The bill
Putting Patients First by Strengthening Provider Accountability in FECA Act
HR. 8823, 119th Congress — read as touching Hospitals & Health Systems.
Sponsored by
Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
ID: M001230
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 8823, 119th Congress — read as touching Hospitals & Health Systems.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
21 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Federal Election Commission" section, p. 898-900 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
July 20, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: Both chambers must agree on the same version of the bill.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
**HR 8823: Putting Patients First by Strengthening Provider Accountability in FECA Act** *Or: How Congress Finally Noticed That Paying Fraudsters Is a Bad Idea—After Decades of Letting Them Bill Medicare for Ghost Bandages*
**1. Main Purpose & Objectives** The stated goal? To “put patients first” by holding medical providers accountable under the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA). Translation: After years of treating FECA like an all-you-can-fraud buffet for shady clinicians, Congress has deigned to notice that paying convicted fraudsters for medical services might be, just maybe, a poor use of taxpayer money. The bill amends FECA to let the Secretary of Labor suspend payments to providers convicted of fraud—not just within FECA, but across federal and state health programs. Groundbreaking. Revolutionary. Next they’ll suggest we stop hiring arsonists as fire marshals.
**2. Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law** Currently, FECA mandates payment for medical services to injured federal workers, with little recourse if the provider is a convicted fraudster—so long as the fraud wasn’t *specifically* against FECA. This bill changes that by: - Adding subsection (c) to 5 U.S.C. § 8103, allowing the Labor Secretary to **suspend payments** to any provider convicted of fraud related to: (A) FECA itself, (B) any federal health care program (per 18 U.S.C. § 24), or (C) any state program paying for similar services. - Requiring the Secretary to issue regulations to implement this suspension authority. - Delaying effect: The rule applies only to payments made **180 days after enactment**—because apparently, we need six months to train bureaucrats not to send checks to people who’ve been *judicially declared liars and thieves*.
Note: This doesn’t bar providers permanently—just lets payments be paused. A slap on the wrist with a wet noodle, wrapped in bureaucratic delay.
**3. Affected Parties & Stakeholders** - **Injured federal workers**: Theoretically protected from fraudulent or substandard care—though if their provider gets cut off mid-treatment, good luck finding a replacement who isn’t also under indictment. - **Medical providers**: Now face payment suspension if convicted of fraud *anywhere* in the health care system—not just FECA. A novel concept: consequences for criminal behavior. - **Secretary of Labor**: Gained new discretionary power—because nothing says “efficient governance” like giving another agency veto power over payments based on external convictions. - **Taxpayers**: Should, in theory, stop funding fraudsters. But given the 180-day delay and reliance on *convictions* (not allegations or civil settlements), don’t hold your breath. - **Fraudulent providers**: Still get paid for six months post-conviction. Priority one: milk the system before the gravy train slows.
**4. Potential Impact & Implications** This bill is less a reform and more a belated admission that the government has been funding crooks. Its impact will be minimal unless: - The Labor Department actually uses the suspension authority (spoiler: they won’t, unless politically pressured). - Convictions are common and timely (they’re not—health care fraud prosecutions are rare, slow, and often plea-bargained down to misdemeanors). - States cooperate and report convictions (lol).
Realistically, this is political theater: a bill that lets Congress *look* tough on fraud while changing almost nothing. It addresses symptoms (paying fraudsters) while ignoring the disease: a FECA system riddled with lax oversight, phantom billing, and providers who treat federal workers like ATMs with pulse oximeters.
In short: HR 8823 is the legislative equivalent of putting a “Please Don’t Steal” sign on the treasury vault—after the thieves have already moved to the Caymans. Congratulations, Congress
Rep. Mackenzie, Ryan [R-PA-7]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 1 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: O000173
Top Contributors
31
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 46 nodes and 46 connections
Total contributions: $46
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 2 harmed.
Section 2(a)(3) allows the Secretary of Labor to suspend payments to medical providers who have been convicted of fraud, which could lead to financial losses for hospitals and health systems that employ or contract with such providers.
