The bill
SHARE Act of 2025
HR. 2332, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
Sponsored by
Rep. Mann, Tracey [R-KS-1]
ID: M000871
Follow the money
The bill
HR. 2332, 119th Congress — read as touching Law Enforcement & Surveillance Tech.
The sponsor
Every bill has someone who introduced it. That name is where the paper trail starts.
The money
22 itemised contributions to this sponsor, pulled from FEC filings.
The alignment
This bill's text tracks the "Intelligence Community" section, p. 254-256 of the Mandate for Leadership.
Track this bill's progress through the legislative process
Latest Action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 33 - 0.
June 24, 2026
📍 Current Status
Next: The bill will be reviewed by relevant committees who will debate, amend, and vote on it.
1. Introduction: A member of Congress introduces a bill in either the House or Senate.
2. Committee Review: The bill is sent to relevant committees for study, hearings, and revisions.
3. Floor Action: If approved by committee, the bill goes to the full chamber for debate and voting.
4. Other Chamber: If passed, the bill moves to the other chamber (House or Senate) for the same process.
5. Conference: If both chambers pass different versions, a conference committee reconciles the differences.
6. Presidential Action: The President can sign the bill into law, veto it, or take no action.
7. Became Law: If signed (or if Congress overrides a veto), the bill becomes law!
Another masterpiece of legislative theater, brought to you by the same geniuses who thought "affordable healthcare" was a thing.
**Main Purpose & Objectives**
The SHARE Act of 2025 is a bill that claims to facilitate the sharing of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history record information between states for the purpose of conducting background checks on individuals seeking licenses or privileges to practice an occupation or profession. Because, you know, it's not like we have more pressing issues to address.
**Key Provisions & Changes to Existing Law**
The bill amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by adding a new section that allows the FBI to share criminal history record information with state licensing authorities through an agreement with a state law enforcement agency or state identification bureau. Oh, and it also defines some terms, because who doesn't love a good game of legislative Calvinball?
The bill's proponents claim this will streamline the process for individuals seeking licenses across state lines. Yeah, right. It's not like we have a robust system in place already that allows states to share information. This is just a clever way to expand federal control over state licensing processes.
**Affected Parties & Stakeholders**
* State licensing authorities: They'll get to play with new toys and pretend they're doing something important. * Individuals seeking licenses: They might experience slightly less bureaucratic red tape, but let's be real, it's not like this bill will make a significant difference in their lives. * The FBI: They'll get to collect more data and expand their surveillance state. Yay!
**Potential Impact & Implications**
This bill is a Trojan horse for increased federal control over state licensing processes. It's a classic case of "mission creep," where the government slowly expands its reach under the guise of convenience or efficiency.
The real impact will be on individual liberties, as this bill further erodes the concept of state sovereignty and increases the power of the federal government to collect and share personal data. But hey, who needs privacy when you can have a slightly more efficient licensing process?
In conclusion, the SHARE Act of 2025 is a masterclass in legislative doublespeak, designed to obfuscate its true intentions behind a veil of bureaucratic jargon. It's a bill that promises to "streamline" processes while actually expanding federal control and eroding individual liberties. Bravo, Congress. You've done it again.
Rep. Mann, Tracey [R-KS-1]
Congress 119 • 2024 Election Cycle
No PAC contributions found
No committee contributions found
This bill has 10 cosponsors. Below are their top campaign contributors.
ID: N000191
Top Contributors
24
ID: L000578
Top Contributors
25
ID: D000230
Top Contributors
26
ID: C001120
Top Contributors
26
ID: N000147
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ID: M001204
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ID: G000546
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ID: B000825
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24
ID: M001157
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22
ID: B000740
Top Contributors
32
Hub layout: Politicians in center, donors arranged by type in rings around them.
Showing 32 nodes and 35 connections
Total contributions: $35
Showing top 19 donors by contribution amount
Which industries are materially affected by specific provisions in this bill. 3 helped, 1 harmed.
Section 2, Subtitle E: The bill allows State law enforcement agencies to access and share criminal history record information for the purpose of conducting background checks, which could enhance their ability to enforce laws and maintain public safety.
Section 2, Subtitle E: The bill restricts the sharing of criminal history record information, which could limit the ability of private prisons to access such information for their own purposes, potentially increasing their costs or administrative burdens.
Section 2, Subtitle E: The bill facilitates the sharing of criminal history record information for occupational licensing purposes, which could benefit labor unions by ensuring that workers are properly vetted and qualified for their jobs.
Section 2, Subtitle E: The bill's provisions on sharing criminal history record information could apply to teacher licensing and certification, potentially benefiting teachers' unions by helping to maintain high standards for educators.
