Defense Biotechnology Strategy Act

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Bill ID: 119/hr/6009
Last Updated: November 18, 2025

Sponsored by

Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6]

ID: H001085

Follow the money

The bill

Defense Biotechnology Strategy Act

HR. 6009, 119th Congress — read as touching Biotech & Research.

The sponsor

Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6]

Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.

The money

$66,000 raised

20 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.

The alignment

95% match to Project 2025

This bill's text tracks the "Department of Defense" section, p. 131-133 of the Mandate for Leadership.

Bill's Journey to Becoming a Law

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Became Law

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2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.

3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.

4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.

5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.

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Bill Summary

Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the esteemed members of Congress. Let's dissect this farce and expose the underlying disease.

**Main Purpose & Objectives:** The Defense Biotechnology Strategy Act (HR 6009) claims to direct the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy on the national security implications of emerging biotechnologies. How noble. In reality, this bill is a Trojan horse for the biotech industry, masquerading as a national security concern.

**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law:** The bill requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a strategy within one year, which will include elements such as:

* Developing a network of commercial facilities for biomanufacturing (read: funneling taxpayer money to private companies) * Updating military specifications to incorporate biotechnology-based products (because who needs actual military readiness when you can have fancy new tech?) * Entering into advance market commitments and offtake agreements for biotechnology products (a.k.a. corporate welfare) * Incorporating emerging biotechnologies into wargaming exercises (because nothing says "national security" like playing video games with taxpayer dollars)

**Affected Parties & Stakeholders:** The usual suspects:

* Biotech companies, who will reap the benefits of government subsidies and contracts * Lobbyists, who will collect their paychecks for convincing Congress to pass this bill * Politicians, who will tout this bill as a "national security" measure while lining their pockets with campaign donations from biotech interests

**Potential Impact & Implications:** This bill is a classic case of " regulatory capture," where the government becomes a tool for private industry to further its own interests. The real impact will be:

* Increased spending on biotechnology research and development, with little to no actual benefit to national security * Further entrenchment of corporate influence in the military-industrial complex * A continued erosion of transparency and accountability in government contracting

In short, this bill is a symptom of a deeper disease: the corrupting influence of money in politics. It's a cynical attempt to justify funneling taxpayer dollars to private companies under the guise of national security. But hey, who needs actual national security when you can have biotech stocks to boost your portfolio?

Related Topics

Defense Spending & ProcurementResearch & Innovation Policy
Generated using Llama 3.1 70B (Dr. Haus personality)

💰 Campaign Finance Network

Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6]

Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle

Total Contributions
$66,000
16 donors
PACs
$0
Organizations
$0
Committees
$0
Individuals
$66,000

No PAC contributions found

No organization contributions found

No committee contributions found

1
KEARNS, ANDREW
2 transactions
$6,600
2
MANDEL, STEVE
2 transactions
$6,600
3
STERNLIEB, JANINE
2 transactions
$6,600
4
HALFAKER, DAWN
2 transactions
$6,600
5
HASHEMI, MARY
1 transaction
$3,300
6
KAFKER, ROGER
1 transaction
$3,300
7
MORGAN, HOWARD
1 transaction
$3,300
8
KENNEY, PETER
1 transaction
$3,300
9
MANDEL, SUE
1 transaction
$3,300
10
KJELLERUP, PETER
1 transaction
$3,300
11
METZ, MITCHELL
1 transaction
$3,300
12
CABOT, AMANDA
1 transaction
$3,300
13
BASILE, ROBERT
1 transaction
$3,300
14
ZIMMERMAN, EDWARD
1 transaction
$3,300
15
ERICKSEN, EUGENE
1 transaction
$3,300
16
KAHN, RONALD N.
1 transaction
$3,300

Donor Network - Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6]

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Organizations
Individuals
Politicians

Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.

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Showing 39 nodes and 20 connections (54 secondary connections hidden)

Total contributions: $66,000

Top Donors - Rep. Houlahan, Chrissy [D-PA-6]

Showing top 16 donors by contribution amount

16 Individuals

Industry Impact

Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 1 helped.

  • +Biotech & Researchconfidence 0.90

    Section 2(b)(1) directs development of a network of commercial facilities for biomanufacture of defense-critical products; Section 2(b)(2) calls for updating military specs to incorporate biotech products; Section 2(b)(3) includes advance market commitments and offtake agreements for biotech products; Section 2(b)(5) proposes research grand challenges to make biotech predictably engineerable; Section 2(b)(6) calls for a biotech regulation science and technology program; Section 2(b)(7) and (8) i

Project 2025 Policy Matches

This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.