Section 2(a)(3) also applies to providers of appliances or supplies, which could include medical device manufacturers, and suspension of payments could harm their business.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on fraud prevention in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) related to medical provider payments, while the Project 2025 policy addresses Federal Election Commission (FEC) reform, litigation authority, and campaign finance regulations under FECA (Federal Election Campaign Act). Despite sharing the acronym FECA, the two refer to entirely different laws with distinct policy domains—workers' compensation versus election law—resulting in no meaningful thematic or policy al"
— 865 — Federal Election Commission l As a legislative matter and given this abuse, the President should seriously consider recommending that Congress amend FECA to remove the agency’s independent litigating authority and rely on the Department of Justice to handle all litigation involving the FEC. There are also multiple instances of existing statutory provisions of FECA and the accompanying FEC regulations having been found unlawful or unconstitu- tional by federal court decisions, yet those statutory provisions remain in the U.S. Code and the implementing regulations remain in the Code of Federal Regula- tions.12 In such instances, those regulated by the law, from candidates to the public, have no way of knowing (without engaging in extensive legal research) whether particular statutory provisions and regulations are still applicable to their actions in the political arena. l The President should request that the commissioners on the FEC prepare such guidance. l In the event that the FEC fails to act, the President should direct the attorney general to prepare a guidance document from the Department of Justice for the public that outlines all of the FECA statutory provisions and FEC regulations that have been changed, amended, or voided by specific court decisions. Legislative Changes. While a President’s ability to make any changes at an independent agency like the FEC is limited,13 the President has the ability to make legislative recommendations to Congress. One of the most obvious changes that is needed is to end the current practice of allowing commissioners to remain as serving commissioners long after their term has expired, defying the clear intent of Congress in specifying that a commissioner can only serve a single term of six years. l The President should prioritize nominations to the FEC once commissioners reach the end of their terms and should be assisted by legislative language either eliminating or limiting overstays to a reasonable period of time to permit the vetting, nomination, and confirmation of successors. l The President should vigorously oppose all efforts, as proposed, for example, in Section 6002 of the “For the People Act of 2021,”14 to change the structure of the FEC to reduce the number of commissioners from six to five or another odd number. The current requirement of four votes to authorize an enforcement action, provide — 866 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise an advisory opinion, or issue regulations, ensures that there is bipartisan agreement before any action is taken and protects against the FEC being used as a political weapon. With only five commissioners, three members of the same political party could control the enforcement process of the agency, raising the potential of a powerful federal agency enforcing the law on a partisan basis against the members of the opposition political party. Efforts to impose a “nonpartisan” or so-called “inde- pendent” chair are impractical; the chair will inevitably be aligned with his or her appointing party, at least as a matter of perception. There are numerous other changes that should be considered in FECA and the FEC’s regulations. The overly restrictive limits on the ability of party com- mittees to coordinate with their candidates, for example, violates associational rights and unjustifiably interferes with the very purpose of political parties: to elect their candidates. l Raise contribution limits and index reporting requirements to inflation. Contribution limits should generally be much higher, as they hamstring candidates and parties while serving no practical anticorruption purpose. And a wide range of reporting requirements have not been indexed to inflation, clogging the public record and the FEC’s internal processes with small-dollar information of little use to the public. CONCLUSION When taking any action related to the FEC, the President should keep in mind that, as former FEC Chairman Bradley Smith says, the “greater problem at the FEC has been overenforcement,” not underenforcement as some critics falsely allege.15 As he correctly concludes, the FEC’s enforcement efforts “place a substan- tial burden on small committees and campaigns, and are having a chilling effect on some political speech…squeezing the life out of low level, volunteer politi- cal activity.”16 Commissioners have a duty to enforce FECA in a fair, nonpartisan, objective manner. But they must do so in a way that protects the First Amendment rights of the public, political parties, and candidates to fully participate in the political process. The President has the same duty to ensure that the Department of Justice enforces the law in a similar manner.
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on fraud prevention in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) by suspending payments to fraudulent medical providers, while the Project 2025 policy section addresses abortion-related regulations, Hyde Amendment compliance, EMTALA interpretations, transgender coverage, and conscience protections—there is no thematic or policy overlap between the two."
