The bill
AI Security and Innovation Act
HR. 9363, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
Sponsored by
Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]
ID: O000019
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 9363, 119th Congress — read as touching AI & Cloud Infrastructure.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
30 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 137-139 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported in the Nature of a Substitute (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 29 - 0.
June 24, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**AI Security and Innovation Act (HR 9363) – A House, MD-Style Diagnosis**
**Main Purpose & Objectives:** Let’s cut through the bureaucratic anesthesia: this bill isn’t about “ensuring U.S. leadership in AI.” It’s about politicians slapping a shiny new label on a bureaucratic tumor and calling it innovation. The stated goal? Establish a “Center for AI Security and Innovation” within NIST to measure risks, share information, and maintain American dominance in AI. Translation: Congress noticed China’s eating our lunch in AI, panicked, and decided the solution is another government office—because nothing says “technological supremacy” like a federal committee studying model serialization attacks while the private sector builds the actual tech. The real objective? Let lawmakers pretend they’re doing something about AI risks while avoiding hard choices like regulating Big Tech or funding basic research without strings attached to defense contractors.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** This bill amends the National AI Initiative Act of 2020 with the legislative equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. It adds glossary entries for “AI model,” “AI system,” “foreign adversary” (lifted verbatim from defense code—because why define threats when you can copy-paste?), and “intelligence community.” Then it creates the Center for AI Security and Innovation, tasked with measuring risks, facilitating info-sharing (read: setting up another bureaucratic bottleneck), and conducting a “transfer study” to see if the Center should become its own agency—a classic Washington move: create a problem, study whether to fix it, then fund the study indefinitely. The Director must be appointed within 3 months and have “experience”—a qualification so vague it could apply to a toaster if it had a LinkedIn profile. Oh, and they’ll evaluate security against model tampering and data leakage—useful, sure, but like installing a burglar alarm while leaving the vault door wide open for regulatory capture.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** - **NIST:** Gets a new toy to manage, meaning more paperwork, mission creep, and diluted focus from actual metrology work. - **AI Researchers:** Will now navigate another layer of federal oversight for grants that likely favor defense-adjacent projects over blue-sky innovation. - **Big Tech:** Will happily cooperate—publicly praising the Center while lobbying to ensure its rules are toothless and voluntary. - **Foreign Adversaries (per DoD definition):** Unfazed. They’re too busy advancing AI to notice we’re busy defining terms. - **Taxpayers:** Funding a solution in search of a problem, while real AI risks—deepfakes, job displacement, autonomous weapons—get kicked down the road. - **Voters:** Treated like rubes who’ll believe “innovation” and “security” in a title mean Congress isn’t just recycling old ideas with new jargon.
**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is symptomatic of a deeper disease: Congress’s inability to tackle complex tech issues without outsourcing them to committees that meet quarterly and publish reports no one reads. The Center may produce useful risk frameworks—but without enforcement power, funding independence, or authority to compel corporate cooperation, it’ll be another advisory body shouting into the wind. Worse, it risks creating a false sense of security: “We’ve got a Center!” while AI advances in garages and labs overseas. The transfer study is a dead giveaway—this isn’t about solving anything; it’s about growing government for government’s sake. If passed, we’ll get more acronyms, more meetings, and marginally safer AI models—right up until the moment someone uses an open-source model to crash a stock market or deepfake a president into declaring war. In short: another expensive bandage on a bullet wound, applied by politicians who confuse activity with achievement. Prognosis? Chronic legislative impotence. Recommendation: Stop diagnosing and start treating—or at least admit you’re just managing symptoms while the patient deteriorates.
Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 7 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: F000477
Top Contributors
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ID: B001291
Top Contributors
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ID: M000871
Top Contributors
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ID: F000472
Top Contributors
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ID: T000482
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ID: H001093
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ID: C001087
Top Contributors
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Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 45 nodes and 66 connections
Total contributions: $66
Showing top 21 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped.
Section 5304 establishes a Center for AI Security and Innovation to ensure continued US leadership in AI research, development, and evaluation, which is likely to benefit the AI and cloud infrastructure industry.