This bill shows semantic similarity to the following sections of the Project 2025 policy document.AI-enhanced analysis provides detailed alignment ratings.
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt emphasize improving information sharing to enhance security and efficiency, and they include safeguards on use and accountability. However, the bill concerns FBI criminal history data for occupational licensing, while the Project 2025 policy focuses on intelligence community sharing of cyber threat intelligence and strategic analysis, resulting in only moderate thematic overlap."
— 221 — Intelligence Community influence and the FBI’s warnings about continued efforts through the 2022 mid- terms highlight the folly of undue certainty without consideration of alternatives. On election influence and other controversial issues, such as the origin of COVID-19, analysts at the most powerful intelligence agencies have increasingly tended to use the leeway they have been given to insert their political views into their work in order to influence (if possibly even control) the analytic process. They do this in ways that attempt to squash dissent and impair the creation of a culture in which entrenched views are challenged and unpopular analytical lines can sur- vive or not according to their merits. To help the United States and its leaders to outcompete China across mul- tifaceted societal, economic, military, and technological threats, the IC’s capability to conduct strategic intelligence analysis that is relevant to policymak- ers in both parties must be rebuilt and strengthened. Because Beijing may be a peer or even exceed U.S. capabilities in some areas, the post-9/11 analytic focus on quick-turnaround secrets is not good enough. Strategic planning—informed by intelligence—must take place for the United States to stay ahead of whatever new threats China may pose. An incoming conservative President will have the opportunity to signal the demand for such strategic products and prioritize their production through communications to intelligence leaders and formal mechanisms such as shifting priorities within the National Intelligence Priority Framework and structuring the President’s Daily Brief. The incoming DNI should also emphasize implementing the recommendations in the Ombudsman’s report, especially regarding objectiv- ity, the inclusion of dissenting viewpoints, and more serious efforts to hold senior leaders accountable for backchannel attempts to change or suppress analytic views. Accounting for the long history of intelligence failures and surprises, an incom- ing conservative President must appreciate the ambiguity, complexity, limits, and assumptions inherent in intelligence assessments. Intelligence often deals with the human dimension in complex decision systems within a foreign country or organi- zation, and this makes consistently accurate predictions difficult if not impossible to develop. Seeing something and understanding what you are seeing are two dif- ferent things, so a President should consistently and patiently press the IC about its potential biases, assumptions, methodology, and sourcing. With regard to election-threat analysis and politically controversial topics, agency leaders should take seriously the Ombudsman’s admonition that we need to maintain tradecraft standards across all countries and topics by ensuring that equitable standards apply across all foreign threat actors. Analysis should be put forward without regard to the domestic political ramifications of intelligence conclusions. “Obligation to Share” and Real-Time Auditing Capability. The fed- eral government has made admirable progress in recent years by being more — 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing
AI Analysis:
"Both the bill and the Project 2025 excerpt discuss mechanisms for sharing sensitive information across entities, but the bill concerns criminal history data for occupational licensing while the policy focuses on cyber threat intelligence sharing with the private sector and within the Intelligence Community, resulting only a tangential connection."
— 222 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise forward-leaning in sharing cyber threat intelligence with private-sector partners and the public, emphasizing that the protective nature of such information is of value only if put into the right hands at the right time. Since critical infrastructure and services are overwhelmingly owned, managed, and defended by the private sector in the United States, there has been an increasing emphasis on declassify- ing intelligence and sharing actionable information with private-sector partners, often through industry-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs); regional meetings of government and private-sector experts called InfraGard, run by the FBI; direct public notification from the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and (increasingly) the NSA; and more discreet one-on-one engagements led by the collecting agencies. These programs properly recognize the private sector’s role in providing cyber- security for Americans; in practice, however, the intelligence shared by the U.S. government through these venues is too often already known or no longer relevant by the time it makes its way through the downgrade process for sharing. In addition, government-shared information often needs to take advantage of the opportunity to provide contexts, such as attribution, trends, and size of the observed cyber problem. As warranted, additional context should be provided to the private sector as a matter of routine. To continue improving the U.S. government’s ability to defend the country’s most vital networks, the IC must adopt an “obligation to share” policy process, including the capacity for “write to release” intelligence products whereby newly discovered technical indicators, targeting, and other intelligence relevant to cyber defense are automatically provided either to the public or to targeted entities within 48 hours of their collection—which is how counterterrorism intel- ligence has been managed for years when it comes to a “duty to warn.” Under this policy, agency heads should still have the flexibility to withhold intelligence for operational or