— 473 — Department of Health and Human Services l Rewrite the ACA abortion separate payment regulation. Section 1303 of Obamacare requires that insurers collect a separate payment for certain abortion coverage in qualified health plans that are approved to be sold on exchanges and that they keep those separate payments in separate accounts that are used only to pay for elective abortion services. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the law was enforced under President Obama, and a Trump- era regulation sought to correct this problem. The Biden HHS rescinded this regulation to allow insurance companies once again—contrary to the law—to collect combined payments for what are clearly required to be separate payments for elective abortion coverage. “Separate” does not mean “together.” HHS should reinstate a Trump Administration regulation and enforce what the plain text of Section 1303 requires. That regulation should be further improved by requiring CMS to ensure that consumers pay truly separate charges for abortion coverage. l Audit Hyde Amendment compliance. HHS should undertake a full audit to determine compliance or noncompliance with the Hyde amendment and similar funding restrictions in HHS programs. This audit should include a full review of the Biden Administration’s post-Dobbs executive actions to promote abortion. It should also encompass a review of Medicaid managed care plans in pro-abortion states. l Reverse distorted pro-abortion “interpretations” added to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)52 prohibits hospitals that receive Medicare funds from “dumping” emergency patients who cannot pay by sending them to other hospitals. It also mandates that hospitals stabilize pregnant women and explicitly protects unborn children. Hospitals or physicians found to be in violation of the statute could lose all of their federal health funding—Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, and other funds—and face civil penalties of up to nearly $120,000. In July 2022, HHS/CMS released guidance mandating that EMTALA- covered hospitals and the physicians who work there must perform abortions, to include completing chemical abortions even when the child might still be alive. The guidance also declared that EMTALA would protect physicians and hospitals that perform abortions in violation of state law if they deem those abortions necessary to stabilize the women’s health. This novel interpretation of EMTALA is baseless. EMTALA requires — 474 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise no abortions, preempts no pro-life state laws, and explicitly requires stabilization of the unborn child. HHS should rescind the guidance and end CMS and state agency investigations into cases of alleged refusals to perform abortions. DOJ should agree to eliminate existing injunctions against pro-life states, withdraw its enforcement lawsuits, and in lawsuits against CMS on the guidance agree to injunctions against CMS and withdraw appeals of injunctions. l Reissue a stronger transgender national coverage determination. CMS should repromulgate its 2016 decision that CMS could not issue a National Coverage Determination (NCD) regarding “gender reassignment surgery” for Medicare beneficiaries. In doing so, CMS should acknowledge the growing body of evidence that such interventions are dangerous and acknowledge that there is insufficient scientific evidence to support such coverage in state plans. l Enforce EMTALA. The undeniable reality of abortion is that it does do not always result in a dead baby, and these born-alive babies are left to die. HHS should use EMTALA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,53 which prohibits disability discrimination, to investigate instances of infants born alive and left untreated in covered hospitals. CMS, OCR, and OIG should be required to follow through on these investigations with specific enforcement actions. HHS should revive a Trump Administration proposed regulation, “Special Responsibilities of Medicare Hospitals in Emergency Cases and Discrimination on the Basis of Disability in Critical Health and Human Service Programs or Activities,”54 to achieve this end. In addition, Congress should pass the Born-Alive Abortion Survivors Protection Act55 to require that proper medical care be given to infants who survive an abortion and to establish criminal consequences for practitioners who fail to provide such care. l Permanently codify both the Hyde family of amendments and the protections provided by the Weldon Amendment. Congress can accomplish this through legislation such as the No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion and Abortion Insurance Full Disclosure Act56 (Hyde) and the Conscience Protection Act57 (Weldon).
AI Analysis:
"The bill focuses on fraud prevention in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) by authorizing payment suspensions for fraudulent medical providers, while the Project 2025 policy excerpt discusses the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's Civil Penalty Fund, its funding limits, structure, and oversight—topics unrelated to healthcare fraud or workers' compensation."