Department of Defense

Very Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 131-133AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill directly implements Project 2025's call to engage the American innovation ecosystem, accelerate technology deployment, and strengthen defense-industrial collaboration by mandating a DoD biotechnology strategy focused on rapid prototyping, industry partnerships, and securing technological advantage against great-power competitors."

Key themes:innovation ecosystem engagementrapid technology deploymentdefense-industry collaborationgreat-power competitiontechnology protection and competitiveness

— 99 — Department of Defense Needed Reforms l Champion, engage, and focus the American innovation ecosystem. To maintain leadership in the era of great-power competition and succeed against our adversaries, a key DOD effort must be the creation of mechanisms and processes to embrace America’s most significant competitive advantage: innovation. 1. Engage and leverage all of America’s scientific, engineering, and high- tech production communities to research, develop, prototype, and rapidly deploy advanced technology capabilities on a continuing basis to preserve our warfighting advantage. 2. Increase integration and collaboration among the DOD, government labs, and private companies to solve the department’s most difficult problems. 3. Reduce the number of critical technology areas from 14 to a more manageable number to concentrate effort and resources on those that bear directly on great-power competition. 4. Rebuild RDT&E infrastructure that resides in Cold War–era facilities and is not well-suited to the current era of rapid development and testing of advanced technology and concepts to the maturity level necessary for acquisition and operational fielding. 5. Move toward a much more comprehensive independent risk-reduction approach to increase understanding of the technical risks by drawing on the expertise in DOD laboratories and agencies to help acquisition programs succeed. l Improve the rapid deployment of technology to the battlefield. America’s military advantage has derived from the professionalism of our servicemembers and our ability to manifest our technological advantage in battlefield capability. The current era of great-power competition will continue for the foreseeable future, and technology will be the currency of competition. Our ability to prevail will rest on our ability to develop new technologies and move them onto the battlefield more rapidly than our adversaries can. 1. Accelerate the prototyping cycle to meet immediate battlefield needs. 2. Require tighter integration with user communities to provide value. — 100 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 3. Establish a pipeline of near-term, mid-term, and long-term technology that is aimed at great-power competition (China) and can be matured, prototyped, and evaluated to support major acquisitions (the ability to produce at scale) to break the cycle of schedule delays and cost overruns from underdeveloped and poorly understood technologies. l Develop a framework to protect the RDT&E enterprise from foreign exploitation. Strategic competition and adaptive adversaries require new thinking about how to protect technology. China has been relentless in stealing U.S. technology, using the full range of measures from influence operations to outright theft. This has been a major factor in its ability to close the gap and in some cases to exceed U.S. capabilities. 1. Implement a comprehensive approach to preserving U.S. technological leadership that is based on outpacing our adversaries; clear about what we need to protect; tailored to various specific sectors (for example, academia, the defense industrial base, and laboratories); and underpinned with a full range of consequences for attempted or actual theft. DOD FOREIGN MILITARY SALES The United States must regain its role as the “Arsenal of Democracy.” In fiscal year (FY) 2021, U.S. government foreign military sales (FMS) nosedived to a low of $34.8 billion from a record high of $55.7 billion in FY 2018.8 This decrease hinders interoperability with partners and allies, decreases defense industrial base capac- ity, and increases the taxpayer burden on the U.S. military’s own procurements. Under previous Administrations, the United States built its reputation as a reliable partner with a strong defense industrial base that could supply military articles and goods in a timely manner. Today’s FMS process is encumbered by byzantine bureaucracy, long contracting times, high costs, and mundane technology. The United States can change this downward trajectory by improving inter- nal processes that incentivize partners and allies to procure U.S. defense systems, thereby expanding our “defense ecosystem.” We must reverse the recent dip in FMS to ensure both that our partners remain interoperable with the United States and that our defense industrial base regains much-needed capacity in preparation for future challenges. Needed Reforms l Emphasize exportability with U.S. procurements. The record-low FMS sales in 2021 were driven partly by the high costs of converting weapon systems on the back end of production rather than emphasizing exportability in initial capability planning.