The bill's focus on AI development and evaluation may lead to increased collaboration and investment opportunities for big tech platforms, as they are likely to be involved in the development of covered frontier systems (Section 5304(c)(4))
The Center's activities, such as evaluating security measures and assessing potential security vulnerabilities, may create opportunities for cybersecurity companies to provide services and solutions (Section 5304(c)(1)(A))
For each industry this bill affects, here's what the sponsor (Rep. Obernolte, Jay [R-CA-23])received from donors associated with that industry during the 2022–present cycles. Donations are not proof of intent — they are a record of who funds the people writing the law.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill's focus on establishing a federal center for AI security and innovation, enhancing risk assessment, and improving information sharing aligns closely with Project 2025's emphasis on leveraging AI and machine learning to exploit intelligence data, improving collection and analysis, and integrating intelligence activities across agencies to counter adversaries like China and Russia."
— 105 — Department of Defense DOD INTELLIGENCE Our national defense establishment must evolve to meet the rapid, pro- found, and dynamic change in the global landscape, but absent significant effort to evaluate and retool in critical areas—including our intelligence and security portfolios—America’s competitive advantage against rivals and adversaries is at serious risk. However, for any structural changes to succeed, the crisis in our Intel- ligence Community (IC)/Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) leadership must be addressed.16 The DIE accounts for the bulk of the Intelligence Community’s personnel and a significant portion of its budget. Of the IC’s 17 elements, eight are within DOD,17 two are independent,18 and seven belong to various other departments and agencies.19 Overall, “[t]he DoD provides 86 percent of the personnel who conduct intelligence activities, both military and civilian.”20 The Defense Intelligence Enterprise must deliver accurate, unbiased, and timely insights consistently and with clarity, objectivity, and independence. If they continue on their current path, however, both the DIE and the Intelligence Com- munity writ large will continue to provide inaccurate and politicized intelligence assessments that mislead policymakers. Needed Reforms l Improve the intelligence process. Defense intelligence assets have been committed to the prosecution of operational campaigns since September 11, 2001, at the expense of our strategic objectives, and this has led to increased risk.21 Further, the DIE has evolved into a “customer-based” model with the DIE/IC trying to be supportive of policy direction at the expense of analytical integrity. The result has been a significant politicization of intelligence. 1. Establish unbiased intelligence reporting from DIE/IC senior leaders. As the leader of the DIE, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security should provide a top-line, dissenting, or clarifying view of DIE and IC assessments as needed. 2. Align collection and analysis with vital national interests (countering China and Russia). 3. Establish an effective global federated intelligence framework with allies and partners and our Combatant Commands. Avoid the temptation to neglect areas that appear less pertinent but that support a convergence of threats and the critical requirements to sustain those threats. — 106 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 4. Establish and sustain feedback loops to provide insight and direction for continuous improvement and accountability.22 We must revisit our assessments and understand where we got it right and where we got it wrong. 5. Better exploit publicly available information (PAI) data and foster innovation to improve collection and analysis. We must end the practice of multiple DIE organizations paying to acquire the same PAI data and invest more in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI) to exploit open-source and classified intelligence data. 6. Remove policy obstacles that impede available technical solutions and tailored approaches in order to preclude corruption at the point of collection. 7. Develop statistical discrimination techniques based on relative value to deal with the volume and velocity of available data and information, which are rapidly exceeding our ability to exploit and analyze available data and information efficiently. l Expand the integration of intelligence activities. The prevalence of asymmetric warfare requires Defense Intelligence to leverage the unique authorities and capabilities of U.S. departments and agencies, as well as our partners and allies, to competitive advantage. 1. Create an improved cyber defense and capability. We must reevaluate the dual-hat structure between the National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). 2. Resurrect economic analysis capability to improve our ability to counter Chinese whole-of-government strategies that combine security with predatory economic objectives. 3. Resurrect critical thinking to provide true strategic intelligence that will enable the U.S. to counter global adversaries and emerging technologies (such as adversary advances in hypersonics, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), cyber domain, advanced fighter aircraft, and advanced undersea capabilities) more effectively. 4. Rebuild human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) and improve their integration with defensive and offensive cyber operations.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's emphasis on strengthening counterintelligence capabilities, particularly through enhancing the National Counterintelligence and Security Center's (NCSC) role in addressing technological and economic espionage threats from adversaries like China and Russia. Both focus on protecting national security, intellectual property, and critical infrastructure by improving information sharing, risk assessment, and collaboration between government, private sector"