— 843 — Financial Regulatory Agencies 37. Table 7, “Civil Penalty Fund Significant Activity,” in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, November 15, 2022, p. 21, https://files. consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_financial-report_fy2022.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 38. Ibid. 39. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Financial Report of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Fiscal Year 2022, p. 20. 40. 12 U.S. Code § 5491, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5491 (accessed March 23, 2023). 41. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Bureau Structure,” last updated March 15, 2023, https://www. consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/bureau-structure/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 42. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Consumer Financial Civil Penalty Fund Rule,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/consumer-financial-civil-penalty-fund-rule/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 43. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Civil Penalty Fund: Consumer Education and Financial Literacy,” https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/payments-harmed-consumers/civil-penalty-fund/consumer- education-financial-literacy/ (accessed March 23, 2023). 44. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Opportunity Exists to Improve Transparency of Civil Penalty Fund Activities, GAO-14-551, June 2014, https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-14-551. pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 45. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), https://www.supremecourt.gov/ opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 46. Ibid., p. 37. 47. See 12 U.S. Code § 5497(a)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/5497 (accessed March 23, 2023). Congress specified that the amount transferred to the CFPB “shall not exceed” 12 percent “of the total operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System…in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.” Ibid., § 5497(2)(A)(iii). 48. Community Financial Services Association of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (5th Cir. 2022), pp. 31–32, https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-50826-CV0.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 49. Ibid., p. 32. 50. Ibid. (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 n. 8 (2020)). 51. U.S. Supreme Court, “Order List: 598 U.S.,” February 27, 2023, Docket No. 22–448, CFPB et al. v. Com. Fin. Services Assn., et al., https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022723zor_6537.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 52. Devin Watkins, Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Ripe for Reform,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Monetary Policy, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 9, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/BA/ BA20/20230309/115384/HHRG-118-BA20-Wstate-WatkinsD-20230309.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023); Norbert J. Michel, “7 Steps Next Director Can Take to Make the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Less Awful,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 28, 2018, https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/ commentary/7-steps-next-director-can-take-make-the-consumer-financial. 53. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve, and National Credit Union Administration. Those functions performed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) prior to Dodd–Frank should be transferred to the OCC since OTS has merged with OCC. 54. See “Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act” in David R. Burton, “Improving Small Business Access to Capital,” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Symposium on Section 1071 of the Dodd–Frank Act, Small Business Lending Panel, November 6, 2019, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_burton-written- statement_symposium-section-1071.pdf (accessed March 23, 2023). 55. 5 U.S. Code Chapter 5, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/part-I/chapter-5 (accessed March 23, 2023). 56. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Administrative Adjudication Proceedings,” https://www. consumerfinance.gov/administrative-adjudication-proceedings/ (accessed March 23, 2023), and 12 Code of Federal Regulations Part 1081—Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, https://www.law.cornell.edu/ cfr/text/12/part-1081 (accessed March 23, 2023). — 845 — 28 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Brendan Carr MISSION STATEMENT The FCC should promote freedom of speech, unleash economic opportunity, ensure that every American has a fair shot at next-generation connectivity, and enable the private sector to create good-paying jobs through pro-growth reforms that support a diversity of viewpoints, ensure secure and competitive communi- cations networks, modernize outdated infrastructure rules, and represent good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND The FCC is an independent regulatory agency that has jurisdiction over inter- state and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable.1 Five Commissioners are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for fixed five-year terms.2 The FCC does not have any other presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed officials. Ordinarily, the five-member FCC is divided politically three to two with a majority of Commissioners from the same political party as the President. The Commissioners’ terms are staggered so that every year at the end of June, one Commissioner’s term expires.3 However, a Commissioner can continue to serve until the end of the next session of Congress (or up to 1.5 years beyond the expiration of the term) if no replacement is confirmed after his or her term ends.4 By law, only a bare majority of Commissioners can be from the same politi- cal party (no more than three when there are five members).5 By tradition, the Chairperson resigns when a new President of a different political party is sworn
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Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.