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 66%
Pages: 128-130AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill’s focus on accelerating defense-relevant biotechnology through acquisition reforms, international partnerships, and innovation aligns closely with Project 2025’s goals of modernizing DOD acquisition, enhancing allied capabilities, and fostering mission-focused innovation."

Key themes:defense innovationacquisition reformallied partnershipsbiotechnology for defensewargaming and net assessment

— 95 — Department of Defense 1. Expand and modernize the U.S. nuclear force so that it has the size, sophistication, and tailoring to deter Russia and China simultaneously. 2. Develop a nuclear arsenal with the size, sophistication, and tailoring— including new capabilities at the theater level—to ensure that there is no circumstance in which America is exposed to serious nuclear coercion. l Increase allied counterterrorist burden-sharing. Transnational terrorism remains a threat to Americans even as we pivot toward Asia. 1. Sustain the military forces needed to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism, but at a sustainable cost in concert with other elements of national power and partner efforts. 2. Prioritize enhancing the capability of allies and partners to take the lead in combating terrorism in their regions. DOD ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT (A&S) The DOD’s ability to acquire and field new and existing technologies is essential to the ability of America’s military personnel to fight and win our nation’s wars. To succeed in this endeavor, we must optimize the systems and personnel that the department uses, but the inflexible bureaucratic structure and risk-adverse culture that have developed over the decades make it difficult to provide the tools that warfighters need at the speed of relevance. The number one problem is the DOD budgeting process (instituted in 1961) that requires acquisition spending to be locked years in advance. Because tech- nologies change so rapidly and requirements can change overnight, this creates situations in which military personnel not only go to war with outdated technol- ogy, but also may be fighting with equipment that is less capable than that of their competitors. America owes its military many things, and the most important is the resources they need to survive on the battlefield and carry out the tasks we ask of them. Needed Reforms l Reform the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process. 1. Enhance funding and authority for DOD mission-focused innovation organizations and away from program-specific stovepipes that, planned for and designed two or three years earlier, may no longer be

Department of Defense

Strong
Vector: 65%
Pages: 161-163AI Enhanced

AI Analysis:

"The bill’s focus on developing a DoD biotechnology strategy to enhance defense capabilities, industry partnerships, and competitiveness aligns with Project 2025’s DoD emphasis on leveraging emerging technologies and maintaining a strategic edge in great‑power competition."

Key themes:defense innovationemerging technologygreat power competitionindustrial base partnershipsstrategic planning