— 218 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY CENTER (NCSC) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has taken a keen inter- est in possibly updating the codified language underpinning much of the nation’s counterintelligence apparatus. “Spy vs. spy” threats continue to exist, but the rise of China and (to an extent) Russia’s machinations move beyond the governmental sphere to technological, economic, supply chain, cyber, academic, state, and local espionage threats at a level our country has never seen. The asymmetric threat includes cyber, nontraditional collection, and issues involving legitimate busi- nesses serving as collection platforms. Barring statutory changes that could occur before 2025, a future conserva- tive President should further empower and resource the IC by executive order or through suggested changes in the Counterintelligence Enhancement Act (CEA) of 2002.32 NCSC was given some authority for outreach efforts on behalf of the IC for counterintelligence education, insider threats, and broader U.S. government best practices, but there remain significant deltas between Title 50 and non–Title 50 entities’ protections. Primary operational elements should remain at the FBI and CIA, with the Bureau and NCSC collaborating on nongovernmental outreach. While there is no need to create a separate agency, a future President and DNI should amplify NCSC’s authorities and roles with respect to counterintelligence strategy, policy, outreach, and governance, including supporting necessary Joint Duty Assignments (JDA) for FBI and CIA personnel. At the same time, the FBI requires significant additional resources and legal authorities to fulfill its statu- tory role as the lead operational counterintelligence agency in dealing with the ever-growing threats posed by our adversaries. The CEA should be updated to include foreign espionage efforts aimed at universities. Corporate America, technology companies, research institutions, and academia must be willing, educated partners in this generational fight to protect our national security interests, economic interests, national sovereignty, and intellectual prop- erty as well as the broader rules-based order—all while avoiding the tendency to cave to the left-wing activists and investors who ignore the China threat and increasingly dominate the corporate world. Reinstitution of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board and the National Security Business Alliance Council should be prioritized with leadership from the NCSC, the FBI, or a com- bination of both entities. When the CCP steals at least $400 billion–$600 billion in intellectual prop- erty each year, it is time to devote some strategic thinking to exactly how and to what degree counterintelligence efforts can help to protect America’s commercial endeavors. If Chinese strategic technology gains are happening almost entirely in transnational commercial space, for example, and the private sector is also gath- ering and analyzing some critical intelligence, these essential data points should assist in national-level counterintelligence efforts. — 219 — Intelligence Community The NCSC was created in the aftermath of 9/11 as the Terrorist Threat Integra- tion Center (TTIC), which later became the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) pursuant to President George W. Bush’s Executive Order 13354.33 The NCTC was an organization of approximately three dozen detainees from across the U.S. government with a mandate to integrate counterterrorism intelligence and missions, including terrorist screening. Eventually: In November 2014 the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) established NCSC by combining [the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive] with the Center for Security Evaluation, the Special Security Center and the National Insider Threat Task Force, to effectively integrate and align counterintelligence and security mission areas under a single organizational construct. The Director of NCSC serves in support of the DNI’s role as Security Executive Agent (SecEA) to develop, implement, oversee and integrate personnel security initiatives throughout the U.S. Government.34 NCSC has added value in such areas as fusing cross-community intelligence for terrorism watchlisting purposes and improving information sharing while carrying roughly half of the overall cadre for the ODNI. An incoming Administration should focus NCTC on integrative tasks, many of which cannot be carried out elsewhere in the IC, but should not use personnel and resources for redundant analyses that duplicate the work of such other IC entities as the FBI and CIA. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR REFORM Analytical Integrity. The “tradecraft” of intelligence analysis is mostly a col- lection of lessons learned over decades about what works and does not work in a profession whose high-stakes work is performed by thousands but that also bears little outside scrutiny and provides few metrics by which to gauge success or failure on a regular basis. These lessons have accumulated from: l The perceived misuse of intelligence by consumers as was the case with respect to war-related assessments in the Johnson and Bush Administrations; l Failures such as the failures to warn of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the specific threat of 9/11; l Successes in piecing together tactical and often technical puzzles such as estimates of Iranian nuclear program maturation; and l Strategic victories such as anticipating critical geopolitical developments that have been years in the making.
AI Analysis:
"The bill aligns strongly with Project 2025's Intelligence Community objectives by establishing a Center for AI Security and Innovation that emphasizes timely information sharing with private-sector partners, improving threat intelligence relevance and utility, and enhancing accountability in intelligence handling—core themes in the Project 2025 section on cyber threat intelligence sharing and classification reform."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.