel through enhanced CBP coordination and pre-arrival baggage screening, which aligns with Project 2025's emphasis on improving CBP's operational efficiency and information-sharing capabilities. However, it does not directly address core Project 2025 priorities such as E-Verify mandates, guest worker visa restrictions, or border security agency consolidation."
— 138 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise and localities, that would include certification that all components of that government, and not just the applicant agency, are registered with and use E-Verify. l If the applicant is a state or locality, commitment by that state or locality to total information-sharing in the context of both federal law enforcement and immigration enforcement. This would include access to department of motor vehicles and voter registration databases. Non-Use of Discretionary Guest Worker Visa Authorities. To stop facili- tating the availability of cheap foreign labor in order to support American workers (particularly poor and middle-class American workers) and follow congressional intent, the Secretary should explicitly cease using at least two discretionary author- ities as part of his or her broader effort to support American workers. l The Secretary should make it clear that he or she will not use the Secretary’s existing discretionary authority to increase the number of H-2B (seasonal non-agricultural) visas above the statutorily set cap. l The Secretary should not issue any regulations in support of the “H-2 eligible” country list, the effect of which would prevent favoring certain foreign nationals seeking an H-2 guest worker visa based simply on their nationality. Restoration of Honesty and Transparency. The Secretary should use his or her inherent authority as leader of the department to follow up with congressional and other partners to disclose information and provide the transparency that has been obstructed during the Biden Administration. The Secretary should proceed from the assumption that congressional inquiries and public information requests were unfulfilled and then seek to fulfill them. Replacement of the Entire Homeland Security Advisory Committee. The Secretary should plan to quickly remove all current members of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee and replace them as quickly as is feasible. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION (CBP) If all immigration agencies are not merged, including USCIS and ORR, then an appropriate third alternative would be to consolidate ICE and CBP to form a combined Border Security and Immigration Agency (BSIA). This would inte- grate critical interdiction, enforcement, and investigative resources, enhancing coordination and refocusing collective efforts on the vast and complex cross-bor- der threats impacting our nation’s health, safety, and national security. It would — 139 — Department of Homeland Security also simultaneously add efficiencies to our nation’s capacity to facilitate lawful trade and travel. The BSIA should establish clear mission requirements, responsibilities, and mandates under existing law regarding the persistent need for and utilization of U.S. military personnel and resources to assist BSIA with increasing whole-of-gov- ernment efforts and long-term strategy to secure our nation’s borders effectively. In addition, appropriate elements within the newly created BSIA should be desig- nated as part of the U.S. National Security and Intelligence Community. A conservative Administration should eliminate any prohibitive guidance, direction, or mandate from DHS or the Administration that curtails or limits CBP from publishing detailed border security and enforcement data not impacting intelligence, interdiction, and investigative operations, methods, or sources. DHS should issue a regulation mandating that CBP publish accurate and timely border security data, readily available to the public, on a regular basis that avoid White House and DHS leadership review and approval. The White House should grant the authority for CBP and DHS executives to utilize component aviation assets under the Office of Air and Marine (OAM). CBP and DHS have worldwide missions with personnel and facilities that are deployed across the globe and in every state in the U.S. With a CBP workforce alone of more than 60,000 people (240,000-plus for DHS) encompassing more than a thousand sea, land, and airports, it is essential that the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Secretary, and Deputy Secretary can travel efficiently to facilities to maintain appropriate situational awareness across the department’s vast mission set and interact with the expansive workforce. Although CBP operates one of the largest aviation components of any domestic U.S. law enforcement agency, executives are prohibited from utilizing the agency’s aviation assets to facilitate official travel. Executives are required to fly on commercial airlines, and this requirement sig- nificantly limits their ability to have classified communications and takes them offline for extended periods of time. Border Patrol (BP) and OAM should be combined within CBP. BP has more than 20,000 personnel, and OAM has approximately 1,800. OAM’s assets are dedicated in support of BP operations the vast majority of the time, yet redundant approv- als, strategies, and independent hierarchal commands serve as impediments to efficient and practical resource deployments. CBP should restart and expand use of the horseback-mounted Border Patrol. As part of this announcement, the Secretary should clear the records and personnel files of those who were falsely accused by Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas of whip- ping migrants and issue a formal apology on behalf of DHS and CBP. The Secretary should combine the Office of Trade (OT) and Trade Relations with the Office of Field Operations (OFO). The OT is the smallest of CBP’s compo- nents, and its operational counterpart, OFO, has a workforce of more than 30,000.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on streamlining TSA re-screening for international-to-domestic connections through pre-departure security coordination, while the Project 2025 DOT section addresses foreign investment screening, slot allocation, pilot training, Essential Air Service reform, and Open Skies enforcement—none of which are directly related to the bill’s aviation security efficiency measures."
— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to have 1,500 flight hours. Today, facing a pilot shortage, larger and safer twin-engine planes with two pilots are being phased out of service at smaller airports and replaced by single-engine planes that have only one pilot. This trend could be reversed if copilots were required to have fewer flight hours or could count certified simulator training. Federal subsidies are also distorting the commercial market. The Essential Air Service (EAS) program subsidizes flights to 200 small airports that are not otherwise commercially viable. The program was established in the 1970s as a temporary measure to cushion deregulation. It has since been made permanent. Finally ending the program would free hundreds of pilots to serve larger markets with more passengers. A new Administration could reform regulations to encour- age airports in lower-served areas of the nation. International air travel is regulated and restricted by individual treaties between the United States and other countries. The new Administration should remain committed to the laudatory goal of “Open Skies.” However, many of the largest emerging markets are not fully open, and our aviation policies should reflect that reality and ensure that U.S. air carriers compete on a level playing field. Specifically, so long as U.S. carriers are not able to fly over Russian airspace, the U.S. should not allow foreign carriers serving markets in East Asia and South Asia to enjoy a com- petitive advantage by continuing to allow them to fly to the U.S. China has failed to put in place several of the policies to which it has already agreed; the U.S. should
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.