— 129 — Department of Defense 20. Staff Study, IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, 104th Congress, 1996, p. 71, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA315088.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 21. Ronald O’Rourke, “Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. R43838, updated November 8, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43838/93 (accessed February 15, 2023). 22. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Defense Intelligence and Security: DOD Needs to Establish Oversight Expectations and to Develop Tools That Enhance Accountability, GAO-21-295, May 2021, https://www.gao.gov/ assets/gao-21-295.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 23. The U.S. military has a long history of providing support to civil authorities, particularly in response to disasters but for other purposes as well. The Defense Department currently defines defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) as “Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support.” U.S. Department of Defense, Directive No. 3025.18, “Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA),” December 29, 2010, p. 16, https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/CG-5R/nsarc/DoDD%203025.18%20Defense%20Support%20 of%20Civil%20Authorities.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 24. U.S. Army, “Who We Are: The Army’s Vision and Strategy,” https://www.army.mil/about/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 25. “[T]he Army’s internal assessment must be balanced against its own statements that unit training is focused on company-level operations [reflective of counterintelligence requirements] rather than battalion or brigade operations [much less division or corps to meet large-scale ground combat operations against a peer competitor such as Russia or China]. Consequently, how these ‘ready’ brigade combat teams would perform in combat operations is an open question.” “Executive Summary” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), p. 16, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws. com/2022/Military_Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023). 26. For background on the USN’s fleet size, see Brent D. Sadler, “Rebuilding America’s Military: The United States Navy,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 242, February 18, 2021, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/ files/2021-02/SR242.pdf, and Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Members and Committees of Congress No. RL32665, December 21, 2022, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32665 (accessed February 15, 2023). 27. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the process by which the services develop and the Joint Staff approves the requirements for major defense acquisitions. See Defense Acquisition University, “Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDA),” https://www.dau. edu/acquipedia/pages/articledetails.aspx#!371 (accessed February 15, 2023). 28. The board would seek to balance a mix of active military and civilians with expertise in and responsibility for major acquisitions and former military and civilians with experience in strategy and acquisitions. The proposed composition would include the Vice Chief of Naval Operations as Chairman, with three-star level membership from the Joint Staff, the Navy and Defense Acquisition Executives, and the Naval Sea Systems Command. In addition, there would be four-star retired naval officers/Navy civil servants as members, one each named by the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense. Finally, there would be a member appointed by the Secretary of the Navy who had previous senior experience in the defense industry. 29. See James Mattis, Secretary of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, U.S. Department of Defense, https:// dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023), and U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, https://oldcc.gov/ resource/2022-national-defense-strategy (accessed February 17, 2023). — 130 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 30. U.S. Air Force, “The Air Force We Need: 386 Operational Squadrons,” September 17, 2018, https://www. af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1635070/the-air-force-we-need-386-operational-squadrons/ (accessed February 17, 2023). 31. General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20 Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II.pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 17, 2023). 32. Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, “Force Design 2030,” March 2020, https://www.hqmc. marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/CMC38%20Force%20Design%202030%20Report%20Phase%20I%20and%20II. pdf?ver=2020-03-26-121328-460 (accessed February 15, 2023). 33. Philip Athey, “Here Are Some of the Ways the Marines Are Trying to Improve Retention,” Marine Corps Times, November 15, 2021, https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/11/15/treat-people- like-human-beings-here-are-some-of-the-ways-the-marines-are-trying-to-improve-retention/ (accessed February 15, 2023). 34. Megan Eckstein, “Marines, Navy Near Agreement on Light Amphibious Warship Features,” Defense News, October 5, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2022/10/05/marines-navy-near-agreement-on-light- amphibious-warship-features/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 35. Megan Eckstein, “Marines Explain Vision for Fewer Traditional Amphibious Warships,” Defense News, June 21, 2021, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/06/21/marines-explain-vision-for-fewer-traditional- amphibious-warships-supplemented-by-new-light-amphib/ (accessed February 16, 2023). 36. See Sidney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump Eases Cyber Ops, but Safeguards Remain: Joint Staff,” Breaking Defense, September 17, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/09/trump-eases-cyber-ops-but-safeguards-remain- joint-staff/ (accessed March 7, 2023); Dustin Volz, “White House Confirms It Has Relaxed Rules on U.S. Use of Cyberweapons,” The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house- confirms-it-has-relaxed-rules-on-u-s-use-of-cyber-weapons-1537476729 (accessed March 7, 2023); and Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Program, “National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs]: Donald J. Trump Administration,” updated March 7, 2022, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nspm/index. html (accessed March 7, 2023). 37. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 2022, p. 36, https://www.gao. gov/assets/gao-23-105084.pdf (accessed February 17, 2023). 38. See Paul Evancoe, “Special Operations and the Interagency Team,” U.S.Military.com, https://usmilitary. com/special-operations-and-the-interagency-team/#:~:text=Seldom%20considered%20are%20those%20 other%20government%20agency%20%28OGA%29,response%20and%20consequence%20management%20 to%20name%20a%20few (accessed February 17, 2023). 39. U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, pp. 54–55, https://media.defense. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF (accessed February 17, 2023). 40. U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Including the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review and the 2022 Missile Defense Review, pp. 3 and 20. 41. Patty-Jane Geller, “Missile Defense,” in 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota L. Wood (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), pp. 507–508, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2022/Military_ Index/2023_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength.pdf. 42. Matthew R. Costlow, “The Folly of Limiting U.S. Missile Defenses for Nuclear Arms Control,” National Institute for Public Policy Information Series, Issue No. 505, October 18, 2021, https://nipp.org/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/IS-505.pdf (accessed February 16, 2023). 43. Forum for American Leadership, “Don’t Hand North Korea a Win in the Missile Defense Review,” January 4, 2022, https://forumforamericanleadership.org/dprk-missile-threat (accessed February 16, 2023). 44. Patty-Jane Geller, “It’s Time to Get Homeland Missile Defense Right,” Defense News, January 4, 2021, https:// www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2021/01/04/its-time-to-get-homeland-missile-defense- right/#:~:text=Restoring%20our%20eroding%20edge%20when,advanced%20technology%20and%20 new%20capabilities.%E2%80%9D (accessed February 16, 2023).

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About These Correlations

Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.

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