counterintelligence reasons but would need to report regularly to Congress on the number of and justification for exceptions. This policy would make sharing intelligence and defending networks the default, as it already is in the rest of the cybersecurity community outside the IC, to improve the quantity, relevance, and timeliness of defensive information while ensuring accountability for top leaders when they must withhold this information. One of the most significant challenges within the IC is presented by the need to share information promptly among the 18 elements of the intelligence enterprise. The only long-term solution to the understandable tension between the need to share information and the need to protect intelligence sources and methods is a robust real-time auditing capability that electronically flags unauthorized access. Under an identity management system with real-time audit, even the most sensi- tive information acquired by America’s intelligence agencies can be shared, and the access to and use of that information are appropriately monitored. Establishing — 223 — Intelligence Community a real-time auditing capability is essential to decreasing the risk for the heads of intelligence agencies in meeting their statutory requirements to ensure that they protect sources and methods associated with the classified information their agen- cies collect. Overclassification. There is broad consensus across the U.S. government and among stakeholders that the system for classifying, declassifying, and otherwise marking and handling sensitive information is at a crossroads. Exorbitant amounts of classified data are created daily, and agency personnel often mistakenly choose classification as the default selection to ensure national security. At the same time, the effectiveness of downgraded and carefully declassified information to support foreign policy efforts has been borne out in, for example, alerting the broader world of Russia’s buildup and likely plans for its invasion of Ukraine. Two executive orders principally govern how the U.S. government handles clas- sified and sensitive information. l Executive Order 13526, “Classified National Security Information,” issued in 2009,38 prescribes the classification levels and procedures for declassification. l Executive Order 13556, “Controlled Unclassified Information,” issued in 2010,39 aimed to establish a uniform program for managing all unclassified information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls. The current system for declassifying classified national security information (CNSI) is extraordinarily analog, requiring experts’ review of individual records. Declassification policies are based on human review of paper and need to con- template and handle the proliferation and volume of digital records created by agencies. The U.S. government will soon reach the point at which manual review is impossible. The declassification of CNSI should support key U.S. national security objectives, reflect mission priorities, and not serve solely as a necessary procedural function. Reforms should include: l Tighter definitions and greater specificity for categories of information requiring protection. l More stringent policies to effect significant reductions in the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCAs). l Stricter accountability measures at the OCA level and more detailed security classification guides.
AI Analysis:
"The SHARE Act focuses on interstate sharing of FBI criminal history data for occupational licensing background checks, which does not directly align with the Project 2025 Executive Office of the President section's emphasis on federalism, regulatory reform, privacy protections, or reducing unfunded mandates. While both involve federal-state coordination and data sharing, the bill's narrow scope on law enforcement information exchange lacks clear connection to the broader administrative and const"
— 66 — Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise 17. President William J. Clinton, Executive Order 13132, “Federalism,” August 4, 1999, in Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 153 (August 10, 1999), pp. 43255–43259, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1999-08-10/pdf/99- 20729.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 18. President Ronald Reagan, Executive Order 12630, “Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights,” March 15, 1988, in Federal Register, Vol. 53, No. 53 (March 18, 1988), pp. 8859–8862, https://www.regulationwriters.com/downloads/Executive_Orders/EO_12630.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 19. Section 115 in H.R. 4577, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Public Law No. 106-544, 106th Congress, December 21, 2000, https://www.congress.gov/106/plaws/publ554/PLAW-106publ554.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 20. 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Biden Jr., Executive Order 14020, “Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council,” March 8, 2021, in Federal Register, Vol. 86, No. 46 (March 11, 2021), pp. 13797–13801, https://www. govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-03-11/pdf/2021-05183.pdf (accessed January 31, 2023). 42. U.S. Constitution, Amendment XXV, https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/amendmentxxv (accessed March 9, 2023). 43. 50 U.S.C. § 3021(c)(1), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3021 (accessed March 9, 2023). 44. 20 U.S.C. § 20(a), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/42#:~:text=The%20business%20of%20the%20 Institution%20shall%20be%20conducted,no%20two%20of%20them%20of%20the%20same%20State (accessed March 9, 2023). 45. Vice Presidents Gerald Ford and Lyndon Johnson assumed (Ford) or initially assumed (Johnson) the office of the presidency by a process of succession.
Showing 3 of 5 policy matches
Policy matches are calculated using a hybrid approach: initial candidates are found using semantic similarity between bill summaries and Project 2025 policy text, then an AI model (Llama 3.1 70B) provides detailed alignment ratings and analysis. Ratings range from 1 (minimal alignment) to 5 (very strong alignment). This analysis does not imply direct causation or intent.